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Relying on a constructivist framework of analysis drawn from the disciplines of 
Philosophy, Religious Studies, and History, this thesis examines the contribution of 
Victorian poetry and poetic theory to the modern construction of ‘mysticism’ as an 
aesthetic and ineffable category. My analysis is guided by the Foucaultian notion that 
any definition of a given concept reflects issues of authority, which I use to propose 
that, in the increasingly secularized milieu of nineteenth-century culture, many 
Victorian intellectuals sought to assert the ineffability and aesthetic character of 
mysticism as part of a larger nineteenth-century search for an authoritative place for 
poetry. With a special focus on the writings of Thomas Carlyle and James Thomson (B. 
V.), the problematization of mysticism I offer here spans the period between the mid-
1820s and 1880s, a relatively broad context that allows me to draw connections among 
various poets, critics and their works, and weave these into a readable narrative where 
mysticism figures as a key player in the collective aesthetic consciousness of an age. 
Chapter I of this thesis establishes the conceptual and theoretical parameters of 
the debate informing the constructivist method I employ, with the aim of offering a 
critique of previous literary scholarship on Victorian poetry that adopts mysticism as a 
primary analytic category. I argue that such scholarship largely bases its analysis on 
essentialist definitions, and often ends up being ideologically exclusionary. Chapter II 
provides a detailed look at the conceptual overlap between mysticism and poetry in both 
Modernist and Victorian discourse for the purpose of establishing that modern 
mysticism is fundamentally a poetic and aesthetic construct, one that was shaped by the 
nineteenth-century discourse on poetry and art. Situating Carlyle’s discourse on 
mysticism within that of other contemporary figures, Chapter III examines his leading 
role in the nineteenth-century conceptual transformation of ‘mysticism’ from a term that 
was pejoratively used to signify ‘unintelligibility’ to one that was used to denote the 
transcendental legitimacy of poetry. Chapter IV traces Thomson’s career-long 
engagement with mysticism along his religious and intellectual development from a 
theist to a self-proclaimed atheist, arguing that it reflects on a larger scale the history of 
mysticism’s development in the second half of the Victorian age: how its Romantic 
appropriation in the mid-nineteenth century was especially freighted with religious 
meanings, and how this would gradually change at the turn of the century, where it 
would become more open to secular and naturalistic interpretations.   
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In T. S. Eliot: Mystic, Son and Lover, Donald Childs argues that ‘in response to the 
scientific, materialist rationalism of the nineteenth century, the variety of phenomena 
gathered into the term “mysticism” at the beginning of the twentieth century offered 
an alternative epistemology – opposing the material with the spiritual, the intellectual 
with the intuitive, the external with the internal’. ‘A tide of mysticism’, Childs states, 
‘was coming in after the ebbing of Arnold’s Sea of Faith’, and the century was 
witnessing a general diffusion of the taste for it: as ‘an alternative epistemology’, it 
appealed to many philosophers, including Henri Bergson and William James; to 
several Roman Catholic and Anglican theologians; and to a wide variety of poets, 
including T. S. Eliot, Ezra Pound, William Butler Yeats, the Georgian poet Rupert 
Brooke, as well as the Imagists Richard Aldington and John Gould Fletcher. 
According to Childs, ‘mystical experience seems as important to these ostensible 
modern poets as it was to such romantic precursors as Wordsworth and Shelley’.1 A 
somewhat similar view has been articulated in The Beginning and End of ‘Religion’ 
by religious historian Nicholas Lash, whose genealogical account of the term 
‘mysticism’ suggests that ‘the word flared up’ at the onset of the seventeenth century, 
and ‘flourished for little more than half a century, then died away’ until the early 
modernist period, where ‘it became the focus of intense discussion’.2 The similarity 
between the two views lies in the fact that both Childs and Lash construe most of the 
nineteenth century as constituting a period marked by a discontinuity in the kind of 
intellectual fervour for mysticism that characterized the periods that both predate and 
follow it. The only difference is that Childs frames this gap along the customary 
temporal bounds of the Victorian era, whereas Lash extends its beginning back to the 
second half of the seventeenth century. 
 Donald Childs’s argument demonstrates, in fact, the traditional critical trend in 
Modernist studies that has been increasingly coming under question for its conception 
of Modernism as representing an essential break from Victorianism. A growing body 
of scholarship in Victorian and Modernist Studies alike is now drawing attention to 
																																																								
1 Donald J. Childs, T. S. Eliot: Mystic, Son and Lover (London: Bloomsbury, 1997), pp. 2-4. 
2 Nicholas Lash, The Beginning and the End of ‘Religion’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 167. 
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how such a view has ‘fetishized’ an ‘ideology of rupture and opposition’ in its 
depiction of the cultural and aesthetic transition between the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. With its aim to  ‘suture’ the long-held ‘Victorian/Modernist divide’, this 
revisionary perspective particularly faults the traditional view for ‘overemphasizing’ 
Modernist ‘innovation in ways that elide the contributions of Victorian predecessors’.3 
As Leigh Schmidt has proposed in ‘The Making of Modern “Mysticism”’, moreover, 
the tendency to underestimate the cultural legacies of the nineteenth century to the 
twentieth is also a problem in the historicist strand in Religious Studies. It can be 
particularly felt in the cultural constructivist works of religious scholars investigating 
the historical development of mysticism as a modern construct, of which Nicholas 
Lash’s analysis is one example. Reviewing this literature, Schmidt points out that such 
studies have overwhelmingly focused on the cultural dynamics of the ‘boom’ of 
academic and popular interest in mysticism at the beginning of the twentieth century, 
rarely ‘taking seriously’ its indebtedness to the religious and intellectual world of the 
preceding era.4 This is to say that the majority of religious scholars in this line of 
research have done one of two things: they have either remained silent on the 
Victorians’ role in the modern construction of the mystical, implying its 
insignificance; or they have declared, as Lash has done, that the Western interest in 
mysticism – which can be traced back to an early period in its intellectual history – 
laid dormant during the nineteenth century, until its revival at the hands of Modernist 
philosophers, religionists and aesthetes.  
 But any serious estimation of the nineteenth-century’s relationship to 
																																																								
3 Lisi Schoenbach, Pragmatic Modernism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. xiv; ‘Call for 
Papers: Making It New: Victorian and Modernist Literature and Periodicals 1875-1935 Conference, 28 
February 2015, Leicester, United Kingdom’, in British Association for Modernist Studies, ed. by 
Deborah Mutch, (De Montfort University, 15 Oct 2014) <http://bams.ac.uk> [accessed 10 February 
2016]; and ‘Call for Papers: Beyond the Victorian and Modernist Divide Conference, 27-28 March 
2014, Normandy, France’, in British Association for Modernist Studies, ed. by Anne Besnault-Levita 
and Anne-Florence Gillard Estrada, (Rouen University, 20 June 2013) <http://bams.ac.uk> [accessed 
10 February 2016]. For other examples that belong to this literature, see Jessica R. Feldman, Victorian 
Modernism: Pragmatism and the Varieties of Aesthetic Experience (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002); Adam Piette, ‘Modernist Victorianism’, in The Oxford Handbook of Victorian Poetry, ed. 
by Matthew Bevis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 273-90; H. M. Dalesky, ‘Thomas 
Hardy: A Victorian Modernist?’, in The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and New 
Perspectives, ed. by Lawrence Besserman (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 179-96; Elizabeth Miller, 
Slow Print: Literary Radicalism and Late Victorian Print Culture (Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 2013), p. 7; and ‘Call for Papers: The Oak and the Acorns: Recovering the Hidden Carlyle 
Conference, 6-8 July 2016, Oxford, United Kingdom’, in British Association for Modernist Studies, ed. 
by Marylu Hill and Paul E. Kerry, (TORCH, 6 January 2016) <http://bams.ac.uk> [accessed 10 
February 2016] 
4 Leigh Schmidt, ‘The Making of Modern “Mysticism”’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 
71.2 (2003), 273-302 (p. 273, 275), hereafter ‘MMM’. 
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mysticism would reveal that, despite the fact that the mystical seemed anathema to 
some of the dominant modes of Victorian thought and culture, the century proved to 
be one of the most fertile grounds in which an interest in mysticism would take root 
and flourish. This is why a writer in The Fortnightly Review would state in 1884 that 
‘I shall seem to many readers to utter a paradox if I say that one of the most 
remarkable notes of this nineteenth century is its mysticism’.5 Remarkable it was, 
indeed, and it resounded far and wide. Be it in the most intimate (or even casual) 
correspondences of the period’s writers, or their more rigorous intellectual 
expositions, one can hardly miss the imprint of an interest in mysticism that had 
preoccupied some of the most eminent minds of the century. It is there, for instance, 
in the ‘ecstasies’ reported by Elizabeth Barrett Browning upon receiving her first 
letter from the ‘king of the mystics’, the title she gave to Robert Browning, who, on 
his part, would later attest to ‘the mystical part’ of his love for her in one of their 
famous letters of courtship.6 It is also there in reports relating to ‘the vexed question 
of the Carlyle domestic relations’, which mention how Browning – siding with 
Thomas Carlyle – was often delighted to tell the ‘little anecdote’ of ‘the deep offence 
he had given Mrs. Carlyle’ for ‘absently’ placing a ‘smoking kettle’ on her new 
hearth-rug: the embarrassing incident, we are told, occurred while he was ‘excitedly 
explaining some point of mystical philosophy’. 7  Intimations of the Victorian 
preoccupation with mysticism are likewise there in the ‘The Holy Grail’ Idyll (1869) 
of Lord Alfred Tennyson, who, we have it on record, had ‘dwelt on the mystical 
treatment of every part of his subject’ while discussing the poem on more than one 
occasion.8 This preoccupation is also why even a philosopher like John Stuart Mill, so 
																																																								
5 W. S. Lilly, ‘Modern Mysticism’, Fortnightly Review, 36 (1 September 1884), 292-308 (p. 292). 
6 Elizabeth Barrett Browning, The Letters of Elizabeth Barrett Browning: Edited with Biogrphical 
Additions, ed. by Frederic G. Kenyon, 2 vols (London: Macmillan, 1897), I, p. 236; and Robert 
Browning, The Love-Letters of Robert Browning and Elizabeth Barrett, ed. by V. E. Stack (Heinemann: 
London, 1969), p. 73. See also my reference to two of Thomas Carlyle’s love letters to his wife on p. 
103. 
7 Alexandra Sutherland Orr, Life and Letters of Robert Browning, 2 vols (New York: Houghton, 
Mifflin, 1891), II, p. 531; Anne Ritchie, Records of Tennyson, Ruskin, Browning (New York: Harpers 
& Brothers, 1893), pp. 156-7; G. K. Chesterton, English Men of Letters: Robert Browning (London: 
Macmillan, 1919), pp. 26-27; Rosaline Orme Masson, Poets, Patriots, and Lovers: Sketches and 
Memories of Famous People (London: James Clarke, 1933), p. 30; and Robert Browning, More Than 
Friend: The Letters of Robert Browning to Katharine De Kay Bronson (Waco, TX: Armstrong 
Browning Library of Baylor University, 1985), pp. 168-9. For an account of how Browning’s relation 
to Jane Welsh Carlyle was never ‘a happy one’, which also mentions this incident, see Charles Richard 
Sanders, ‘The Carlyle-Browning Correspondence and Relationship’, The Bulletin of the John Rylands 
University Library of Manchester, 57.1 (autumn 1974), 213-46 (pp. 223-5).  
8 On one occasion, as mentioned in a report by Hallam Tennyson (part of which I quote above), we 
learn that Tennyson indulged in a long discussion on the mysticism of the poem, pointing out ‘the 
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closely associated with the positivist utilitarianism of the century, would earn the 
reputation of being ‘a mystic’.9  
  This thesis intervenes in the on-going critical conversation that seeks to 
highlight ‘the existence of overlaps and unexplored continuities’ between the 
Victorian and Modernist periods, with the overall aim of complicating the ‘narrative’ 
of Modernism as marking an innovative break from the aesthetics and ideologies of 
the nineteenth-century.10 The area of overlap or continuity that I should like to cast 
some light on is in the two periods’ notions of mysticism, but this, needless to say, is a 
vast topic. Relying on a constructivist framework of analysis drawn from 
philosophical and religious disciplines, I am particularly interested in examining the 
contribution of Victorian poetry and poetic theory to the modern construction of 
mysticism as an aesthetic and ineffable category. The main thrust of my argument is 
based on the Foucaultian notion that any definition of a given concept (in this case, 
mysticism) reflects issues of authority. I use this to propose that, in a world where 
long-revered religious beliefs and institutions were gradually being eroded by the 
secular forces of scientific materialism, many Victorian intellectuals sought to 
aestheticize mysticism and/or assert its ineffability as part of a larger nineteenth-
century search for an authoritative place for poetry. Arguments about the nineteenth-
century’s post-Romantic conceptions of what poetry was doing and the kind of 
knowledge it hoped to create are, I acknowledge, nothing new to the field of Victorian 
																																																																																																																																																															
difference between the five visions of the grail, as seen by the holy Nun, Sir Galahad, Sir Percival, Sir 
Lancelot, Sir Bors’. Another occasion is reported by James Knowles in his account of how the idea of 
the Metaphysical Society was proposed by Tennyson on 13 November 1868, following a long 
discussion on the mystical aspects of ‘The Holy Grail’: 
While King Arthur was being so much and so frequently discussed between us the 
mystical meanings of the Poem led to almost endless talk on speculative metaphysical 
subjects – God – the Soul – free will – Necessity – Matter and spirit – and all the circle of 
Metaphysical enquiry. Tennyson said how good it would be if such subjects could be 
argued and debated by capable men in the manner and with the machinery of the learned 
Societies. 
See Hallam Tennyson, Alfred Lord Tennyson: A Memoir by His Son, 2 vols (New York: Greenwood 
Press, 1969), II, p. 63; and The Letters of Alfred Lord Tennyson, ed. by Cecil Y. Lang, and Edgar F. 
Shannon Jr., 2 vols (Oxford: Clarendon Press, II (1987), p. 517. 
9 William D. Gairdner, ‘Poetry and the Mystique of the Self in John Stuart Mill: Sources of Libertarian 
Socialism’, Humanitas, 21 (2008), 9-33 (p. 19). 
10 My use in this thesis of such traditional terms of periodization as ‘Victorian’ and ‘Modernist’ is a 
tentative one, therefore. It is informed by this growing interest in ‘the problematics of periodization’, 
one that particularly seeks to emphasize the ‘cultural and aesthetic complexities’ that characterize the 
transition from the nineteenth to the twentieth century, acknowledging the ways in which they 
‘dovetailed and overlapped’: ‘CFP: Beyond the Victorian and Modernist Divide Conference’, in BAMS, 
ed. by Besnault-Levita and Estrada  <http://bams.ac.uk> [accessed 10 February 2016]; ‘CFP: Making It 
New Conference’, in BAMS, ed. by Deborah Mutch <http://bams.ac.uk> [accessed 10 February 2016]; 
and Lawrence Besserman, ed., ‘Introduction’, in The Challenge of Periodization: Old Paradigms and 
New Perspectives (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. xi-xxiv (p. xi). 
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Studies. What I propose is new, however, because my discussion primarily intends to 
underscore how the period’s post-Romantic definitions of mysticism were a 
constitutive discourse in nineteenth-century formulations of poetic theory, and this 
whilst also seeking to indicate the significant role played by Victorian poets and 
critics in the formation of mysticism as a modern category that still persists today.  
 Mysticism as a subject of enquiry is a capacious one, and any study that 
incorporates it as an analytic category must acknowledge the fact that it may be 
impossible to limit it in a systematic way. I agree with William Harmless that, as far 
as the phenomenon called ‘mysticism’ is concerned, epistemological certainty is 
impossible, and that ‘formulating a coherent and convincing theory of mystical 
experience is singularly daunting’. 11  This introduction will delimit as much as 
possible what I mean by mysticism, and, in doing so, ultimately aims to offer a 
critique of previous, non-constructivist literary-critical research that has explored the 
question of mysticism in relation to Victorian poetry. I believe this is a useful 
undertaking, as it would allow me to point out one of the profound and enduring 
difficulties in much of the literary scholarship that engages with this category, as well 
as to make some suggestive remarks on how it may be rectified.  
I begin my discussion with a few notes on the difficulty of defining mysticism, 
leading to an overview of the essentialist and constructivist definitions, which together 
constitute the dominant debate in scholarly studies attempting to define this category, 
especially in the fields of Philosophy and Religious Studies. Following this is a review 
of previous research on the cultural construction of mysticism, a substantial section 
that broadly traces the category’s discursive history from its earliest use in the mystery 
cults of Graeco-Roman culture to its essentialist definition in the twentieth century. 
This is done in order to draw attention to mysticism’s historical instability as a 
conceptual category, paying special attention to how the various transformations in its 
meaning through history correspond to changes in sociohistorical structures of power 
that are deeply implicated in issues of culture and ideology. In addition to providing a 
better understanding of the study’s key term, this genealogical sketch is also meant to 
lay the groundwork for my research, given that my analysis of the Victorian context 
is, in part, an attempt to contribute an additional building block in the reconstruction 
of mysticism’s genealogy. Reviewing previous constructivist work done in this area, 
																																																								
11 William Harmless, Mystics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 258. 
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therefore, including that conducted in literary studies, will help in articulating the 
scope of the research gap I intend to fill. This is not to mention that this genealogical 
account is also useful in highlighting the fact that mysticism was not always defined 
in the experiential and psychological terms that were used to characterize it at the turn 
of the twentieth century, and that its modern essentialist definition is ‘only one in a 
series of social constructions of mysticism; and, like the others, is implicitly bound up 
with issues of authority’.12 This is significant for my critique of previous literary 
scholarship on Victorian poetry that adopts mysticism as a primary analytic category, 
because I argue that this scholarship largely bases its analysis on essentialist 
definitions, and often ends up being ideologically exclusionary. The final part of the 
introduction provides a brief discussion of the theoretical assumptions underpinning 
the constructivist method I employ in my analysis, and an outline of the scope and 
structure of the thesis, the latter of which includes a rationale for my choice of the two 
main writers around which my discussion of other writers will revolve.  
1. What is Mysticism? 
Brian Bocking, a contemporary scholar in the study of religions, has not long ago 
noted how a colleague of his joked to him that a more appropriate spelling of 
‘Mysticism’ would be ‘Mistycism’, reflecting, as Bocking suggests, ‘a general 
scpeticism about rational efforts to clarify such a topic’.13 Indeed, the opinion that 
‘mysticism’ is an intrinsically ambiguous and slippery term is something that has been 
variously reiterated in the scholarly literature that has attempted to grapple with the 
problem of defining it. In 1978, for instance, Louis Dupré argued that ‘mysticism’ 
resists straightforward definition because it had developed into an umbrella term to 
designate a wide array of religious phenomena: ‘No definition could be both 
meaningful and sufficiently comprehensive to include all experiences that, at some 
point or other, have been described as mystical’.14 Dean Inge stated the case more 
strongly in Christian Mysticism (1899) to include other aspects of the term’s meaning: 
																																																								
12 Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1995), p. 12, hereafter PGCM. 
13 ‘Mysticism: No Experience Necessary?’, in Diskus 7, ed. by, (BASR: British Association for the 
Study of Religions, 2006) <http://basr.open.ac.uk/diskus/bocking.htm> [accessed 25 September 2015]  
14 ‘Mysticism’, in The Encyclopedia of Religion, ed. by Mircea Eliade, 16 vols (New York: Macmillan, 
1987), X, pp. 245-61 (p. 245). 
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No word in our language – not even ‘Socialism’ – has been 
employed more loosely than ‘Mysticism.’ Sometimes it is used as an 
equivalent for symbolism or allegorism, sometimes for theosophy or 
occult science; and sometimes it merely suggests the mental state of 
a dreamer, or vague and fantastic opinions about God and the 
world.15 
This is what William Harmless has recently dubbed the term’s ‘conceptual 
hyperinflation’, particularly contending that ‘its currency value has spiraled out of 
control’,16 which echoes the following words of an 1896 unsigned essay in the 
Edinburgh Review: 
There are certain terms of general classification that seem 
predestined to breed confusion in criticism and thought; and among 
these the term Mysticism might be almost considered one of the 
most pre-eminently bewildering. […] The epithet, indeed, is one of 
those of which the significance embraces such varying 
characteristics that no dictionary can keep pace with the subtle 
developments it is perpetually acquiring.17 
To highlight this definitional impasse, moreover, Josiah Moses declared in 1906 that 
the term ‘has almost as many different definitions as it has definers. We look in vain 
for agreement as to its meaning’.18 This conveys something of the meaning of Frank 
Whaling’s argument in 1985 that ‘mystical theory has become a minefield of 
conflicting interpretations’.19 Nonetheless, despite the breadth and incongruities of the 
term’s semantic field, it is safe to say that the views that have largely dominated the 
academic study of ‘mysticism’ from the turn of the twentieth century onwards can be 
classified into two broad theoretical schools: the essentialist, and the constructivist.20  
																																																								
15 Christian Mysticism (London: Methuen, 1899), p. 3. 
16 William Harmless, Mystics, p. 260. 
17 Schmidt, ‘MMM’ (p. 276). 
18 Pathological Aspects of Religions (Westchester, MA: Clark University Press, 1906), p. 69. 
19  Frank Whaling, ed., ‘Comparative Approaches to the Study of Religion’, in Contemporary 
Approaches to the Study of Religion: The Humanities, 2 vols (New York: Mouton, 1984), I, pp. 165-
296 (p. 278). 
20 Other popular but less influential theories are those that seek to provide a naturalistic explanation of 
the experiences reported by mystics, the conclusions of which are vigorously debated, with one group 
of scholars relying on them as a way of explaining away religious experiences, and another arguing that 
they are not incompatible with the veridicality of the mystical. These explanations come from a variety 
of disciplinary quarters, including neuroscience, psychoanalysis, socio-biology and psychology. For 
some of the most prominent literature on the subject, see William Alston, Perceiving God (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); James Austin, Zen and the Brain: Toward an Understanding of 
Meditation and Consciousness (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); C. Daniel and Ventis Batson, W. 
Larry, The Religious Experience: A Social-Psychological Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University 
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2. Essentialist Theories of Mysticism 
An essentialist theory of mysticism – also known as the ‘common-core’, ‘perennialist’ 
or ‘universalist’ perspective – holds that there is a universal essence that pervades all 
mystical experiences across time periods and world traditions, and irrespective of 
linguistic, cultural or creedal differences. The proponents of this position argue that 
any variation in the reports given by mystics owes merely to the different 
interpretations that are placed upon the mystical experience, and not to the nature of 
the experience, which is the same everywhere and at all times. They explain that, 
during a mystical experience, the phenomenon itself is unmediated by the cultural 
categories and subjective biases of the individual undergoing the experience, but that, 
later, at the post-experiential stage of describing the mystical event, the individual will 
interpret it according to the expectations and norms of his/her own background. A 
Hindu will, therefore, speak of it in terms compatible with Hinduism, a Christian in 
terms compatible with Christianity, a Sufi with Sufism, and so on. Implicit in this is 
the belief that there is such a thing as a pure, contentless mystical state of 
consciousness (disengaged from all linguistic and conceptual categories), and that, to 
get to its true essence, it is the task of the religious scholar to ‘strip’ the mystic’s 
account of any post-experiential interpretation that he/she may have applied to it.21 
																																																																																																																																																															
Press, 1982); Kenneth Dewhurst, and Beard, A.W., ‘Sudden Religious Conversions in Temporal Lobe 
Epilepsy’, British Journal of Psychiatry, 117 (1970), 497–507; Eugene G. D’Aquili and Andrew 
Newberg, ‘Religious and Mystical States: A Neuropsychological Model’, Zygon, 28 (1993), 177–200, 
The Mystical Mind: Probing the Biology of Religious Experience (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1999), 
and ‘The Neuropsychology of Aesthetic, Spiritual, and Mystic States’, Zygon, 35 (2000), 39–51; Evan 
Fales, ‘Scientific Explanations of Mystical Experiences, Part I: The Case of St. Teresa’, and ‘Part II: 
The Challenge to Theism’, Religious Studies, 32 (1996), 143-163, and 297-313; Peter Fenwick, ‘The 
Neurophysiology of Religious Experiences’, in Psychiatry and Religion: Context, Consensus, and 
Controversies, ed. by Dinesh Bhugra (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 167–177; John Heaney, Psyche 
and Spirit (NY: Paulist Press, 1973); R. W. Hood, Jr., ‘Mysticism, Reality, Illusion and the Freudian 
Critique of Religion’, International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 2 (1992), 141-159, ‘The 
Empirical Study of Mysticism’, in The Psychology of Religion, ed. by B. Spilka and others (Boulder, 
CO: Westview Press, 1997), and Dimensions of Mystical Experience: Empiritcal Studies and 
Psychological Links (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2001); Jeff Jordan, ‘Religious Experience and Naturalistic 
Explanations’, Religious Studies, 17 (1991), 158-64; Philip Kitcher, Vaulting Ambition: Sociobiology 
and the Quest for Human Nature (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1985); Patrick McNamara, ed., Where God 
and Science Meet: The Psychology of Religious Experience (London: Praeger, 2006); Kai Nielsen, 
‘Naturalism and Religion: Must Naturalistic Explanation Explain Religion Away?’, Philo, 1 (1998), 45-
62; W. B. Parsons, The Enigma of the Oceanic Feeling: Revisioning the Psychoanalytic Theory of 
Mysticism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Michael Persinger, Neuropsychological Bases of 
God Beliefs (New York: Praeger, 1987); William Wainwright, ‘Natural Explanations and Religious 
Experience’, Ratio, 15 (1973), 98-101, and Mysticism: A Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value, and 
Moral Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981); David M. Wulff, ‘Mystical 
Experience’, in Varieties of Anomalous Experience: Examining the Scientific Evidence, ed. by Etzel 
Cardena and others (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2000), pp. 397–440. 
21 Harmless, Mystics, p. 255. 
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The American philosopher and psychologist William James – son of Swedenborgian 
theologian Henry James, Sr., and brother of novelist Henry James – is considered a 
seminal figure in the development of this position, particularly for his influential book 
The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). Other key figures include Evelyn 
Underhill (1912/1920), Rudolf Otto (1917), Aldous Huxley (1946), R. C. Zaehner 
(1957), W. T. Stace (1960), Mircea Eliade (1957), Ninian Smart, and Robert Forman 
(1990/1998/2000).22  
In order to do justice to the complexities of the debate within this camp, it 
important to note that, beyond a certain point of agreement, these scholars have 
differed on several fronts. In terms of the goal of the mystical experience, for 
example, some have contended that it is the direct encounter or union with a Divine 
principle (Underhill, 1912; Otto, 1857; Zaehner, 1957), while others have defined it as 
attaining a spiritual state of ‘undifferentiated unity’ (Stace, 1960), or as merely being 
the subject of a ‘pure consciousness event’ (Forman, 1990/1999). On the question of 
the core characteristics of mysticism, moreover, we find a clear case of disparity 
between the ones listed in William James’s definition (‘ineffability’, ‘noetic quality’, 
‘transiency’ and ‘passivity’) and those identified by Rudolf Otto (‘creature feeling’, 
‘awfulness’, ‘overpoweringness’, and ‘energy’ or ‘urgency’), and this is to name but 
one example. There has also been disagreement on whether or not there can really be 
only one ‘core’ experience underlying the various accounts of mystics the world over, 
with some scholars arguing for two types (or more), as in Stace’s differentiation 
between an ‘introvertive’ and ‘extrovertive’ mysticism, or Zaehner’s threefold model 
																																																								
22  For their most significant contributions toward advancing this ‘common-core’ approach to 
mysticism, see Evelyn Underhill, Mysticism: A Study in the Nature and Development of Man’s 
Spiritual Consciousness, 4th edn (New York: P. Dutton, 1912), and The Essentials of Mysticism and 
Other Essays (London: Dent & Sons, 1920); Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy. trans. by John W. 
Harvey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923; repr. 1958 [German original 1917]); Aldous Huxley, 
The Perennial Philosophy (London: Chatto & Windus, 1946; repr. 1947); R. C. Zaehner, Mysticism 
Sacred and Profane: An Inquiry into Some Vareities of Praeternatural Experience (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1957); Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. trans. by W. R. 
Trask (New York: Harcourt, 1957); W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy (London: Macmillan, 
1960); Ninian Smart, The Science of Religion and the Sociology of Knowledge: Some Methodological 
Questions (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1973), and ‘Interpretation and Mystical Experience’, 
in Understanding Mysticism, ed. by R. Woods (London: Athlone Press, 1980), pp. 78-91; as well as 
Robert K. C. Forman, ed., The Problem of Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990), ‘Introduction: Mystical Consciousness, the Innate Capacity, and the 
Perennial Philosophy’, in The Innate Capacity: Mysticism, Psychology, and Philosophy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 3-42, his ‘Mystical Knowledge: Knowledge by Identity’, Journal 
of the American Academy of Religion, 61.4 (1993), 705-738, and Mysticism, Mind, Consciousness 
(New York: State University of New York Press, 1999).  
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of mystical phenomena (the ‘theistic’, the ‘monistic’, and the ‘panenhenic’). 23 
However, it is key to bear in mind that, notwithstanding all their differences, these 
scholars do have one overriding attribute in common, and that is how they eschew 
placing any importance on the historical and socio-political contexts of mystical texts, 
believing that these should not distract us from recognizing the substantial 
commonalities behind the mystics’ multiform expressions of their experiences.  
3. Constructivist Theories of Mysticism 
While it can be fairly said that the essentialist paradigm had exercised an almost 
undisturbed hegemony over the academic study of mysticism for six decades since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, in the mid-1960s, it came under intense and 
repeated critical scrutiny. It is particularly in the wake of Greshom Scholem’s studies 
of the culturally specific aspects of Jewish mysticism in the late 60s and early 70s24 
that critics of essentialism found themselves hovering on the cusp of the paradigm 
shift that was to be set in motion by the 1978 publication of Mysticism and 
Philosophical Analysis, a collection of essays edited by Steven Katz, a student of 
Scholem.25 The shift would be toward constructivism, which has since been a staple of 
theoretical investigations of mysticism in the field of Religious Studies, leading to the 
gradual decline in the status of the perennialist model. It is necessary to note, though, 
that the constructivist discourse on religious experience came in two waves, the first 
of which was philosophical in it emphasis, while the second – and now the more 
popular of the two – focuses on the socio-political aspects of the subject under study.26 
3.1. The First Wave 
The constructivist – also referred to as the ‘contextualist’ or ‘linguistic’ – turn in the 
philosophical study of mysticism arose in reaction to the long-held essentialist thesis 
																																																								
23 Robert H. Sharf, ‘The Rhetoric of Experience and the Study of Religion’, Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, 7.11–12 (2000), 267–87 (pp. 269-70). 
24 See, for example, Gershom Scholem, On the Kabbalah and Its Symbolism. trans. by R. Manheim 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1969); and ‘The Name of God and the Lingustic Theory of the Kabbala: 
Part 1’, Diogenes, 79 (1972), 59-80, and ‘Part 2’, Diogenes, 80 (1972), 164-94, all of which extend and 
develop the discussions on mysticism proposed in his much earlier Major Trends in Jewish Mysticism 
(New York: Schocken Books, 1941). 
25  Louis Komjathy, ed., ‘Approaching Contemplative Practice’, in Contemplative Literature: A 
Comparative Sourcebook on Meditation and Contemplative Prayer (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2015), 
pp. 3-51 (pp. 14-5). 
26 Benjamin Y. Fong, ‘On Critics and What’s Real: Russell Mccutcheon on Religious Experience’, 
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 82.4 (2014), 1127–1148 (p. 1128).  
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that mystical experiences are fundamentally transcultural, trans-historical and trans-
linguistic. Steven Katz’s emphatic contention that ‘there are NO pure (i.e. 
unmediated) experiences’27 is the central epistemological plank of this approach, 
whose early leading theorists also include Robert Gimello (1978), Hans Penner 
(1983), Wayne Proudfoot (1985), and Philip Almond (1982).28 Influenced by the 
change in the philosophical climate that produced the linguistically-oriented works of 
Bertrand Russell, Martin Heidegger, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Michel Foucault and 
Jacques Derrida,29 the constructivists stress – in diverse ways and to various degrees – 
‘the significance of public language over private experience in the study of religion’,30 
and how mysticism should be interpreted ‘in context, or rather in many overlapping 
contexts – historical, literary, religious, theological’.31 They are unanimous in their 
belief that a mystical experience should not be accorded a special, sui generis32 status, 
arguing that all experiences (and mystical ones are no exception) are inevitably 
shaped by the language, culture and psychological background of the experiencer. 
Accordingly, constructivists reject the essentialist premise that linguistic and 
contextual elements only influence the way individuals interpret a mystical 
phenomenon post-experientially, proposing instead that these elements also play a 
formative role in shaping the experience while it is taking place. This means that 
variations in the accounts given by mystics in different times and places are 
understood to reflect, not merely a difference of interpretation, but a difference in the 
actual experience, so that a Hindu mystical experience, for example, is believed to be 
																																																								
27  Steven Katz, ed., ‘Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism’, in Mysticism and Philosophical 
Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 22-74 (p. 26). Emphasis is from the original. 
Unless otherwise noted in this thesis, all forms of emphasis in quoted texts are from the original.  
28 For their most significant contributions, see Steven Katz, ed., Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis 
(1978), Mysticism and Religious Traditions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), Mysticism and 
Language (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), and Mysticism and Sacred Scriptures (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Wayne Proudfoot, Religious Experience (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1985); Robert Gimello, ‘Mysticism and Meditation’, in Katz (1978), pp. 170-99, 
and ‘Mysticism in Its Contexts’, in Katz (1983), pp. 61-88; Hans Penner, ‘The Mystical Illusion’, in 
Katz (1983), pp. 89-116, and ‘The Encyclopedia of Religion’, in Critical Review of Books in Religion 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989), pp. 1-21; and Philip Almond, Mystical Experience and Religious 
Doctrine (New York: Mouton Publishers, 1982).   
29 Jorge N. Ferrer, and Jacob H. Sherman, eds., ‘Introduction’, in The Participatory Turn in Spirituality, 
Mysticism and Religious Studies (Albany: SUNY Press, 2008), pp. 1-80 (p. 2); and Robert C. Fuller, 
Religious Revolutionaries: The Rebels Who Reshaped American Religion (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2004), p. 216. 
30 Ferrer and Sherman, eds., ‘Introduction’ (pp. 2-4). 
31 Harmless, Mystics, p. 257. 
32 A Latin term which literally translates to ‘of one’s or its own kind’, referring to something that is 
unique and constitutes a class of its own: ‘sui generis, n.’, in OED Online (Oxford University Press, 
September 2015) <http://www.oed.com/> [accessed 25 October 2015] 
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genuinely distinct from a Buddhist or a Christian one. Again, as in the case of the 
essentialists, the similarity between theorists of this approach should not be 
overemphasized, given that they are divided on several questions, the chief one being 
the extent to which mystical experiences are context-dependent: some lean toward 
what has been variously termed ‘complete’, ‘hard’ or ‘extreme constructivism’, the 
view that mystical experiences are entirely the product of one’s cultural, religious and 
social conditioning; others alternatively favour what has been called ‘incomplete’, 
‘soft’ or ‘partial constructivism’, which posits the contextually-mediated (but not 
contextually-determined) nature of mysticism on the grounds that ‘contextual 
determinism’ cannot account for those novel elements in a mystical experience that 
are not part of the mystic’s prior conditioning.33 
3.2. The Second Wave 
What distinguishes the second-wave constructivist approach to mysticism from the 
first is that, with its advent, ‘the emphasis of the discourse on religious experience 
shifted from the philosophical to the sociopolitical’.34 This is to say that, while the 
first wave is partly preoccupied with phenomenological questions about how mystical 
experiences are culturally constructed, the second wave strictly locates its work 
‘within the history of ideas’, directing its constructivist thrust, not at mystical 
experiences as such, but at mysticism as a conceptual category.35 Indeed, although it is 
true that both constructivist positions are suspicious of the experiential emphasis of 
the perennialist approach,36 the first wave is not completely free of its own theorizing 
on questions of experience; as Robert Sharf explains, it operates on the assumption 
																																																								
33 Jerome Gellman, ‘Mysticism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, 
rev. edn, (Stanford University, Spring 2014 Edition) <http://plato.stanford.edu/index.html> [accessed 
10 October 2015]; Robert Forman, ed., ‘Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism and Forgetting’, in 
Forman (1990), pp. 3-52 (p. 13); Jess Byron Hollenback, Mysticism: Experience, Response, and 
Empowerment (Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996), p. 9. 
34 Benjamin Fong, ‘On Critics’ (p. 1128). 
35 Richard King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and "the Mystic East" (New 
York: Routledge, 1999), p. 1, hereafter Orientalism.  
36 For a representative example of this from the work of an early constructivist, see Steven Katz’s 
‘Mystical Speech and Mystical Meaning’, in Mysticism and Language, pp. 3-41, where he stresses the 
‘textual’ – as opposed to the ‘experiential’ – aspect of mysticism. Katz namely contends that what 
constitutes the mystics’ chief heritage is their ‘writings and related linguistic creations’ in the sense that 
what we normally refer to as the world’s ‘mystical traditions’ are nothing but a chain of documents and 
texts written within these traditions: no scholar or theorist has any ‘privileged’ access to ‘the original 
mystics’ experience outside its textual incorporation’ (p. 4). This ‘hermeneutic of suspicion’ against 
‘experience’ as an analytic category is much more pronounced in the works of second-wave 
constructivists: Grace Jantzen, PGCM, p. xiv. 
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‘that since the historical, social, and linguistic processes that give rise to the [mystic’s 
report] are identical with those that give rise to the experience, the former, which are 
amenable to scholarly analysis, provide a transparent window to the latter’.37 On the 
other hand, second-wave constructivist analysis – better known as ‘social 
constructivism’, or the ‘critical turn’ – usually shows little interest in the 
phenomenological and ontological status of mystical experiences, unless it is to negate 
‘experience’ as an ‘empty category’.38 It is more interested in problematizing and 
unmasking the concept of mysticism that is said to be itself the product of a specific 
set of historical and socio-political conditions. 
The difference between the two constructivist positions is perhaps better 
understood by referring to their critique of the sui generis discourse on mystical 
experience, and how they differ in their corrective approaches to it. Both hold that no 
universalist model of mysticism can be universally applicable, because it is inevitably 
tainted by the theorist’s own ideological or theological assumptions that ‘will do little 
to convince those whom do not share his [or her] particular religious beliefs and 
affiliation’. Attendant to this is the argument that perennialist models are too often 
based on a conspicuously Western and Christian point of view, as in the ‘theological 
violence’ committed by Underhill, Otto and Zaehner, for example, who uncritically 
privilege, as normative, the theistic type of mystical experiences – those involving a 
spiritual union with a Creator who is distinct from creation – over other mystical 
phenomena, a view that necessarily excludes the non-theistic, and atheistic mysticisms 
of the East, or regards them to be of an inferior order.39 There are, of course, many 
essentialist scholars who did voice these objections, endeavouring on their part to 
develop other models that are ‘explicitly non-theological’, but constructivists have 
shown that, even in such models, ‘half-disguised theological presuppositions 
persistently distort the analytical pitch’ that many times proves to be an extension of a 
liberal-humanist Christian theology.40 As for how the two constructivist positions 
attempt to avoid the pitfalls of the perennialist model, scholars of the first wave 
embrace postmodern cultural relativism, proposing a pluralist understanding of 
																																																								
37 Sharf, ‘Rhetoric of Experience’ (p. 285). 
38 King, Orientalism, p. 248. 
39 Richard King, ‘Mysticism and Spirituality’, in The Routledge Companion to the Study of Religion, 
ed. by John Hinnells (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 306-322 (pp. 315, 318). See King’s discussion, in 
this source, of Otto’s and Zaehner’s models (pp. 312-18), as well as his commentary on Underhill in 
Orientalism, p. 7. 
40 Timothy Fitzgerald, The Ideology of Religious Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 
x, 3, 16; and Benjamin Fong, ‘On Critics’ (pp. 1128, 1133). 
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mysticism that accepts a variety of religious phenomenologies as equal, in the sense 
that no type of mystical experience is seen as superior to any other; in their ‘rejection 
of universal “grand narratives”’, therefore, they seek to safeguard the integrity of the 
world’s diverse religious traditions, and ‘to respect’, in Katz’s terms, ‘the richness of 
the experiential and conceptual data’. For scholars of the second wave, however, a 
corrective approach to essentialism must address not only how its ‘experiential bias’ 
often pejoratively misrepresents mystical Eastern traditions, but how it even 
‘misrepresents pre-modern usage of the term within the Christian tradition’.41 
To explain, social constructivists are convinced that the universalist concept of 
mysticism as an ‘intense and private experience’ is not viable, because it is a relatively 
modern invention. Drawing on the constructivist work that was already being done on 
the broader category of ‘religion’,42 they argue that, if one examines the semantic 
history of ‘mysticism’, one finds that it has not always been understood in this sense, 
that its definition has undergone several major changes over time,43 and that no 
definition of it has ever been ‘innocent’ or ‘apolitical’: that is, like the category of 
religion, it has always developed within a specific socio-cultural context to serve the 
ideological, political or personal interests of those who needed it.44 In this sense, they 
believe that essentialism’s ‘exclusive emphasis upon the experiential dimension of 
“the mystical” ignores the wider social, ethical and political dimensions of the subject 
matter’.45 The alternative approach they propose is a deconstructive one, perhaps not 
in the ‘technical sense’ of deconstruction that is associated with the work of Derrida, 
but more loosely as ‘an approach that takes meanings that are unreflectively taken as 
																																																								
41 King, Orientalism, pp. 168-70, 24, 161.  
42 For classics in this literature, see Jonathan Smith, Imagining Religion: From Babylon to Jonestown 
(Chicago,  IL: University of Chicago Press, 1982), and ‘Religion, Religions, Religious’, in Critical 
Terms for Religious Studies, ed. by Mark C. Taylor (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1998); 
Robert Alan Segal, Explaining and Interpreting Religion: Essays on the Issue (New York: Peter Lang, 
1992); Talal Asad, Genealogies of Religion: Disciplines and Reasons of Power in Christianity and 
Islam (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Russell McCutcheon, Manufacturing 
Religion: The Discourse on Sui Generis Religion and the Politics of Nostalgia (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), and Critics Not Caretakers: Redescribing the Public Study of Religion 
(Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2001); Timothy Fitzgerald, ‘A Critique of ‘Religion’ as a Cross-Cultural 
Category’, Method and Theory in the Study of Religion, 9.2 (1997), 91-110, and The Ideology of 
Religious Studies; Donald Wiebe, The Politics of Religious Studies (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1999); William Arnal, ‘Definition’, in Guide to the Study of Religion, ed. by Willi Braun and R. 
McCutcheon (London: Continuum, 2000); and Daniel Dubuisson, The Western Construction of 
Religion: Myths, Knowledge, and Ideology (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003). 
43 King, Orientalism, p. 9; and Grace Jantzen, PGCM, p. 12. 
44 Kevin Schilbrack, ‘Religions: Are There Any?’, Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 78.4 
(2010), 1112–1138 (p. 1116). 
45 Richard King, Orientalism, p. 161. 
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real and seeks to reveal them as conceptually unstable, historically emergent, and 
ideologically motivated’. Barbara Johnson’s commentary on Derrida’s method applies 
here:  
[The approach] reads backwards from what seems natural, obvious, 
self-evident or universal, in order to show that these things have 
their history, their reasons for being what they are, their effects on 
what follows them, and that the starting point is not a given but a 
construct, usually blind to itself.46 
This is why, throughout their studies, many social constructivists use scare-quotes 
around the terms ‘mystic’, ‘mystical’ and ‘mysticism’ (or at least ask that they be 
implicitly understood whenever the terms appear), a strategy that is meant to guard 
against ‘importing universal or essential conceptions’ of the category into their own 
analyses.47  
Needless to say, there are significant variations in the views of social 
constructivists of mysticism regarding their hermeneutical distrust of the category of 
‘experience’. Most notably, there are those who go beyond challenging the credibility 
of the sui generis discourse on ‘religious experience’ and take up an epistemological 
position that altogether rejects its ontological reality. Russell McCutcheon and Robert 
Sharf are the first and most recognized advocates of this view, the former through his 
book Manufacturing Religion (1997), in which he argues that ‘religion’ – including 
‘religious experience’ – exists only as a ‘conceptual tool’, possessing at best a 
‘phantom objectivity’, and that it should not be mistaken as an ‘ontological category 
actually existing in reality’. 48  In his 2000 essay on the religious ‘rhetoric of 
experience’, Sharf similarly writes that ‘the term experience cannot make ostensible a 
something that exists in the world’, calling for a reconsideration of one of the field’s 
main questions:  
The question is not merely whether or not mystical experiences are 
constructed, unmediated, pure, or philosophically significant. The 
																																																								
46 Kevin Schilbrack, ‘Religions: Are There Any?’ (p. 1113). 
47 Raʻanan S. Boustan, From Martyr to Mystic: Rabbinic Martyrology and the Making of Merkavah 
Mysticism (Tübingen, Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2005), p. viii. See, for example, Leigh Schmidt’s 
‘MMM’. I should note here that my own use of these words throughout the thesis is also intended to be 
in ‘fictive quotation marks,’ to borrow Peter Schäfer’s expression: that is, in a way that acknowledges 
only their culturally acquired meanings, without attaching to them any a priori essentialist definition of 
the phenomenon: Peter Schäfer, The Origins of Jewish Mysticism (Germany: Mohr Siebeck, 2009), p. 
23.  
48 McCutcheon, Manufacturing Religion, pp. viii, 23. 
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more fundamental question is whether we can continue to treat the 
texts and reports upon which such theories are based as referring, 
however obliquely, to determinative phenomenal events at all. 
Sharf concludes his essay with the bold statement that ‘all attempts to signify “inner 
experience” are destined to remain “well-meaning squirms that get us nowhere”’49 
With its aim at ‘clearing the ground of the clutter of “experience” talk’,50 this view has 
been called the ‘deflationary’, ‘abolitionist’, or ‘pure’ account of social construction.51 
However, there is another prevalent form of social constructivism that does not go that 
far, and for which a repudiation of the sui generis stance does not entail making the 
epistemological leap toward a complete rejection of the reality of experiences. 
Scholars who hold this view are also wary of the phenomenologist’s appeal to 
experience, but this suspicion is a ‘practical’ rather than an epistemological one, in the 
sense that it seeks to establish a hermeneutical distance from any ideologically laden 
concept, while steering clear of making final decisions about its ontological status.52 
Those who take this position agree with other social constructivists that an 
‘unreflective’ essentialism is ‘indefensible’, and that it is necessary to introduce 
‘reflexivity into one’s study’ by looking into ‘the history and politics of one’s 
concepts’.53 Unlike abolitionist constructivism, however, this view maintains that ‘to 
show that a concept is a social construction says nothing about whether or not that 
concept identifies something real’. More will be said about this in section 5, where I 
explain why I side with this view in my own approach to the study of mysticism in 
Victorian poetry and poetics.  
3.3. Mysticism and Power: A Genealogical Account 
I have mentioned in the previous section – but perhaps not emphasized enough – the 
social constructivist belief that no conceptualization of mysticism is ever divorced 
from issues of authority, whether they are ideological, social, political, or even 
personal. As Richard King argues in his instructive book Orientalism and Religion: 
Postcolonial Theory, India and ‘The Mystic East’, a constructivist analysis should 
																																																								
49 Sharf, ‘Rhetoric of Experience’ (pp. 282, 285-86). The quote in his closing statement is a phrase of 
Samuel Beckett: see Brian Bocking’s ‘Mysticism: No Experience Necessary?’ [accessed 25 September 
2015] 
50 Bocking, ibid. 
51 Kevin Schilbrack (pp. 116-7); and Benjamin Fong (p. 1132). 
52 Fong (p. 1130). 
53 Schilbrack (pp. 1113, 1121). 
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take ‘seriously not only the social location of the concepts under examination but also 
their involvement in a wider cultural field of power relations’. King particularly 
argues for an understanding of mysticism that shows ‘an awareness of the mutual 
imbrication of religion, culture and power as categories’, or what has become known 
as ‘the politics of knowledge’.54 He builds his argument on the equally estimable work 
of Grace Jantzen, Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism, one of the first studies of 
its kind in terms of its deconstructive approach to the categories under investigation. 
Both Jantzen and King broadly follow the Foucaultian brand of social constructivism, 
based on the work of the French historian and philosopher Michel Foucault, which 
principally holds that ‘knowledge and power are interconnected, and that an 
investigation of what is allowed to count as knowledge can never be far removed from 
an investigation of power relations’. ‘Foucault believed’, says Jantzen, ‘that any form 
of defined knowledge has an ideological function’, which means that knowledge is 
neither ‘raw’ nor ‘pure’, but ‘reflects the interests of the knower’. When applied to 
definitions of mysticism, it would follow that ‘what counts as mysticism’ in any given 
sociocultural and historical context will be influenced by the vested interests of those 
who have the power to define it in that context.55 The result, then, is a discourse that 
invents or constructs the object it claims to explain.  
 This brings me to Foucault’s genealogical approach to conceptual analysis, in 
which social constructivists of ‘mysticism’ find an apt analytical tool for the 
delegitimation of the essentialist definition of the term. For an explanation of this, I 
defer once again to Jantzen and King. According to Jantzen, ‘the genealogy of 
knowledge’, as Foucault has called it, is especially attentive to the idea that ‘those 
who have the power to define knowledge have not remained the same’. With this in 
mind, she offers a very rough sketch of the major alterations in Western regimes of 
power and knowledge from the medieval to the modern period: ‘In the medieval era 
powerful monks and abbots gave way to bishops; gradually the authority of the church 
gave way to the authority of kings and secular princes; in modern society philosophers 
and theologians in universities are characterised as “the ones who know”’. Both 
Jantzen and King explain that, because mysticism is a social construct that ‘inevitably 
contains and conceals issues of power and authority’, it is reasonable to assume that 
the category has undergone considerable changes in meaning that correspond with 
																																																								
54 King, p. 1. 
55 Jantzen, pp. 2, 12-4. 
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these (and other) broad changes in Western structures of power.56 A genealogy of the 
concept of mysticism, therefore, is, as King notes, ‘a history of the idea that pays 
specific attention to the power dynamic involved in the way in which it has been 
defined in various historical circumstances’. From a deconstructive perspective, its 
aim is to reveal that what modernist Jamesian philosophers have often conceived as a 
reified, universal, trans-historical and apolitical category is, in fact, a precarious and 
contingent one.57 As it may be expected, this approach has opened up numerous areas 
of research on the subject, and, although a full genealogical account of the modern 
construction of mysticism has yet to be achieved,58 the rich body of scholarship that 
has so far been produced under its auspices illuminates much of the category’s 
history, and the dynamics of its development.59 It is beyond the scope of this chapter 
to provide an overview of the significant findings of this body of literature in anything 
but an elliptical manner. My intent here is merely to sketch out, in very broad terms, 
some of the historical transformations in the semantic field of ‘mysticism’ from its 
																																																								
56 Jantzen, pp. 12-3, 25. 
57 King, pp. 8, 2. 
58 Amy Hollywood, ed., ‘Introduction’, in The Cambridge Companion to Christian Mysticism, ed. by 
A. Hollywood and Patricia Z. Beckman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 1-34 (p. 
6); and Peter Tyler, The Return to the Mystical: Ludwig Wittgenstein, Teresa of Avila and the Christian 
Mystical Tradition (London: Continuum, 2011), p. 4. 
59 The historical problemtizations of the category of mysticism that I am aware of can be found in Hal 
Bridges, American Mysticism: From William James to Zen (New York: Harper and Row, 1970); 
Michel de Certeau, Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, trans. by Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 80-100, The Mystic Fable: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries, trans. by Michael B. Smith, 2 vols (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992-2015), and 
‘Mysticism’, Diacritics, 22 (1992), 11-25; Eric J. Sharpe, Nathan Söderblum and the Study of Religion 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1990), pp. 113-115; T. J. Jackson Lears, No Place of 
Grace: Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1993), pp. 142-215; Grace Jantzen, ‘Feminists, Philosophers, and Mystics’, Hypatia, 9 (1994), 
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first-known use to the modern period, so as to give an idea of its historical instability 
as a category of thought, and how this was determined, in part, by an ever-changing 
matrix of power relations.  
 Indeed, a look at the etymological origins of the term reveals that it had quite a 
different meaning from what it had come to signify by the turn of the twentieth 
century. It is important to point out, though, that the noun form ‘mysticism’ is a 
relatively late development in the history of the category, first emerging in 
seventeenth-century France, and then moving from French to other European 
languages.60 Previously, the term had been in use in the adjectival forms ‘mystic’ and 
‘mystical’, both of which are derived from the Greek adjective µυστικός, which was 
used to describe the secret rites of initiation into the mystery religions of pre-
Christian, Graeco-Roman antiquity. The adjective itself is a derivative from the verb 
µὺω, the Greek for ‘to close’, particularly ‘to close one’s eyes’ or ‘one’s lips’ in the 
figurative sense of ‘keeping a secret’.61 It was meant to signify an imperative to those 
who have been initiated into the mystery cults to keep silent about the secret process 
of their initiation, the secret being ‘the ritual itself which must not be divulged to the 
uninitiated’.62 In other words, as Louis Bouyer explains in ‘Mysticism: An Essay on 
the History of the Word’, with its connotation of secrecy, the category of mysticism in 
its earliest forms was used to refer not to any kind of experiential or divine 
knowledge, but simply to what happens in a communal rite of initiation.63 
 In the same essay, Bouyer also offers what is arguably the most insightful 
exposition of the earliest uses of the term in the Christian tradition,64 maintaining that 
when ‘the mystical’ was first adopted into the Christian vernacular, it was applied to 
‘the least Greek thing about Christianity: the Bible’. According to him, in early and 
medieval Christian culture, ‘the mystical’ continued to refer to what is ‘secret’ or 
‘hidden’, but its earliest connection with pagan ritualistic realities was largely 
superseded by its association with ‘the most difficult theological problems presented 
by Christianity’, that is, ‘scriptural exegesis’: the scriptures were claimed to have an 
‘inner’ or ‘hidden’ meaning beyond their literal signification. Bouyer believes that this 
is when ‘the mystical’ began to acquire ‘truly supernatural splendor’, because the 
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veiled meaning of a sacred text was believed to be nothing other than the supernatural 
or divine reality of Jesus Christ, a meaning that can be uncovered only through the 
allegorical interpretation of the Bible. Although it would still be a long way before the 
modern psychologization of mysticism (the conception of it in terms of private, 
universal, and intensely psychological states of consciousness), the employment of the 
term in this sense represents a clear development toward that direction, something that 
has been pointed out by Amy Hollywood: 
This usage […] marks a shift toward the experiential. The process 
by which one comes to know hidden things is designated as mystical 
rather than the things uncovered themselves. In uncovering the 
hidden meaning of scripture, by moving from what Origen calls the 
body (the literal meaning) of the text to its soul and spirit (both 
aspects of the allegorical), one is lifted up through the body to the 
soul.65  
Of course, it should be kept in mind that, for early Church fathers, such as Origen and 
Clement, the allegorical meaning of biblical texts was not confined to that which 
inheres in their literary or linguistic forms, but extended to what can be read in the 
events of Christian history reported in them, which were said to represent the divine 
presence in action.  
 In addition to the hermeneutical aspect of its application, Bouyer’s essay also 
makes a case for the significance of another aspect of the early Christian usage of the 
adjective ‘mystical’, and this is in connection with the Church’s liturgical life. He 
contends that, just as in the case of scriptural allegory, the symbolic practices of the 
sacraments in pre-modern Christianity were thought to be imbued with a ‘mystical’ or 
‘hidden’ significance, whose meaning is also nothing other than the recognition of the 
divine reality of Christ.66 Speaking of the spiritual meaning given the Eucharist, for 
example, Richard King explains this from the perspective of the early Church fathers:  
The mystical is that which transforms a mundane activity 
(consuming bread and wine) and sacramentalizes it, i.e. transforms 
it into an event of cosmic and eternal significance. It is through the 
Eucharistic celebration that the Christian may enter into communion 
with the timeless realm of God.67  
William Harmless is of the opinion that, if this – or the mysticism of an allegorical 
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interpretation – could be described as a ‘mystical experience’ at all, the early Church 
fathers would have spoken of it as ‘the ordinary faith experience of all baptised 
Christians’. This is not to say that a preoccupation with the experiential aspect that is 
now associated with our modern understanding of mysticism was not found in early 
Christianity. ‘It clearly was’, Harmless explains, ‘but the desert fathers and later 
monastic thinkers spoke of their experience not as “mystical experience,” but as 
“contemplation”; they spoke of themselves not as “mystics,” but as “contemplatives”’. 
68 
  Feminist scholars working on the deconstruction of early and medieval 
Christian mysticism have contended, and rightly so, that this conception of the 
mystical was a thoroughly patriarchal construct, one that served the power interests of 
male ecclesiastics toward the systematic exclusion of women from public religious 
life. Where the mystical meaning of scripture is concerned, the argument goes that the 
marginalization of medieval women can be discerned not only in the fact that they 
were denied formal theological training, and were indeed discouraged from pursuing 
such study privately, but also in how their fulfilment of the societal ‘expectations of 
marriage and child-bearing’ meant that ‘the leisure […] for the study of scripture was 
unequally distributed’ among men and women of the time.69 To define the mystical as 
the allegorical interpretation of the Bible, therefore, was to ensure that women were 
excluded from the category, given that the category was being associated with the 
highly abstract and speculative scholarship that was ‘overwhelmingly the domain of 
male intellectuals within the Church’.70 That such an exclusion had philosophical 
presuppositions is not overlooked by Grace Jantzen, who explains this in reference to 
the spiritual hierarchy outlined by ‘Dionysius the Areopagite’, the pseudonym of the 
anonymous sixth-century writer now known as Pseudo-Dionysius. 71  Pseudo-
Dionysius held that God – as Creator and the principal source of authority in the 
universe – presides over this hierarchy, followed by all created things in a chain of 
‘descending authority’, where each creature is ranked according to the extent to which 
it bears God’s image and likeness: this stretches from the celestial hierarchy, with its 
different angelic orders, through the ecclesiastical structure of bishops, priests, and 
deacons, where women are notably absent from all positions of authority. As far as 
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this reflects a belief in the spiritual inferiority of women, Jantzen notes that the 
Pseudo-Dionysian spiritual ladder significantly bears the legacy of Plato, whose 
misogynistic discourse on the gender-determined nature of spirituality was assimilated 
very early on into the Christian tradition. The Platonic stance on gender differences 
was that ‘men had more of the divine elements, air and fire’ and ‘women were 
composed more by the grosser elements of earth and water’ so that it is only proper 
‘that men participated in divinity and were capable of spirituality, while women were 
oriented toward procreation’.72  
 It is not unreasonable to infer from this that medieval claims about the 
mystical meaning of scripture were not politically innocent, but ones with serious 
exclusionary implications, particularly when it is borne in mind that those who made 
these claims also argued that the Bible’s mystical meanings are not accessible to the 
masses: according to them, unlike its outward literal sense, its inner secrets are only 
comprehensible to ‘a religious elite’ who are, by nature and training, the most fit to 
receive its divine truths. ‘Not everyone is sacred’, they would insist, least of all, 
women with their inherent inclinations toward physicality and the earth. The same 
thing applies to the medieval association of the mystical with the Church’s liturgical 
ceremonies, which was similarly influenced by the period’s gender-biases. As Grace 
Jantzen explains, whereas Christian sacramental rites were a crucial dimension of 
what counted as ‘mystical’ during the Middle Ages, it was one of the decrees of the 
Church that its rituals be witnessed only by the ecclesiastical authorities and their 
initiates, to the exclusion of all others, an exclusion that ‘differentiates’, as Pseudo-
Dionysius declares, ‘what belongs to the common crowd from the things that bind and 
unify a hierarchy’. Granting the already mentioned fact that there was ‘no place for 
women’ in the ecclesiastical hierarchy of early Church society, one of the 
consequences of this was that it ensured the marginalization of women from the 
mystical aspects of the Church’s ritual life.73  
 However, notwithstanding the deeply patriarchal culture of the medieval 
religious community, the era did witness many efforts to ‘push back the boundaries of 
misogyny’ in ways that enabled some women (as well as a few men) to offer 
alternative constructions of mysticism that could be conceived as uniquely female.74 
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In this sense, it can be said that ‘mysticism represented a source of power and 
inspiration’ to some of the traditionally disempowered voices of medieval religious 
culture.75 Both Amy Hollywood and Grace Jantzen maintain that, in response to their 
exclusion from the scriptural and liturgical dimensions of the mystical, medieval 
women endeavoured to overturn the perceived weaknesses of their sex in a way that 
worked in their favour, allowing them to assert their own religious authority as 
spiritual instructors. In particular, it is proposed that, ‘dominated by the prevailing 
belief in their intellectual inferiority and their highly significant physicality’, such 
women sought ‘to turn this paradigm to a new use by uncovering the links between’, 
for example, ‘their suffering physicality and the historical bodily suffering of Jesus’.76 
It may be true, so goes the argument, that medieval women lacked scholastic training 
in the abstract theological and metaphysical questions of the day, as well as the 
necessary knowledge of ancient languages for interpreting complex biblical passages; 
still, these women could claim that their intrinsic emotionalism and sensuality made 
them naturally receptive – a privilege they had over men – to the visionary, auditory, 
and somatic avenues of experiencing the divine, allowing them, in turn, ‘to claim their 
own voices and their own authority on the basis of this spirituality’.77   
 Moving from the medieval to the early modern context, the most significant 
scholarly attempt to unmask some of the hidden agendas that went into the 
construction of mysticism during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is the work 
of Michel de Certeau. De Certeau’s genealogical investigation into the term’s history 
is the first to draw attention to the fact that, up to the late sixteenth century, the 
category of mysticism was only used as an adjective, shortly after which it underwent 
a process of substantivation, where it emerged as a noun for the first time in European 
intellectual history – namely, in the form of the French word ‘la mystique’. De 
Certeau believes this development to be emblematic of the post-medieval 
secularization of knowledge, ‘a knowledge that defines its own scientific objects’, 
arguing that the period’s emerging scientific discourse ‘reified the mystical as an 
object of inquiry in accordance with its own categories and methodologies’. This is to 
say that, whereas the medieval form of the term was strictly used as a modifier ‘that 
qualified something else’ – for example, certain types of knowledge, objects or 
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practices (exegetical and liturgical) – particularly within traditional church 
institutions, the term’s modern form was indicative of ‘a new space of knowledge’ or 
‘field of research’. Put otherwise, one can say that the mystical acquired ‘its autonomy 
in passing from an adjectival to a substantive position’, in the sense that it was 
assigned ‘a region of its own, with its own objects, itineraries, and language’.78 
 For de Certeau, this key episode of the term’s development took place during 
the formative period of the rise of modern science to dominance as a new paradigm of 
knowledge, one that sought to establish ‘its own distinctiveness’ by increasingly 
distancing itself from the theological, cosmological and ethical ‘sediments of its 
past’.79 As might be expected, this was not without its repercussions on the category 
of mysticism: de Certeau asserts that the response of mystics and their apologists to 
‘this recently isolated unity’ conformed with the secularization process that was 
occurring in other newly defined (or redefined) fields of scientific research, so that the 
story of the development of mysticism into an isolated domain is also the story of its 
divestment of its traditional theological origins (This would be a very gradual and 
intermittent process that would continue well up to the late nineteenth century).80 It is 
no coincidence, for example, that the ‘chemist philosopher’ of medieval culture 
‘disengaged himself from a cosmological philosophy’ and was transformed into a 
‘chemist’ at the same time that the ‘mystic theologian’ disassociated himself from a 
theological tradition and simply became ‘a mystic’.81 It is also de Certeau’s contention 
that an important aspect of the seventeenth-century secularization of knowledge is the 
emergence of a growing interest in studying the reported experiences of past saints 
and mystics, not with the previously-held conception of mysticism as representing a 
normal or acceptable dimension of divine worship, but with a new preoccupation on 
its psychosomatic manifestations. This often led to the conception of mystical 
experiences as types of ‘extraordinary’, or even ‘abnormal’ phenomena. What this 
suggests, de Certeau believes, is that the new scientific discourse that was 
progressively objectifying the mystical, was concomitantly leading to its 
pathologization, and, thereby, to the decline of its social and cultural status: that is, 
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mysticism was being pushed from the central place it had held in medieval religious 
culture – as a dignified form of spiritual practice that was accessible only to a 
religious elite – to ‘the margins of an increasingly secularized society’.82  
 Paradoxically, however, the early modern isolation and objectification of 
mysticism was also, in part, an outgrowth of the diminishing status of the mystical 
within the Western Christian tradition during the Protestant Reformation of the early 
sixteenth century. De Certeau speaks of how the mysticism of scriptural exegesis had 
increasingly become the subject of much censure in the days of Martin Luther, who 
was its severest critic. Luther, as de Certeau notes, ridiculed the ‘twaddle’ of a 
‘mystical theology’ on the grounds that it was more Platonic than Christian, an 
allegorical game of which Christian Neo-Platonists, from Origen and Pseudo-
Dionysius to Gerson, were all culpable.83 This can be understood in the context of 
Luther’s belief in the simplicity and lucidity of the Bible’s teachings, and how it is 
imperative that the Christian laity should not be deterred from approaching and 
understanding it on their own. The point to emphasize here is that mysticism as a form 
of hermeneutical biblical practice was on the decline since the beginning of the 
sixteenth century, after having been ‘one of the traditional functions of theology’ for 
so long.84 Aside from this, the ecclesiastical institutions of the sixteenth century were 
also continually depreciative of the mystical contemplative tradition for its apparent 
novelty or ‘late birth’. Meister Eckhart, John of the Cross, and other contemplative 
writers of the late-Medieval period were, for instance, being dismissed in 
contemporary religious discourse with the disparaging label ‘the new mystics’, 
disparaging because the word ‘new’ had pejorative connotations at the time. Such 
mystics, it was said, ‘had neither tradition nor genealogy’, with a history dating back 
only three or four centuries, and whose writings were ever straying away from 
institutional Christian orthodoxy.85  
 De Certeau argues that the prevailing strategy that apologists and defenders of 
the mystical employed against the general decline of the status of mysticism within 
the Christian Church was ‘the invention of an ancient mystical tradition within the 
orthodox walls of Christianity’.86 As a consequence, Western intellectual culture 
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witnessed a proliferation of ‘mystical literature’, the production of which involved the 
gathering together of a sufficient body of texts already extant from the long history of 
the Christian tradition – such as the hagiographies and writings of saints, or the corpus 
of patristic and scriptural works – all of which were then reinterpreted and labelled 
‘mystic’ in order to ‘distinguish them from other past and contemporary texts 
(theological treaties, biblical commentaries, etc.)’. To borrow de Certeau’s language, 
it is through the isolation of such texts, and their delimitation by ‘a proper name 
(“mystic”)’, that ‘a mystic tradition was fabricated’.87 The reinterpretation of old 
material involved shifting attention to new aspects of the texts which highlighted their 
contemplative purposes: for example, the shift could be ‘from a focus upon the virtues 
and miracles of the saints to an interest in extraordinary experiences and states of 
mind’. ‘The consequence of this’, as Richard King explains, ‘was that it tied the newly 
sanctified mystics and their apologists to the established tradition of the exegesis and 
the overarching authority of the Church, as well as binding them to a canon of 
acceptable and orthodox ecclesiastical literature’. 88  More importantly for the 
development of the conceptual category of mysticism, however, de Certeau maintains 
that the consequence of the formation (or fabrication) of a mystical tradition is that it 
further established the category as a substantive in its own right, indicating the rise of 
its significance as a category of thought, and a legitimate subject matter of scientific 
and philosophical inquiry. 
 Whereas the ‘grammatical promotion’ of the French adjective ‘mystique’ to its 
noun form ‘la mystique’ occurred sometime at the juncture of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries,89 its parallel in English came to pass only in the mid-eighteenth 
century, as noted by Leigh Schmidt in an indispensable article on the modern making 
of mysticism in Anglo-American culture. Prior to that, and through the early decades 
of the eighteenth century, the English adjectival forms of the category were the words 
‘mystic’ and ‘mystical’, and they were still, as Schmidt observes, ‘inextricably woven 
into a larger system of Christian theology, linked at the level of practice to a 
recognizable set of devotional and exegetical habits’. Hence, in Thomas Blount’s 
1656 definition of ‘mystical theology’, for instance, we find that the category retains 
its medieval association with the contemplative branch of Christian worship: 
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Mystical Theology, is nothing else in general but certain Rules, by 
the practise whereof, a vertuous Christian may attain to a nearer, a 
more familiar, and beyond all expression comfortable conversation 
with God. 
Similarly, in its conceptual engagement with the category in question, Ephraim 
Chambers’s Cyclopædia (1738) emphasizes ‘the mystical sense of Scripture’, which 
reveals the persistence of the mystical hermeneutics of scripture in Anglo-American 
discourse well into the eighteenth century.90  
 However, Schmidt contends that, when the noun ‘mysticism’ first came into 
use in the English-speaking world, it reflected an evident shift in the semantics of the 
category, emerging ‘as a term charged with the reproaches of misplaced sexuality, 
unintelligibility, pretension, and reason-be-damned extravagance’. He explains that 
the category’s newly acquired negative connotations were related to how the term was 
socially located within eighteenth-century debates about the makings of a ‘reasonable 
religion’, namely, a religion that is in accordance with the Enlightenment values of 
rationality, public decorum, balance, proportion and moderation. More specifically, 
Schmidt maintains that the category’s new formation was chiefly used as part of an 
Enlightenment critique of religious enthusiasm, which it increasingly sought to depict 
in sexualized terms as a form of ‘false religion’. To this kind of critique belongs, for 
example, Ephraim Chambers’s association of the mystics with ‘fanatic ecstasies, and 
amorous extravagancies’, as well as Henry Coventry’s distinction between ‘the 
seraphic entertainments of mysticism and extasy’ and ‘the true spirit of acceptable 
religion’. That Coventry’s construal of mysticism is highly sexualized is evident in his 
view that the root cause of all mystical devotion is ‘disappointed love’: the 
individual’s unfulfilled passions and desires are said to be ‘transferred from mere 
mortals to a spiritual and divine object, and love […] is sublimated into devotion’. 
This is why, addressing female mystics, Coventry attributed their suffering to ‘the 
want of timely application from our sex’, and their need to experience the physical 
gratifications of ‘connubial love’.91  
 In addition to this, Schmidt identifies another significant aspect of the English 
Enlightenment approach to mysticism, also in relation to religious enthusiasm, and 
this is its attempt to limit the category’s field of signification by infusing it with 
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thoroughly sectarian connotations. Mysticism, in this case, is primarily characterized, 
not by a specific set of recognizable features or attributes, but by being peculiar to an 
inconsequential number of small sects within Christianity, especially the Quietists the 
Quakers and the Methodists. Schmidt’s evidence for this is substantial, but perhaps 
most pertinent to this review is the fact that, up to its seventh edition of 1842, the 
Encyclopædia Britannica showed a preference for the classification ‘mystics’ over 
‘mysticism’ for its entry titles on the category, a choice that underscores the sectarian 
understanding of the subject matter which ran through its discussions. That is, the 
category was no longer principally identified with a type of theology or scriptural 
hermeneutics, but rather with ‘a particular sect of Christians, a definable group of 
pious (if misguided) souls’. A case in point is the entry of the 1797 edition, which in 
part reads thus: 
MYSTICS, […] a kind of religious sect, distinguished by their 
professing pure, sublime, and perfect devotion, with an entire 
disinterested love of God, free from all selfish considerations. […] 
The principles of this sect were adopted by those called Quietists in 
the seventeenth century, and under different modifications, by the 
Quakers and Methodists. 
Schmidt further explains that such a construction of the category ‘was marked by a 
specific Anglican politics of ecclesiastical containment’, where ‘mystics’ were 
recognized as ‘just one more sect, among many, prickling magisterial forms of 
established Christianity’. It was an argument against taking seriously the notion of 
mysticism’s historical continuity that came with the seventieth-century invention of a 
‘mystical tradition’, as well as an attempt to detract from its significance as a cultural 
force that could lay any claims to knowledge about the true nature of religion. 
Therefore, the category was regularly being employed as a ‘party label’ for ‘a singular 
brand of recent enthusiasts and pietists’, ‘an often amorous, always muddleheaded 
sect whose members, for all their devout fancies, were too absorbed with solitary 
practices to be overly dangerous’.92 
 In his survey of the Anglo-American intellectual scene of the nineteenth-
century, moreover, Schmidt identifies the 1840s and 1850s as another key turning 
point in the social construction of the term in Western culture. It is at this point in the 
history of modern Britain and America, he contends, that the category was clearly 
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being extricated from the cultural matrix of its Medieval and Enlightenment origins.93 
No longer predominantly related to an ancient Christian exegetical or contemplative 
tradition, nor primarily used ‘as a stick’ with which to beat the fanatical excesses of 
false religious sects, 94  the mid-nineteenth-century concept of mysticism was 
undergoing a definitional shift from which it would ultimately emerge a romanticized 
construct: it would become ‘loosely’ spiritual, universal, perennial and eclectic; so 
argues Schmidt in his reference to the updated edition of the Encyclopædia 
Britannica, a source that, according to him, offers a good and relevant measure for 
tracking the cultural construction of concepts. Indeed, in its eighth edition of 1858, the 
entry on ‘mysticism’ declares that ‘its main characteristics are constantly the same, 
whether they find expression in the Bagvat-gita of the Hindu, or in the writings of 
Emmanuel Swedenborg’. The entry particularly establishes the notion of the global 
and all-inclusive nature of the mystical through the diversity of the types of mysticism 
that it now covers, ranging across historical, geographical and national divides: these 
include the mysticisms of the Neo-Platonists, the Greeks, the Germans, the Orientals, 
and the Spanish. One thing becomes clear from this, and that is that, for those in 
Britain who undertook to review the period’s current state of knowledge (namely, the 
writers and editors of encyclopaedias), mysticism appeared ‘much grander than a 
peculiar party within Christianity’.95 
 Such a conception of the term finds similar articulations across the Atlantic, 
especially those coming from the Protestant liberal circles of Transcendentalist New 
England, where Ralph Waldo Emerson was celebrated as ‘chief singer of his time at 
the high court of Mysticism’. It was a place, as Schmidt points out, that was crucial in 
producing William James’s theories. From this intellectual climate comes, for 
example, the 1861 statement of the Unitarian and Transcendentalist preacher, 
Octavius Frothingham, that mysticism is peculiar ‘to no sect of believers, to no 
church, to no religion; it is found equally among orthodox and heterodox, Protestants 
and Catholics, Pagans and Christians, Greeks and Hindoos, the people of the Old 
World and the people of the New’. Bronson Alcott, a member of the Transcendental 
Club,96 would write, too, to the same effect that mysticism ‘is the sacred spark that has 
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lighted the piety and illuminated the philosophy of all places and times’. Also 
belonging to this liberal religious culture is Unitarian James Freeman Clarke, an 
influential figure in Comparative Religion and author of the popular Ten Great 
Religions (1871-1883). Clarke’s 1880 lecture on ‘The Mystics of All Religions’ 
describes the mystic as follows: 
He sees through the shows of things to their centre, becomes 
independent of time and space, master of his body and mind, ruler 
of nature by the sight of her inmost laws, and elevated above all 
partial religions into the Universal Religion. This is the essence of 
mysticism. 
According to Schmidt, the essentialist overtones of this kind of discourse set the stage 
for William James’s later reconfiguration of mysticism as an experiential category. He 
explains that, for James and his intellectual progenitors, the project of universalizing 
and de-historicizing mysticism was possible only by recasting it as ‘solitary 
subjectivity’: this involved not only defining mysticism, first and foremost, as 
experience, but equally characterizing it as an intensely private and interior one, 
which, in turn, served to disassociate it from all theologies, all doctrines, all rituals, 
and all institutions, and, hence, from historical and cultural particularity.97 Of course, 
in the hands of William James, a chief contributor to the development of modern 
psychology,98 this led to the psychologization of mysticism.  
Albeit with some modifications and marked differences of opinion, this is the 
modern understanding of mysticism that has endured to the present century, and 
which current social and cultural constructivists are seeking to deconstruct. As 
suggested by Schmidt, the deconstruction of this category involves examining ‘both 
the larger processes and the local peculiarities’ that have contributed to its 
development. This means, on the one hand, that there is an overall shared narrative of 
the modern construction of mysticism within the larger context of nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century Euro-American culture; and, on the other, that a multitude of lesser 
narratives can be traced in how this category was formulated within more 
particularized contexts. To be sure, Schmidt’s own study – while giving an overview 
of some of the larger cultural processes that went into the creation of modern 
mysticism in nineteenth-century Europe and America – is specifically interested in 
																																																								
97 Schmidt, ‘MMM’ (pp. 284-85, 287-88). 
98 For William James’s distinguished place in the history of modern psychology, see Erik Tonning, 
Modernism and Christianity, p. 14. 
	 31	
probing the dynamics of the category’s modern development in the context of New 
England Transcendentalism. This is why, in addition to arguing that modern 
mysticism arose as an ‘antipositivist’ and ‘antimaterialist tool’ for the protection of 
religion against the general forces of Western scientific reductionism, Schmidt 
proposes that the construct was also a part of the more particular discourse of the 
American pre- and post-Civil War period, advanced by those ‘seeking a religious 
vision to serve the national cause of political and religious union’. ‘The Unitarian 
Transcendentalist fascination with a universalistic mysticism’, he states, was geared 
toward ‘capturing a holy union out of the rubble of rival nationalisms, North and 
South’.99  
Aside from Schmidt, feminist scholars Grace Jantzen and Joy R. Bostic offer 
other particularized narratives of mysticism’s modern invention within the more 
specific context of feminine spirituality. Focusing on William James’s notion of the 
ineffability (or inexpressibility) of mystical experiences, Jantzen argues that, whether 
aware or not, modern philosophers and psychologists reformulated mysticism into an 
ineffable, privatized and feminized category in a way that it ensured it remained the 
same patriarchal construct it had always been, one that reinforces the political 
suppression of women: 
Whereas in the medieval era the religious in general and the 
mystical in particular was far too important to be left to women, in 
the modern era mysticism and religious experience are indeed seen 
as available to women, but with their feminisation, they have also 
been marginalized. […] The alleged inexpressibility of mystical 
experience correlates neatly with the silencing of women in the 
public arena of the secular world: women may be mystics, but 
mysticism is a private intense experience not communicable in 
everyday language and not of political relevance.100 
Joy R. Bostic, on the other hand, investigates how Christian-identified African 
American women of the nineteenth century sought to subvert the dehumanizing 
gender and racial stereotypes that were an integral part of the cultural discourses of a 
patriarchal and white supremacist system. She argues that, in such a context, 
‘mysticism’ and ‘religious experience’ figured as emancipatory constructs, ones that 
empowered black females to construct their own identities as ‘emancipated subjects’, 
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and to ‘create their own autonomous spaces for activism and agency’. The latter is 
what Bostic refers to as ‘mystical spaces’, contending that, within them, these women 
became ‘social agents’ with ‘multipositional, relational, and complex’ identities, who 
believed themselves rightfully capable of ‘communal political engagement’. In other 
words, the mystical, as Bostic insists, represented one way in which the nineteenth 
century African American woman ‘resisted the cultural impositions of one-note 
stereotypes and gendered role limitations’.101  
 Added to this, and as final examples in this genealogical overview, 
contemporary scholarship by Richard King and Robert H. Sharf has similarly 
contributed to the study of the modern construction of mysticism, offering 
deconstructions of the category that are predominantly positioned within the 
postcolonial project. In this case, the larger narrative involves the social, political 
and/or ideological ‘othering’ of the mystical by Western imperialist discourse (or its 
legacies), a narrative that follows various trajectories according to its historical 
particularity.102 Building on Edward Said’s thesis that ‘Orientalism is as concerned 
with the Occident and the preservation of Western cultural identity through the 
projection of an Oriental Other as it has been with the manipulation of the East’, 
Richard King offers an analysis of the colonial constructions of ‘the mystic East’ that 
leads to the following conclusion: 
The representation of Hinduism and Buddhism as mystical religions 
has functioned to reinforce Western Orientalist stereotypes of 
eastern religion and culture as world denying, amoral and lacking an 
impulse to improve society. This has allowed the West to define 
itself as progressive, scientific and liberal in contrast to the 
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superstitious, tradition-bound and ‘underdeveloped’ Third World 
nations of Asia.103 
From the opposite side, Robert H. Sharf points out that western-educated Asian 
intellectuals were deeply aware of the Occidentals’ contemptuous views of Asian 
religions, and how these were blamed for the Asian continent’s social, political and 
scientific backwardness. He explains that, threatened by the continuation of the 
West’s cultural and political imperialism, as well as its technological and military 
advances, these intellectuals responded with a counter-colonial discourse that 
reinforced the image of the East as being mystical, and further contributed to the 
construction of modern mysticism as an experiential category: 
Asian intellectuals […] would not only affirm the experiential 
foundation of their own religious traditions, but they would turn 
around and present those traditions as more intuitive, more mystical, 
more experiential, and thus ‘purer’ than the discursive faiths of the 
West. In short, if the West excelled materially, the East excelled 
spiritually. This strategy had the felicitous result of thwarting […] 
the threat of Western cultural hegemony. 
Sharf not only highlights the significant impact these westernized Asian scholars had 
on the study of religion in the West, but also credits them with establishing ‘the 
romanticized image of Asian mysticism’ in Western writings.104  
4. Problematizations of Mysticism in the Literary Context of Victorian England: 
A Review of Literature  
Having given a general sketch of the origins and climactic changes of meaning that 
‘mysticism’ has undergone through its long history, including a few examples of the 
cultural agendas at play at different stages of the term’s historical development, I 
would like to reiterate what several scholars have suggested, that research on the 
‘archaeology’ of the term is still relatively new.105 Amy Hollywood has recently 
affirmed (2012) that ‘the story of the modern articulation of the category of mysticism 
is only beginning to be written’, and she seconds Leigh Schmidt’s opinion that one 
lacuna in the previous literature on the subject is the absence of any serious 
examination of the term’s genealogical inheritance from the eighteenth- and 
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nineteenth centuries.106 Schmidt had argued in ‘The Making of Modern “Mysticism”’ 
(2003) that critics and cultural historians who have investigated the development of 
mysticism as a modern essentialist construct have made a ‘major historical oversight’ 
in identifying the early seventeenth century and the turn of the twentieth century as 
the two key moments in this category’s modern construction, leaving ‘a gaping 
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century hole’ in their accounts. This view, according to 
Schmidt, ‘skims across many of the most important developments within the 
category’s modern formation’, because ‘most of the figures who actually matter in 
making mysticism a universal construct fall into this massive historical gap and 
receive little or no mention at all’. 107  In this sense, Schmidt’s article is an 
unprecedented attempt at filling this chronological lacuna, a task he takes up again in 
Restless Souls: The Making of American Spirituality (2005); and, as Amy Hollywood 
observes, Schmidt’s research on the subject ‘plugs in crucial pieces of the Anglo-
American story’.108 It is incumbent to point out here, however, that, in both studies, 
Schmidt is interested in the conceptual transformations that mysticism underwent on 
British soil only insofar as they represent a significant stage in the term’s transatlantic 
migration from Europe to America, with the American context being the chief subject 
of his analysis. In other words, instructive and indispensible as it is, Schmidt’s 
discussion of the construction of mysticism in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
British culture is confined to a short survey of the major developments occurring in 
that context, leaving much room for further research.  
As far as nineteenth-century Britain is concerned, the last decade or so has 
witnessed the emergence of other studies that are mindful of the cultural 
constructedness of mysticism within this context. For example, In 2004, as part of her 
examination of the fin-de-siècle occultism of the last two decades of the nineteenth 
century, cultural historian Alex Owen locates the late-Victorian interest in mysticism 
(and other occult phenomena) in relation to ‘major secular developments in the 
understanding of mind and consciousness’, arguing that this interest ‘constituted a 
crucial enactment of the ambiguities of “the modern”’. She particularly explores how 
the mystical revival’ of the 1880s-1890s was partly involved in the fin-de-siècle 
construction of a psychologized subjectivity that resisted ‘a purely secularized 
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formulation of human consciousness’ even though it embraced the medical 
psychologists’ view of it as an ‘invariably fragmented or multiple self, formulated 
through complex processes of remembering and forgetting, and one in which the 
conscious “I” of the moment is inherently unreliable and unstable’. Its ambiguity, as 
Owen observes, lies in how ‘it was centrally concerned with a renegotiation of self 
that sought an accommodation with a unifying and transcendental spirituality even as 
it understood the self’s multiplicity and contingency’.109 In addition to Owen’s work, 
the last few years have seen similar investigations particularly in the field of literary 
studies. This is a welcome shift from the essentialist outlook that had dominated 
literary critical debates on the question of mysticism up to the eighties of the last 
century, and which still persists today – to which I will turn in the following section. 
The recent literary critical discussions that I am aware of which bear some proximity 
to the context of my own work, and which examine mysticism in fairly constructivist 
terms, are Colleen Pauza’s ‘Mysticism and the Mind: Varieties of Subjectivities in 
British and Irish Fiction, 1860-1940 and Beyond’ (2009),110 Cory Hutchinson-Reuss’s 
‘Mystical Compositions of the Self: Women, Modernism, and Empire’ (2010),111 and 
Anna Neill’s Primitive Minds: Evolution and Spiritual Experience in the Victorian 
Novel (2013).112 As Hutchinson-Reuss notes, studies of this kind113 partake in the 
larger critical conversation of ‘rethinking James’ that has principally taken place in 
the fields of philosophy, history and religious studies, but which has no doubt 
furnished literary critics with ample cues for further analysis and discussion. Whether 
explicitly stated or not, these studies contribute to building mysticism’s genealogical 
narrative that aims to unhinge the category from the eternal, de-politicized and 
universal realm in which William James had placed it at the turn of the twentieth 
century, bringing it back to the ‘conditioning webs’ of culture and history.114  
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Colleen Pauza’s ‘Mysticism and the Mind’ documents the emergence of 
mystical narrative elements in Victorian realist fiction as early as the mid-nineteenth-
century, identifying these as the source of the modernist conception of stream-of-
consciousness subjectivity, both of which are said to have been shaped by the constant 
merging of the spiritual and the physiological in the period’s psychological theories of 
the mind. One of the aims of Pauza’s work is to trace back some features of modern 
mysticism to George Eliot’s undogmatic construction of a ‘religion of humanity’ in 
her realist fiction, and how the latter was made possible through Eliot’s innovative 
narrative techniques. Taking inspiration from the work of Grace Jantzen and Richard 
King, Cory Hutchinson-Reuss’s study is an exploration of the gendered and orientalist 
mechanisms of authority in the mystical discourse of women writers who were 
conscious of the pervasive nationalist and imperialist climate of their times. Her study 
centres on how these writers ‘turned to the internal landscapes of the self and 
developed new aesthetic forms to convey psycho-spiritual reality’, arguing that the 
women writers she covers ‘occupy a range of positions regarding the self’s 
conundrums, depending upon the kind of mysticism they craft and the political issues 
they engage’.115 It should be noted, however, that Hutchinson-Reuss’s focus on the 
nineteenth century is confined to the developments occurring in its last decade, and 
these are examined more in the context of Modernism than in the context of late-
Victorian literature. Anna Neill’s Primitive Minds lends support to Pauza’s work in 
her investigation of how episodes of mystical experience correspond with the findings 
of nineteenth-century physiological psychology in the Victorian realist novel, and how 
this is especially manifested in ‘the creation of a narrative first-person or omniscient, 
centered consciousness’, one of the grounds on which this genre ‘rests its claim to 
modernity’. Neill particularly argues that, following the lead of Victorian evolutionist 
mental science, nineteenth-century realist fiction views mystical states of 
consciousness as cases of ‘temporary cerebral malfunction’ or ‘pathological mental 
events’ associated with ‘an evolutionary lower state’ that, nevertheless, ‘unlock 
perceptions of the “real” beyond the lens of ordinary human consciousness’. For Neill, 
then, a mystical state of consciousness ‘opens a space in the realist narrative fabric for 
the supernatural’, where the supernatural does not merely serve as an ‘object of 
																																																																																																																																																															
as table-rapping, mediumship, mesmerism, seances, palmistry, clairvoyance, astral travel, and crystal-
gazing. See Alex Owen’s The Place of Enchantment, pp. 3-6, for the difference between ‘mysticism’, 
‘spiritualism’ and ‘occultism’.  
115 Hutchinson-Reuss, pp. 4-5. 
	 37	
scientific curiosity’, but rather forms ‘the very perceptual basis by which these 
narratives are able to discern significant connections among characters, objects and 
everyday human events’.116  
As these studies may indicate, current historical and literary research on the 
nineteenth-century category of mysticism generally points to a growing interest in 
exploring its relationship to the developing field of psychology in the second half of 
the nineteenth century. Within the field of Victorian literary studies, moreover, the 
research interest is more specifically concerned with how the category was shaped by 
the shift of emphasis from a philosophical to a physiological perspective in mid-
nineteenth-century scientific studies of the mind,117 and how this played out in the 
Victorian realist fiction of the 1860s onward. This is indeed a valuable and rich 
avenue for uncovering some of the complex discursive processes through which the 
Jamesian definition of mysticism was constructed, offering insights that have not been 
previously addressed by the historical problematizations of the category that focus on 
its seventeenth- and twentieth-century developments. However, this attention to the 
interconnections of mysticism and Victorian advances in psychology cannot 
adequately account for the century’s earlier attempt, in the 1840s, to intellectually 
rehabilitate mysticism from public abuse,118 an endeavour that clearly had firmer ties 
to German philosophical Idealism. Another research avenue that can better help 
account for this, and which I believe is just as significant and promising for charting 
some of the cultural contours of nineteenth-century mysticism, is to examine the place 
of mysticism in Victorian poetry and poetic theory. This is neither to say that 
mysticism’s engagement with philosophical idealism, on the one hand, and the poetry 
and poetics of the period, on the other, was confined to the early part of the century; 
nor to imply that German idealism was the only conduit through which the nineteenth-
century categories of poetry and mysticism overlapped, for psychology certainly 
constituted another one. Rather, it is simply to argue that, through their negotiation 
and appropriation of the philosophy of the German Romantics, Victorian poets and 
their critics had much to do with the century’s earlier attempt at reconfiguring 
mysticism, and that acknowledging the significance of this begs an analysis of the 
larger question of their role in the modern formation of the category. The Making of 
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and Aesthetic and Ineffable ‘Mysticism’ in Victorian Poetry and Poetics is an attempt 
to illuminate some key aspects of this question. As the title of my thesis indicates, I 
am particularly interested in the Victorians’ contribution to the construction of 
mysticism as an aesthetic (or poetic) and ineffable category, and the cultural dynamics 
involved in that.  
Employing ‘mysticism’ as an analytic category in the study of Victorian poetry 
is, of course, nothing new. One can easily compile an extensive bibliography of the 
academic critical literature devoted to analysing the mysticism of various poets of the 
period – that is, those whose writings have been traditionally thought to manifest 
elements of mystical experience. Such critical assessments, however, and as hinted 
earlier, have been conducted from a predominantly essentialist viewpoint, which 
explains why any bibliography of this kind would show a general decline in the 
literary scholarship on the subject during the last two decades of the past century: it is 
a decline that, in my opinion, coincides with the falling-out-of-favour of the 
essentialist theory of mysticism, itself brought about by the advent of Katzian 
constructivism in the late 1970s. As Leigh Schmidt has declared, ‘mysticism’, in its 
essentialist sense, ‘is a category in disrepair’, and ‘its fall from theoretical grace has 
been precipitous’.119 But the fact that the essentialist paradigm has fallen on hard 
times does not mean that mysticism should become an outmoded category in critical 
discussions of nineteenth-century poets. It certainly does not detract from the fact that 
the mystical, as a concept, was a crucial one in the Victorian literary and critical 
imagination. On the contrary, I believe that adopting a constructivist approach to the 
subject can do much in the way of recuperating mysticism as a viable category for the 
analysis of the period’s poetry and its poetics. The constructivist reading that this 
thesis sets out to offer, therefore, is not solely for the purpose of uncovering the role 
of the period’s poetic culture in the modern construction of mysticism, but equally to 
cast light on how mysticism was a constitutive discourse in the Victorian making of 
(and theorizing about) poetry. In the chapters that follow, then, the discussion will be 
principally directed towards highlighting the Victorians’ preoccupation with the 
mystical, and how it informed their poetical output, as well as their criticism of it; 
concurrently, it will aim to delineate how the nineteenth-century discourses of and 
about poetry constituted one of the vital cultural channels that shaped the vast terrain 
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mysticism would come to occupy at the turn of the twentieth century. 
The Making of and Aesthetic and ineffable ‘Mysticism’ in Victorian Poetry and 
Poetics never strays far from the kind of questions that guide any constructivist 
deconstruction of the mystical, such as those proposed by Richard King at the outset 
of Orientalism:  
In any given sociohistorical context, what is the agenda of power 
underlying a particular characterization of mysticism? What 
evaluative judgments are being made in the decision to include or 
exclude certain phenomena from the category? What is at stake in 
giving a particular definition of the subject matter? 120 
These questions, of course, do not purport to introduce us to completely new ground 
in the literary scholarship on mysticism and Victorian poetry, for even the essentialist 
readings of the past century have occasionally touched upon, in one way or another, 
the cultural aspects of a given poet’s mystical experience/s. Nonetheless, such 
considerations of the nineteenth-century nexus of the mystical and the poetic from the 
perspective of cultural studies are mostly limited to instances of isolated discussions 
within studies that are primarily concerned with other topics, and seldom do more 
than point out the influence of the mystical on a particular poet or text.121 To my 
knowledge, no one has as yet undertaken a full-length study devoted entirely to the 
subject at hand. The problematization of mysticism that I offer here roughly spans the 
period between the mid-1820s and 1880s, a relatively broad context that allows me to 
draw connections among various poets, critics and their works, and weave these into a 
readable narrative where mysticism figures as a key player in the collective aesthetic 
consciousness of an age. It goes without saying that the approach of the present study 
does not aim or profess to effect a paradigm shift in the literary scholarship on 
mysticism, but is an attempt to explicitly define and reinforce an already emerging 
discourse in literary critical analyses that deal with this category. How my thesis seeks 
to answer the above questions will be outlined in the following section, but not before 
a brief look at some examples of the dominant essentialism of previous scholarship on 
the subject, and some of the theoretical issues that inform my approach. 
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5. Moving Beyond the Essentialist/Constructivist Divide: A Critique of 
Essentialist Readings of Victorian Poetry 
‘In aftertimes’, stated an anonymous essay of 1862, ‘when the characteristics of this 
century shall have been reflected upon, and chronicled, the mystic tendencies of it will 
assuredly not be forgotten’.122 This is exactly so; from the turn of the twentieth 
century onward, the critical literature that has noted the mystical tendencies of the 
Victorian period in general, and its poetry in particular, has been voluminous. With 
regard to the portion of it that focuses on the period’s poetry, I have earlier proposed 
that it has tended to cluster at the essentialist end of the spectrum, and I argue here 
that this is evident in its preoccupation with evaluating the phenomenological status of 
the ecstatic type of experiences that figure in Victorian poetry, those which have the 
potential of being considered mystical. Bearing in mind that the declared objective of 
its evaluations has often been to determine whether or not a given experience is 
worthy of being called ‘mystical’, the underlying premise that obviously drives the 
decisions of studies that belong to this literature is the belief that mysticism possesses 
an essential phenomenological character against which particular experiences can be 
judged. Of course, I exclude from this kind of criticism the substantial critical 
scholarship in which the terms ‘mystic’, ‘mystical’ and ‘mysticism’ are employed in a 
perfunctory manner, typically in a single throwaway statement, and with only a loose 
sense of their meaning. By this, I am referring to studies whose scholarly 
preoccupations are with other research questions unrelated to mysticism, and whose 
usage of the terms is at best incidental, showing no critical investment in the 
category’s essentialist/constructivist implications; such studies do not (and are not 
intended to) intervene in the literary critical debate over the mysticism of Victorian 
poets. The essentialist scholarship I have in mind, on the other hand, uses mysticism 
as a main analytic category and, so, directly takes part in that critical conversation. 
Examples from this literature are too numerous to catalogue here, but it would perhaps 
suffice to offer some representative examples from the literary scholarship on two 
Victorian poets whose writings have particularly attracted this kind of critical 
attention, namely, Alfred Lord Tennyson and Gerard Manley Hopkins. 
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Under a section entitled ‘Theism, No Mysticism’ in an article on ‘“Vision” in 
“The Holy Grail”’ (1996), James Bennett argues for the ‘rejection of the label 
“mystic” for Tennyson’. Although he admits that the poet often turned to the realm of 
private experience for a ‘personal relationship with the divine’, he believes that 
Tennyson’s intuitions did not amount to the mysticism of a Suso or a Richard Rolle, 
because they did not reflect the renunciative and ascetic qualities of the two. For him, 
the trance experience and dream of lyrics XCV and CIII of In Memoriam (1850), as 
well as the ‘waking trance’ which the poet described several times to friends and 
acquaintances,123 may be explained in psychological terms in relation to Tennyson’s 
troubled ‘sense of identity’. In particular, Bennett seconds Ashton Nichols’s view that 
these visions are probably nothing more than ‘epiphanies’, closer to Wordsworth’s 
‘spots of time’ or Browning’s ‘infinite moment’ than to anything that can be properly 
called ‘mystical’.124 What Nichols specifically argues in ‘The Epiphanic Trance 
Poem: Why Tennyson is Not a Mystic’ (1986) is not at all different from what R. C. 
Zaehner and other religious theorists and critics125 have traditionally suggested in their 
denial of Tennyson’s mysticism: that the poet’s trances lack an ‘intense consciousness 
of divine otherness’, i.e. an awareness of a personal God. In place of that, Nichols 
finds that these visions betray an uncertainty or doubt about the nature of the 
experience, which he identifies as the defining feature of the modern literary 
epiphany.126  
 That these arguments are based on essentialist models of mysticism is evident, 
for instance, in how Bennett justifies his verdict by recourse to the ‘features essential 
to mysticism’ as described by Mark Schorer (1846) in his own denial of the 
genuineness of William Blake’s mysticism, an argument that, in turn, takes William 
James to be the religious authority on the subject.127 This is at one remove from 
Nichols’s position, which directly cites James’s famous definition of mystical 
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experience, arguing that Tennyson’s descriptions of his trances do not meet the 
Jamesian criterion of ineffability.128 It should be noted, moreover, that Bennett’s and 
Nichols’s studies belong to a line of criticism that is often written in response to critics 
who also operate from an essentialist perspective but for the opposite purpose of 
proving that the poet’s work is ‘a record of genuine mystical experience’.129 One such 
critic is Stephen Grant, who, in ‘The Mystical Implications of In Memoriam’ (1962), 
seeks to demonstrate a connection between the phenomenological features of a 
Tennysonian trance and the four characteristics of mysticism outlined in James’s 
Varieties.130 Another is Carlisle Moore (1963), who refers to the Varieties’ two 
lectures on ‘conversion’ to propose that lyric XCV of In Memoriam bears all the 
‘earmarks’ of the mystical ‘phenomenon of religious conversion’.131 One reason that 
James’s Varieties had such a strong hold on twentieth-century critics of Tennyson is 
probably that the book itself documents Tennyson’s trances as one example of 
mystical experience, an opinion cited by A. Dwight Culler (1977) in his argument that 
the poet’s trances were induced by a transcendental ‘meditative technique’ akin to the 
ancient mantric practices of the Indian Vedic and the Chinese Zen traditions.132 More 
recently, in ‘Tennyson and Zeno: Three Infinities’ (2009), W. David Shaw builds on 
Culler’s essentialist analysis to similarly argue that, ‘as a mystic who is ultimately a 
monist’, Tennyson used ‘mantras to evoke God’s presence’, a notion that Shaw seeks 
to demonstrate by analytically comparing ‘the yoga of breath control and incantation’ 
with the alternations in Tennyson’s poetry between an ‘elliptically’ and an 
‘expansively sublime’ style.133 
 Moving to Hopkins scholarship, whereas James’s Varieties makes no mention 
of the poet, Evelyn Underhill – the second household name in the essentialist school 
of mysticism – describes him as being ‘perhaps the greatest mystical poet of the 
Victorian era’, and this in her book The Essentials of Mysticism and Other Essays 
(1820).134 One of the earliest essentialist readings of the poet in literary criticism, 
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however, is found in a 1933 essay by Herbert Read, who endorses the argument of 
Hopkins’s first biographer, the American Jesuit Gerald F. Lahey, that Hopkins’s 
‘Terrible Sonnets’ are a poetic rendering of the most dreadful and sublime stage of a 
mystic’s spiritual development, what Saint John of the Cross christened the ‘Dark 
Night of the Soul’. Affirming with Lahey that ‘Hopkins, smiling and joyful with his 
friends, was at the same time on the bleak heights of spiritual night with his God’,135 
Read declares that ‘this absence of spiritual complacency is of the very essence of 
Christian Mysticism’, a conclusion that clearly conceives mysticism via a 
phenomenological emphasis on essences.136 In addition to Underhill and Read, W. H. 
Auden (1964) was also in favour of viewing Hokpins as a mystic, which he does as 
part of advancing his own theory of mysticism. According to Auden, there are ‘four 
distinct kinds of mystical experience’, the first of which involves being ‘in 
communion with what Gerard Manley Hopkins called the inscape of things’, namely, 
a joyful awareness of the ‘numinous significance’ and holiness of the organic and 
inorganic objects of the material world.137 Auden’s commitment to the essentialist 
paradigm is evident in how he acknowledges the authority of William James, even 
loosely tailoring his fourfold typology according to ‘the mystical ladder’ outlined in 
the Varieties,138 while departing from its theory by proposing five fundamental 
features of mysticism (in place of the four Jamesian characteristics).139 
 Aside from this, critics who have rejected Hopkins’s mysticism have also done 
so on the same essentialist grounds by which Tennyson critics have denied the 
laureate the label ‘mystic-poet’: that the poet’s work shows no evidence that he 
experienced ‘the immediate awareness of God’s presence in the soul’. The latter 
words are those of John Pick (1942) in his argument that Hopkins’s poetry never 
‘expressed that which constituted the essence of the mystic’. For Pick, ‘the essence of 
mysticism, of “infused contemplation” (to speak of it in theologically accurate terms), 
is […] the felt contact, immediate and experimental without the intrusion of images or 
the discursive reason, of God’s presence’, a contact that he believes is nowhere to be 
found in the work of the Jesuit poet. From this perspective, Pick also takes issue with 
critics who have attributed ‘the aridity and desolation’ which is the subject of 
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Hopkins’s sombre sonnets of 1885-86 to the ‘Dark Night of the Soul’:  
Not a single line of Hopkins that is extant bears the authentic stamp 
of the very essence of the Dark Night of the Senses or of the Soul. 
He is not in any strict sense a contemplative or mystical poet. The 
sufferings and trials and aridities and desolations which he […] 
expressed in his Dublin poems are not the characteristics of the 
mystical life.140 
Pick’s view is along the lines of Humphry House’s (1935) previous argument of why 
‘Hopkins was not a mystic’: 
There is nothing in [his] poems to show that he felt that immediate 
and personal presence of God, a consciousness of which is common 
to the mystics […]. There is nothing of that disturbing intimacy in 
the love of God which is the mark of St. Teresa and of St. John of 
the Cross.141 
In recent years, moreover, Jill Muller also arrived at the same conclusions after 
analysing the controversial sonnets against Evelyn Underhill’s chapter on ‘The Dark 
Night of the Soul’. In her 2003 book on Hopkins’s Catholicism, Muller observes that, 
while there is a resemblance between the morbidity expressed in the sonnets and the 
‘purificatory sufferings of St. John of the Cross and other mystics, such a resemblance 
provides a flimsy basis from which to argue that the poet was himself a mystic’. 
Central to her argument is the notion that Hopkins’s last poems, those following the 
‘sonnets of desolation’, ‘proffer little or no evidence of mystic experience’ that finally 
leads ‘to union with God’, which is the expected outcome of the traditional ‘Dark 
Night of the Soul’ according to Underhill’s essentialist model.142 The persistence of 
this critical position is likewise evident in the recent writings of Dennis Sobolev, who 
judges the poet’s work to be no more than ‘partially’ mystical, because it only fulfills 
what he refers to as the ‘minimal definition’ of mysticism. According to his article 
‘Gerard Manley Hopkins and the Language of Mysticism’ (2004), an adequate 
minimal definition of mystical experience is what has been articulated by the Catholic 
theologian, Louis Bouyer, as being ‘quite simply total self-abandonment in naked 
faith’, which may include a spiritual awareness of the divine principle in nature. What 
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Sobolev contrarily proposes as a maximal definition requires that there ‘be an ascent 
toward God’, an act of the ‘transcendence of the material world whereby the soul is 
reunited with its Creator’, a definition that, together with the minimal one, reinforces 
the same hierarchal gradations of mystical experience offered by the essentialist 
theories of James and Underhill.143 Sobolev, it should be mentioned, also reiterates 
this argument in his most recent book The Split World of Gerard Manley Hopkins: An 
Essay in Semiotic Phenomenology (2011).144 
Although the above-reviewed studies on Tennyson and Hopkins differ in some 
important respects, one thing they have in common is their preoccupation with 
offering a phenomenological definition of mysticism, by which its authenticity in a 
given text may be evaluated, or according to which a particular text can be interpreted. 
As indicated in this chapter’s earlier overview of the essentialist and constructivist 
schools, constructivists rightly point out that one of the methodological deficiencies of 
the essentialist phenomenology of mysticism, to which the above studies variously 
subscribe, is that it is implicitly theological. This, they also argue, generates an 
ideologically ‘exclusionary narrative’. 145  Indeed, in light of the literature just 
reviewed, a compelling argument can be made that any literary-critical study adopting 
this approach cannot escape making onto-theological truth claims that are many times 
imposed on the reader, or on the literary text itself. This is because such a study 
depends in its analysis on a number of ontological and phenomenological categories 
that it ‘unreflectively’ takes as real, self-evident, universal, and as constituting stable 
referents from which the meaning of the literary text can be derived, and this without 
addressing the problem that categories of this kind are, in fact, highly contentious.  
For example, in the literary interpretations put forth by James Bennett, Ashton 
Nichols (in Tennyson scholarship), John Pick, Humphry House, Jill Muller and 
Dennis Sobolev (in Hopkins scholarship), the critic takes it for granted not only that 
mystical experiences are objectively real, but also that genuine mysticism must 
‘essentially’ involve a spiritual merger in ‘the Other’ (that is, a personal God who is 
separate from creation), neglecting the fact that not all readers share these religious 
assumptions: some readers simply do not believe in the reality of mystical 
experiences, even though they subscribe to a similar theistic or ‘dualistic’ religion that 
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‘insists upon the distinction between the creator and the created’; some, on the other 
hand, do take seriously the mystics’ claims, but adhere to a ‘monistic’ religious 
tradition that ‘views the universe as of one substance or being’ with ‘no final 
distinction of kind’, as in the case of some of the atheistic religions of the East;146 and 
yet some readers are committed to a materialist ideology that has no place for the 
supernatural or the divine. With their religious sources being overwhelmingly 
Christian, or from a Christian background, the insistence of these critics that true 
mysticism necessarily involves a spiritual union with a personal God is clearly an 
imposition (whether intentional or not) of Christian categories on their readers. It 
demonstrates Raymond Nelson’s observation in ‘Mysticism and the Problems of 
Mystical Literature’ (1976) that much of the scholarship on mysticism (including that 
conducted in literary studies) is based on a Western and Christian point of view that 
privileges a dualistic religious philosophy over a monistic one. Nelson explains that 
this arises from the fact that ‘the most influential studies of mysticism were written by 
Christians at the end of the nineteenth century when most Asian religions were still 
suspect’.147 One would not be mistaken to assume, therefore, that arguing that the 
perceived monistic propensities of Tennyson or Hopkins – and, by extension, of 
Eastern religions – constitute a false or an inferior form of mysticism ‘suggests a kind 
of theological or moral coercion on the part of the critic rather than an attempt at 
literary analysis’, to borrow the words of Harold Bloom from a related context.148 
But surely Bloom’s quasi-constructivist suggestion does not only apply to 
critics who base their analysis on religious views that privilege Christian ontological 
categories. Even in the case of A. Dwight Culler and W. David Shaw, for instance, 
who favourably assert Tennyson’s mysticism in relation to Eastern religious 
traditions, their phenomenological analyses of his poetry are similarly problematic 
from a constructivist point of view. This is on the grounds that implicit in their 
interpretations is the a priori assumption that the truth-claims of Buddhist and Hindu 
mystics possess ontological significance, an assumption that, again, is not likely to 
prove meaningful to many readers. Shaw’s study, for example, discusses how 
‘Tithonus’ (1833-1859) and ‘The Ancient Sage’ (1885) verbally recreate ‘the moment 
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of fugitive enlightenment that Zen calls satori’, arguing that the poems depict 
Tennyson’s ‘experience of the Absolute’ as an ‘instant of oscillation’ between ‘the 
blissful moment of merging with the One and the moment of abrupt awakening when 
the mind draws back to reflect on its dream’. This Shaw does by referring to the 
essentialist Buddhist scholar T. D. Suzuki, who, in The Field of Zen (1970), describes 
the spiritual phenomenology of ‘satori’ as ‘the oneness dividing itself into the subject-
object and yet retaining its oneness at the very moment that there is the awakening of 
a consciousness’.149 But, while the thematic and stylistic implications that Shaw 
gleans from such a reading hold much merit for those open to Buddhist philosophy, or 
even to religious pluralism, how seriously can they be taken by a reader whose notions 
of the sacred are antithetical to this, or by one who entertains a strictly secular 
conception of mysticism? As Robert Sharf notes in his criticism of the essentialist 
rhetoric of experience found in similar studies, ‘while these representations […] 
assume the rhetorical stance of phenomenological description, we are not obliged to 
accept them as such’: 
We must remain alert to the ideological implications of such a 
stance. Any assertion to the effect that someone else’s inner 
experience bears some significance for my construal of reality is 
situated, by its very nature, in the public realm of contested 
meanings.150 
I do not, of course, wish to hold up the social constructivist approach to 
mysticism as one that is ideally free of ideologically exclusionary practices. As 
mentioned earlier in this chapter, some constructivists, in their hermeneutical distrust 
of the essentialists’ emphasis on phenomenology, have gone beyond challenging the 
sui generis discourse on mystical experiences to taking up an epistemological position 
that completely rejects their ontological reality. The ‘abolitionists’ or ‘deflationists’, 
as they are sometimes called, argue that religion – including mystical experience – 
‘has no ontological status’, that it exists only as a ‘conceptual tool’, corresponding to 
‘nothing outside the modern Western imagination’. For them, it is a concept that ‘is so 
bias, so theologically and ideologically laden, that the best thing for scholars to do is 
to abandon it’.151  Not only that, they also call for entirely disbanding or revamping 
the academic discipline of Religious Studies, in which the essentialist discourse has 
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been vindicated for so long. Not surprisingly, however, the abolitionist view has 
attracted many detractors, even within the constructivist camp, and they have 
challenged it on multiple grounds, arguing, for instance, that there is a ‘difference 
between saying that religious experience is nothing but a discursive construction and 
saying that it is something that is a discursive construction’; that the constructivist 
approach can still entertain the notion that ‘there is a thing called religious experience, 
a phenomenon that exists in a few overlapping parts of the human world without being 
a universal feature of human nature’; and that it is still possible for religious theorists 
to talk ‘positively about religious experience in a way that avoids some of the major 
pitfalls of the sui generis approach’. 152  But most significantly for the present 
discussion, detractors of the abolitionist line of social constructivism have called 
attention to how its proponents operate on a discourse that is said to be itself 
‘ideologically poisonous’.153  
This argument is explored in Benjamin Y. Fong’s ‘On Critics and What’s 
Real: Russell McChutcheon on Religious Experience’. According to Fong, the 
abolitionist constructivist discourse ‘wants, effectively, to cast out scholars who treat 
discursive constructs as realities’, and, in doing so, ‘acts in complicity with a new 
power dynamic’, one that seeks to denigrate the liberal humanist project within the 
field of Religious Studies, asserting, instead, the primacy of the ‘critical’ perspective 
within the more empirically oriented disciplines of History, Anthropology and 
Sociology. He contends that, if this brand of social constructivism were to practice 
some ‘reflexive application’ of its own theories, it would find that its deconstruction 
of religious experience, ‘which was supposed to undermine the categories by which 
domination is enacted’, has ‘inadvertently led to a resentful, but no less respectful, 
deference to authority’. 154  As Grace Jantzen has it, such discourse is ‘simply 
postmodern criticism’s imposition of its own sense of enlightenment’.155 In other 
words, like the religious essentialists, the academic Foucaultians on the extreme end 
of the essentialist-constructivist spectrum are not without their own ideological 
agendas, which they similarly pursue by creating their own social constructs and 
conceptual tools, one of which is ‘western civilization’: 
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If the humanist is guilty of helping invent and defend the 
“ahistorical, monolithic homogeneity” cum ideological weapon 
known as religion, so too is the social constructionist guilty of 
helping invent and critique the ahistorical, monolithic homogeneity 
cum ideological weapon known as “Western Civilization”, […] a 
rhetorical tool that creates and sustains his own seemingly coherent 
social identity. 
Fong believes that one of the unfortunate consequences of the abolitionist perspective 
is that it has led to ‘further entrenchment’ within the constructivist/essentialist divide, 
in which scholars on each side ‘are only too happy to have critics rather than 
conversation partners’, both being ‘interested in delimiting the bounds of [the] other’:  
 [The] investment in the unreality of discursive products, like [the] 
investment in the reality of a sacred essence, plays out in a certain 
context of which we ought to be aware: namely, the sharp split 
between the “scientific” treatment of “natural” phenomena and the 
“critical” treatment of “constructed” phenomena, two spheres within 
which two very different kinds of “intellectuals” now assert and 
affirm themselves.156 
This is the place to make a few important assertions about some of the 
intentions underpinning the critical position I adopt in this thesis. First, my choice of 
employing the constructivist approach here is in no way an attempt to engage with the 
question of the reality or unreality of mystical experiences, nor is it necessarily a 
refusal of one or another essentialist definition of mysticism. Also, my rejection of the 
critical practice found in the above-cited studies on Tennyson and Hopkins – a 
practice that I believe represents a pervasive critical trend in literary studies on 
mysticism – should not indicate that I am, per se, against the use of the essentialist 
approach in literary criticism. Rather, what I particularly find objectionable in these 
studies is the absence of any form of critical reflection upon one’s adopted definition 
of the category, how each critic’s personal beliefs about what fundamentally 
constitutes the mystics’ private subjective experiences are taken as self-evident, with 
the implicit assumption that they are ‘not open for critical scrutiny’.157 On this point, I 
agree with Kevin Schilbrack and others that, with the substantial amount of criticism 
that has been leveled so far against the perennialist paradigm, it has become 
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‘indefensible’ to adopt an essentialist stance that is uncritical about ‘the epistemic 
location’ from which it speaks, and one that displays no awareness of ‘the 
complexities and nuances that any adequate view of religious experience […] has to 
admit and reconcile’.158 Although examples of its application have been scarce in 
literary criticism, I do believe that critical reflexivity is not incompatible with the 
essentialist focus on phenomenology, and that some aesthetic value could be derived 
from an application of both in a critical reading of a literary text.159 This is all to say 
that, unlike the abolitionist scholars of social constructivism, my own preference for 
employing the constructivist method in this thesis is not an attempt to silence the 
voices of contemporary literary critics who are interested in the phenomenology of 
mysticism. 
Having said that, I also agree with the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
that we are in need of more cultural-constructivist critiques of the mystical so as to 
‘help neutralize the conception of the solely private nature of mysticism’,160  a 
conception born of the long dominance of the essentialist approach in scholarly 
investigations of the category, and one from which the current state of knowledge has 
still not fully recovered.161 To state this in terms more relevant to my study, I believe 
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that the past dominance of the essentialist method in literary critical inquiries of 
mysticism has led to the treatment of ‘mystical texts’ as each being nothing but a 
record of an intense private subjective experience that provides genuine insights into 
the inner world of the writer/poet; and it is my view that this perspective ought to be 
neutralized by turning our attention to the cultural aspects of mysticism, attending to 
the fact that literary discourses of and about mysticism are inevitably inscribed in 
public documents, with a communicative and performative function. This is prompted 
by my belief that the previous critical emphasis on the experiential aspects of the 
mysticism of a given literary text has distracted much attention from other significant 
aspects of mysticism that could be recognized by analysing the same material, but in a 
different way. In doing the latter, I seek to achieve some measure of scholarly 
neutrality by taking a middle way position on the essentialist-constructivist spectrum, 
de-ontologizing mysticism merely for interpretive purposes, while suspending 
judgment on questions pertaining to the philosophy and phenomenology of religion. 
In this sense, my application of the constructivist approach is germane to that of 
Richard King, who locates his work within ‘the history of ideas’, distinguishing it 
‘from philosophy on the grounds that the latter involves an engagement and 
evaluation of ideas rather than a non-committal examination of concepts within their 
own cultural and historical context’.162  
6. Thesis Scope and Structure 
Save for a few instances, all of the texts I refer to in support of my argument in this 
thesis are not by Victorian writers whose notions of mysticism held close associations 
to Christian theology and exegesis, nor those who ideologically regarded themselves 
as speaking from within a tradition of Christian orthodoxy. For example, little or 
nothing is said in relation to Charles Kingsley, John Keble, Christina Rossetti, or 
Hopkins, not for their lack of writing on the subject. This is an intentional omission, 
because, as Leigh Schmidt explains, the emergence of modern mysticism as an 
essentialist construct at the turn of the twentieth century was the product of a certain 
‘Romantic universalism’ that was expressly working towards ‘shearing it of distinct 
practices’ in a way that could serve as a ‘basis for moving beyond theological 
differences’. ‘The everlasting and triumphant mystical tradition’, William James 
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would aver in the Varieties, ‘hardly altered by differences of clime or creed. In 
Hinduism, in Neoplatonism, in Sufism, in Christian mysticism, in Whitmanism, we 
find the same recurring note’.163 I am solely interested in nineteenth-century writers 
who more directly contributed to this non-theological, even anti-creedal, 
understanding of mysticism. Moreover, while by no means exhaustive in the selection 
of the materials I cite, I intend to pursue my argument across a diverse range of 
writers, both canonical and non-canonical, so as to indicate the far-reaching nature of 
the intellectual process that went into the modern making of mysticism as a poetic and 
an ineffable construct. But these selections are also meant to contextualize the in-
depth analysis I attempt to offer of two literary figures who are of particular interest to 
the topic at hand: that is, Thomas Carlyle, and James Thomson (B. V.). One of the 
rationales for structuring my analysis around a case study of these two writers is that it 
would allow me to convey the great extent to which mysticism had influenced the 
intellectual life of individual writers living in the nineteenth century, whereas the 
contextualizing material could serve to indicate how the mystical preoccupations of an 
individual writer was part of a larger preoccupation that characterized the Victorian 
discourse on poetry. My choice of these two particular writers – one of whom 
occupied the centre of Victorian literary culture, and the other its periphery – is also 
significant.  
In a study that primarily works with an understanding of ‘mysticism’ as a term 
that always represents the conceptual locus of a struggle ‘for recognition and 
authority’,164 Carlyle is of primary importance, not only for the authoritative and 
central place he held among the Victorian literati, nor for his own preoccupation with 
the question of authority,165 but also for the vital part he played in the popularization 
of mysticism in Victorian intellectual culture, something that this thesis intends to 
highlight. As for James Thomson, his significance for this study partly derives from 
the facts that he wrote from a peripheral cultural location, and that he was conscious 
of his own marginality, which I believe offers a distinctive case where mysticism 
functions as a category of resistance to cultural marginalization. Indeed, in his case, I 
																																																								
163 Schmidt, ‘MMM’ (pp. 287-8, 290).  
164 Richard King, Orientalism, p. 18.  
165 For this, see, for example, Chris R. Vanden Bossche, Carlyle and the Search for Authority (Ohio: 
Ohio State University Press, 1991); David Riede, ‘Transgression, Authority, and the Church of 
Literature in Carlyle’, in Victorian Connections, ed. by Jerome McGann (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1989), pp. 88-120; and ‘Communities in Mourning: Making Capital Out of Loss in 
Thomas Carlyle’s Past and Present and Heroes’ in Daniela Garofalo’s Manly Leaders in Nineteenth-
Century British Literature (New York: SUNY Press, 2008), pp. 95-111.  
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argue that the struggle for authority could be understood as a response not only to the 
general marginalization of poetry as a cultural power, but also to the intellectual 
relegation that Thomson himself had suffered in consequence of his association with 
the militant atheism and radicalism of Charles Bradlaugh’s National Reformer. But 
Thomson’s significance for my analysis equally derives from the fact that, throughout 
the development of his religious beliefs, from the theism of his early twenties to his 
later self-proclaimed atheism, the poet never gave up his interest in mysticism and the 
belief in its fundamental relationship to poetry. Tracing the modifications of 
Thomson’s aesthetic theory along his religious and intellectual development will help 
underscore two central points of this study: the first is the conceptual elasticity and 
openness of the category of mysticism, how it may encompass a wide range of 
meanings according to the spiritual or cultural needs of the individual/group by which 
it is employed; secondly, that the one common element that lies behind all definitions 
of the term is the drive for authority. I especially agree with R. A. Forsyth, who has 
offered an account of Thomson’s ‘gradual loss of faith’ in response to ‘the rising tide 
of evolutionary science’, notably arguing that ‘he demonstrates in miniature the 
spiritual history of his time; and therein rests his prime importance’.166 A similar thing 
could be said about Thomson’s significance for a study of the cultural construction of 
mysticism in Victorian poetry and poetics: that his career-long engagement with this 
concept, including his later adaptations to its definition, reflects on a larger scale the 
history of its development in the second half of the Victorian age: how the Romantic 
appropriation of the term in the mid-nineteenth century was especially freighted with 
religious meanings and how this would gradually change at the turn of the century, 
where it would become more open to secular and naturalistic interpretations.  
As for the structure of my argument, it will be divided into three chapters. 
Chapter II, ‘“Poetry then is Our Mysticism”: The Victorian Making of an Aesthetic 
Mysticism’, begins with a discussion of the Modernist period, with the purpose of 
establishing that mysticism indeed figured as an aesthetic category in twentieth-
century philosophical and literary discourse, showing how its notions of the mystical 
were closely bound up with those of the poetic. William James, Evelyn Underhill, 
Aldous Huxley, T. S. Eliot, John M. Murray, Hart Crane and Wallace Stevens are 
among the philosophers and poets discussed in this section. The chapter’s main 
																																																								
166 ‘Evolutionism and the Pessimism of James Thomson (Bv)’, Essays in Criticism, 12.2 (1962), 148-
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argument is that the twentieth-century aesthetic and poetic construction of mysticism 
finds its source in the long Victorian debate about the nature and function of poetry, 
particularly that which reflected the spiritual concerns of a perceived post-Christian 
perspective. Building on Grace Jantzen’s and Richard King’s premise that definitions 
of mysticism represent the conceptual site of a historical struggle over meaning and 
authority, I propose that the period’s discourse on mysticism was a constitutive 
discourse for Victorian formulations of poetic theory, offering poets and critics alike 
an important means for asserting and making sense of the place of poetry in the 
increasingly secularized milieu of nineteenth-century culture. I support this argument 
by reference to a range of Victorian thinkers and literary figures, including Thomas 
Carlyle, John Stuart Mill, Alfred Lord Tennyson, George Eliot, Algernon Swinburne, 
and Elizabeth Barrett Browning, all of whom show the influence of the Romantic and 
German Idealist traditions in their desire to stress the authority of intuitions as an 
ultimate source of knowledge that is comparable, if not superior, to the much 
venerated logic of the rationalists.  
Carlyle on mysticism is the subject of Chapter III, which aims to underscore 
not only Carlyle’s pioneering engagement with this category, but also the leading role 
he played in the construction of one of the essential features of mysticism in its 
modernist (Jamesian) sense: namely, its ineffability. This is discussed in the context of 
his early inclination towards ‘Germanizing the public’ through his early essays of the 
1820s and 1830s, which culminated in his first major work, Sartor Resartus (1833-
4).167 I particularly examine his contribution to the conceptual shift in the nineteenth-
century understanding of the mystical from a category that was pejoratively used to 
signify ‘vagueness’ and ‘unintelligibility’ to one that was invoked as an honorific title 
to describe the highest order of poets, and the transcendental conditions of their poetic 
creativity. The chapter demonstrates that Carlyle’s defence against employing 
mysticism in the former accusatory sense involved defending the stylistic 
irregularities of mystical poets by positively attributing them, not to a want of 
eloquence on the mystics’ part, but rather to the inherent incapacity of language to 
accommodate their intuitions of an infinite and supernatural reality. This meant 
conceding that mystics are indeed vague and obscure, but only to those whose 
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intuitive powers of comprehension have been dulled by the empiricism and material 
philosophy of the period. I also explore this argument in relation to other significant 
Victorian poets and critics, including Tennyson, Barrett Browning, Swinburne, and 
Arthur Symons. Placing Carlyle’s early work in the context of a substantial corpus of 
other nineteenth-century writings will lead to one of the main points I intend to 
highlight in this chapter: that is, the crucial role that Victorian poetic theory had in the 
modern construction of an ineffable mysticism, in many ways making this construct 
an artefact of Victorian poetics. 
Chapter IV picks up some of the key notions discussed in the previous two 
chapters and incorporates them into an elaborate analysis of James Thomson’s 
relationship to mysticism. The analysis begins with a study of Thomson’s early career, 
calling attention to his claims for the privileged status of poetry and its ability to 
supplant traditional Christianity as an authentic source of divinely inspired truth. 
Central to this discussion is how Thomson’s claims for poetry involved defining 
mysticism as being the highest form of poetry. Referring to a number of Thomson’s 
essays of the 1860s, I focus on his conception of ‘poetic inspiration’ as a form of 
mystical experience, falling back on the complex web of relations he weaves between 
‘Poets’ and ‘Mystics’. In doing so, the chapter casts light on how Thomson’s early 
writings employ the category of mysticism to distinguish between inspired and 
uninspired poetry, with the former being construed as representative of ‘quintessential 
poetry’. An analysis of Thomson’s later critical position will reveal that the poet never 
abandoned his notions of mysticism nor his theory of poetic inspiration, only the 
belief in their divine origin, and that his reconfiguration of these was in such a way 
that allowed him to maintain his early Romantic notions about the prophetic role of 
the poet as the possessor of a unique and privileged insight. I argue that his later 
position, while not yet informed by the Romantic permutations of psychoanalysis, 
belongs to the pre-Freudian intellectual culture of the late nineteenth century that was 
witnessing attempts to ‘neutralize’ Romanticism’s ‘revelatory moments’, by 
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CHAPTER II 
‘Poetry then is our Mysticism’:  
The Victorian Making of an Aesthetic ‘Mysticism’ 
It is curious to observe how universally the Poet still vindicates his 
sway over us, how the Pleasures of Imagination are part of the 
inheritance of all men. In every man, there lies a mystic universe, 
which when the words, ‘Let there be light,’ are spoken, starts into 
visibility.  
Thomas Carlyle, 1830. 
Poetical Thought! – reader, light up the lamps of your spirit, and 
look at her. The glory of the earth, more than its glory, is burning in 
her eyes with a deep, mystical, unquenchable fire […]. The sword of 
the cherubim, which drove from the world its vision of beauty, left 
one in her soul, and from the depths of that soul she gathers it, and 
spreads it over the withering land, and wailing sea, and darkening 
sky; and tries to call them as God called them ere the ruins came, 
“very good”. 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, 1836. 
Mystics [are] all great artists, for they do but body forth, according 
to their diverse gifts, which they have intuitively discerned in the 
high reasons of their fancies: […] because their greatest thoughts 
have never been the result of laborious effort, nay, nor of conscious 
induction, but have been apprehended by the lighting flash of 
genius: and also because their essential theme is connected with the 
one feeling only to be mystically apprehended, namely the relation 
of the individual to the Absolute.1 
W. S. Lilly,2 1884. 
																																																								
1 Thomas Carlyle, Carlyle’s Unfinished History of German Literature, ed. by Hill Shine (Lexington, 
KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1951), p. 6; Elizabeth Barrett Browning, ‘A Thought on Thoughts’, 
The Athenæum (23 July 1836), 522-23 (p. 522); and W. S. Lilly, ‘Modern Mysticism’, Fortnightly 
Review, 36 (1 September 1884), 292-308 (pp. 305-6).  
2 William Samuel Lilly, a well-known English man of letters, and a barrister ‘in nothing much beyond 
the title’. He often contributed to the major publications of his time, including The Fortnightly Review, 
The Dublin Review, The Nineteenth Century, The Contemporary Review and Popular Science Monthly. 
He was a Justice of Peace for Middlesex and London, an Honorary Fellow of Peterhouse, Cambridge 
(since 1893), and was also elected as a member of The Athenæum ‘under its rule regarding 
distinguished men’. Writing to Thomas Huxley, Herbert Spencer described him as ‘a foeman worthy of 
your steel’. A ‘liberal’ Catholic, Lilly’s ‘Modern Mysticism’ (pp. 293-98, 300, 306) defines mysticism 
in clear essentialist terms, asserting its universalism in very sympathetic language, and tracing its 
historical manifestations in Hinduism, Buddhism, Neo-Platonism, Sufism, and Christianity. See ‘Death 
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The epigraphs chosen to open this chapter indicate a connection between two concepts 
upon which rests its primary concern: mysticism and art.3 I argue in this chapter that 
the language employed here by Carlyle, Barrett Browning and W. S. Lilly of The 
Fortnightly Review characterizes a significant strand in the Victorian debate about 
poetry that displayed an increasing interest in utilizing the terms ‘mystic’, ‘mystical’ 
and ‘mysticism’ as a way of asserting the cultural authority of poets. It is my 
contention that this intellectual current was particularly working to associate poetry 
and art with a certain conceptualization of mysticism which drew on both the 
Romantic and German Idealist traditions, and that underlying all this was a clear 
cultural and ideological agenda. It is the same agenda behind the many religious 
claims that were being made for poetry during the nineteenth century4 in the face of its 
ever-growing enthusiasm for the rationalist and materialist philosophies of the time. 
Most of these claims were from a non-Christian or post-Christian perspective, 
occurring at a time when it seemed that the Bible was fast losing its credibility as a 
cultural force, their chief aim being to transfer what can be salvaged of its spiritual 
and moral functions to the realms of ‘Poetry’ and ‘Art’. From a constructivist 
perspective, the overall aim of this chapter is to assert the role of Victorian poetic 
theory in the modern aestheticization of the mystical, but this first requires 
establishing the fact that mysticism did indeed emerge as a poetic and aesthetic 
construct in twentieth-century modernist discourse, something that has not received 
due recognition by previous cultural investigations of this category. Before exploring 
the category’s use in the Victorian context, therefore, I begin my analysis with a 
consideration of the discursive relationship between mysticism and poetry in the 
context of twentieth-century writing on religion and aesthetics.  
1. The Aestheticization of Mysticism in Modernist Discourse 
To illustrate the figuration of modern mysticism as a poetic and aestheticized 
construct at the beginning of the twentieth century, a good point to start with is the 
writings of William James and Evelyn Underhill, whose works were influential in 
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3 It is useful, at this point, to cite Isobel Armstrong’s observation that, for the Victorians, ‘the category 
of art’ was ‘almost always poetry’: Victorian Poetry: Poetry, Poetics and Politics, p. 3. 
4 David J. DeLaura, ‘The Future of Poetry: A Context for Carlyle and Arnold’, in Carlyle and His 
Contemporaries, ed. by John Clubbe (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1976), pp. 148-
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setting the terms and framework for the essentialist paradigm of mysticism that was to 
dominate academic scholarship up to the last quarter of the century. As far as James is 
concerned, it is compelling enough that the only experience of the mystical variety 
that he reports as having – and to which he actually traces the origin of his Varieties,5 
as well as what he calls his ‘mystical germ’6 – is described as being identical to the 
experience of ‘the poet’. The incident itself, occurring in an 1898 mountain-hiking 
trip, is surprisingly of the lesser-known aspects of James’s interest in mysticism, as his 
account of it only appears in a letter to his wife; to readers of his Varieties, however, 
he claimed to adopt an objective approach to the subject from the perspective of an 
outside observer, as indicated in the following lines: 
Whether my treatment of mystical states will shed more light or 
darkness, I do not know, for my own constitution shuts me out from 
their enjoyment almost entirely, and I can speak of them only at 
second hand. But though forced to look upon the subject so 
externally, I will be as objective and receptive as I can.7   
Contrarily to this, the account in his letter eloquently details his enjoyment of ‘a state 
of spiritual alertness of the most vital description’, where he felt as if ‘the Gods of all 
the nature-mythologies’ and ‘the moral Gods of the inner life’ were ‘holding an 
indescribable meeting in [his] breast’. ‘The intense significance’, he declares, ‘of the 
whole scene’ where this occurred, ‘its everlasting freshness and its immemorial 
antiquity and decay’, the ‘influences of Nature, the wholesomeness of the people 
round’ him, as well as the thought of his wife, children and his relation to them were 
all intricately ‘part and parcel’ of the entire experience, ‘and beaten up with it, so that 
memory and sensation all whirled inexplicably together’.8 James emphasizes over and 
over again the sense of heightened ‘significance’ as the most characteristic feature of 
that experience, which is the exact definition he employs with regard to the first type 
of the mystical states of consciousness identified in the Varieties,9 showing that he did 
actually consider himself to be intimately familiar with the phenomena of his 
investigation. The interesting point to highlight here is how the conclusion of his 
																																																								
5 William James, The Letters of William James, ltd. edn, 2 vols (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1920), 
II, p. 77. 
6 Kevin Stein, Poetry’s Afterlife: Verse in the Digital Age (Ann Arbor: University Of Michigan Press, 
2010), p. 236. 
7 Varieties, p. 379. See also p. 89, and Ralph Perry, The Thought and Character of William James 
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1935), p. 330. 
8 Letters of James, pp. 76-7. 
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description indicates his belief that such a mystical state necessarily underlies the 
creative force of the poetic mind:  
It was one of the happiest lonesome nights of my existence, and I 
understand now what a poet is. He is a person who can feel the 
immense complexity of influences that I felt, and make some partial 
tracks in them for verbal statement.10  
 It is small wonder, then, that aesthetic experience, whether that of poetic 
creation or appreciation, occupies a definite rung on ‘the mystical ladder’11 outlined in 
James’s theory. Although James does not necessarily consider poets to be full-fledged 
religious mystics,12 he undoubtedly believed that a true poet, in the league of a 
Wordsworth or Shelley, for example, is one who has mystically attained a ‘higher 
vision of an inner significance’ in nature, what he also referred to as the ‘mystic sense 
of hidden meaning’.13 For him, the function of poetry and art is to offer a glimpse into 
this mysterious region, so that the failure of an audience to be moved by them 
indicates their own loss of an innate mystical perception:  
Most of us can remember the strangely moving power of passages in 
certain poems read when we were young, irrational doorways as 
they were through which the mystery of fact, the wildness and the 
pang of life, stole into our hearts and thrilled them. […] Lyric poetry 
and music are alive and significant only in proportion as they fetch 
these vague vistas of a life continuous with our own, beckoning and 
inviting, yet ever eluding our pursuit. We are alive or dead to the 
eternal inner message of the arts according as we have kept or lost 
this mystical susceptibility.14 
It may be true that the aesthetic pleasure taken in an artwork is located, among 
other states of consciousness, at the lowest level in James’s hierarchy of mystical 
																																																								
10 Letters of James, pp. 77.  
11 Varieties, p. 383. 
12 In the Varieties, true poetry is considered the result either of a ‘sporadic’ mystical state of 
consciousness, or of a more religiously cultivated mystical life. The sporadic experiences are 
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highest experience of ‘the immediate presence of God’, all of which are generally characterised by an 
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‘twice-born’, or of the ‘sick soul’, in which the individual, driven by a pessimistic conviction of the 
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experiences;15 but the fact that his discussion of the ‘deeper plunges into the mystical 
consciousness’ up to the highest level of ‘religious mysticism pure and simple’ is 
dependent for illustration on the writings of poets and literary figures16 suggests the 
pervasive place that artists take in this hierarchy. This also reveals the extent to which 
mysticism was aestheticized in his work. Indeed, it is not irrelevant that the highly 
aesthetic approach of the Varieties itself has been variously noted by Jamesian 
scholars, who, in doing so, have indirectly pointed not only to how such modern 
philosophical negotiations of mysticism too often collapsed into literary discourse,17 
but also to how James’s notions of the mystical were closely tethered to those of the 
poetic. G. William Barnard, for instance, observes: 
James’s language is not that of the logician, who attempts to 
“elaborate a consistent system and avoid errors of technique,” but 
rather, it is the language of a poet, who strives to “create such a 
compelling interpretation of life that the reader can appropriate it as 
her own.” James’s philosophy not only denotes and specifies; it also 
connotes, evokes, stirs.18  
Similarly, Charlene H. Seigfried describes the ‘ideal’ guiding James’s work as one 
that involves a ‘conjunction of science and poetry, of fact and theory, of exact 
description and flights of fancy, of accurateness and passion’.19 On the same note, 
Douglas Anderson contends that ‘James’s work in Varieties creates space not only for 
religion and religious experience, but for […] our romances with poetry, art and 
music’.20 It seems, one may argue, that the modern discourse on mysticism, even 
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Tennyson (p. 297), J. A. Symonds (pp. 298-9, 302-4), Charles Kingsley (298), the Swiss philosopher, 
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American Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 201. 
18 G. William Barnard, Exploring Unseen Worlds: William James and the Philosophy of Mysticism 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997), p. 2. 
19 Ibid., p. 2. See also Meaning and Action (New York: Bobbs-Merril, 1968), by Horace Thayer, who 
was critical of this type of discourse, and went so far as to conceive James as being ‘anti-intellectual’, 
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20 ‘Respectability and the Wild Beasts of the Philosophical Desert: The Heart of James’s Varieties’, The 
Journal of Speculative Philosophy, 17.1 (2003), 1-13 (p. 12). 
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when espousing an empirically-oriented approach, could, at times, be easily read as a 
defence of art and poetry. 
 This is the case of Evelyn Underhill’s chapter ‘The Mystic as Creative Artist’, 
in The Essentials of Mysticism and Other Essays (1920), where she maintains, with 
Hegel, that art ‘ranks with religion and philosophy’ as one of the ‘the three spheres of 
Absolute Spirit’. Declaring that ‘the business of the artist is not only to delight us, but 
to enlighten us’,21 Underhill was clearly no supporter of the school of aestheticism, 
whose tenets were still flourishing in the early century, despite its death, as a 
movement, in 1896.22 She believed, instead, that a ‘creative artist of the highest kind’ 
is essentially a mystic, whose ‘personal encounter with Infinite Reality’ is attained, 
not as a ‘spiritual individualist’, but as ‘the ambassador of the race’, forever prompted 
‘to fulfil his duty to’ it through art. ‘The great artist’, she states elsewhere in The 
Essentials, ‘is the Door, the Way to a wider universe’, redeeming ‘his fellows from 
slavery to a lower level of colour, form, sound’, towards ‘new possibilities of vision 
and hearing’. Also, whereas, much like James, Underhill held that the mysticism of 
artists is normally not quite as complete as that of ‘full-grown mystics’,23 she still 
believed that ‘it is only through the mood of humble and loving receptivity in which 
the artist perceives beauty, that the human spirit can apprehend a reality which is 
greater than itself’, making it indispensible for even the most cultivated mystical states 
of consciousness. ‘The love and realization of beauty’, she explains, ‘makes the senses 
themselves into channels of Spirit’, and, ‘unless informed with’ this, any form of 
religious devotion ‘becomes thin, hard and sterile’.24 
In her treatment of the mystic as poet, Underhill cites the following much 
‘celebrated passage’ by Henri Bergson, another early twentieth-century figure that had 
(albeit indirectly) a considerable impact on the aesthetic construction of mysticism – 
particularly through his theory of ‘creative evolution’ which penetrated Anglo-
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22 Dennis Denisoff, ‘Aestheticism in the Modernist Era and After’, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of 
British Literature, ed. by David S. Kastan and others, 5 vols (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 
VI, pp. 17-8. 
23 Obviously informed by her own Catholic faith, Underhill’s definition of the highest form of 
mysticism is one that privileges the contemplative Christian path to spiritual experience. She placed 
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nonetheless, ‘never get beyond’ Illumination, which, in effect, is ‘an experience of Eternity, but not of 
the Eternal one’ that marks the final unitive stage, where ‘the Eternal one’ represents the personal 
Godhead of Christianity. See The Essentials, pp. 15-21. 
24 The Essentials, pp. 16-17, 96. 
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American philosophical and literary circles, turning ‘intuition’ and ‘creativity’ into the 
‘buzzwords’ of the time:25 
Could we enter into immediate communion with things and with 
ourselves – then, we should all be artists. […] Deep in our souls we 
should hear the uninterrupted melody of our inner life: a music often 
gay, more often sad, always original. All this is around and within 
us: yet none of it is distinctly perceived by us. Between nature and 
ourselves – more, between ourselves and our own consciousness – 
hangs a veil: a veil dense and opaque for normal men, but thin, 
almost transparent, for the artist and poet.26 
Underhill, who, by then, had been ‘drunk with Bergson’,27 likewise conveys the 
special authority granted here to artists and poets in her description of what is 
traditionally identified by religious writers as the gift of ‘spiritual Understanding’, a 
gift that she now defines as being available to poets, ‘and from it their power 
proceeds’. It ‘enables its possessor’, Underhill points out, ‘to behold life truly, that is 
from the angle of God, not from the angle of man’. Such a belief in the intrinsic 
godliness or religiosity of poetry additionally finds expression in The Essentials in her 
commentary on the place of ‘feeling’ in mystical contemplation. She suggests there 
that ‘religious and poetic intuition’ virtually share the same source: ‘The springs of the 
truest prayer and of the deepest poetry – twin expressions of man’s outward-going 
passion for that Eternity which is his home – rise very near together in the heart’. This 
is why Underhill insists that ‘faith and poetry’ should be ‘fused in one’ in the mystic’s 
‘rapturous mediations’:  
Nor need we fear the reproach that here we confuse religion with 
poetry. Poetry ever goes like the royal banners before ascending life; 
therefore man may safely follow its leadership in his prayer, which 
is – or should be – life in its intensest form.28 
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 But it is, of course, Underhill’s earlier published Mysticism (1911), more than 
The Essentials, that represents a critical text in the modern aestheticization of the 
mystical, being Underhill’s major work, and one of the earliest academic studies of 
the phenomena to meet with immediate and sustained success.29 Examples from the 
work would show that her later thought on the relationship between mysticism, art and 
poetry never deviated from this early model. ‘Mysticism’, she asserts, for instance, is 
‘the most romantic thing in the universe, from one point of view the art of arts, their 
source and also their end’. Of the artist’s function in society, we find the same 
romantic conception of The Essentials: ‘on him has been laid the duty of expressing 
something of […] his glimpse of the burning bush, to other men. He is the mediator 
between his brethren and the divine, for art is the link between appearance and 
reality’. Moreover, in terms of where poets stand in relation to the three stages of the 
mystical life, Underhill writes that ‘all phases of poetic inspiration’ fall under ‘the 
head of Illumination: which is really an enormous development of the intuitional life 
at high levels’; it includes all ‘pleasurable and exalted states of mystic consciousness 
in which the sense of I-hood persists, in which there is a loving and joyous relation 
between the Absolute as object and the self as subject’, as opposed to the complete 
unitive state of the final stage. But, then again, the final stage of the mystic’s 
development also requires a poetic disposition:   
In mysticism the will is united with the emotions in an impassioned 
desire to transcend the sense-world in order that the self may be 
joined by love to the one eternal and ultimate Object of love; whose 
existence is intuitively perceived by that which we used to call the 
soul, but now find it easier to refer to as the “Cosmic” or 
“transcendental” sense. This is the poetic and religious temperament 
acting upon the plane of reality. 
The idea of the mystical religiosity of poetry – and the arts in general – also finds 
expression in Mysticism in Underhill’s argument that a poetic masterpiece is 
conceived only in ‘moments of transcendence’, where the poet undergoes an 
‘indescribable inebriation of Reality’ and becomes something of Novalis’s ‘God-
intoxicated man’. ‘In his brief moments of creation’, she similarly states, the artist 
may cross all physical and temporal ‘boundaries’ to join ‘the “free soul” of the great 
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mystic’, who is perpetually ‘hovering like the six-winged seraph before the face of the 
Absolute’. And again:  
[The mystic’s] intuition of the Real lying at the root of the visible 
world and sustaining its life, is present […] in the arts: perhaps it 
were better to say, must be present if these arts are to justify 
themselves as heightened forms of experience.30 
Moving from William James and Evelyn Underhill to other modernist 
intellectuals, the rest of this section will aim to show that this kind of aestheticizing 
discourse on the mystical continued well into the twentieth century and clearly made 
its impression on Anglo-American literary criticism. The examples I present here are 
admittedly somewhat arbitrarily chosen from the abundance of available literature, but 
it is reasonable to agree that they effectively demonstrate the presence of a poetic 
mysticism in modern poetic theory. One of the more important figures from this 
literature is T. S. Eliot, who had studied both works when he was absorbed in 
philosophy in his Harvard years,31 and was not immune to their suggestions later on. 
Although his ‘Tradition and the Individual Talent’ (1919) famously sought to strip 
literary criticism from any metaphysical trappings, proposing an impersonal, anti-
Romantic theory of poetry that would ‘halt at the frontier of metaphysics or 
mysticism’, 32  a belief in a connection between poetry and mysticism was 
unquestionable for him: 
That there is a relation (not necessarily noetic, perhaps merely 
psychological) between mysticism and some kinds of poetry, or 
some of the kinds of state in which poetry is produced, I make no 
doubt. 
This was stated in his discussion of the 1927 English translation of Prière et Poésie 
(1926), entitled Prayer and Poetry: A Contribution to Poetical Theory, by the French 
Jesuit and literary scholar, Henri Brémond. Despite Eliot’s reservations about the 
work, he commended it for examining ‘the likeness, and the difference of kind and 
degree, between poetry and mysticism’, and how this yielded ‘many penetrating 
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remarks about the nature of poetry’.33 The central argument of Brémond was that 
‘poetic activity is a profane, natural sort of preliminary sketch of mystical activity’ 
and that ‘the poet in the last resort is but an evanescent mystic whose mysticism 
breaks down’.34 Brémond’s book, in fact, spurred quite a controversy at the time, and 
among those who contributed to the debate was John M. Murray, who had also read 
Underhill,35 and was in agreement with both Catholic writers on the essential kinship 
between mystics and poets, though with far larger views about the status of poetry: 
The mystic is but halfway to the perfect poet (as he is but half-way 
to the perfect Christian). On the other hand, a complete mysticism 
and a complete poetry are all but identical. Keat’s principle of 
“beauty in all things” and Eckhart’s vision of “God in all things” are 
practically indistinguiashble. And, in fact, the complete mystic is 
invariably, a great poet.36 
In addition to this, another notable critical work that builds on Underhill, as well as 
James, is Alfred Brockington’s Mysticism and Poetry on a Basis of Experience, 
published in 1934, which refers to such poets and writers as Browning, Hopkins, and 
Newman, arguing that the first condition of both the ‘poetic experience’ and the 
‘mystical experience’ is an ‘intuition’ that requires a complete ‘abandonment in 
faith’.37  
It is probably this increased attention to mysticism in critical theory that 
prompted Wallace Stevens, who was particularly familiar with James’s work,38 to 
declare in 1951 that ‘the theory of poetry, that is to say, the total of the theories of 
poetry, often seems to become in time a mystical theology or, more simply, a 
mystique’. For him, there were two aesthetic theories with which poets are ‘constantly 
concerned’: in the first, the imagination is felt to be ‘part of a much larger, much more 
potent imagination’, which drives the poet to live on ‘the verge of consciousness’, 
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often resulting in a poetry that is ‘marginal’ and ‘subliminal’; in the second, the poet 
regards ‘imagination as a power within him to have such insights into reality as will 
make it possible for him to be sufficient as a poet in the very center of consciousness’, 
resulting in a ‘central poetry’. And, in both cases, Stevens believed that poetry, at its 
root, is an emanation of the mystical: 
The adherents of the [first] are mystics to begin with and pass from 
one mysticism to another The adherents of the [second] are also 
mystics to begin with But all their desire and all their ambition is to 
press away from mysticism toward that ultimate good sense which 
we term civilization. 
Steven had already stated as early as 1936, in a lecture on ‘The Irrational Element in 
Poetry’, that it is this element that linked poetry to mysticism: ‘all mystics approach 
God through the irrational. Pure poetry is both mystical and irrational’. But unlike 
Murray, Brémond and Underhill, he gave equal status to the poetic and mystical 
phenomena. ‘It is certain’, he contended in ‘The Figure of the Youth as a Virile Poet’ 
(1943), ‘that the experience of the poet is no less a degree than the experience of the 
mystic’, and that poets are ultimately ‘the peers of saints’.39  
 The same reliance on a notion of mysticism is also displayed in the critical and 
aesthetic terminology of Hart Crane,40 who had not only drawn ‘solid satisfaction 
from James’s Varieties’, but had personally identified with ‘several experiences in 
consciousness’ that the book corroborated.41 Crane’s poetic theory rests on the belief 
that the artist’s identification with life should be ‘in the true mystical sense as well as 
in the sense which Aristotle meant by the “imitation of nature”’, focusing on the 
‘metaphysical’ causes ‘of his materials, their emotional derivations or their utmost 
spiritual consequences’. This would result in what he calls an ‘absolute’ poetry, one 
that works ‘toward a state of consciousness’, a condition of ‘innocence’ or ‘absolute 
beauty’ where ‘there may be discoverable new forms certain spiritual illuminations, 
shining with a morality essentialized from experience directly’. These ‘moments of 
“illumination”’ Crane also significantly describes as ‘a sharpening of reality 
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accessible to the poet, to no such degree possible through other mediums’.42 Poetry, in 
other words, had, for him, a closer affinity to the mystical than any other form of art. 
 The construction of an aesthetic mysticism has, of course, not been limited to 
poetic theory or literary criticism in the twentieth century, nor have these been the 
only arenas where the aestheticizing influence of James and Underhill can be felt. Of 
the more philosophically and psychologically oriented discussions of mysticism that 
display this influence is, for example, Aldous Huxley’s The Perennial Philosophy 
(1946), which gives the following answer to the question of how ‘the poetical use of 
words [is] related to the life of the spirit’: 
The experience of beauty [in poetry or art] is pure, self-manifested, 
compounded equally of joy and consciousness, free from admixture 
of any other perception, the very twin brother of mystical 
experience, and the very life of it is supersensuous wonder. 
Like Underhill, however, the similarity is more of a ‘qualitative’ one: 
The poet, the nature lover, the aesthete are granted apprehensions of 
Reality analogous to those vouchsafed to the selfless contemplative; 
but because they have not troubled to make themselves perfectly 
selfless, they are incapable of knowing the divine Beauty in its 
fullness.43 
A similar analogy is more conspicuously made in E. I. Watkin’s Poets and Mystics 
(1953), which is another contribution to the psychology and philosophy of religion. 
More influenced by Underhill than James,44 Watkin argues, in a chapter entitled 
‘Poetry and Mysticism’, that while ‘a poet may be also a mystic, a mystic also a poet’, 
the two can rarely co-exist at once. This is because aesthetic and mystical intuitions, 
although similar in being ‘concrete and obscure’,45 ‘are wholly distinct in nature’: the 
former is an artistic intuition of ‘significant form’, while the latter is an intuition of ‘a 
Reality Formless because exceeding all forms’. Nonetheless, the meeting point 
between the poet and mystic is that both are endowed with an ‘exceptional measure’ 
of ‘aesthetic sensibility’, which transforms what Watkins terms the ‘opaque’ 
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‘psychophysical constitution’ of the natural man into ‘a state of transparency’ that is 
open to spiritual activity. Without this sensibility, no conscious ‘union with God’ 
would be possible for the mystic, and, with it, poets like Wordsworth, or Tennyson, 
for instance, become accidental mystics: 
Since poets, like others of exceptional aesthetic sensibility, are on 
the whole more likely to be transparent than those not so endowed, 
it is not surprising that poets […] have been the subject of a mystic 
experience of a lower order, a naturally mystical experience, an 
experience that is to say of God’s immanence in their own spirit and 
beyond it in the universe.46 
 The last example to be considered in this section is a book by the prolific 
English philosopher, novelist, and literary critic, Colin Wilson, also entitled Poetry 
and Mysticism, and published in 1970, just a few years apart from the first appearance 
of the constructivist theories of Steven Katz (1978), which goes to illustrate the 
longevity of this essentialist view of poetry and mysticism. Much similar to most of 
the writers discussed here, Wilson argues that while aesthetic and mystical 
experiences are distinct, ‘the dividing line’ is not so clear, given that ‘the 
psychological mechanisms are identical in each case’. The gist of the book is stated in 
the back cover, namely, that ‘the mystic’s moment of illumination shares with great 
poetry the liberating power of the deepest levels consciousness’. In making this point, 
Wilson primarily takes issue with the 1960s’ ‘revival of the fashion to exalt eastern 
modes of thought and disparage the western’. One of his central arguments was that 
Zen Buddhism had nothing new to tell the West that could not already be found in its 
literature, and that the inner workings of ‘the Zen experience’ corresponds exactly 
with ‘the phenomenology of the poetic experience’ involved in western poetry, 
particularly in its Romantic strains. To explain, Wilson argues that, through various 
forms of shock techniques, ranging from paradoxical questions and parables, to verbal 
and even physical provocation, Zen practice aims to ‘jar the mind into sudden 
recognition’ of one’s deeper levels of consciousness, beyond the ‘upper levels of the 
personality’ that are connected to habitual, everyday awareness. The result is a 
profound state of spiritual calm and peace. It is Wilson’s belief that the more sublime 
poetic utterances of the western tradition also serve as ‘a system of such shocks’, with 
the aim to effect the same inner shift of consciousness, delivering the ‘mind from its 
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narrowness’ and ‘the triviality of everydayness’ into the deep serenity of mystical 
insight: ‘Good poetry has this power of getting straight through to the deeper level, of 
issuing the order “Relax” and being obeyed. There is a release of tension, a sigh of 
relief’. He argues, therefore, that ‘the poetic experience and the mystical experience 
are the same experience in every way’, even in pessimistic poets whose work offer no 
clear sense of affirmation. In their case, ‘the poetic experience is a fragmentary 
mystical experience’, but a mystical experience nonetheless: ‘if the poet, unlike the 
mystic or the saint, fails to obtain his vision of pure affirmation, this is not the fault of 
the vision, but of the poet’s clumsy attempt to grasp the essence of his “flashes of 
intensity”’. 47  
 ‘To look into the Victorian mind’, W. E. Houghton writes, ‘is to see some 
primary sources of the modern mind’, a statement which W. David Shaw observes ‘is 
as true of poetic theory as any other branch of knowledge’.48 The remaining part of 
this chapter will specifically aim to show how the kind of conceptual engagement with 
mysticism in twentieth-century poetic theory that has been discussed here did not arise 
in a historical vacuum. Rather, it was related to developments already occurring in 
nineteenth-century poetics that were geared towards making sense of the place of 
poetry in a world that was undergoing radical change on many fronts, one of which 
was the religious. 
2. The Victorian Making of a Poetic and Aesthetic Mysticism 
Having briefly indicated in the previous section some of the ways in which modernist 
discourse on mysticism tends to aestheticize this category, it remains to pursue the 
important question of how this poetic construct finds its source in Victorian debates 
about poetry, particularly those that took upon them the task of defining the mystical. 
Before I get to that, however, let me first refer to Grace Jantzen’s chapter on ‘The 
Language of Ineffability’ in Power, Gender and Christian Mysticism, which is a 
valuable contribution to the social constructivist scholarship surrounding mysticism. 
The chapter is significant in that it brings to light how this construct owes an 
‘enormous unacknowledged debt’ to both German Idealism and Romantic philosophy, 
‘especially with regard to ineffability’ as its ‘key ingredient’. With mysticism’s 
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characteristic of ineffability being the main concern of my following chapter, I shall 
let Jantzen’s just-quoted remark on it stand here without further elaboration, focusing, 
instead, on her explanation of the category’s debt to Germany for the experiential 
emphasis in the modernists’ definition of it as a state of ‘immediate consciousness of 
the Deity’. Jantzen specifically explains that the modern understanding of mysticism 
builds, in part, on the Kantian belief that while human knowledge is determined by the 
phenomena (objects as they are experienced by our sensory-mental apparatus), the 
noumena (objects as they exist in themselves) remain ‘beyond our grasp’; according 
to Kant, therefore, we should be mentally unequipped to experience God, especially 
given his conception of God not as ‘a possible object’ or ‘being’ but as ‘a 
transcendental ideal’ that serves to order and unite the totality of experience. 
However, because such rationalist strictures debar the mind from any transcendent 
knowledge of God, Jantzen maintains that twentieth-century scholars of mysticism 
have relied, whether aware or not, on the Romantic Idealist tradition to postulate an 
alternative form of experience to help escape ‘the excessive formalism and 
intellectualism’ of Kant. Hence, it came about in modernist philosophy that God – 
although unknowable to the categories ‘imposed by our own mental structure’ – can 
be known through heightened states of ‘feeling’ that antecede all intellectual activity, 
where even subject-object differentiation has not yet taken place.49  
In discussing this experiential turn in defining the mystical, Jantzen identifies 
the integral roles played both by the German theologian and philosopher, Friedrich 
Schleiermarcher, for his application of Romantic principles to the generic category of 
religion,50  and by Carlyle and Emerson, for introducing William James to the 
Romantic philosophy, in both its Coleridgian and German versions. 51 She believes 
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that the role of the latter was made possible through their personal friendship with 
Henry James Sr, and his family, both being ‘“familiar divinities in the James 
household” with whom both father and son must settle their accounts’.52 While I agree 
with the essential place attributed here to Carlyle and Emerson in the modern 
formation of mysticism in Anglo-American discourse, I wish to add that this is not 
confined – as Jantzen seems to imply – to their personal acquaintance with the 
Jameses, but extends to their own far-reaching intellectual influence. Leigh Schmidt 
has pointed out the problem of how William James ‘becomes little more than a straw 
man in Jantzen’s critique’, and how ‘the larger culture […] which gave birth to James, 
is nowhere to be found in [such] critical accounts of the category’s modern 
formation’. ‘The process of mysticism’s reinvention in departicularized form’, he 
urges, ‘needs itself to be particularized and seen in its own historical complexity’.53 
Given that the focus of my research is on the nineteenth-century British context, I 
believe that recognizing the full extent of Carlyle’s contributions to modern mysticism 
is a modest but important step toward addressing this problem,54 and it is equally 
important to clarify that much of his contributions took place within the context of his 
discussions of poetry.   
It is incumbent to remember that Carlyle has been variously dubbed ‘the single 
most important conduit of German literature and thought in the nineteenth century’,55 
and Emerson his ‘most prominent translator’, making Emerson, ‘to a large extent, the 
entranceway to German Idealist philosophy’ in New England.56 That their own brands 
of idealism shows a distinctive involvement with mystical notions, and indeed marks 
them as pioneering forces in the popularization of mysticism is something that has 
been felt as early as 1850, by R. D. of The Knickerbocker, a New York monthly 
magazine. Hailing Emerson as a quintessential ‘Yankee Mystic’, the reviewer declares 
that he is no ‘harmless dreamer’, that his ‘abstract principles […] may be becoming 
realities through the mind of the nation’. Such an influence, he adds, is potentially 
comparable only to Carlyle in England, who was finally becoming recognized for 
having ‘moulded earnest minds’ like no other thinker in the forties, and this after years 
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of being ‘mimicked and laughed at and slashed’ as ‘a mere dreaming mystic’. Both 
men, he believes, have succeeded in inspiring a growing circle of admirers ‘as 
“idealistic,” as spiritual, ay, as noble in thought, as any ever gathered around Plato or 
Alexander Philo’,57 an analogy indicating how the two writers must have stood for 
many of their contemporaries as leading figures in the rising wave of interest in 
mysticism. It is, after all, one of the contentions of the present and following chapters 
that many Victorians were under the sway of Carlyle’s writings when conceiving their 
own notions of the mystical. But before turning to how Carlyle’s definitions of 
mysticism were essentially formulated within the context of his poetic theory, it is 
worthwhile to first consider Grace Jantzen’s main argument as it relates to his and to 
other similar nineteenth-century notions of poetry: namely, her proposition that any 
concept of mysticism is ‘implicitly bound up with issues of authority’.58 A question 
worth asking, in other words, is what was chiefly at stake for Victorian poets and 
Victorian sympathizers with poetry and the arts in adopting a Romantically-inspired, 
experiential definition of mysticism?  
The clue to the answer lies in what David J. DeLaura describes as ‘the high 
and religious claims’ that were being made for poetry throughout the period, which he 
believes were ‘unprecedented’59 and ‘correlative to a broadly conceived religious and 
spiritual crisis, seen as the central and characteristic experience of the century’. He 
explains that, for many Victorian critics, ‘poetry’s fate, and its role, [was] a function 
of what may be salvaged in the coming universal shipwreck of the older European 
synthesis’ of ‘philosophy’, ‘theology’ and ‘piety’.60 Making the same point, M. H. 
Abrams states that one of the consequences of the ebbing tide of assurances about the 
factual fallibility of the Bible – itself brought about by the scientific fervour of the 
new era, and the triumph of rationalist inquiry – was the attempt to save the moral and 
spiritual functions of the ‘exploded dogmas’ by transferring them to the poetic 
enterprise. Poetry was now to substitute religion for men like Arnold, for instance, 
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who, despite their misgivings about the ‘anti-poetic’ values of the times,61 spoke of its 
‘immense’ future:  
Our religion has materialised itself in the fact, in the supposed fact; 
it has attached its emotion to the fact, and now the fact is failing it. 
But for poetry, the idea is everything […] Poetry attaches its 
emotions to the idea; the idea is the fact.62 
According to Arnold, the ‘higher destinies’ of poetry are to be realized when 
‘mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console 
us, to sustain us’, by becoming ‘a complete magister vitae as the poetry of the ancients 
did: by including, as theirs did, religion with poetry’. ‘Without poetry’, he said, ‘our 
science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and 
philosophy will be replaced by poetry’. 63  Carlyle also joined in this opinion: 
‘Literature is but a branch of Religion, and always participates in its character: 
however, in our time, it is the only branch that still shows any greenness; and, as some 
think, must one day become the main stem’.64 For him, ‘the history of literature, 
especially for the last two centuries, is our proper Church History; the other church, 
during that time, having more and more decayed from its old functions and influence’. 
In 1831, furthermore, Carlyle wrote to Goethe that ‘literature is now nearly all in all to 
us; not our Speech only, but our Worship and Law-giving; our best Priest must 
henceforth be our Poet; the vates will in the future be practically all that he ever was 
in theory’. And, again, in his obituary for Goethe a year later: ‘The true Poet is ever, 
as of old, the Seer; whose eye has been gifted to discern the godlike Mystery of God’s 
Universe, and decipher some new line of its celestial writing’.65 ‘A religious utility’, 
Robert Alfred Vaughan similarly argued, ‘is the species of usefulness possessed by 
poetry’: 
The mind most poetical is fitted to become the most religious. The 
poet and the Christian have alike a hidden life. Worship is the vital 
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element of each. Poetry has in it that kind of utility which good men 
find in their Bibles, rather than such convenience as they have in 
their railway guides. It ennobles the sentiments, enlarges the 
affections, kindles the imagination, and […] cultivates those 
faculties within us, which the more we cultivate them, the more do 
we find meanness a thing impossible.66  
 It would appear from this that the Victorian discourse on poetry, even when 
making no reference to mysticism, was itself rife with issues of authority.67 Indeed, 
one must not forget that, with these grand hopes for its future, came also the louder 
assertions of the poet’s superior mission as a divinely-inspired prophet, a ‘heady 
doctrine’ 68  encountered by Victorian poets and critics in the writings of their 
Romantic forebears, which many were only too happy to adopt, even amidst an 
increasingly anti-Romantic critical milieu.69 Joseph Bristow, in fact, notes how this 
trope had been further aggrandized in the hands of the Victorians, who now claimed 
for the poet ‘greater capabilities than either the philosopher or scientist’: ‘The poet is 
[…] the saviour of the secular age. In the Romantic period, the poet was certainly 
divinely inspired. Now, a generation later, the poet is God’s emissary – an 
intermediary between finite and infinite worlds’.70  To be sure, borrowing from 
Wordsworth and Shelley, as well as Goethe and Fichte, the doctrine became common 
currency among the Cambridge Apostles, for example, who lent eager ears to these 
famous words of April 8, 1828 by F. D. Maurice, the group’s moral and intellectual 
leader:  
The mind of the poet of the highest order is the most perfect mind 
that can belong to man […] It is his high calling to interpret those 
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universal truths which exist on earth only in the forms of his 
creation.71 
But Tennyson, who was a member of the Apostles by then, had already formulated 
this idea on his own in the much earlier ‘Armageddon’, depicting the poet’s visionary 
stance as almost partaking in God’s omniscience: 
I felt my soul grow godlike, and my spirit 
With supernatural excitation bound 
Within me, my mental eye grew large 
With such a vast circumference of thought, 
That, in my vanity, seemed to stand 
Upon the outward verge and bound alone 
Of God’s omniscience.72 (21-27)  
These and similar conceptions would prove to have a long hold on many 
literary minds of the century, only diminishing in force, as Bristow suggests, with the 
more secular and ‘elder Victorians’.73 Tennyson, for example, had not only adopted 
this oracular role in his juvenilia and early poems (for example, ‘To Poesy’ (1828), 
‘Timbuctoo’ (1829), ‘The Poet’ (1830) and ‘The Poet’s Mind’ (1830)), but was fully 
convinced of its truth ‘all through his life as a poet’, as reported by ‘a former 
intimate’:   
He told me that this sense [of his divine poetic gift] was almost 
awful to him in its intensity, because it made him feel as a priest 
who can never leave the sanctuary, and whose every word must be 
consecrated to the service of Him who had touched his lips with the 
fire of heaven which was to enable him to speak in God’s name to 
his age.74 
And although Carlyle ‘certainly had a grudge against poetry’, which developed 
through his maturity, he had never departed from that fundamental belief, expressed in 
his early ‘vein of enthusiasm’,75 that the sacred duty of the poet is to lead ‘us to the 
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edge of the Infinite, and let us for moments gaze into that!’.76 This is not to mention 
how the London Browning Society, formed in 1881, would reaffirm and revive the 
vatic conception of art expressed in poems like ‘Pauline’ (1833), ‘Fra Lippo Lippi’ 
(1855) or ‘Abt Vogler’ (1864), by celebrating Browning himself ‘as a teacher, a 
prophet, a seer, one who could remind men of spiritual realities in a world of doubt 
and anxiety’.77 ‘God has a few of us whom he whispers in the ear’, Browning had 
spoken thus in mid-century of the status of the artist, whose business is to ‘interpret 
God to all of you’, and there were still many voices in the late century that enlisted 
poets as foremost among those ‘few’. (Abt Vogler’ 87; ‘Fra Lippo’ 311).78   
 These, clearly, are all familiar notions in the scholarship on Victorian poetry 
and criticism, but what concerns me here is the fact that the long Victorian debate 
about the nature and function of poetry, particularly that which reflected the spiritual 
concerns of a post-Christian perspective, was a major context for the development of 
the modern (Romantic) conception of mysticism. The debate, in other words, 
witnessed many emerging attempts to define ‘poetry’ and ‘art’ as ‘mysticism’, or to 
assert an affinity between these categories, a tendency that was ultimately 
underpinned, as we shall see, by the desire to stress the reliability of intuitions, as a 
source of truth, equal, or even superior, to rational and scientific thought. Put 
otherwise, one could say that as far as Victorian poets and critics are concerned, the 
act of defining the mystical in romantically experiential terms was, at its core, and, 
indeed as Grace Jantzen has contended, a struggle for power and authority; the 
struggle, in this case, was against nineteenth-century empirical and secular ideals that 
were gradually gaining cultural ascendancy. Thus, to answer my earlier question, what 
was at stake for poets and critics in adopting this definition of mysticism was nothing 
less than the preservation of belief in the religious impulse, upon which depended 
their high claims for poetry, not the least of it being the only answer for the moral and 
spiritual needs of a perceived post-Christian world. More will be said about this 
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shortly, when I come to consider Carlyle who was the most explicit on this subject, 
but first a few examples of how the Victorian literary scene was positing that such a 
mysticism, in its alleged apprehension of divine and cosmic realities, is accessible to 
poets at moments of poetic inspiration.  
 Perhaps one of the earliest and most notable contexts for the conceptual 
associations between poetry and mysticism that contributed to Victorian formulations 
of poetic theory is traceable to the second decade of the nineteenth century. This 
comes to light if we recall that distinct group that was formed within the society of the 
Cambridge Apostles in its first generation, and which went by the name of ‘the 
Mystics’. Of the makeup and importance of this ‘mystic clique’, Peter Allen explains 
that its ‘nucleus’ consisted of men incuding F. D. Maurice, John Sterling, John M. 
Kemble, William Donne, Richard Trench, and Joseph Blakesley, and that it was ‘a 
predominant influence in the Society and the basis for the Apostolic cult that 
developed around the figures of Arthur Hallam and Alfred Tennyson’ – in fact, 
becoming, as Tod Jones notes, ‘the largest group within the society’ by 1830.79 
Coleridge, who was himself a Cambridge man, was a major influence on the group, 
and they were followers of ‘his ultimate creed that, while imagination was the path to 
truth, fantasy 80  [or fancy] only led to illusion’. Speaking of their theological 
tendencies, Richard Deacon maintains that it ‘was a mishmash of evangelistic 
enthusiasm, Coleridgianism and mysticism plus a great deal of self-doubting and 
questioning’.81    
As for the centrality of literature or the poetic imagination to this group’s 
conception of themselves as mystics  (and, in turn, to their own understanding of 
mysticism), this is suggested by their chief maxim, that ‘social regeneration would 
come not through political change but through the spiritual influence of modern 
literature, specifically the writings of Coleridge, Wordsworth, Shelley and Keats.’ 
Hence, when John Kemble, for example, converted from his Benthamite views in 
1828, and ‘adopted the mystics’ cause […of] the spiritual regeneration of mankind’, 
and after having spent a year in Germany, consuming opium, and metaphysics, as well 
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as writing poetry, he enthusiastically announced his apostolic mission in a letter to a 
fellow-mystic, giving religious precedence to poetry:       
It is to lend my hand to the great work of regenerating England, not 
by Political Institutions! Not by extrinsic and conventional forms! 
By a higher and holier work, by breathing into her the vigorous 
feeling of a Poet, and a Religious man […] Wordsworth has begun 
the work, he has delivered the sown field into our hand, and is not 
the harvest ours?82 
Such words reflect not only the grandiose hopes that were held for poetry at the time, 
but also how it was mystically elevated by this group, who believed that, through ‘the 
study of modern literature’, one is able to gain an understanding of nothing short of 
‘the operations of the divine principle at work in the world’.83 
 The fact that the title of this apostolic ‘mystical’ coterie, ‘the Mystics’, was 
self-assigned marks an interesting move from the negative attitude evinced towards 
this key term by the first generation of Romantic poets, who were themselves 
positively ‘in touch with a living tradition of European mystical writing’. Stephen 
Prickett points out how both Wordsworth and Coleridge ‘went out of their way to 
avoid the charge of mysticism’, with Coleridge openly attacking its claims,84 in a way 
that ironically offered, as Kiyoshi Tsuchiya states, ‘a fairly accurate description of his 
own practice, personal and idiosyncratic, involving a good deal of catachresis and 
neologism’.85 The coming together of the Cambridge Mystics in the mid-twenties,86 
therefore, indicates that the new era was acquiring a greater readiness to brave the 
accusations that the word ‘mysticism’ so often implied in the critical journals of the 
time,87 along with a desire to favourably renegotiate what it means. It is true that 
Arthur Hallam, the Mystics’ leader in 1830,88 was not among those to brave such 
criticism, informing Kemble that he had ‘no wish to earn the reputation of an Atheist 
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or a Mystic’.89 But this was not the case with Tennyson, at least, for whom the 
mystical held more personal implications. 
Indeed, there is considerable evidence that Tennyson had always found in the 
word ‘mysticism’ a meaningful term by which to define and make sense of his 
‘trance’ experiences, as he had called them. Not only does ‘The Mystic’ (1830) 
feature as the title of one his earliest self-reflective poems, we also find the poet 
contemplating a similar title as late as 1885, when he chose ‘The Ancient Mystic’ for 
the trial edition of what we now know as ‘The Ancient Sage’.90 That the persona of 
the mystic in these two poems represents part of Tennyson’s self-image is evident in 
how both poems depict a trance state identical to those that the poet so often described 
in his conversations or correspondence with his friends. I cite here the two oft-quoted 
descriptions that were reported by Benjamin Blood and John Tyndall. To Blood, 
Tennyson wrote in a letter of May 7, 1874:  
I have never had any revelations through anaesthetics, but a kind of 
waking trance—this for lack of a better word—I have frequently 
had, quite up from boyhood, when I have been all alone. This has 
come upon me through repeating my own name two or three times 
to myself silently, till all at once, as it were out of the intensity of 
consciousness of individuality, individuality itself seemed to 
dissolve and fade away into boundless being, and this not a 
confused state, but the clearest of the clearest, the surest of the 
surest, the weirdest of the weirdest, utterly beyond words, where 
death was an almost laughable impossibility, the loss of personality 
(if so it were) seeming no extinction but the only true life. 91  
Tyndall’s report gives a similar account: 
With great earnestness Tennyson described to me a state of 
consciousness into which he could throw himself by thinking 
intently of his own name. It was impossible to give anything that 
could be called a description of the state, for language seemed 
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incompetent to touch it. It was an apparent isolation of the spirit 
from the body. Wishing doubtless to impress upon me the reality of 
the phenomenon, he exclaimed, ‘By God Almighty, there is no 
delusion in the matter! It is no nebulous ecstasy, but a state of 
transcendent wonder, associated with absolute clearness of mind.’92 
This ‘waking trance’ which Tennyson associated with ‘an apparent isolation of 
the spirit from the body’ clearly corresponds to the state of wakeful vision of lines 36-
7 in ‘The Mystic’: ‘He often laying broad awake, and yet / Remaining from the body, 
and apart’ (36-37).93 In fact, in Hallam Tennyson’s notes on the autobiographical 
basis of the belief and experience described in ‘The Ancient Sage’, he compares it to 
‘The Mystic’, asserting that the experiential content of the earlier poem has an 
autobiographical origin: 
Compare with this poem The Mystic, written in his boyhood, which 
records his early intimations, or indistinct visions, of the mind’s 
power to pass beyond the shadows of the world – to pierce beyond 
the enveloping clouds of ignorance and illusion, and to reach some 
region of pure light and untroubled calm, where perfect knowledge 
should have extinguished doubt.94 
 As a side note, it should be observed that the poet’s insistence on this trance condition 
being ‘the weirdest of the weirdest’ interestingly finds expression in the ‘weird 
seizures’ of the speaker in ‘The Princess’, also referred to as a ‘waking dream’ 
(Section I. 12-4).95  
As for ‘The Ancient Sage’, the section where the poem’s mystic speaks about 
his transcendental experiences is an ‘almost word-for-word’ rendering in poetic 
language of the visionary trance reported by Blood:96 
                             More than once when I  
Sat all alone, revolving in myself  
The word that is the symbol of myself,  
The mortal limit of the Self was loosed,  
And past into the Nameless, as a cloud  
Melts into Heaven. I touch’d my limbs, the limbs  
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Were strange not mine—and yet no shade of doubt,  
But utter clearness, and thro’ loss of Self  
The gain of such large life as match’d with ours  
Were Sun to spark—unshadowable in words.97 (229-38) 
The lines are also strikingly close to Tyndall’s description that he himself notes it with 
‘profound astonishment’ in the chapter he contributes to Hallam’s Memoir. Writing to 
Hallam, he states:  
Here it [is] recorded in black and white. If you turn to your father's 
account of the wonderful state of consciousness superinduced by 
thinking of his own name, and compare it with the argument of the 
Ancient Sage, you will see that they refer to one and the same 
phenomenon.98  
In fact, recognizing that the poem might be viewed as being completely inspired by 
Lao Tzu,99 Tennyson was keen on stressing that it also recorded his own intimate 
thoughts and experiences. Footnoted to the section on the sage’s visions is the poet’s 
ascription of that kind of experience to himself: ‘This is also a personal experience 
which I have had more than once’. He elsewhere declares: ‘The whole poem is very 
personal. The passages about ‘Faith’ and the ‘Passion of the Past’ were more 
especially my own personal feelings’.100 One is not mistaken, then, in assuming that, 
when Tennyson was contemplating the label ‘mystic’ for the poem’s persona, he was 
also closely thinking of this in connection to himself.   
Returning to Tennyson’s writing in the context of its relation to the ‘mystical’ 
coterie of the Apostles, it is fair to say that the group’s celebrated, self-proclaimed 
connection to a notion of mysticism is most likely what encouraged him to publicly 
court the term in ‘The Mystic’ (1830), published within a year of his admission to the 
group. This poem is important for the purposes of the present chapter in the way it 
gives an idea of how Tennyson’s views on mysticism converged with the prophetic 
role he conceived for himself as a poet. This becomes clear only by comparing it to 
‘The Poet’ and ‘The Poet’s Mind’, all published in the same volume of 1830, as well 
																																																								
97 Poems III, p. 145.  
98 Memoir II, p. 478. 
99 According to Tennyson, the poem was written after he had read about the ‘life and maxims’ of the 
‘Chinese philosopher Laot-ze’, but it does not reflect his philosophy (Memoir II, p.476). For an 
insightful study that challenges this denial, see Richard Benton, ‘Tennyson and Lao Tzu’, Philosophy 
East and West, 12.3 (1962), 233-240. 
100 Memoir II, p. 319. 
	 82	
as to his 1829 prize poem, ‘Timbuctoo’,101 given that the two personas of ‘the mystic’ 
and ‘the poet’ coincide on several points in these poems: both are set apart from 
ordinary mortals by their visionary insight into the ultimate principle, ‘the everlasting 
will’, that ‘investeth and ingirds all other lives’ (‘The Poet’ 7-12; ‘The Mystic’ 1-5, 
41-46; ‘Timbuctoo’ 76-83, 109-12, 209-13); both have transcended temporal 
boundaries, and seen through the gates of ‘life and death’, with their ‘shining’, 
‘burning eyes’ (‘The Mystic’ 27-34; ‘The Poet’ 5, 39; ‘Timbuctoo’ 66, 87); both must 
bear the ‘scorn’ and ‘sneer’ of an ‘undiscerning’ materialistic world that fails to 
‘fathom’ their heavenly message (‘The Mystic’ 2-5; ‘The Poet’s Mind’ 4, 10, 32-35); 
and, finally, both have reached the highest state of human consciousness, on ‘the 
outward verge’ of the divine, which is similarly described either as the final one in a 
series of concentric ‘circle[s]’, or as a circle with  an overwhelming ‘vast 
circumference’ (‘The Mystic’ 41-44; ‘Timbuctoo’ 88-94, 211).102 	
One poet-critic who obviously picked up on this connection was Richard H. 
Horne, an admirer of ‘The Mystic’,103 whose essay on Tennyson, in A New Spirit of 
the Age (1844), marks an early instance where the category of mysticism is explicitly 
incorporated in a theoretical account of poetry. This last fact did not escape the 
attention of its reviewers, as Graham’s Magazine of July 1844 declared, for example, 
that, in this piece, ‘a theory of poetry is invented’, one that positively recommends 
itself to ‘all who have been in the habit of laughing at Tennyson as a senseless mystic 
and professor of unreason’.104 Horne, it should be noted, had objected in the essay to 
the ‘war-cry’ of ‘mystical mystery!’ that was reverberating through the ranks of the 
critical periodicals against certain species of poetry. In an attempt to favourably recast 
the category in question, he made clear his belief that what was intended here as a 
pejorative accusation could not, in fact, be closer to the truth of what he believed to be 
the elemental nature of poetry. According to him, poetic inspiration is essentially 
associated to a postulated ultimate principle of ‘mystery’ that is spiritual in nature, so 
that the more a poet’s verse is haunted by the sense of the mysterious, the closer it is 
to its divine origin: 
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The poetic fire is one simple and intense element in human nature; it 
has its source in the divine mysteries of our existence; it develops 
with the first abstract delight of childhood, the first youthful 
aspiration towards something beyond our mortal reach; and 
eventually becomes the master passion of those who are possessed 
with it in the highest degree, and the most ennobling and refining 
influence that can be exercised upon the passions of others. [… One 
condition of its presence] must be that of a certain consciousness of 
dreamy glories in the soul, with vague emotions, aimless impulses, 
and prophetic sensations, which may be said to tremble on the 
extreme verge of the fermenting source of that poetic fire, by which 
the life of humanity is purified and adorned.  
From this spiritualized and idealist view of poetry, Tennyson emerges with ‘the title 
of a true poet of the highest class of genius’ and a ‘favoured son of Apollo’,105 an 
estimation that was shared by Elizabeth Barrett Browning, who had collaborated with 
Horne on his New Spirit. As such, Browning’s appreciation of the poet – as well as of 
Wordsworth and Keats – was also interestingly predicated on a conceptual reliance on 
the mystical to define ‘poetry in its highest order’, as indicated in a letter that predates 
the publication of New Spirit by a year. ‘Certainly’, she had written to Horne in 1843, 
‘there is a mystical effluence of poetry (a highest height over the highest height) in 
Wordsworth, Tennyson and Keats’. 106 
That these examples point to the development of a more sympathetic attitude 
towards mysticism in Victorian literary criticism is supportable from another review 
of Horne’s work that appeared in The Literary Gazette of 16 March 1844; speaking of 
Horne’s style, the reviewer mentions how it has actually become fashionable to affect 
a ‘critical jargon’ that is itself coloured with ‘the clouded, mystical and metaphysical’ 
language of the literature it is evaluating.107 At any rate, it may be fairly said that the 
kind of genial rapprochement between mysticism and poetry in the examples above 
continued well into the century, signifying a growing tendency towards the aesthetic 
construction of mysticism in Victorian discourse on poetry. We see this, for instance, 
in the ‘sweeping romantic vision’ of Robert Vaughan’s Hours with the Mystics 
(1856),108 which makes a point in noting that the aesthetic appreciation of beauty – 
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including that experienced in poetry – can ‘aid us in our ascent toward the super-
sensuous’ and ‘ideal world’: 
We are often indebted to a sunset or a landscape, to a strain of music 
or a suddenly-remembered verse, for a voyage into a world of vision 
of our own, where we cease altogether to be aware of the external 
cause which first transported us thither.  
The chapter on the ‘Mysticism of the Neo-Platonists’, where these lines occur, also 
refers to Plato’s ‘divine madness’ of poetic inspiration in the Ion to range poetry 
among the manifestations of the mystical temperament,109 a classification that is all 
the more sympathetic to mysticism, given the special place Vaughan accorded to 
poets, and how he personally identified with them.110 Indeed, in a comment that 
further demonstrates the mid-century’s increasing acceptance of an essential affinity 
between poetry and mysticism, his friend J. B. Paton declared that everyone who 
knew Vaughan recognized that his belonged to ‘the poetic’ class of mind,111 curiously 
adding that ‘his sympathy with mysticism, which attracted him to that subject, 
sufficiently proves this to be the bent of his mind’. 112 In other words, it takes a poet to 
understand a mystic, either because there is an aesthetic dimension to mysticism, or a 
mystical dimension to poetry. It is the same assumption made in George Eliot’s 
following lines about Goethe, from a letter of Nov. 11, 1874:   
I must say, for my part, that I think he had a strain of mysticism in 
his soul,—of so much mysticism as I think inevitably belongs to a 
full poetic nature—I mean the delighted bathing of the soul in 
emotions which overpass the outlines of definite thought.113     
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 Other examples of this aesthetic tolerance for the mystical in the Victorian 
literary critical discourse of the second half of the century are found, for instance, in 
Swinburne’s 1868 essay on Blake, or in the paper read by Hiram Corson at the eighth 
meeting of the London Browning Society in 1882. With regard to Swinburne, his 
essay describes Blake ‘as a mystic of the higher’ and ‘nobler kind’, and clearly shows 
how he had no patience for the kind of anti-mystical critics, who, as he sarcastically 
suggests, ‘regard mysticism with distaste or contempt, as essentially in itself a vain or 
noxious thing a sealed bag or bladder that can only be full either of wind or of 
poison’. Although he did not necessarily believe that poetic inspiration was a form of 
mysticism, he does argue here that, when a mystic happens to be a poet, and one of 
great genius, as in the case of Blake, then his mysticism must be deemed aesthetically 
instructive. The mistake, then, of the critical literature that is overly suspicious of 
mystics, explains Swinburne, is its failure to realize that a literary critic is not called 
upon to be ‘an apostle’ of a poet’s ‘mystical creed’, but rather to attempt an objective 
evaluation and appreciation of its aesthetic value in a work. To use his own words, 
what a ‘reasonable commentator’ ought to do, when approaching a mystical poem, is 
not to aim to ‘preach’ its ‘gospel’, but ‘merely to do art a good turn in some small 
way, by explaining the “faith and works” of a great artist’. ‘First get well hold of the 
mystic’, he states, ‘and you will then at once get a better view and comprehension of 
the painter and poet’. 114  
Hiram Corson’s paper, on the other hand, holds that aesthetic experience, both 
that of poetic creation and appreciation, is intrinsically mystical in nature. His main 
proposition is that ‘the life and efficacy of Art depends on the personality of the 
artist’, where the idea of ‘personality’ corresponds not with the artist’s ‘conscious 
intellect’, but with ‘his spiritual constitution’. In the following excerpt, worth quoting 
in full, Corson particularly argues that, in true art such as Shakespeare’s, the artist’s 
personality succeeds to infuse the work with the deepest spiritual mysteries of the 
‘Soul’ (or of ‘Being’), eliciting an experience of cognitive-aesthetic communion 
between the artist and his/her audience, which he describes in mystical terms: 
Personality is the ultimate source of spiritual quickening and 
adjustment. Literature and all forms of Art are but the intermediate 
agencies of personalities. […] The inmost, secretest life of 
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Shakspere’s [sic] Plays came from the personality, the inmost, 
secretest life, of the man Shakspere. We might, with the most alert 
sagacity, note and tabulate and aggregate his myriad phenomenal 
merits as a dramatic writer, but we might still be very far from that 
something back of them all, or rather that immanent something, that 
mystery of personality, that microcosmos, that “inmost centre, 
where truth abides in fullness,” as Browning makes Paracelsus 
characterize it, “constituting man’s self, is what Is,” as he makes the 
dying John characterize it, in A Death in the Desert, that “innermost 
of the inmost, most interior of the interne,” as Mrs. Browning 
characterizes it, “the hidden Soul,” as Dallas characterizes it, which 
is projected into, and constitutes the soul of, the Plays, and which  is 
reached through an unconscious and mystic sympathy on the part of 
him who habitually communes with and does fealty to them. That 
personality, that living force, cooperated spontaneously and 
unconsciously with the conscious powers, in the creative process; 
and when we enter into a sympathetic communion with the concrete 
result of that creative process, our own mysterious personalities, 
being essentially identical with, though less quickened than, 
Shakspere’s, respond, though it may be but feebly, to his.115  
Much like Horne’s usage of the notion, therefore, the mystical in this excerpt is 
evidently derived from an anti-secular conception of the word ‘mystery’, being more 
or less defined as the unknowable, inscrutable inner workings of the spiritual life. This 
is the same meaning that A. S. Arnold finds in Carlyle’s understanding of mysticism, 
arguing in 1888 that ‘the word mystery’, for Carlyle, who acknowledged himself to be 
a mystic, was ‘but an apology for ignorance’ in spiritual matters, as in the ignorance in 
‘the ways of God’, the ‘Unseen Hand’, or the infinite ‘Power’ that governs the 
universe.116  
At this point, it should be noted that the few examples here brought together 
owe much to the earlier efforts of Carlyle, whose considerable and controversial 
attention at confronting the negative halo surrounding mysticism is what best marked 
the beginning of a new Victorian discourse on mysticism. I have previously observed 
that Carlyle was a pioneering figure in the popularization of mysticism, which is not 
far from what John R. Davis had in mind in pointing out that, as part of his project to 
promote German literature, Carlyle ‘began to interpret positively the term “mystic”’, 
as early as 1825, where it had been ‘hitherto used as a term of abuse levelled at 
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German authors in Britain’.117 In ‘The State of German Literature’ (1827), for 
example, Carlyle criticises the many who are too quick to use this term disparagingly, 
without even pausing to consider what they mean by it: ‘Mysticism is a word in the 
mouths of all: yet, of the hundred, perhaps not one has ever asked himself what this 
opprobrious epithet properly signified in his mind’. ‘Examined strictly’, he adds, 
‘mystical, in most cases, will turn out to be merely synonymous with not 
understood’.118 His answer to this rather accusatory conception of the mystical will be 
addressed in the next chapter (as part of my analysis of Carlyle’s contribution to the 
Victorian construction of an ineffable mysticism), but it is sufficient, for now, to 
simply note how Carlyle was actively working to create a more favourable image for 
mystics in the face of English prejudices, especially during the early part of his career. 
‘Mystics’, he insisted, according to Davis, ‘were dealing in human truths, poetry, 
beauty and ideals at a time when most people’s existence was narrow and 
mundane’.119 This finds expression in his essay on ‘Novalis’ (1829), for instance, as 
he claims for mysticism a universal legacy that honourably manifested itself through 
the poets of Italy, among others: 
Novalis […] was openly enough, in good part a Mystic himself. Not 
indeed what we English, in common speech, call a Mystic; which 
means only a man whom we do not understand, and, in self-defence, 
reckon or would fain reckon a Dunce. Novalis was a Mystic, or had 
an affinity with Mysticism, in the primary and true meaning of that 
word, exemplified in some shape among our own Puritan Divines, 
and which at this day carries no opprobrium with it in Germany, or, 
except among certain more unimportant classes, in any other 
country. Nay, in this sense, great honours are recorded of 
Mysticism: Tasso, as may be seen in several of his prose writings, 
was professedly a Mystic; Dante is regarded as a chief man of that 
class.  
What Carlyle intended here as ‘the primary and true meaning’ of the word mysticism 
proves to be a positive (idealistic) one from the fact that he incidentally defines it in 
the same essay as ‘that spiritual condition, which by its own account is like pure 
Light, colorless, formless, infinite’.120 
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We probably get an idea of Carlyle’s enthusiasm for mysticism during this 
period from his notebook entry of 4 August 1831, in which we learn that it was not 
merely a subject with which he was preoccupied in writing, but one that obviously 
followed him in many of his conversations. The entry, written while travelling on his 
way to London, suggests his eagerness to discuss the subject even during a long and 
tiresome waiting interval. It reads thus: ‘saw Esbie in the steerage; talked mysticism 
with him during six weary hours we had to stay at Whitehaven’.121 Moreover, as 
suggested by Edward Alexander, Carlyle’s early dealings with John Stuart Mill also 
indicate that he was eagerly endeavouring to win ‘disciples’ to his ‘own special brand 
of mysticism’, a point that has been similarly mentioned by Emery Neff.122 Neff 
namely argues that, in the 1830s, ‘Carlyle turned to the search of kindred spirits who 
might aid him in preaching the gospel of mysticism’, adding that, when gratified to 
having found a number of ‘young men already converted by his Review articles, he 
decided that his best work during the winter would be to investigate the “quality, 
numbers, and aims” of his London disciples’. Mill, Neff believes, was, in this regard, 
the most significant of these young associates.123  
During this period, Carlyle’s correspondence with, or about, Mill is revealing 
in terms of his interest in mysticism. The following extract from his letter to Mill of 
May 1st, 1833 reveals, for instance, how he was constantly on the lookout for English 
fellow mystics: 
Yesterday in some Newspaper I saw a sentence quoted from the 
Monthly Repository about Books and Men, which was curiously 
emblematic of my own late thoughts. If it was not you that wrote it 
(which I fear), then there must be another Mystic in England, whose 
acquaintance I should gladly make.124 
Carlyle had previously ‘hunted out the author’ of the five Examiner articles, entitled 
‘The Spirit of the Age’ (1831), which had led him, upon reading them, to 
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enthusiastically exclaim to himself: ‘Here is a new Mystic!’.125 After seeking his 
acquaintance in London, Carlyle’s favourable description of his first meeting with 
Mill indicates his hope that he had succeeded to recruit a new member to his ‘Mystic 
School’: 
We had almost four hours of the best talk I have mingled in for long. 
The youth walked home with me almost to the door; seemed to 
profess almost as plainly as modesty would allow that he had been 
converted by the Head of the Mystic School, to whom personally he 
testified very hearty-looking regard. […] These rudiments of a 
Mystic School, better than I anticipated here, are by far the most 
cheering phenomenon I see in London. Good will come of it. Let us 
wait, and see in what way.126 
And even when Mill, for the sake of his conscience, ‘wrote to him a distinct 
profession’ of all the opinions he held, which he knew were incompatible with 
Carlyle’s mysticism, Carlyle simply brushed this aside and insistently replied that ‘the 
chief difference between’ them was that Mill ‘was as yet consciously nothing of a 
mystic’. 127 ‘Your very Mysticism’ (for there is enough of it in you)’, Carlyle 
explained, ‘you have to translate into Logic before you give it place’.128 It is not clear 
when exactly Carlyle lost hope in converting Mill, but Dwight Lindley believes that it 
is this that ‘finally led to the rupture in their friendship’.129  
As for his conceptual association between poetry and mysticism, and how he, 
in turn, sought to re-interpret the latter category aesthetically, Carlyle has left us 
ample evidence of this in his essays and private writings. The closing paragraph of his 
notebook entry of 8 January 1828, for example, not only shows us ‘most clearly’ – if 
any of Carlyle’s writings could – what he meant by mysticism,130 but also states his 
belief that poetry, in its truest and highest sense, properly belongs to its domain:   
Tasso was a mystic, as we should call him: Must not every true poet 
be so? That is to say, must he not have a sense of the Invisible 
Existences of Nature, and be enabled as it were to read the symbols 
of these in the visible? Can any man delineate with life the figure 
even of a Trinculo or Caliban otherwise? For is not the poorest 
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nature a mystery; the most grovelling street-porter, the most arid 
Kanzlerverwandte a type in some obscurer sense and an emanation 
from the Land of wonders?131  
These lines are an early, though non-figurative, expression of Carlyle’s clothes 
philosophy that would be more fully developed in Sartor Resartus (1833-34), 
providing its controlling metaphor. Consciously turning back to ‘a very old tradition’ 
that ‘has flowed through all ages of thought like a subterranean stream’, the 
philosophy conceives material reality to be a mere appearance, as if a garment, 
concealing behind it a noumenally Absolute reality that is essentially divine in nature, 
and one that remains hidden and mysterious to all but a special few. Observing the 
lines above, it is useful to note what has been previously mentioned, that Carlyle’s 
conceptualization of mysticism goes hand in hand with a particular notion of 
‘mystery’. In his excellently comprehensive study of Carlyle’s relationship to German 
thought from 1819 to 1834, Charles F. Harrold relates this notion to the medieval 
theological conception of ‘mystery’ as ‘that which is everywhere revealed but is not 
understood of those who have not right judgment’. Maintaining that this is also what 
underlies Carlyle’s appropriation of Goethe’s ‘Open Secret’, Harrold argues that 
Carlyle’s ‘sacred mystery’ is such ‘in a double sense: as beyond fathoming by human 
reason, and as lying undiscerned to the mass of mankind’. Mystics, in this sense, are 
those who are able to pierce through the shows and the outward trappings of the 
physical world, and seize at this ‘divine mystery’, an ability that Carlyle counted as 
‘but one of the two great gifts of the Hero’ – the other being the gift of ‘action’.132 
And sure enough, given his suggestion above that ‘every true poet’ must be a mystic, 
it is no wonder that Carlyle included the class of poets as foremost among his 
catalogue of heroes in 1840, declaring its similarity to the class of prophets in that 
‘they have penetrated both of them into the sacred mystery of the Universe’, ‘open to 
all, seen by almost none! That divine mystery, which lies everywhere in all Beings’. 
The poet’s penetration of this mystery, he explains, occurs on the aesthetic level, and 
yields a kind of organic unity between the outward musicality of the poetic utterance 
and the internal spiritual melody of the ‘thing’ sung:  
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A musical thought is one spoken by a mind that has penetrated into 
the inmost heart of the thing; detected the inmost mystery of it, 
namely the melody that lies hidden in it; the inward harmony of 
coherence which is its soul, whereby it exists, and has a right to be, 
here in this world. 
This, Carlyle believes, is behind Ludwig Tieck’s description of Dante’s Divine 
Comedy as ‘a mystic unfathomable Song’.133   
An important point for discussion in relation to Carlyle’s lecture on ‘The Hero 
as Poet’ (1840) is that mentioned by Emerson R. Marks, that such adulatory accounts 
of the poet, similar also to Emerson’s description of the poet as a ‘representative 
man’, indicate how the focus of nineteenth century poetic theory was undergoing a 
‘shift of attention from what poets created to the intellectual and psychological 
equipment which enables creation in the first place’.134 This brings me to Carlyle’s 
appropriation of the Kantian distinction between ‘Reason’ and ‘Understanding’, and 
how it was part of a larger attempt by Victorian poets and critics to define mysticism 
in a way that asserts the authority of poetic intuitions over the empiricism and material 
philosophy of the period. To be sure, in such pieces as ‘The State of German 
Literature’ and ‘Novalis’, for example, Carlyle’s defence of mysticism is, in effect, a 
defence of the cultural authority of poetry, because it involves postulating that 
ultimate knowledge is obtained, not through the much venerated logic of the 
rationalists, but by an intuitive faculty in man that is believed to be, among other 
things, the seat of the poetic imagination. This Carlyle accomplishes by giving a more 
Romantic and religious interpretation to the functions of Reason in Kant’s Idealist 
philosophy. 
Charles Harrold explains that Carlyle’s Reason is, in fact, ‘far less rational 
than Kant’s pure practical reason’, taking on for him ‘a mystical significance’ that 
shows the greater influence of Coleridge and Jacobi, with some traces of the 
seventeenth century English divines as well as the English Platonic tradition.135 
Defining both Reason and Understanding as ‘organs’, or ‘modes of operation, by 
which the mind discovers truth’, Carlyle perceives the relation between the two as an 
opposition between absolute and relative truth: ‘Reason discerns Truth itself, the 
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absolutely and primitively True; while understanding discerns only relations’. As to 
what is meant by ‘Primitive Truth’, Carlyle suggests that it is anything that deals with 
the transcendentally ‘infinite’ and ‘eternal’ questions, such as ‘the existence of God’ 
and the ‘immaterial Soul’, or ‘the end and meaning of man’. The answer to these, he 
argues, are attained only subjectively ‘by intuitions, in the deepest and purest nature of 
Man’, what he describes as ‘the inward eye’, which involves denying that ‘Sense is 
the only inlet of Knowledge, that Experience is the primary ground of Belief’. Stated 
differently, these truths cannot be inferred from the external ‘world of sense’, as they 
are ‘written’ in ‘obscure but ineffaceable characters within our inmost being’. For 
Carlyle, therefore, ‘the proper province of Understanding is all, strictly speaking, real 
practical and material knowledge, Mathematics, Physics, Political Economy’, etc., 
which he deems to be far inferior to Reason’s more spiritual domain: ‘Let it not step 
beyond this province, however; not usurp the province of Reason, which it is 
appointed to obey, and cannot rule over without ruin to the whole spiritual man’.136 
That Carlyle indeed considered the intuitive, or visceral, ‘mode’ of discovering truth 
as definitive of mysticism is evident in his statement that ‘to know; to get into the truth 
of anything, is ever a mystic act, of which the best logics can only babble on the 
surface’.137 It is even more clearly seen in how he equates the essential doctrine 
behind ‘the Teologia Mistica, so much venerated by Tasso in his philosophical 
writings’, as well as ‘the “Mysticism” alluded to by Novalis’ to his own peculiar 
version of Kant’s Reason, prompting Charles Harrold to describe this Romanticized 
version of it as being ‘little else than a mystical penetration to spiritual truth’.138  
Now according to the constructivist approach applied in this thesis, it is fair to 
say that Carlyle’s characterization of the mystical along these Romantic and loosely 
Kantian lines effectively exemplifies Richard King’s view that mysticism is a 
category that ‘represents the conceptual site of a historical struggle’ over ‘meaning 
and authority’. It is perhaps useful to recall that this approach maintains not only that 
any established definition of mysticism is a product of ‘a particular community, with a 
particular agenda, at a particular time, in a particular cultural space’, but also that any 
investigation of the social or cultural construction of a given conception of mysticism 
is principally ‘an investigation of power relations’. I have previously cited the opinion 
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that there is an agenda of power with a clear cultural and historical particularity 
underlying, for example, the medieval ecclesiastical definition of the mystical as being 
related to the hidden meaning of the Scripture: it demonstrates the patriarchal 
exclusion of medieval women from religious life, given that the majority of them 
lacked scholastic training in interpreting the Bible. 139 And so, too, in a different way, 
it is legitimate to argue that, in the case of Carlyle and other Victorians, the definition 
of mysticism as an intuitive path to ultimate knowledge defies the Jamesian 
essentialist notion of a mysticism that is universal, ahistorical and acultural, showing, 
instead, that it was very much a product of its ideological and and historical situation. 
In defining it as an intuitive knowledge of transcendent reality, mysticism more 
specifically represented a conceptual site of a power contest between the competing 
ideals of the religious and secular camps in the nineteenth century. 
 In discussing the modern making of mysticism, Leigh Schmidt explains that 
there were many ‘battles to be both fought and mediated’ in the intellectual and 
religious worlds that brought about William James’s theory, a major one of which was 
the ongoing contention between religion and science. He moreover argues that the 
invention of an ‘intuitive’ mysticism that is superior to all rational discursive practices 
was partly meant as a ‘defensive’ strategy to secure ‘religious feelings’ in an isolated 
and untouchable sphere, above the onslaught of scientific or materialist analysis: ‘As 
an antipositivist, antimaterialist tool, the new mysticism offered an intellectual shield 
against untrammeled naturalism, “the fierce onward current of purely scientific 
thought”’.140 With this in mind, nothing in Carlyle’s writings shows us more clearly 
how mysticism – so defined – was deeply entangled in contemporary cultural debates 
against positivism than the conclusion of ‘Novalis’. The following passage, extracted 
from it, is long, but besides interestingly employing Schmidt’s same metaphor of 
intellectual warfare, it will not bear abridgment without detracting from its relevance 
to how Carlyle’s defence of mysticism was implicated in issues of ideological power:    
Mysticism, whatever it may be, should, like other actually existing 
things, be understood in well-informed minds. We have observed, 
indeed, that the old-established laugh on this subject has been 
getting rather hollow of late; and seems as if, ere long, it would in a 
great measure die away. It appears to us that, in England, there is a 
distinct spirit of tolerant and sober investigation abroad, in regard to 
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this and other kindred matters; a persuasion, fast spreading wider 
and wider, that the plummet of French or Scotch Logic, excellent, 
nay indispensable as it is for surveying all coasts and harbours, will 
absolutely not sound the deep-seas of human Inquiry. […] ‘The day 
will come,’ said Lichtenberg, in bitter irony, ‘when the belief in God 
will be like that in nursery Spectres’; or, as Jean Paul has it, ‘Of the 
World will be made a World-Machine, of the Æther a Gas, of God a 
Force, and of the Second World – a Coffin.’ We rather think, such a 
day will not come. At all events, while the battle is still waging, and 
that Coffin-and-Gas Philosophy has not yet secured itself with 
Tithes and penal Statutes, let there be free scope for Mysticism, or 
whatever else honestly opposes it. A fair field, and no favour, and 
the right will prosper! 
 So much for essentialism’s insistence on the ahistorical and apolitical nature of 
mysticism. It clearly fails to place any importance on the ideological agenda 
underlying such a culturally-loaded discourse as this one. Evidently, Carlyle is not too 
particular about the exact definition of mysticism here, so long as it represented a 
category that offered an effective combatant against the purely secular movements 
that were steadily gaining ground at the time. Ideologically speaking, it appears that 
there is much at stake in insisting that mysticism is an ‘actually existing thing’, instead 
of something that warrants ridicule. The extract above may help indicate how, in the 
nineteenth century, the term’s definition was no longer primarily inclined toward the 
social exclusion of women from religious authority, as in medieval times, nor chiefly 
socially situated within debates about the acceptable ‘comportment of religious 
people’, as in mid-eighteenth-century critiques of enthusiasm. On the contrary, the 
term’s usage, in ‘Novalis’, reveals that what was fundamentally at stake at the time 
was, in fact, the primal religious impulse of the theists, and that mysticism was being 
proposed as a possible candidate to help win the ‘battle’ of belief between a God-
centred, or theistic, philosophy and the ‘Coffin-and Gas’ philosophy of the 
materialists. To be sure, it is clear in the rest of the essay that the attraction of Kant’s 
Idealism for Carlyle’s conception of the mystical largely lies in its denial of ‘the 
existence of Matter’, or the radical reinterpretation of it, and the possible metaphysical 
and religious implications of that: ‘the old hostility of Matter is at an end, for Matter is 
itself annihilated; and the black Spectre, Atheism, “with all its sickly dews,” melts 
into nothingness forever’. 141  Schmidt is correct in observing that this kind of 
metaphysical and philosophical speculation was an integral part of the intellectual 
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process that went into the modern making of mysticism: 
The modern construction of mysticism as a category was very much 
grounded in a particular set of cultural negotiations over the reality 
and unreality of the spiritual world. It was intended to engage, not 
bracket, those metaphysical questions.142 
That being said, what is especially significant to highlight here is how 
Victorian poetic theory, and the poetic enterprise as a whole, constituted a major arena 
where this cultural and ideological struggle for domination took place in the process 
of inventing this modern construct. This is because taking part in any intellectual 
process – defining mysticism, in this case – that sought to establish the supremacy of 
religious theism over a secular, naturalistic philosophy was in the best interest of the 
Victorian poets and critics who were struggling to assert the cultural relevance of 
poetry by claiming its recourse to primal religious feelings. More specifically, we may 
argue that, if Richard King is correct in observing that there were important 
considerations (ideological, critical, ethical, etc.) involved in the decision to include, 
or exclude, certain phenomena from this category, then Victorian poets and critics 
undoubtedly took part in these decisions.143 And these decisions served them well, 
too. The choice to include poetic inspiration as a type of the mystical phenomenon, for 
example, served to extend any claims that were being made for mysticism and religion 
to the sphere of poetry. In the same way, the decision to exclude rational modes of 
perception from the realm of the mystical was important, because it ensured that 
poetry stood separately, and independently, from the realm of Logic, either on an 
equal or superior footing; this naturally meant that the validity of poetic truths could 
not be critiqued, dissected or judged according to positivist epistemic values. For 
Victorian poets and critics, therefore, joining other intellectuals in defining mysticism 
as an inner subjective and anti-rationalist experience of the Absolute was a means of 
establishing the cultural authority, not only of religion, but also of poetry, given that 
poetry was already being promoted as a source of truth of high religious and mystical 
claims.  
Examples of how Victorian discourse on poetry displayed this kind of cultural 
and ideological struggle for domination in its conception of mysticism is found in the 
critical tendency to identify poetry, sometimes along with religion, as being 
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constitutive of (or equivalent to) the mystical while simultaneously pitting it against 
logic and scientific scepticism. Carlyle’s characterization of Kant’s Reason stands as a 
representative example. Having established above how Carlyle’s Romantic 
appropriation of the philosopher’s Idealism transformed Reason into a mystical 
faculty, so to speak, it is curious to note now that ‘Poetry’ always seems to be at the 
foreground of the spiritual landscape Carlyle tends to create when referring to this 
Kantian notion. In ‘Characteristics’ (1831), for example, Carlyle refers to the intuitive 
faculty as the ‘mystic region’ of the mind, from where ‘Posies’ emerge, forming one 
of the leading cultural manifestations of man’s spiritual principle. This principle, 
according to him, is awaiting to be revived from the sickening effects of the 
scepticism of modern life, the kind of scepticism that is born ‘of Logic, and its limits, 
and uses and abuses’:   
The fever of Scepticism must needs burn itself out, and burn out 
thereby the Impurities that caused it; then again will there be 
clearness, health. The principle of life, which now struggles 
painfully, in the outer, thin and barren domain of the Conscious of 
Mechanical, may then withdraw into its inner sanctuaries, its 
abysses of mystery and miracle; withdraw deeper than ever into that 
domain of the Unconscious, by nature infinite and inexhaustible; 
and creatively work there. From that mystic region, and from that 
alone, all wonders, all Poesies, and Religions, and Social Systems 
have proceeded.144     
The internal conflict suggested in these lines between the spirits of rationalism and 
mysticism, in addition to the latter’s definitive connection to poetry is also present in 
the following depictions of Reason offered in ‘The State of German Literature’ and 
‘Novalis’. The former states: 
Its [Reason’s] domain lies in that higher region whither logic and 
argument cannot reach; in that holier region, where Poetry, and 
Virtue and Divinity abide, in whose presence Understanding wavers 
and recoils, dazzled into utter darkness by that ‘sea of light,’ at once 
the fountain and the termination of all true knowledge. 
Similarly, in ‘Novalis’, Reason is said to be ‘the pure, ultimate light of our nature; 
wherein […] lies the foundation of all Poetry, Virtue, Religion; things which are 
properly beyond the province of Understanding’.145 The fact that ‘Poetry’ relies here 
																																																								
144 ‘Characteristics’, Edinburgh Review (August-Dec. 1831), 351-83 (pp. 355, 381). 
145 ‘State of German Literature’ (pp. 349); ‘Novalis’ (p. 117). 
	 97	
on the mystical for the legitimacy of its cultural authority is unmistakeable when one 
keeps in mind that in both essays Reason is consistently defined in mystical terms. 
 In addition to Carlyle, another significant Victorian thinker who entertained 
similar views about the authority of the mystical and poetic mindset over the rational 
one was none other than John Mill, the son of the distinguished philosopher of the 
empirical and utilitarian school, James Stuart Mill. But this was Mill of the early 
thirties who still ‘had a good deal in common’ with Carlyle, and who was particularly 
going through an ‘excess[ive]’ stage in his reaction against the Benthamite 
utilitarianism of his early education.146 By then, Mill had emotionally recovered from 
his melancholic crisis of 1827-1828, itself owing much to his rigid rationalist 
upbringing that had threatened to turn him into ‘a mere reasoning machine’.147 His 
recovery famously came through the works of Wordsworth and Coleridge, which led 
to his adoption of certain Romantic views on mysticism and poetry, views that would 
not last, but that clearly represent a significant moment in the history of mysticism in 
Victorian poetic theory.148 These views, especially the ones on mysticism, were 
mostly expressed in his private correspondence with Carlyle, and his longest 
statement of them appeared in his letters of July 5, 1833, and March 2, 1834. 
 In these letters, Mill puts forth his idea about the proper role of the Logician, 
or philosopher, in relation to mysticism, poetry and art, the last two of which he uses 
interchangeably. His thoughts betray how, even at this stage, Mill could not 
completely liberate himself from his father’s doctrinaire rationalism, and his 
fundamental appeal to the principle of utility. Mill argues that ‘Mysticism’ is to be 
accepted, and deemed most serviceable, only if it proves ‘its translatability into 
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logic’.149 In true Romantic fashion, nonetheless, he declares that ‘the highest truths’ 
are those that belong to ‘the poet or artist’, which are intuitively attained: ‘that is, they 
need neither explanation nor proof, but if not known before, are assented to as soon as 
stated’. All of this comes as part of his attempt to argue that his own ‘humbler part’, as 
a Logician, is much more needed than the role taken up by Carlyle, whom he 
considers ‘a Poet and Artist’, even though Carlyle’s ‘walk of usefulness’ is judged ‘to 
be the higher’ of the two. Mill explains that, whereas ‘the artist’s is the highest part, 
for by him alone is real knowledge of such truths conveyed’, only a few readers, 
hearers, and spectators, ‘to whom those truths are intuitive’, would be able to 
understand them. The majority, on the other hand, will ‘consider them as nothing but 
dreaming or madness’, due to the prosaic nature of his contemporary intellectual and 
social scene. This is where the role of the Logician comes in, as he is among those few 
who are endowed with the ability to intuitively perceive such truths, and is equally 
able to allow others to see them more comprehensibly through the lens of Logic. On 
him, then, falls the task of translating the mystical and ‘impressive’ language of the 
poets, so as to ultimately ‘make those who are not poets, understand that poetry is 
higher than Logic’.150  
 In other words, the authority of Mill’s intuitive man of Logic is derived from 
his role as an auxiliary to mystics, poets and artists, who are elevated to the Carlylean 
pedestal of cultural prophets. It may be true that, for him, Logic is an indispensable 
tool for the evaluation of mysticism, but this is not in the sense of insisting that 
mysticism ought to be proven according to rationalist criteria of judgment. Rather, it is 
in the sense that it should be able to be ‘manipulat[ed]’ into clear logical statements. 
The letter of 1834, in which ‘mysticism’ features as a key term, indicates as much:  
Is not the distinction between Mysticism, the mysticism which is of 
Truth, & mere dreaming, or the substitution of imaginations for 
realities, exactly this, that mysticism may be “translated into logic?” 
I mean in the only sense in which I ever endeavour so to translate it. 
You will understand what I mean. Logic proves nothing, yet points 
out clearly whether and how all things are proved. This being my 
creed, of course none of my mysticism, if mysticism it be, rests on 
logic as its basis; yet I require to see how it looks in the logical 
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dialect before I feel sure of it. And if I have any vocation I think it is 
exactly this, to translate the mysticism of others into the language of 
Argument. Have not all things two aspects, an Artistic and a 
Scientific; to the former of which the language of mysticism is the 
most appropriate, to the latter that of Logic? The mechanical people, 
whether theorists or men of the world, find the former unintelligible, 
& despise it. Through the latter one has a chance of forcing them to 
respect even what they cannot understand – and that once done, they 
may be made to believe what to many of them must always be in the 
utmost extent of the term “things unseen.” 151  
This vocation of being a translator of intuitive truths is similarly described in his letter 
of the previous year, but in relation to poetry: 
I am not in the least a poet, in any sense; but I can do homage to 
poetry. I can to a very considerable extent feel it and understand it, 
and can make others who are my inferiors understand it in 
proportion to the measure of their capacity. [my italics] 
As Bruce Mazlish suggests, ‘neither the poetry nor the mysticism would be very 
recognizable’ after they have been subjected to Mill’s translation,152 but what is 
certainly recognizable from the quotes above is that mysticism, as a concept, was 
inexorably linked to poetry and art, and that even Victorian men of logic, such as Mill, 
found in it a meaningful term by which to lay their own claims to cultural authority. 
This sense of authority, however, was notably predicated on an understanding that the 
cognitive domain of science, logic and intellectual analysis is subordinate to the realm 
of intuitions. 
Aside from the writings of Carlyle, Mill, and other Victorian intellectuals who 
ideologically regarded themselves as ‘outside Christianity’, a similar aestheticized 
notion of mysticism materialized even in Victorian vindications of poetry by the 
‘consciously orthodox Christian’ critics, who, according to David J. DeLuara, placed 
various levels of importance ‘on credal and doctrinal correctness’. The two examples 
cited by DeLaura, from the writings of Frederick Robertson and John H. Newman, 
perfectly suit the present purpose, both of which express the then ‘increasingly 
widespread view’ that although poetry is ‘subordinate to revelation’, it is ‘the restorer 
of a disappearing religious consciousness’, ‘the guardian of a “vague” numinousness 
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under threat from science’. 153  Namely, in 1852, Robertson stated that ‘Poetry’ 
originates from mysticism, and, in turn, serves to preserve it from the destructive 
forces of modern science, clearly conceiving the mystical as a visceral experience or 
knowledge that rises above the practical materialism of science: 
Science destroys Poetry: until the heart bursts into mysticism, and 
out of science brings Poetry again; asserting a wonder and a vague 
mystery of life and feeling beneath and beyond all science, and 
proclaiming the wonderfulness and mystery of that which we seem 
most familiarly to understand. 
Based on this, he also justifies the mystical style of poetry that belongs to Tennyson, 
Browning and Wordsworth, as a necessary response to the limitations and dry 
concreteness of scientific facts: 
The reaction from the age of Science is, and I suppose ever will be, 
the Poetry of Mysticism. For men who have […] become conscious 
that the clear formulas and accurate technicalities of science have 
not expressed, nor ever can, the truths of the Soul, find a refuge in 
that vagueness and undefined sense of mystery which broods over 
the shapeless borders of the illimitable. [… This] is a necessary 
phase in the history of Poetry, and is but a protest and witness for 
the infinite in the soul of man.154  
Robertson seems to be saying that nineteenth-century mysticism is a testimony to the 
inadequacy of materialist and rationalist philosophies to meet man’s metaphysical 
needs, and ‘Poetry’ is taken to be the definitive medium for its expression. As for John 
Newman, he had argued about a decade earlier that modern poetry had gradually 
come to ‘counterbalance’ the more dominant practical and materialistic tendencies of 
mid-century culture, and by this, substituting the spiritual role of the Church: ‘The 
taste for poetry of a religious kind has in modern times in a certain sense taken place 
of the deep contemplative spirit of the early Church’. This is where he suggests that it 
would not be ‘far-fetched’ to draw a ‘comparison between the mysticism of the 
ancients, and the poetry or romance of the moderns, as to the religious tendencies of 
each’: 
Poetry then is our mysticism; and so far as any two characters of 
mind tend to penetrate below the surface of things, and to draw men 
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away from the material to the invisible world, so far they may 
certainly be said to answer the same end; and that too a religious 
one.155 
Conclusion 
To conclude, ‘mysticism’ obviously became a recurrent term in Victorian discourse 
on poetry, and the act of defining it offered poets and critics alike an important means 
for asserting and making sense of the place of poetry in the increasingly secularized 
milieu of nineteenth-century culture. Particularly, its definition as a transcendent state 
of consciousness, whether explicitly stated, or implicitly accepted, was intended to 
lend support to the Romantic critical claims that sought to elevate poetry to the status 
of a divinely inspired prophecy; this is because poetic inspiration itself was effectively 
being identified as a form of mystical experience. As has been widely discussed in the 
scholarship on Victorian poetry and criticism, such Romantic claims are best 
interpreted as a response to that generally perceived ideological crisis that came in the 
wake of the higher biblical criticism, and the early discoveries of geology and biology, 
all of which elicited the need to salvage the moral and spiritual functions of the 
discredited dogmas by transferring them to the poetic enterprise. We may rightly say, 
therefore, that the Victorian aestheticization of mysticism was driven by a clear 
cultural and ideological agenda: it was done as much to further the cause of religion, 
and its cultural sphere of influence, as to assert the spiritual and moral function of 
poetry in a modern secular setting. The same cultural and ideological politics also 
underlay the emergence of this modern category as an anti-positivist and anti-
materialist construct, and Victorian poetic theory equally had much to do with this. 
When William James, for instance, wrote, in the context of discussing the mystical, 
that ‘intuitions’ are ‘truer than any logic-chopping rationalistic talk, however clever’, 
and Underhill followed suit in declaring the ability of passions to open ‘doors’ of truth 
‘which logic has battered on in vain’,156 they were both responding to the writings of 
Victorian poets and critics, who made a positive case for mysticism in the effort to 
establish the supremacy of poetry over science. 
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CHAPTER III 
‘I am bound to find you in reasons, Sir, but not in brains’:  
Carlyle and the Nineteenth-Century Reinterpretation of the Obscurity of 
‘Mysticism’ 
According to John Nichol’s biography of Thomas Carlyle for The English Men of 
Letters (1892), Carlyle’s days as a student saw the words ‘No Mysticism’ inscribed 
over Edinburgh University’s entrances, as part of its academic mission,1 something 
that seems to have had an opposite effect on Carlyle.2 For if anything, Carlyle’s early 
intellectual career would be marked by a diligent preoccupation with the mystical, 
whether in his readings, writings, or social interactions with friends and 
acquaintances. His early letters certainly reveal that he was eager to ‘preach’ 
mysticism to any literary company he mixed with;3 and, as in his first dealings with 
John Stuart Mill,4 he often tended to believe that he was close to winning a new 
‘convert’ to ‘the Mystic School’. His letter to his brother John of 11 August 1829 is a 
case in point. In it, Carlyle gives the following account about his visit to Dumfries, 
where he me with Francis Jeffrey of the Edinburgh Review: 
Saw the Jeffreys: they arrived about seven at night; and the new 
Dean and I sat talking of high and low matters till near two in the 
morning. The Dean of Faculty seems slowly coming over to 
“Mysticism,” were he not long ago a vollendete Stümper 
[completely unreasonable man]!5 
Two years later, William Empson, Jeffrey’s son in law, would also be subjected to 
Carlyle’s efforts of conversion, and Carlyle would deliver a similar verdict on him: 
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‘He is, as I thought, in the threshold of mysticism; but I think will go deeper’.6 This is 
not to mention the ‘Mr. Esbie’ cited in Chapter II, whom Carlyle ‘preached mysticism 
to for six hours’ while travelling to Liverpool, and this despite being both ‘sleepless’ 
and ‘victualless’.7 Even Carlyle’s intimate letters to his wife are not without his 
attempts to proselytize, revealing that it was his hope, too, that Jane Welsh Carlyle 
would become ‘a Mystic’. Such is the case of his letter of August 15th, 1831: 
I will ‘take up with no other women’; for I believe in my heart I 
have the best woman of them all to myself – That is, if she were a 
mystic, as she will one day be: nay already is.– And so here good 
night my own Jane and Wife! 
And again a week later: 
Understand however once more that I have yet taken up with no 
other women. […] I perceive that of all women my own Jeannie is 
the wife for me: that in her true bosom (once she were a Mystic) a 
Man's head is worthy to lie. Be a Mystic, Dearest; that is, stand with 
me on this everlasting basis, and keep thy arms around me: thro’ life 
I fear nothing.8 
In this last letter, Carlyle also informed Jane about meeting Charles 
Wentworth Dilke, then the editor of the Athenaeum, whom he reported to have 
introduced to mysticism: ‘We had immensities of talk; and Dylk [sic…] heard 
mysticism for the first time with astonishment enough’. It should be pointed out that 
Carlyle’s visit to London in 1831 was for the purpose of arranging for the publication 
of Sartor Resartus, which explains why he was debating mysticism with several 
London publishers. Of his earlier meeting with John Bowring of the Westminster 
Review, he wrote: ‘I went to Bowring’s. […] We talked copiously, he utterly 
utilitarian and radical, I utterly mystical and radical; and parted about noon; with a 
standing invitation on his part to come again’.9 From his letters, it is clear that 
Carlyle’s ultimate hope at the time was to be able to gather a circle of like-minded 
mystics around him, who could, as Emery Neff put it, ‘aid him in preaching the gospel 
of mysticism’.10 And he preferred this to be in London, where they can exert more 
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influence, and even start a publication of their own. Informing his brother John of his 
news on 20 December 1831, Carlyle writes:  
Last and greatest, Tait of Edinr […] says that he is just starting, or 
thinking to do it, a radical or mystico-radical Magazine, and 
earnestly desires &c &c I myself have been studying as you partly 
know, whether a mystico-radical school could not be brought 
together here [London], and a Publication begun as their organ: I 
write to Tait in some measure to that effect; and think probably for 
the present he will – do nothing. Die Zeit bringt Rosen [Time brings 
roses]. 
A few months earlier, Carlyle had also written to his wife that ‘in London, I should 
strive to ascertain if I could not be my own Editor. Two or three sufficient Mystics 
(such will ere long be in Britain) might do wonders’.11 
 Of course, Carlyle was never to succeed in establishing the kind of mystic 
coterie he had in mind, one with its own publishing organ, but the same cannot be said 
about his aspirations for popularizing mysticism in Britain’s mainstream intellectual 
culture. The latter was no easy feat, and while other writers would contribute to 
bringing it about, there could be little doubt that Carlyle’s early writings played the 
role of catalyst. Indeed, an investigation of this would give credence to George Eliot’s 
laudatory remark of 1855 – written even amidst the public furor over Latter-Day 
Pamphlets (1850) – that ‘the extent of [Carlyle’s] influence may be best seen in the 
fact that ideas which were startling novelties when he first wrote them are now 
become common-places’.12 ‘Carlyle’s discourse’, as a recent critic has similarly 
argued, ‘was so undeniably and powerfully constitutive’,13 a statement meant to 
suggest that the impact of Carlyle’s writings on nineteenth-century thought owed to 
their ability to construct new modes of thought, or reshape already-existing ones. This 
echoes a truth that was felt not only by Eliot, but by many other eminent 
contemporaries of Carlyle’s, such as biographer, editor, and literary critic David 
Masson,14 one of his lifelong friends. Albeit extravagant in tone, there is sufficient 
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justice in Masson’s 1850 critical estimation of Carlyle’s literary and intellectual 
influence: 
It is nearly half a generation since Mr. Carlyle became an 
intellectual power in this country; and certainly rarely, if ever, in the 
history of literature, has such a phenomenon been witnessed as that 
of his influence. Throughout the whole atmosphere of this island his 
spirit has diffused itself, so that there is probably not an educated 
man under forty years of age, from Caithness to Cornwall, that can 
honestly say he has not been more or less affected by it. […] One 
can hardly take up a book or a periodical without finding in every 
page some expression or some mode of thinking that bears the mint-
mark of his genius.15 
Carlyle on ‘mysticism’, the subject of this chapter, is an attempt to outline 
Carlyle’s influence on the development of the modern category of ‘mysticism’, by 
viewing his early writings as one of the chief sources of the conceptual shift in the 
nineteenth-century understanding of this category. It was 1827 when Carlyle 
undertook ‘to reveal the inadequacy of the reigning British empiricism, and its menace 
to whatever was creative and dynamic in literature, society, and ethics’,16 a task he set 
out to do by ‘Germanizing the public’, to borrow his own phrasing.17 Charles Harrold 
explains that the reason Carlyle looked to Germany for inspiration was that he 
recognized that, in order to highlight ‘the fallacies of the prevailing British 
philosophy’, he had ‘to advance beyond mere opposition, and to present in a new and 
illuminating form the essence of what he thought was at once the wisdom of the ages 
and the answer to his opponents’; in other words, it was a task that Carlyle felt 
‘needed new terms and fresh concepts’, something he was able to find in the 
metaphysical language of the German Romanticists.18 ‘Mysticism’ was certainty one 
concept that was consistently invoked in his early writings, from the earliest essays on 
Jean Paul Richter (1827), Werner (1828), Novalis (1829), and Schiller (1831), through 
the various ones on Goethe (1828-32), culminating in his first major work, Sartor 
Resartus (1833-4). Eliciting passionate reactions (both reverential and hostile), these 
works were widely read at their time of publication, and again later, when Carlyle’s 
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achieved fame through The French Revolution (1837) revived interest in his earlier 
writings.19 Their influence on contemporary notions of the mystical would be slow but 
definite, so that by the time of the publication of the Encyclopædia Britannica’s ninth 
edition (1875-89), the entry on ‘mysticism’ would bear the distinctive stamp of 
Carlyle’s definition: it would place primary emphasis on characterizing mystical 
experiences as defying linguistic expression, an argument in the advancement of 
which Carlyle had played a leading role, more than any other writer of the period, and 
this as part of his defence against the century’s abusive association of mysticism with 
the vague and obscure.  
In this sense, this chapter is an investigation of Carlyle’s contribution to the 
construction of one the essential features of mysticism in its modernist (Jamesian) 
sense: namely, its ineffability. Referring to some examples from twentieth-century 
scholarship in the fields of philosophy and psychology, where ‘mysticism’ emerged as 
a central term of debate, I will begin my analysis with a brief discussion of how the 
Modernist discourse on mysticism did in fact significantly define this category in 
terms of its ineffability. The discussion will then turn to one of the pejorative 
conceptions of the term in Victorian times, particularly how nineteenth-century 
writers very often used it in the sense of ‘vagueness’ or ‘obscurity’, as it is my 
contention that the then-emerging discourse on the ineffability of ‘mysticism’ – in 
which Carlyle participated – developed as a response to this kind of usage. The second 
section of my analysis will first focus on Carlyle, and how he sought to defend 
mystical literature against such a conception. It will be shown that he adopted an 
approach along the Johnsonian retort figuring in the title of this chapter,20 one in 
which Carlyle blames any incomprehensibility that is attributed to the mystical text, 
not on the writer’s style, but on the deficiency of the reader’s intuitive powers of 
comprehension. A main objective of this discussion will be to show how Carlyle’s 
definition of ‘mysticism’ as ineffable was a way of arguing for the authority of 
																																																								
19 Angus Hawkins, Victorian Political Culture: ‘Habits of Heart and Mind’ (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2015), pp. 222-23; and Gisela Argyle, Germany as Model and Monster: Allusions in English 
Fiction, 1830s-1930s (Toronto: McQill-Queen's University Press, 2002), pp. 28-9. For a good account 
of Carlyle’s reputation from his early career to the mid-twentieth century, including various estimations 
of the nature of his influence, see Jules Paul Siegel, ed., ‘Introduction’, in Thomas Carlyle: The Critical 
Heritage (London: Routledge, 1971), pp. 1-25. 
20 ‘I have found you an argument; but I am not obliged to find you an understanding’, which was 
Samuel Johnson’s reply to ‘a pertinacious gentleman’ he had debated with on a certain matter when this 
‘opponent’ happened to say ‘I don’t understand you, Sir’: James Boswell, The Life of Samuel Johnson, 
2 vols (London: Henry Baldwin, 1791), II, p. 514. This appears in Carlyle’s ‘State of German of 
Literature’ (p. 339). 
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intuitions in the face of the destructive forces of scepticism and scientific materialism. 
The chapter will finally provide an analysis of various examples from other Victorian 
writers, including Swinburne, Tennyson, Elizabeth Barrett Browning and Arthur 
Symons, all of whom believed in the inexpressibility of a mystic’s meaning. Placing 
Carlyle’s writing in the context of contemporary literary debates that negotiated this 
aspect of the term’s meaning will lead to one of the main points I intend to highlight 
in this chapter: that is, the crucial role that Victorian poetic theory had in the modern 
construction of an ineffable mysticism, in many ways making this construct an 
artefact of Victorian poetics. 
1. ‘Mysticism’ as an Ineffable Construct in Twentieth-Century Modernist 
Discourse 
That ineffability is indeed a defining characteristic of the modern category of 
mysticism is something that can be confirmed with reference to the household names 
in the religious philosophy and psychology of the twentieth century. As Grace Jantzen 
notes, when modern and contemporary philosophers ‘discuss mysticism they regularly 
take ineffability – the impossibility of verbal articulation – as a primary characteristic 
of the mystical’.21 William James, for instance, famously described it as ‘the handiest 
of the marks by which [to] classify a state of mind as mystical’, arguing that ‘the 
subject of it immediately says that it defies expression, that no adequate reports of its 
contents can be given in words’. In this sense, James believed that mystical states ‘are 
more like states of feeling than states of intellect’: 
No one can make clear to another who has never had a certain 
feeling, in what the quality or worth of it consists. One must have 
musical ears to know the value of a symphony; one must have been 
in love one’s self to understand a lover’s state of mind. Lacking the 
heart or ear, we cannot interpret the musician or the lover justly 
[…]. The mystic finds that most of us accord to his experiences an 
equally incompetent treatment.22 
Agreeing with William James that ineffability is one of ‘the constant characteristics of 
the contemplative experience’ of the mystic, Evelyn Underhill similarly refers to 
mysticism as ‘the dim and ineffable contemplation of Unnameable Transcendence’. 
																																																								
21 PGCM, pp. 278-9.  
22 Varieties, pp. 295.  
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‘Those who have seen’, she declares, ‘are quite convinced: those who have not seen, 
can never be told’. In an attempt to expound on this, she likens the mystics’ accounts 
of their experiences to the nautical charts and maps which can only be understood by 
experienced sailors:   
These [mystical] maps have an uncouth, even an impious 
appearance in the eyes of those unacquainted with the facts which 
they attempt to translate: as the charts of the deep-sea sailor seem 
ugly and unintelligible things to those who have never been out of 
sight of land.23 
 Other prominent twentieth-century theorists of mysticism who have 
emphasised its ineffability – taking their cues from both James and Underhill – 
include James Pratt, Rudolf Otto, W. T. Stace, and Ninian Smart.24 In The Religious 
Consciousness: A Psychological Study (1926), for example, Pratt states that ‘the 
mystic is justified in his constantly reiterated assertion that his deepest religious 
experiences are indescribable’, and that ‘in fact the ineffability of the experience is 
one of its most prominent characteristics’.25 Rudolf Otto’s Das Heilige of 1917 
(translated into English in 1923) likewise argues that ‘mysticism is the stressing to a 
very high degree, indeed the overstressing, of the non-rational or supra-rational 
elements in religion’, so that the mystic’s experience of the ‘numinous’ remains 
‘inexpressible – an άρρητον or ineffabile – in the sense that it completely eludes 
apprehension in terms of concepts’.26 W. T. Stace makes the same point in Mysticism 
and Philosophy (1960), but additionally maintains that ineffability is a consequence of 
the indivisible unity inherent in the mystical experience: 
Mystical experience, during the experience, is wholly 
unconceptualizable and therefore wholly unspeakable. This must be 
so. You cannot have a concept of anything within the 
undifferentiated unity because there are no separate items to be 
conceptualized. Concepts are only possible where there is a 
multiplicity or at least a duality. 
																																																								
23 Mysticism, pp. 396, 413, 149-50.  
24 See also Aldous Huxley, Perennial Philosophy, p. 29; R. C. Zaehner, Mysticism Sacred and Profane: 
An Inquiry into Some Vareities of Praeternatural Experience, pp. 7, 16, 30; and Robert K. C. Forman, 
ed., ‘Introduction: Mysticism, Constructivism, and Forgetting’, in The Problem of Pure Consciousness 
(p. 41). 
25 The Religious Consciousness: A Psychological Study (New York: Macmillan, 1926), p. 346. 
26 Rudolf Otto, The Idea of the Holy, pp. 23, 5. 
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Stace, therefore, asserts that ‘mystical experiences being unconceptualizable are also 
unverbalizable’,27 which finds an echo in Ninian Smart’s description of the mystical 
experience as ‘indescribable’, ‘beyond speech: higher than our words can soar’.28 It is, 
indeed, with reason that Steven Katz states, in Mysticism and Language (1992), that 
the adoption by modern religious philosophers of ‘some form of the ineffability 
thesis’ has become ‘so common’ that ‘it is often presented as an unassailable truth, an 
unquestionable premise, of any and all study of mystical sources’.29 This, however, 
has not always been the case, as will be shown in the following section.  
2. ‘Mysticism’ as ‘incomprehensible gibberish’ in the Victorian Poetics of 1830-
1870 
Any review of the Victorian usage of the word ‘mysticism’ would reveal that, as far as 
its implications about language are concerned, it was most often deployed as a term of 
disparagement to denote ‘mistiness’, ‘vagueness’, ‘unintelligibility’, and ‘obscurity’, 
particularly within the period between 1830 and 1870. The familiar quip that 
‘mysticism begins in mist and ends in schism’, for example, is a Victorian one, 
reportedly being the words of John Henry Newman, when discussing the Catholic 
Church’s position on the subject.30 It was not, however, in the theological discourse of 
the nineteenth century that this derogatory usage of the term became prevalent,31 but 
rather in the period’s literary reviews of the writings of German authors and poets – 
or, for that matter, of any English poet who displayed a philosophical and stylistic 
inclination toward Germany.32 Of course, one is compelled to ask why such a term, 
which is ‘not literary in the sense that we would recognise today’, should become 
prominent in the critical assessment of literature? In Victorian Scrutinies: Reviews of 
Poetry 1830-1870, Isobel Armstrong contends that, ‘almost without exception’, 
																																																								
27 W. T. Stace, Mysticism and Philosophy, p. 297. 
28 Ninian Smart, Dimensions of the Sacred: An Anatomy of the World's Beliefs (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), pp. 43, 173. 
29 Steven Katz, ed., ‘Editor’s Introduction’, in Mysticism and Language (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), pp. v-vi (p. v). 
30 Nicholas Watson, ‘Introduction’, in The Cambridge Companion to Medieval English Mysticism, ed. 
by Samuel Fanous and Vincent Gillespie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 1-28 (p. 
6). 
31 For a good summary of the mid-century’s negative theological significations of the term, see John 
Keble’s discussion on the ‘Meaning of the Charge of Mysticism’ in ‘On the Mysticism Attributed to the 
Early Fathers of the Church’, in Tracts for the Times, No. 89 (Oxford: James Parker and Company, 
1840; repr. 1868), (pp. 3-4, 6-7). 
32 Rosemary Ashton, The German Idea, pp. 96, 40-41, 70-71; and John R. Davis, The Victorians and 
Germany, p. 70. 
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periodical critics and reviewers (of the decades under study) embraced an ‘impure’ 
theory of art, refusing to regard the poem as being disconnected from a social and 
moral function. Theirs was a primarily ‘pragmatic’ criticism: its ‘emphasis was almost 
invariably on the human or social reference of the work of art, on its effect on the 
reader, and hence on the needs of the reader’. One of the consequences of this was ‘an 
almost complete absence of a specialised or technical critical vocabulary in Victorian 
reviewing, a vocabulary capable of describing the formal or aesthetic qualities of a 
poem’. Instead, most of the critical terminology that became common currency during 
the period ‘carry a psychological, human/social or moral reference’, and this, 
according to Armstrong, is partly why the term ‘mystical’ featured as one of ‘the 
commonest evaluative words in criticism at this time’. It is tied, she believes, with 
what Victorians conceived to be one of the essential moral functions of poetry, and 
that is to help in the growth and development – on both the individual and collective 
level – of the ‘faculty of sympathy’, upon which ‘the morality of a society’ depends. 
This was considered feasible only by adopting a ‘plain’ and ‘simple’ language that 
deals with the ‘common’ and ‘familiar’ aspects of everyday experience. A ‘mystical’, 
or ‘obscure’ language was, therefore, believed to be ‘symptomatic of a deep moral and 
emotional failure, a failure of sympathy’:  
The poet’s job is not to explore strange and unknown areas of 
experiences […], but to confirm and revitalize through an appeal to 
the emotions those central fundamental experiences with which we 
are already familiar. This is where his moral responsibilities lie.33  
As Armstrong suggests, Victorian reviews of poetry, ‘throughout the period’, 
abound with examples of the use of ‘mysticism’ as a ‘condemnatory’ critical term, 
which can be demonstrated through a list of short excerpts from various periodicals of 
the kind cited in her discussion.34 My intention here, however, is to demonstrate this 
aspect of the term’s meaning, by referring to three nineteenth-century critics who have 
written more than a few passing comments on mystical literature, and whose 
commentaries are representative of this pervasive critical tendency. The first of these 
is the poet-critic J. B. Selkirk (the pseudonym of James Bucham Brown),35 who 
																																																								
33 Armstrong, pp. 4-6, 21, 26-27, 9-11, 21, 26, 27.   
34 Victorian Scrutinies, p. 6-9. 
35 Greatly admired by Tennyson, James Bucham Brown (1832-1904) was a Scottish poet and essayist, 
who started his career at his father’s manufacturing firm, later resigning that for a literary career. He 
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dedicates a chapter on ‘Mysticism and Modern Poetry’ in his book Ethics and 
Aesthetics of Modern Poetry (1878). Selkirk argues that there is a ‘modern renaissance 
of the mystical element’ in both the poetry and criticism of the nineteenth century, 
pointing to the development of a ‘mystical school’ that ‘seems to encourage the belief 
in its disciples that mysticism is a necessity of true poetry’. For Selkirk, mystical 
poetry is chiefly identifiable by its ‘circuitous speech and doubtful intelligibility’, by 
its use of ‘an intricate and perplexed phraseology’, as well as ‘an amount of ingenious 
excogitation’; in short, by its ‘incomprehensible gibberish’: 
It would be no exaggeration to say that pages of it might be quoted 
that, for ordinary readers, contain, on average, a gleam of 
intelligence in about every tenth line, and in some cases passages so 
utterly incoherent that to all rational appearances they might have 
been concocted in Bedlam by one of the inmates for the 
entertainment of his fellow-sufferers in bondage. 
Of its contemporary popularity, Selkirk states that ‘the mischief of obscurity has been 
so dexterously shaded into our modern poetry’ that ‘we doubt much if there ever was 
a time in which the charge could be more justly made than our own’. To his fellow 
poets, he prescribes the recommendation given by William Thackeray’s Mr. 
Yellowplush, which, albeit humours, contains much truth, Selkirk believes: that it is 
‘generally best in poetry to understand puffickly what you mean yourself, and to 
igspress your meaning clearly afterwards, in the simpler words the better p’r’aps’.36 
 In principle, Selkirk has no strong objection against mysticism or ‘the 
mysterious’. ‘Mystery is inevitable’, he argues, especially in relation to ‘that class of 
subjects belonging to the spiritual or moral world, and in which poetry so largely 
deals’. What is problematic, in his opinion, is that many of the century’s poetic 
geniuses – he names Coleridge, Browning, Tennyson, and Carlyle ‘in prose’ – have 
‘gone further into the region of mystery, and even mystification, than can be easily 
justified’, and therein lies their ‘weakness’. Nevertheless, Selkirk insists that this, in 
itself, does not amount to ‘a real mischief’, but that one has ‘to keep in mind that the 
over-applauded use of one generation is apt to become the abuse of the next’, and that 
																																																																																																																																																															
Magazine, Cornhill Magazine, and Chambers’s Journal, and his first published volume of poetry went 
through five editions, from 1869 to 1911. ‘Selkirk’ was the name of his childhood hometown, to which 
he dedicated one of his most popular poems, ‘Auld Selkirk Toon’: W. Sorley Brown, ed., ‘Foreward’, 
in The Complete Poems of J. B. Selkirk, centenary edn (Selkirk: R. M. Linklater, 1932), pp. xi-xxix.   
36 J. B. Selkirk, Ethics and Aesthetics of Modern Poetry (London: Smith, Elder, 1878), pp. 71, 99-100, 
66, 77, 82. 
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these writers have indeed ‘had more influence on the poetry of the present generation 
than is good for it’. ‘The weakness of an undoubted master’, he adds, ‘becomes a very 
insufferable vice in his imitator’, a vice that, in this case, has grown into ‘a literary 
fashion’: 
What we complain of is, that this step is being continually 
attempted, and a school of poets has arisen with whom mysticism 
appears to be an intentional specialty: an affected, imitation 
mysticism, for, being a fashion in most cases, it goes no deeper than 
a manner […]. When mysticism falls from being the crasis of the 
man, and becomes the mere fashion or trick of the school, the 
chances are that it is no longer the veil over what is itself beautiful 
and profound, but rather the mist that magnifies feebleness. 
And Selkirk lays the blame for this ‘fashionable freak of obscurity’ as much on ‘the 
incomprehensible poets’ as on their readers/critics, who refuse to challenge them for 
fear of being called ‘stupid’ or ‘common-place’:  
Beyond doubt a great deal of obscurity is permitted to exist merely 
because it is unchallenged. A great many shrink from questioning 
what to them is unintelligible, or only half intelligible, for no better 
reason than that by so doing they fear to draw upon themselves a 
doubt of their own intellectual sufficiency. […] Away with such 
moral cowardice! Let us rather be ten times stupid, in the eyes of 
fashion, than once false to our own judgment.37 
 One critic whom Selkirk would not have deemed guilty of this type of ‘moral 
cowardice’ is Charles Knight,38 the writer of the condemnatory piece entitled ‘The 
Mystic School’, published in The London Magazine, as early as 1828 – fifty years 
prior to Selkirk’s book.39 Knight is well aware that the cost of criticizing ‘the disciples 
of this school’ is that it ‘will merely prove us in their minds to be “dullheads” – 
																																																								
37 Selkirk, pp. 68-70, 72, 75-6, 98-9, 101, 86-7. 
38 An esteemed figure among the ‘London literati’, Charles Knight (1791–1873) was a publisher, 
author, social reformer, and Shakespeare scholar. His early position as Windsor’s overseer of the poor 
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39 The piece was published anonymously, but has been attributed to Charles Knight by C. W. 
Proescholdt-Obermann in Goethe and His British Critics: The Reception of Goethe's Works in British 
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“worldlings” – in short, dunces and ninnies of every shape and denomination’. 
Addressing other critics, however, he stresses that it is their obligation ‘to lift up our 
humble voice in favour of Truth, Nature, and Simplicity, as opposed to affectation, 
euphuism, mysteries, and mysticism’. As for his definition of the essay’s key term, 
Knight holds that ‘mysticism is of two sorts’, both of which are linked with a 
‘paradoxical’ and ‘gratuitous obscurity’ that is often ‘gross, glaring, and most 
invitingly open to ridicule’. The first of these is conceptual in kind:  
In the ideas, it is when the thinker himself has no very clear 
conception of what he is aiming at – when thoughts and images 
crowd upon each other, like the fumes of a drunken dream, – 
brilliant, perhaps, and striking in themselves, but connected by no 
logical links, and directed to no definite end.  
The second type of mysticism, on the other hand, is stylistic in nature: 
In the expression, it is when the writer, having a positive meaning, 
so involves it in obscurities of illustration (this is no Bull) and other 
disguises of language, as to prevent the reader arriving at any clear 
conclusion of what he really does mean.40 
  Knight’s essay was, in fact, written in response to Carlyle’s critical articles of 
the late 1820s that were published in the Edinburgh and Foreign Reviews, including 
‘Jean Paul Friedrich Richter’ (1827), ‘State of German Literature’ (1827), and 
‘Goethe’s Helena’ (1828). The main objective of Knight’s essay, therefore, is to offer 
a cautionary note against ‘a certain species of criticism and tone of writing, which 
have latterly been creeping into our critical literature’, in which one finds 
‘straightforward nature cast contemptuously aside, and all the vague, hair-splitting, 
endlessly-involved jargon of German mysticism supplying its place’. To demonstrate 
his point, Knight quotes several excerpts from Carlyle’s writings, to which he 
responds in a continual note of puzzlement. ‘We confess’, he states at one instance, 
‘that we cannot trace the glimmering of a meaning here’. And at another: ‘Now, we 
dare say this writer believed that he understood himself; – but did he? – did he 
understand what he meant by the words contained in the last sentence […]?’. It should 
be noted that Knight’s censure is not only levelled at Carlyle’s criticism, but also 
equally at German mystical poetry, because he believes, like Selkirk, that ‘the style of 
																																																								
40 Charles Knight, ‘The Mystic School’, The London Magazine, I (1828), 170-76 (pp. 176, 174, 172, 
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criticism has grown up with, and partly grown out of, the style of poetry’. On 
Goethe’s poetic style, for example, he poses the following rhetorical questions: 
Why not tell openly and clearly – as eloquently or poetically as you 
please, but still clearly – what you have to say? Did the best, the 
greatest, the most poetical writers, use any such trickery – for it is 
trickery – as this?  
While this, and the other previous examples, tellingly support Armstrong’s argument 
that clarity was a valued aesthetic quality for Victorian poets and critics, they also 
serve to reveal how ‘mysticism’ featured as a significant term of reproach in 
nineteenth-century debates about poetry, namely those addressing its responsibilities 
toward its readers, as well as the conceptual and stylistic demands that should be made 
upon it. The same is true for Knight’s following objection to what he perceives as the 
enigmatical indulgences of ‘the mystic school’ of poetry in general:  
Poetry is not an enigma. We are not to be called upon, in the first 
instance, to “give it up,” before the poet will deign to tell us the 
solution. The great masters of Art have thought it best to tell their 
meaning in clear terms; and in this, as in nearly all things else, the 
great masters of Art have adhered to the principles of Nature.41  
More than the sense of puzzlement expressed by Knight at the meaning of 
Carlyle’s articles is his bewilderment by the fact that the articles were published in the 
Edinburgh Review, ‘precisely the very last place where we should have expected to 
find them’, given that the review was previously antithetical to anything mystical.42 
Indeed, John Davis argues that it is to the ‘credit’ of Francis Jeffery – the editor of the 
review, whose literary sympathies were expressly anti-mystical and anti-German – 
that he agreed to publish Carlyle’s work.43 This brings me to the third critic who had 
																																																								
41 ‘The Mystic School’ (pp. 170-5); and Selkirk, p. 67. 
42 Ibid., pp. 170-1. 
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substantially written against mysticism, and who had often done so by employing the 
term in the depreciatory sense of ‘vagueness’ and ‘obscurity’, that is, Francis Jeffrey 
himself. Jeffrey’s criticism is suggestive not the least because the bulk of it was 
written in his private letters to Carlyle,44 with whom he was corresponding as an 
intimate friend, rather than an editor,45 thus revealing that discussions of mysticism 
were not confined to the public sphere of nineteenth-century writing; they also 
infiltrated the private lives of Victorian intellectuals. Only published in their entirety 
in 2008, Jeffrey’s letters to Carlyle represents a rich source on mid-nineteenth-century 
conceptions of mysticism that has not yet received its due attention, and of which a 
full analysis demands much more space than my present study would allow. It is still 
possible, however, as well as profitable, to refer here to a number of typical examples 
from the text, with the purpose of demonstrating how the correspondence between the 
two was one of the significant conceptual battlegrounds on which the Victorian debate 
about mysticism was fought.46 With Carlyle being an advocate of the mystical, and 
Jeffrey a trenchant opponent, one could say that the letters demonstrate, on a smaller 
and heightened scale, the ideological and cultural tensions and oppositions of the 
nineteenth-century that went into the modern construction of mysticism, a process that 
involved a continual attempt at advancing/repelling certain definitions of the term 
from both sides of the conflict.  
 Indeed, in his introduction to Jeffrey’s letters to both Thomas and Jane 
Carlyle, William Christie highlights the special attention that is given to the subject of 
																																																																																																																																																															
determined to learn German – and give battle to that race of canting muddy-headed pretenders – I want 
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mysticism throughout their correspondence. This is discussed in the context of ‘the 
unlikeliness of the friendship’ between the two men, which went beyond ‘the obvious 
imbalance in background, status, wealth and age’, prompting even Carlyle to consider 
their relationship ‘a Mystery’.47 According to Christie, the seeming incompatibility of 
this friendship stems from what can only be ineffectually termed an ‘intellectual’, 
‘philosophical’, ‘political’, or even ‘ideological’, ‘impasse between the two men that 
would never be overcome throughout their long, vicissitudinous relationship and 
would require at times all the mutual toleration they could muster’. He notably points 
out that ‘the most intransigent characterization of this impasse’ is found in Carlyle’s 
Reminiscences, where Carlyle declares that Jeffrey ‘seemed bent on, first of all, 
converting me from what he called my “German Mysticism,” – back merely, as I 
could conceive, into dead Edinburgh Whiggism, Scepticism, and Materialism’. It is 
Christie’s contention, moreover, that ‘the two of them would recur to this impasse 
obsessively in their dealings with each other over the years, with a good deal of 
acrimony and even contempt at different times’.48 
 As far as Jeffrey’s side of the correspondence is concerned, Carlyle could not 
have phrased it better when he noted that their conversations were characterized by 
‘an unembarrassment and frankness of hitting and repelling’, which perhaps too often 
became, as William Christie puts it, both ‘uncompromising and insensitive’ on 
Jeffrey’s part. From his letters, it certainly seems that Jeffrey was never one to pass up 
an opportunity to ‘preach’ against, or at least ridicule, what he believed to be his 
friend’s most ‘cherished opinions’, and this resulted in – to borrow again Christie’s 
words – a great deal of ‘mocking and nagging’. Many times, though, his ‘nagging’ 
was of the kind of teasing banter that was meant to be affectionately playful, rather 
than confrontational or corrective, and was not necessarily about the obscurity of 
mysticism. To this belongs, for example, the mock-honorific appellations that he used 
with Carlyle, such as ‘the master mystic’, or ‘my most magnificent of mystics’. It is 
also evident in the letter Carlyle received from him when visiting Cheltenham, well-
known for its medical waters: Jeffrey light-heartedly comments there that ‘it would be 
a fine thing’ if it should turn out that Carlyle’s mystical philosophy ‘was merely the 
																																																								
47 When the two had first met, Carlyle was thirty-two years old, ‘comparatively unknown’ and without 
a salaried position, whereas Jeffrey, at fifty-three, was not only the editor of ‘the leading periodical of 
the day’, but was also a well-off Edinburgh advocate and one of ‘its star literary attraction[s]’, gaining 
£2,800 a year through his editorship, to say nothing of his income as an advocate: Christie (pp. ix-x, 
xii). 
48 Christie (pp. xii, ix, xv).  
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result of a bad secretion of Bile, – and was all washed away by the copious potations 
of the Cheltenham spring’. A further example is found in Jeffrey’s attempt at 
moderating some ‘magnificent compliments’ that Carlyle had paid him in a previous 
letter: 
You mystics will not be contented with kindness of heart and 
reasonable notions in anybody – but you must have gifts and tasks 
and duties – and relations with the universe, and strugglings to utter 
forth the truth – God help you and your vainglorious jargon, which 
makes angels smile I take it – and sensible men laugh outright.49 
Of course, more important for the present discussion is the fact that Jeffrey’s 
teasing remarks were most often about the unintelligibility of this ‘vainglorious 
jargon’, as is observable, for example, in his letter of December 9, 1829. In the 
following excerpt from it, Jeffrey makes a dig at Carlyle’s literary taste, particularly 
how he expects him to delight in the unreadability of a certain article by William 
Hamilton, of which Jeffrey greatly disapproved: 
One article50 I think must have given you particular pleasure – being 
genuine German and mystical. – and altogether unintelligible to 
ordinary mortals. – I venture to pronounce it without any exception 
the most unreadable thing that ever was printed in Great Britain and 
moreover downright sheer gibberish and nonsense.  
A similar example is found in the letter of January 3, 1828. There, in the same context 
of his suggestion – made in jest – to recommend Carlyle as ‘Professor of Mysticism’, 
Jeffrey sarcastically comments on his friend’s penchant for the vague and 
unintelligible, how it would hinder his appreciation of the unambiguous, yet dignified, 
philosophy of a Dugald Stewart, for example: ‘he was a man of a lofty and pure mind 
– and could for the most part be understood – for which you of course will despise 
him’. In the same instance, and to further drive his point home, Jeffrey mocks the 
obscure style of a German mystical pamphlet that was sent to Carlyle by an admirer of 
his ‘State of German Literature’: ‘Some horrid German blockhead has sent me an 
incomprehensible little pamphlett [sic] for you – about Kants philosophy – a childish 
– primer sort of thing’. It should be kept in mind, of course, that Jeffrey’s derisive 
exasperation with the German’s incomprehensibility here is also a derision against the 
																																																								
49 Christie (pp. x-xi, xiv, xv); and Jeffrey, Jeffrey Letters, pp. 39, 16, 25, 19, 46, 140, 28. 
50 Hamilton’s review of Victor Cousin, published in ER, 50 (Oct. 1829), under Macvey Napier’s 
editorship. 
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incomprehensibility of mystics in general, because, for him, ‘German’ and ‘mystical’ 
were nearly interchangeable. As William Christie has pointed out, ‘in the vocabulary 
of Jeffrey’s letters, “German” and “Germanic” remain part of a family of pejoratives – 
one that includes “mysticism” and “mystical”’.51 
That Jeffrey also found Carlyle’s own mystical writings pure ‘gibberish’, in an 
amusing sort of way, is evident when he casually mentions how he, Thomas Macaulay 
and several others had ‘laughed at your Mechanical age – and some of your ravings 
ab[ou]t the ravings of your German novelists’, the latter of which is a reference to 
Carlyle’s German Romance (1827), which includes authors Jeffrey had previously 
censured for their mysticism.52 Of Carlyle’s review of Burns, moreover, he expressed 
his ‘wish [that] there had been less mysticism about it – at least less mystical jargon’, 
and, when asked to describe such jargon, he defined it as the peculiar use of language 
that renders the writer humorously incomprehensible:  
I hold the frequent use of words at once vague and unusual to come 
fairly within that description – or any use of words by the mere 
mention of which everybody at once recognises the writer – and 
smiles at the recollection. 
It should also be noted that many of Jeffrey’s gibes at his friend’s mystical obscurity 
were embedded in his insults of Carlyle’s ‘German idols’, because he believed that the 
complexity of Carlyle’s writings owes much to the stylistic ‘perversions and 
absurdities’ he had acquired from German literature. It is telling that, in the letter 
where Jeffrey explains his meaning of ‘mystical jargon’, he does so in the context of 
noting the Germans’ influence on Carlyle’s style. ‘I am really anxious to save you 
from this foeda superstitio’,53 he writes, ‘the only harm it has yet done you is to make 
you a little verbose and prone to exaggeration’. The letter specifically makes an 
association between ‘mysticism and Dousterswivels’, as Jeffrey argues that Carlyle 
should not begrudge being labelled by such terms, so long as he ‘profess[es] to think 
lightly of all that can be readily understood – and to measure the depths of anything 
																																																								
51 Jeffrey Letters, pp. 41, 14; and Christie (p. xv). 
52 Jeffrey Letters, p. 96. In citing from Christie’s edition, I follow his choice of typographical marks that 
attempt to reproduce, as closely as possible, the manuscript form of Jeffrey’s letters. One example of 
Carlyle’s ‘German novelists’ who had been previously censured by Jeffrey is Goethe, whose work 
features in the third volume of Carlyle’s ‘German Romance’, a collection of translated German 
novellas; see note 101 above, referring to Jeffrey’s review of Carlyle’s 1824 translation of Goethe. 
53 Latin: repulsive fanaticism. 
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by its darkness’. With ‘Dousterswivel’ generally standing for a German swindler,54 it 
is safe to deduce from this that ‘German’ and ‘mysticism’ were both synonymous in 
Jeffrey’s mind with ‘incompressibility’. In this sense, an indictment of the enigmatical 
language of mystics almost always underlies Jeffrey’s censure of German writers, 
such as when he asks Carlyle ‘[to] spare us, if you possibly can for once - the laud and 
exaltation of your Germans – which doth somewhat nauseate our insular taste – even 
in moderate doses’.55  
 To these, and other such comments, Carlyle did not seem to have taken any 
offence, but Jeffrey did not always voice his objections against his friend’s mysticism 
with the intention of making a casual joke of it. Many times his censures became 
serious rebukes that were conveyed in the vein of expressing his concerns about what 
was obstructing Carlyle’s ‘career both of usefulness and distinction’.56 In such cases, 
it is indeed a testimony to Jeffrey’s critical integrity that his commentaries to his 
friend were not less severe or unsparing than his criticism of Wordsworth’s and 
Goethe’s mysticism;57 and, although it was not as easy for Carlyle to take these in the 
good-natured spirit he displayed toward Jeffrey’s congenial mockery, he always made 
it a point to reply with the most ‘kind’ and ‘friendliest Letters’. 58  His harsh 
evaluations of Carlyle’s writings should not, however, indicate that he believed them 
to be ‘less than original and highly intelligent’. As William Christie states, ‘Jeffrey 
never doubted Carlyle’s genius, […] he just did not like anything Carlyle thought and 
wrote!’.59 
																																																								
54 ‘Dousterswivel’ is from the character Herman Dousterswivel, a German swindler in Walter Scott’s 
novel The Antiquary. As William Christie explains, the word ‘became a common term of abuse which 
Jeffrey and his circle applied to charlatans, especially those inhabiting the grey area between science 
and magic and between philosophy and mysticism’: Jeffrey Letters, p. 22 (n2). 
55 Jeffrey Letter, 21-3, 2, 146, 23-4, 45.   
56 Ibid., p. 6. 
57 It is worth mentioning here Michael Fry’s view, in the ODNB, on Jeffrey’s criticism of Romantic 
poets in general: that, ‘influential’ though he was, ‘Jeffrey failed to appreciate some of the best and 
most enduring literature of his time. He could see no virtue, for example, in the English lake poets’. 
According to Fry, his attacks on Wordsworth’s “The Excursion”, and Byron’s first collection, as well 
as the way ‘he overstated the case for Scott’s “Marmion”’ reveal ‘Jeffrey’s lack of sympathy with, 
indeed incomprehension of, romantic sensibility. He remained in aesthetic matters a man of the 
eighteenth century, holding to standards of correctness in literature which he identified with artificial 
diction and deliberate design’: Michael Fry, ‘Jeffrey, Francis, Lord Jeffrey’, in ODNB, ed. by David 
Cannadine, (Oxford University Press, 2004) <http://www.oxforddnb.com/public/index.html> [accessed 
17 June 2015] 
58 Ibid., p. 75 (n3). See, for example, Carlyle’s letter to his brother John of 12 November 1830, for a 
full account of his true reaction to one of Jeffrey’s rebukes. Carlyle describes it as ‘a long, unasked, 
abusive and almost ill-bred Criticism’, confessing that, upon reading it, his ‘first thought was naturally 
to wash him away’: Jeffrey Letters, p. 75 (n3).  
59 Christie (p. xvi).  
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 ‘It always provokes me to see him throwing away great talents’, wrote Jeffrey 
to Jane Carlyle, describing his regret at how her husband’s ‘poetical abstractions’ 
were an impediment to his popularity; and this seems to be the consistent sentiment in 
all his rebukes against Carlyle’s mysticism, which never fail to touch upon the 
unintelligibility of said ‘abstractions’. I cite below two excerpts from Jeffrey’s letters 
to demonstrate this. The excerpts are long, but only long enough to give a good sense 
of how the mainstream intellectual culture of the early and mid-nineteenth century – 
as represented by Francis Jeffrey – had a strong aversion to mysticism and the 
mystical, and how these terms were commonly applied with the pejorative meaning of 
‘vagueness’ and ‘obscurity’. In the following passage from his letter of 4 January 
1829, for example, Jeffrey questions the basic tenants of Carlyle’s mystical 
philosophy, referring to them as ‘paradoxes’, and warning against the detrimental 
effects they would have on the future of his career: 
I persist in kind thoughts – and good purposes – and firm opinions 
ag[ains]t all dogmatism and clear views of the desperate darkness of 
wilful and audacious mystics – […] Do cure yourself of this 
tendency to exaggeration – which is a propensity too youthful even 
for you – […] You may talk as long as you like about […] the 
necessity of having a right creed as to your relations with the 
universe – but you will never persuade anybody that the regulation 
of life is such a mighty laborious business as you would make it, or 
that it is not better to go lightly thro’ it, with the first creed that 
comes to hand, than to spend the better part of it in an anxious 
verification of its articles – If you were only amusing yourself with 
these paradoxes, I should have no objection – but you take them so 
dreadfully in earnest that it vexes me – for it will neutralise half the 
fame, and all the use of your talents – and keep aloof from you most 
of the men who are fittest for your society – and so much for my 
renewed testimony ag[ains]t mysticism.  
Besides labelling Carlyle’s philosophy as paradoxical, notice here Jeffrey’s 
description of the mystics’ views as a desperate ‘darkness’, a term that could stand to 
signify their ignorance, but one that he had used elsewhere in reference to what he 
believed to be the complex and perplexing language of mysticism.60  
 In addition to this, another instance where Jeffrey delivers a stern lecture on 
Carlyle’s mysticism is his letter of response to Carlyle’s request for his assistance in 
procuring the Chair of Astronomy at the University of Edinburgh. This was in 14 
																																																								
60 Jeffrey Letters, pp. 118, 33-4.  
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January of 1834, and it was not the first (nor last) time Carlyle sought Jeffrey’s 
support for a teaching position, only to be informed that there was little that could be 
done for him while he continued to uphold his mystical doctrines.61 On this occasion, 
Jeffrey particularly urged Carlyle to step down from his ‘barren and misty eminence’, 
which is a reference to Craigenputtoch, Carlyle’s principal residence at the time, and a 
place that stood for Jeffrey as a perfect symbol of his friend’s mysticism.62 Never a 
mincer of words, Jeffrey speaks here again of the unpopularity of Carlyle’s 
‘paradoxes’ and ‘obscure’ doctrines, and blames them for being the cause of his ‘not 
having the occupation and consequent independence of some regular profession’: 
That of a Teacher is no doubt a most useful and noble one – But you 
cannot actually exercise it, unless you offer to teach what is thought 
worth learning – and in a way that is thought agreeable – and I am 
afraid you have not fulfilled either of those conditions – You know I 
do not myself set much value on the paradoxes and exaggerations in 
which you delight – [… They are] arrogant, vituperative – obscure – 
anti-national and inconclusive – […] It sounds harsh to say this – 
but I say it as a witness – and as you begin to experience the effects, 
you may perhaps give more credit to my testimony than you used to 
do – you will never find (or make) the world friendly to your 
doctrines, while you insist upon dragooning it into them in so 
hyperbolical a manner. […] And if we once had you fairly down 
from that barren and misty eminence where you reside bodily, I trust 
we should soon reconcile you to an intellectual subsidence.63 
Jeffrey’s purpose here was clearly to impress upon Carlyle how their contemporary 
intellectual ‘world’ did not consider his mystical doctrines ‘worth learning’, especially 
																																																								
61 See, for example, Jeffrey’s letter of 6 September 1827, as well as that of 4 February 1834, in which 
he replies to similar requests by Carlyle.  
62 Albeit playfully, Jeffrey typically spoke of Craigenputtoch in highly religious terms, and too often in 
association with Carlyle’s mysticism, which is partly due to the place’s elevated and secluded location 
that (in a way) resembled a monastery. In 1831, he described it, for example, as ‘the mist veiled shrine 
in the desert’, and, in his letter of 8 December 1828, he wrote: ‘Pray tell us what you have been doing – 
or suffering rather in that supramundane retreat – I sometimes fear you are ill – and sometimes that you 
are so happy with your mysticism […] that you forget there is anybody to care for you in this lower 
world’: Jeffrey Letters, pp. 84, 31. For other similar examples, see pp. 26, 65, 38-9, 105, 129. In fact, 
Carlyle himself often ascribed his Dumfriesshire home with religious and mystical significance. As 
Chris Vanden Bossche has pointed out, ‘he became fond of comparing Craigenputtoch to Patmos, the 
island in the Aegean where Saint John wrote the book of Revelations’, and spoke of it in his letters as ‘a 
place to write “mystical Reviews” and to begin “prophesying”’. Even Jane W. Carlyle draws on this 
connection in one of her letters, when she jokingly informs Henry Inglis that one of their farm animals, 
‘being of another school than the mystic’, ‘found his station at Craigenputtoch quite too solitary; and 
so, without hinting his resolve to anyone, rushed forth one day into the wide world’: see Chris R. 
Vanden Bossche, Carlyle and the Search for Authority (Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1991), p. 
52; and CL, IV, pp. 429-35.    
63 Jeffrey Letters, p. 144.  
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given that he had not conveyed them ‘in a way thought agreeable’, by which he was 
referring to Carlyle’s manner of writing. His description of Carlyle’s writing as 
‘hyperbolical’, ‘exaggerat[ed]’, and ‘anti-national’ is related to what he perceived as 
an intentional abandonment, on Carlyle’s part, of the lucid and straightforward style 
that Jeffrey often associated with English writers, as opposed to the ‘paradox[es] and 
outlandish absurdity’ he attributed to German writing.64 What the excerpt above 
succeeds to convey, in other words, is the general unfavourable attitude of the 
nineteenth-century British public toward mysticism, and the many negative 
significations it was ascribing to the term, an important one of which was that of 
‘mistiness’ and ‘obscurity’.  
3. ‘Toleration is all I ask’:65 Carlyle and the Redefinition of ‘Mysticism’ as 
Ineffable  
Although Jeffrey was correct in perceiving how the intellectual climate of their time 
was seriously opposed to what he believed to be Carlyle’s ‘verbal and metaphysical’ 
peculiarities, his avowal that Carlyle would never succeed in making ‘the world 
friendly’ to his ‘doctrines and manner of writing’ would be contradicted by the 
successful reception of the turn-of-the-century studies on mysticism by William 
James, who not only was a personal acquaintance of Carlyle, but was also 
intellectually influenced by him.66 It is, of course, well-known by Jamesian scholars 
																																																								
64 For an example of this, see Jeffrey Letters, pp. 21-2. 
65 See CL, I, pp. 343-46. Carlyle wrote this as early as 1821, in a letter to a college friend who 
apparently criticized his interest in mystical literature, and the impact it was having on his writing style. 
In reply, Carlyle stated, ‘Let me be doing with Lake poets, Mystics, or any trash I can fall with’, 
justifying his style in terms of the unutterability of the meanings he often wished to communicate: 
I have been a solitary dreamer all my days, wrapt up in dim imaginings, strange fantasies, 
and gleams of all things; so that when I give utterance to the sensations produced on me 
by the actual vulgar narrow stupid world of realities, you very justly think me on the 
verge if not past the verge of—coma. But Toleration, man! toleration is all I ask. 
66 In 1901, writing on the success of his University of Edinburgh Gifford lectures on mysticism, from 
which the text of his Varieties (1902) would be taken, William James states: ‘I have given nine of my 
lectures and am to give the tenth tomorrow. They have been a success, to judge by the numbers of the 
audience (300-odd) and their non-diminution towards the end. No previous “Giffords” have drawn near 
so many’: James, The Letters of William James, p. 149. The following year, James would continue to 
explore his notions on mysticism in his Harvard Summer School of Theology Lectures on ‘Intellect and 
Feeling in Religion’, where he would develop a significant point of discussion around what Carlyle had 
called ‘natural supernaturalism’. As mentioned in the previous chapter, a large part of Carlyle’s 
influence on James came through his friendship with James’s father, Henry James Sr., who – despite 
the many reservations he expressed about Carlyle in his personal account of him – was a great admirer 
of Carlyle’s ‘Past and Present’ (1843) and Sartor Resartus; he wrote that ‘Carlyle is the very best 
interpreter of spiritual philosophy which could be devised for this age, the age of transition and 
conflict’: See William James, Manuscript Lectures, ed. by Frederick H. Burkhardt, The Works of 
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that James had read Sartor Resartus by the early 1870s,67 and the point they most 
often note, in terms of Carlyle’s influence on his work, is James’s appropriation of 
Diogenes Teufelsdröckh’s spiritual conversion as a valid model of mystical 
illumination.68 I argue here, however, that James’s indebtedness to Carlyle is equally 
evident in another significant way that has not received its due recognition; by this, I 
mean how James addresses ‘the reproach of vagueness’, to use his own words, that 
was frequently attached to ‘the words “mysticism” and “mystical”’ by recourse to the 
ineffability thesis that also appears in the conversion episode of Sartor Resartus. My 
contention from this is that it provides a clue to how the Jamesian ‘mark of 
ineffability’ is a distinctly Victorian inheritance, one that found its earliest and most 
extensive articulation in Carlyle’s writings. I shall shortly discuss the examples from 
Carlyle’s work, but the main point of interest here is the fact that, contrary to Jeffrey’s 
concerns, the popular reception of what he regarded as the mystics’ stylistic and 
doctrinal ‘obscurities’ was growing more cordial with the advance of the century.  
This last point is substantiated by Carol T. Christ in Victorian and Modern 
Poetics, which argues that the period between the 1830s and 1870s witnessed a 
gradual shift in the reading public’s attitude toward the kind of poetry that was 
deemed ‘mystical’, ‘extravagant’ and ‘obscure’, a fact that finds support in how 
Victorian criticism was becoming ‘increasingly tolerant of difficulty in poetry’. 
‘Browning’s critical reputation during the Victorian period’, Christ states, ‘provides a 
good index to Victorian attitudes toward the obscurity and interpretability of literary 
texts’. She maintains that while his early published work, up to Men and Women 
(1855), was criticized for the ‘mysticism’ and ‘obscurity’ of its style, by 1864, with 
the publication of Dramatis Personae, his poetry was increasingly being ‘praised for 
																																																																																																																																																															
William James, 17 vols, XVI (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988 [1875-1908]), p. 90; and 
Henry James, Henry James, Senior: A Selection of His Writings (Chicago: American Library 
Association, 1974), p. 273, as well as pp. 251-67, for his ‘Personal Recollections of Carlyle’. For 
further notes on Carlyle’s connection with and influence on James, see p. 70 (n. 51) of Chapter II of 
this thesis, and Robert J. O’Connell, S. J., William James on the Courage to Believe (New York: 
Fordham University Press, 1997), pp. 28, 103. 
67 For James’s reading lists that were recorded in his notebook of 1856, and his diaries of 1870-71 
(where Carlyle’s name appears), see Robert D. Richardson, William James in the Maelstrom of 
American Modernism (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2007), pp. 15, 125. 
68 James extensively quotes from that episode in The Will to Believe (1896), and again recurs to it in 
The Varieties (1902): See The Will to Believe and Other Essay in Popular Philosophy (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 42-45; and The Varieties, pp. 167-68. As for the Jamesian 
scholarship that notes this, see, for example, Arthur Oncken Lovejoy, ‘William James as Philosopher’, 
in William James Remembered, ed. by Linda Simon, 153-64 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1999) (p. 162); Robert D. Richardson, James in the Maelstrom, p. 355; and Jeremy Carrette, William 
James’s Hidden Religious Imagination: A Universe of Relations (Abingdon, Oxon: Taylor & Francis, 
2013), p. 179.  
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its complexity, its subtlety, its truth and authenticity’. The reverse is also true in the 
case of Tennyson’s reputation, Christ adds: ‘in the forties and fifties he was praised 
for the very universality and clarity of moral statement which, it was felt, Browning 
lacked’, but, ‘by the 1870s, when Browning’s reputation was at its height’, 
Tennyson’s poetry was condemned ‘for being too simple in conception’. In an 
argument that finds support in Gregory Tate’s recent and insightful study on the 
‘psychology of Victorian poetry’, Christ explains that one of the reasons for the 
Victorian’s developing appreciation of the difficulty of Browning’s works is the 
period’s rising interest in Psychology, a discipline that helped cultivate the belief that 
the complex ‘workings of the mind were a legitimate subject for poetry’.69 But what 
Christ does not mention is that such an acceptance of the enigmatic and complex style 
of writing was as much tied to the century’s metaphysical negotiations as to its 
psychological theories,70 and that this positive shift in attitude was not confined to 
popular opinions toward the mystical style; it extended to the concept of mysticism 
itself. Drawing on the same critical literature, a good example of the latter point can 
be found in the 1864 critical estimation of Browning by Walter Bagehot, one of 
Browning’s admirers. In the vein of listing the poet’s ‘accomplishments’, Bagehot 
mentions Browning’s mysticism in a romantic and idealised light: ‘He is at once a 
student of mysticism, and a citizen of the world. He brings to the club sofa distinct 
visions of old creeds, [and] intense images of strange thoughts’.71  
When compared with The Saturday Review’s outcry against Browning’s 
‘madness and mysticism’ of nine years earlier (24 Nov. 1855),72 Bagehot’s review is a 
good indication of how the Victorian discourse on mysticism was becoming more 
congenial in its conceptualization of the term. Central to my present argument is the 
idea that one of the characteristic ways in which this change occurred was through the 
deliberate attempts by poets and critics alike to invert the term’s traditional derogatory 
																																																								
69 Carol T. Christ, Victorian and Modern Poetics (London: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 
145-6; and Gregory Tate, The Poet’s Mind: Psychology of Victorian Poetry 1830-1870, pp.154-6. See 
also Tate’s discussion of how ‘the more positive reception of [Browning’s] work from the 1860s 
onward was closely’ bound up with ‘the critical fortunes’ of the ‘psychological school’, pp. 154-6. 
70 See, for example, Gregory Tate’s discussion of ‘the pervasive obscurity and linguistic intricacy’ of 
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71 Walter Bagehot, ‘Wordsworth, Tennyson, and Browning; or, Pure, Ornate, and Grotesque Art in 
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connotations of ‘vagueness’ and ‘obscurity’ into positive ones, so that the mystical 
came more and more to signify ‘the ineffable’, ‘the incommunicable’ or ‘the infinite’. 
As far as Victorian attempts of promoting mysticism are concerned, Carlyle was 
something of a pioneer, as noted by John R. Davis and Jerry A. Dibble,73 particularly 
through his defence of German mysticism. The posthumous estimation of Carlyle by 
his friend David Masson also hints to his leading role in the positive redefinition of 
the term; Masson refers to how Carlyle ‘dallied with the term’ in his early career, and 
how he ‘seemed to be the apostle of an unknown something called “German 
Mysticism”. According to Masson, this had even earned Carlyle the epithet ‘Mystic’ 
in the intellectual circles of the day: ‘The first name affixed to Carlyle to signify a 
perception of the difference of his ways of thinking from those of other people was 
Mystic’.74  
Unsurprisingly, the first work of Carlyle’s to secure him such a title is his 
essay ‘State of German Literature’ (1827), being the first to receive sufficient critical 
acclaim, as well as to ‘set many tongues wagging’.75 In it, Carlyle significantly 
highlights how the word ‘mystical’, in England, has become heavily-loaded with a 
negative meaning that is ‘synonymous with not understood’, and goes on to argue that 
the meaning does not necessarily indicate that the fault lies with the mystical writer: 
that is, it could very well be indicative of a problem in the readers’ powers of 
comprehension: 
It is well known, that to the understanding of anything, two 
conditions are equally required; intelligibility in the thing itself 
being no whit more indispensable than intelligence in the examiner 
of it. “I am bound to find you in reasons, Sir,” said Johnson, “but 
not in brains;” a speech of the most shocking unpoliteness, yet truly 
enough expressing the state of the case.  
What the lines here show is an attempt to subvert the semantic implications of ‘the 
charge of mysticism’ in favour of the German mystic writers, 76 and to question the 
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position of authority from which English critics so often scorn their writings, an 
attempt that runs through Carlyle’s treatment of mysticism in the rest of the essay. 
 In fact, in his attempt to overturn the pejorative signification of ‘mysticism’ as 
‘obscurity’, Carlyle shifts the whole locus of authority from the critic to the mystic, 
subordinating the former to the latter. This is done by conceiving the mystic poet (or 
writer) as a source of prophetic truth, who is endowed with transcendental legitimacy. 
In this case, any stylistic complexity found in the prophet’s writing is explained in 
terms of the religious profundity of his/her message, and of the spiritual experience it 
endeavours to capture, things that are said to surpass the rational constrains of human 
language. The following two excerpts are Carlyle’s sketch of a mystic caught in an 
ecstatic, visionary moment so intense that it eludes not only external symbolic 
representation (through language), but even the internal mental processes that 
facilitate cognition and memory: 
A simple, tender, and devout nature, seized by some touch of divine 
Truth, and of this perhaps under some rude enough symbol, is wrapt 
with it into a whirlwind of unutterable thoughts; wild gleams of 
splendour dart to and fro in the eye of the seer, but the vision will 
not abide with him, and yet he feels that its light is light from 
heaven. 
Carlyle expounds on this, arguing that critics and ‘scoffers’ who frown upon the 
‘obscure’ nature of the mystic’s speech are ungenerous in their judgments, because 
they fail to appreciate it for what it is: that is, a serious and honest attempt by one who 
has been granted a divine revelation to translate this into a vernacular that belongs to 
the corporeal realm of ordinary experience. The difficult and idiosyncratic style that 
often arises from this should not, therefore, be attributed to a want of eloquence or 
intelligence on the mystic’s part, but rather to the inadequacy of the linguistic medium 
itself to accommodate his/her experiential knowledge of metaphysical reality. Such 
knowledge, Carlyle insists, is essentially unspeakable: 
How shall he speak; how shall he pour forth into other souls that of 
which his own soul is full even to bursting? He cannot speak to us; 
he knows not our state, and cannot make known to us his own. His 
words are an inexplicable rhapsody, a speech in an unknown tongue. 
Whether there is meaning in it to the speaker himself, and how 
much or how true, we shall never ascertain; for it is not in the 
language of men, but of one man who had not learned the language 
of men; and, with himself, the key to its full interpretation was lost 
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from amongst us. These are mystics; men who either know not 
clearly their own meaning, or at least cannot put it forth in formulas 
of thought, whereby others, with whatever difficulty, may 
apprehend it. Was their meaning clear to themselves, gleams of it 
will yet shine through, how ignorantly and unconsciously soever it 
may have been delivered; was it still wavering and obscure, no 
science could have delivered it wisely.77 
As it is obvious, instead of reinforcing its usual depreciatory senses of ‘vagueness’, 
‘darkness’ and ‘ambiguity’, Carlyle seeks here to make ‘mysticism’ definitive of what 
is ‘unutterable’ and ‘ineffable’, a transcendent spiritual state far beyond the reach of 
words. 
One might naturally ask, why do Carlyle’s mystics resort to language in the 
first place when fully knowing that their experience cannot be given linguistic form, 
and is not that a contradiction? Carlyle explains that this is because mystics are 
‘labouring with a poetic, a religious idea, which, like all such ideas, must express 
itself by word and act, or consume the heart it dwells in’. Thus, although convinced of 
the inadequate resources of language as a means of communicating their meaning, 
mystics, Carlyle suggests, cannot help but try to express the inexpressible, in the hope 
that they may convey at least the barest rudiments of it to their fellowmen. He 
believes that, in doing so, there will be much stuttering and faltering – or even a 
complete breakdown – in the mystic’s speech, but that ‘gleams’ of the intended 
meaning ‘will yet shine through’ to the perceptive reader. This is why Carlyle lays the 
blame on critics and readers for any complaints about the incomprehensibility of 
mystical texts. In his opinion, readers are expected to appreciate the difference 
between reading a text that conceptually deals with a ‘material and physical object’78 
and one in which ‘the object to be treated belongs to the invisible and immaterial 
class’. In the former, ‘the few obstacles to communication are easily overcome’, 79 
because the physical and conceptual properties of the object being considered are 
naturally susceptible to external representation – through the various tools and 
methods of scientific discourse. But it is entirely another matter in the case of 
‘invisible and immaterial’ objects, where ‘the difficulties of comprehension are 
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78 Carlyle includes within this category objects that do not purely belong to the ‘physical’ realm, but 
rather qualify as quasi-abstract objects, such as the phenomena of social and political science. See pp. 
339-40.  
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increased an hundred-fold’, and the reader is expected to be as patient and as 
cooperative as the writer, before condescendingly dismissing the latter as a ‘mystic’: 
In this case, […] it will require long, patient and skilful effort, both 
from the writer and the reader, before the two can so much as speak 
together; before the former can make known to the latter, not how 
the matter stands, but even what the matter is, which they have to 
investigate in concert. He must devise new means of explanation, 
[…and] strive, by a thousand well-devised methods, to guide his 
reader up to the perception of it; in all which, moreover, the reader 
must faithfully and toilsomely cooperate with him, if any fruit is to 
come of their mutual endeavour. Should the latter take up his 
ground too early, and affirm to himself that now he has seized what 
he still has not seized; that this and nothing else is the thing aimed at 
by his teacher, the consequences are plain enough: disunion, 
darkness and contradiction between the two; the writer has written 
for another man, and this reader, after long provocation, quarrels 
with him finally, and quits him as a mystic.80 
As Jerry A. Dibble notes, the passage reflects Carlyle’s belief that the habit of 
negatively labelling a writer as a ‘mystic’ is ‘less an attempt at classification than a 
way of rejecting out of hand philosophical ideas uncongenial to one’s own way of 
thinking’.81 Stated differently, Carlyle is suggesting that accusations of mysticism, 
when used in the sense of ‘unintelligibility’, largely reflect the intellectual laziness or 
conservatism of readers and critics who are unwilling to be drawn into a 
contemplation of things ‘invisible and immaterial’.  
 Carlyle takes this a step further in his later essay on ‘Novalis’ (1829), where he 
more boldly contests the disparaging meanings attached to mysticism, particularly 
those pertaining to matters of intelligibility. The essay clearly indicates that its main 
objective is a corrective one, and that is ‘to communicate some views not of what is 
vulgarly called, but of what is a German Mystic’. As in ‘State of German Literature’, 
Carlyle points out that the ‘vulgar’ connotation that English speakers most often 
associate with the word ‘mystic’ merely turns out to be the quality of not being 
understood: ‘What we English, in common speech, call a Mystic […] means only a 
man whom we do not understand, and, in self-defence, reckon or would fain reckon a 
Dunce’. However, in his attempt to deconstruct this negative association in ‘Novalis’, 
Carlyle is not only considerably harsher on fellow English critics who employ the 
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term in this derisive sense, but is also less confident in the reading public’s ability to 
comprehend mystical texts. Whereas his previous essay contends that it is possible for 
readers to understand a poet’s mystical language if only they were more patient and 
cooperative with the writer, Carlyle suggests now that the difficulty that readers often 
encounter with this kind of language does not necessarily stem from their impatience, 
or unwillingness to collaborate with the writer: too often it is because the meaning 
being communicated is beyond their sphere of comprehension. In other words, what 
Carlyle seems to be arguing in this essay is that an understanding of a poet’s 
mysticism depends less on the full engagement of one’s mental faculties, and more on 
the possession of an intuitive faculty that is akin to the mystical poet’s, and with 
which the majority of the reading public is not equipped. And herein comes the proper 
role of literary critics, Carlyle believes. By his definition, true critics possess the 
necessary intuitions to decipher the mystic’s message, and are thus elevated to the 
pedestal of cultural prophets who come second only to mystics and poets in their 
ability to meet the spiritual demands of their time. He particularly argues that on the 
critic falls the responsibility of explaining the interpretable parts of the mystic’s 
message, while encouraging readers to hold with respect and veneration – rather than 
ridicule – those parts that are beyond their understanding: 
He [is] the priest of literature and Philosophy, to interpret their [the 
mystics’] mysteries to the common man; as a faithful preacher, 
teaching him to understand what is adapted for his understanding, to 
reverence what is adapted for higher understandings than his.82 
As far as the question of authority is concerned, the mystics here are clearly being 
presented as intellectual and spiritual superiors to ‘the common man’, with the critic 
serving as a faithful mediator between the two, who humbly submits to the mystics’ 
authority. According to Carlyle, such is the role that literary criticism ought to have, 
but he believed that this is far from the case of the contemporary literary scene.  
 In pointing out his reservations about the then dominant discourse of literary 
criticism, Carlyle underlines how modern reviewers and critics essentially belong to 
the school of ‘Common-sense Philosophers, men who brag chiefly of their 
irrefragable logic, and keep watch and ward, as if this were their special trade, against 
“Mysticism” and “Visionary Theories”’. Their purpose in doing so, as Carlyle 
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explains, is to cater to the prevalent taste for pragmatic and materialist principles (over 
idealist ones), so as to offer the consuming public what it wants, rather than what it 
needs, while steering clear of any philosophy that might contradict its comfortable 
worldview. ‘In this way’, Carlyle adds, the reviewer may ‘recommend himself to 
certain readers, but it is the recommendation of a parasite’, one who ‘glozes his master 
with sweet speeches, that he may filch applause, and certain “guineas per shet,” from 
him’. Such a reviewer, he also declares, is nothing but ‘a pander of laziness, self-
conceit and all manner of contemptuous stupidity on the part of his reader; carefully 
ministering to these propensities; carefully fencing-off whatever might invade that 
fool’s-paradise with news of disturbance’. He explains that the ‘most convenient’ 
method in which this is carried out is to adopt ‘the style of derision’ in critical 
reviews. Namely, when dealing with mystical poets, whom Carlyle refers to as ‘great 
Authors’, this critic’s approach is said to involve the ‘habit of sneering at all 
greatness, of forcibly bringing down all greatness to his own height’, leading to the 
pejorative characterization of the mystic as being ‘little better than a living mass of 
darkness’.83 
 In response to this, and as in ‘State of German Literature’, Carlyle attempts to 
redefine ‘the mystical’ by inverting its negative connotations of ‘darkness’ and 
‘obscurity’ into the favourable one of ‘ineffability’, and it is interesting how well his 
attempt here demonstrates Grace Jantzen’s Foucaultian premise which I have used as 
a guiding argument for my thesis: that ‘the way one defines “the mystical” relates to 
ways of establishing and defining authority’. Indeed, Carlyle’s awareness of the issues 
of authority at stake in contemporary negotiations of mysticism is apparent in the 
distinction he draws between the kind of relationship that reviewers often adopt 
toward the mystical poets being reviewed and the kind that he embraces in his own 
reviews. Both are portrayed in a language that masks the ‘conflictual power relations’ 
at the heart of Victorian responses to the mystical.84 For Carlyle, the former involves 
the easier and more ‘convenient’ approach that places critics at the centre of authority, 
allowing them to treat any difficulty encountered in the mystical text as an occasion 
for mockery: 
The first and most convenient [method] is, for the Reviewer to perch 
himself resolutely, as it were, on the shoulder of his Author, and 
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	 131	
therefrom to show as if he commanded him and looked down on 
him by natural superiority of stature. Whatsoever the great man says 
or does, the little man shall treat with an air of knowingness and 
light condescending mockery; professing, with much covert 
sarcasm, that this and that other is beyond his comprehension, and 
cunningly asking his readers if they comprehend it! […] In this way 
does the small Reviewer triumph over great Authors; but it is the 
triumph of a fool.  
Grace Jantzen states that, at any moment in time, ‘what counts as mysticism will 
reflect (and also help to constitute) the institutions of power in which it occurs’, and 
these lines from Carlyle certainly show a consciousness of the power dynamic 
involved in defining this category.85 The dynamic is symbolized by the ‘Reviewer’ 
towering over ‘his Author’ in ridicule of what he perceives to be the latter’s deficient 
phraseology and unintelligible style, two things that are so often associated with 
mysticism as to amount to a definition of it. But Carlyle realizes that such a 
conception of the term is a ‘self-defen[sive]’ strategy at its core, one that is meant to 
reinforce the mainstream ideological culture of the time. I have noted in the previous 
chapter how Carlyle’s ‘Novalis’ described the cultural thought of the early nineteenth 
century as being widely grounded in secular and naturalist principles, making it very 
sceptical of the philosophical idealism of Germany, and the transcendental values it 
propounds. In the context of the essay, therefore, the quote above reflects Carlyle’s 
belief that, in an intellectual climate that privileges the utilitarian, positivist and 
materialist values of industrial England, defining ‘mysticism’ as ‘that which cannot be 
comprehended’ is a way of undermining the authority of mystics, and their 
transcendental worldview. This is indeed why Carlyle closes his essay with a plea to 
‘let there be free scope for Mysticism’ in the ideological ‘battle’ that was ‘still 
waging’ between ‘Religion’ and the ‘Coffin-and-Gas Philosophy’ of ‘French or 
Scotch Logic’.86 
By the same token, it is not surprising that Carlyle’s alternative definition of 
mysticism in this essay is also driven by an agenda of power. This may be discerned, 
partly at least, in the attitude he attempts to foster in his readers toward the mystics’ 
challenging language, encouraging them to adopt one not of mere ‘tolerance’, but of 
‘reverence’. Carlyle specifically argues in ‘Novalis’ that mystics, as writers, are 
admittedly ‘very singular’ and ‘difficult beyond most others to examine wisely and 
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with profit’, but that their complexity is more a thing ‘to wonder at than laugh at’. His 
invocation here of the sense of ‘wonder’ is a suggestion that readers should develop a 
religious interest in the mystic’s words, only possible if they are to abandon the usual 
conception of mysticism as being nothing more than a stylistic idiosyncrasy, moving 
from this to a conception that aims for an understanding – imperfect as it may be – of 
the experiential reality that lies behind the mystic’s words. In this case, the problems 
relating to the readability of mystical texts are no longer blamed on the mystic’s 
linguistic capacity; instead, and as mentioned earlier, they are attributed to the 
limitations of the perceptual and conceptual categories of earthly language, how they 
are insufficient to capture the religious state of consciousness that is said to be the 
primary subject of the mystic’s message. What Carlyle ultimately intends is to call 
into question the rationalists’ commitment to a materialist epistemology, and its 
adequacy as an authoritative mode for understanding and representing the world. It is 
safe to say that this ideological agenda is the underlying motivation of the following 
lines, for example, where Carlyle addresses the ineffability of mystical experiences, 
by rhetorically asking this question: how may a spiritual state that is completely 
devoid of sensory content be possibly represented through the materialist constraints 
of a logical mindset, one that is made even less imaginative by England’s industrial 
ethos? 
How shall we understand it, and in any measure shadow it forth? 
How may that spiritual condition, which by its own account is like 
pure Light, colourless, formless, infinite, be represented by mere 
Logic-Painters, mere Engravers we might say, who, except copper 
and burin, producing the most finite black-on-white, have no means 
of representing anything?  
Thus, it is also safe to say that, by overturning mysticism’s pejorative signification of 
‘unintelligibility’ into the idealised meaning of ‘inexpressibility’, Carlyle seeks to 
reverse the whole network of power relations around which the previous definition 
has been constructed, placing the mystic at the highest level of authority. This is 
evident in the fact that his approach to Novalis involves identifying himself, as well as 
his readers, as being morally and intellectually inferior to the mystic author: 
We wish less to insult over this highly-gifted man, than to gain some 
insight into him; [...] we are bound in justice to say that, far from 
looking down on Novalis, we cannot place either them [readers] or 
ourselves on a level with him. To explain so strange an 
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individuality, to exhibit a mind of his depth and singularity before 
the minds of readers so foreign to him in every sense, would be a 
vain pretension in us.87 
 Of course, no discussion about Carlyle’s contribution to the Victorian 
construction of an ineffable mysticism would be complete without referring to Sartor 
Resartus (1833-34), which, to borrow the words of J. A. Dibble, ‘has long been 
recognized as a seminal work for Carlyle and for the Victorian period as well’.88 
Carlyle’s apology for the mystic’s language in ‘Novalis’ – including the ideological 
power dynamics in which it was embedded – finds similar expression in Sartor 
Resartus, something that has been noted in Dibble’s instructive study of the latter 
work. With regard to the central ideological/cultural tension that informs Sartor 
Resartus, Dibble identifies it – in line with the various readings of the work – as ‘a 
conflict between English and German, empiricist and idealist, or Benthamite and 
Coleridgean points of view’. He also points out how these are respectively represented 
through the work’s two fictional personas, the English ‘Editor’ and the German author 
of the Clothes Philosophy, Diogenes Teufelsdröckh. Dibble, however, rejects the 
familiar and persistent interpretation of the work that considers its editorial framework 
‘a reflection of Carlyle’s own divided loyalties, a basic uncertainty on his part how far 
it was advisable to follow German idealism down the road to pure Reason’.89 He 
argues, on the contrary, that Carlyle employs this framework only as a way to modify 
the style of ‘dogmatic idealism’90 that he had adopted in previous writings, and more 
importantly, that this modification is ‘part of a legitimate and distinct approach to the 
problem of philosophical style’, an approach whose main objective does not at all 
differ from that of Carlyle’s earlier work: namely, the popularization of both the 
mystical language of German idealism, and the philosophy it endeavours to express.91  
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But Dibble is also keen to note that Carlyle’s incorporation of a stylistic 
approach that is ‘radically different from that of dogmatic idealism’ should not 
indicate that he ‘shared the reservations of his English readers’, or that he was no 
longer sympathetic ‘to the rationale behind the style of dogmatic idealism’; after all, 
he ‘would return to it under different circumstances and with different goals in mind’ 
in his future writings. To explain Sartor Resartus’s stylistic departure from Carlyle’s 
previous writings, therefore, Dibble maintains that, despite Carlyle’s awareness of ‘the 
advantages of a dogmatic style’, he was likewise aware that it had ‘serious limitations 
– limitations, which without amelioration, spell defeat for the very program to which 
the style as a whole was meant to give expression’. Not the least of these limitations is 
how it ‘never failed to provoke the English realist to righteous indignation’ against its 
‘needless obscurity’, ‘its avoidance of “plain words,” its “hyper-metaphorical style,” 
its addiction to paradox, and, above all, its lack of logical method and consequent 
mysticism’.92 Thus, when it came to writing a new work, as Dibble’s argument runs, 
Carlyle was driven ‘to embody the expected resistance of Anglo-Saxon audiences in 
the persona of an English editor’, whose role was to serve ‘as a buffer for ingrained 
English attitudes’ toward the linguistic and stylistic devices of German mysticism. As 
the editor criticized, and attempted to make sense of it, the text gradually grew into a 
justification of the mystic’s philosophy and style:  
The Editor’s “English” reservations about the style and method of 
Teufelsdröckh’s Clothes Philosophy, like his reservations about 
idealism generally, are part of a strategy designed to lead the reader 
toward acceptance of the idiosyncrasies of Teufelsdröckh’s style 
and, ultimately, the Clothes Philosophy itself. Almost certainly, the 
Benthamites’ charges of mysticism, irrationality, and argument from 
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private intuition are the specific kind of objection the Editor seeks to 
counter by his criticism of Teufelsdröckh’s style. 
In short, far from reflecting Carlyle’s ambivalence about the transcendental 
philosophy of German mystics, the editorial framework of Sartor Resartus, and its 
approach to ‘the problem of style’, suggest that the work shares the same ideological 
agenda as ‘Novlis’ and other earlier work. It aims to promote the religious impulse of 
the mystics in the face of rationalist reductions of it by the century’s ever-advancing 
secular and material forces. In the words of Dibble, Sartor Resartus belonged to the 
idealist enterprise, and was, thus, part of ‘a crusade against a godless and 
dehumanized world’, exemplifying ‘what is often seen as the Victorians’ 
disparagement of logic’, which ‘was not so much a denial of its powers as a 
recognition of its limits’.93 
 One of the most prominent examples in Sartor Resartus that conveys the kind 
of philosophical and cultural negotiations that motivated the Victorian discourse on 
mysticism is found in the Editor’s response to Teufelsdröckh’s spiritually-charged 
ruminations about his conversion experience at the opening of the chapter on ‘The 
Everlasting Yea’. The implicit philosophical question being negotiated, in this 
instance, is whether or not individual, private revelation holds any authority as a 
reliable source of knowledge. The Editor’s commentary is meant to represent the 
realist perspective that is often reluctant to attach any epistemological value to 
intuitive religious experiences on the grounds that such experiences are far removed 
from tangible reality, as well as being inaccessible to discursive reasoning. In this 
case, ‘mysticism’ features as a label of abuse in the context of criticizing the mystic’s 
writing for being ‘perplex[ing]’, full of ‘innuendoes’, and ‘with needless obscurity’; 
and what begins as an attack on style becomes loaded with ontological implications. 
This is evident in how the stylistic criticism quickly turns into an evaluation, on the 
phenomenological level, of the mystic’s experience, where it is finally judged to be 
delusive and ‘whimsical’ in nature. The reason given for such a verdict is that the 
experience’s description offers ‘no clear logical Picture’, which indicates that the 
Editor prioritizes rationalist and empirical philosophy, over metaphysics, as a self-
sufficient approach to reality.94  
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But Carlyle only brings in this disparaging conception of the mystical to allow 
for an opportunity to challenge it, and so we find Teufelsdröckh rebutting the Editor’s 
argument by echoing the same rhetorical question Carlyle had posed in ‘Novalis’. The 
intent of the question is to indicate that what is deemed ‘unintelligible’ by ‘the sensual 
eye’ of the Editor is, in fact, ‘unspeakable’ from a metaphysical perspective. This is 
shown in the following passage that also includes the Editor’s commentary: 
Singular Teufelsdröckh, would thou hadst told thy singular story in 
plain words! But it is fruitless to look there, in those Paper-bags, for 
such. Nothing but innuendoes, figurative crotchets: a typical 
Shadow, fitfully wavering, prophetico-satiric; no clear logical 
Picture. ‘How paint to the sensual eye,’ asks he once, ‘what passes 
in the Holy-of-Holies of Man’s Soul; in what words, known to these 
profane times, speak even afar-off of the unspeakable?’ We ask in 
turn: Why perplex these times, profane as they are, with needless 
obscurity, by omission and by commission?  Not mystical only is 
our Professor, but whimsical; and involves himself, now more than 
ever, in eye-bewildering chiaroscuro.95 
The ideological clash here between the transcendentalism of the ‘mystical’ Professor 
and the secular-positivism of the Editor supports my argument that the nineteenth-
century discourse on mysticism – whether it was on the offensive or the defensive side 
of the question – was deeply implicated in a cultural contest over meaning and 
authority. Indeed, as it has just now been pointed out, the Editor’s negative association 
of the word ‘mystical’ with the sense of vagueness/ambiguity is an attempt to 
delegitimize any truth claim that does not abide by the objective and clear-cut 
distinctions of the scientific and empirical worldview. On the other hand, 
Teufelsdröckh’s defensive conceptualization of ‘mysticism’ as something ineffable, a 
reiteration of Carlyle’s own defence of mystical language in previous works, is clearly 
meant to contest the period’s many claims about the absolute authority of scientific 
materialism, with its resolute attachment to verifiable, physical reality; this, in turn, is 
meant to champion the validity of intuitive experiences as a source of real knowledge, 
unverifiable as they may be. Through the principle of ineffability, therefore, Carlyle is 
particularly trying to differentiate between a ‘sensual’ realm of experience and a 
super-sensual one, arguing that while the first offers much true and useful knowledge, 
its material and conceptual distinctions are too ‘profane’ to accommodate an 




This finds further support elsewhere in Sartor Resartus, most notably in 
Teufelsdröckh’s diatribe against those who are hostile to ‘Mystery and Mysticism’. 
According to Teufelsdröckh, these are rationalists who take up ‘Logic’ as the ultimate 
instrument of ‘Truth’, refusing to believe anything that cannot be explained through 
its lens, while failing to recognize its inability to answer the prime questions of 
existence – such as those relating to the problems of life and death. Theirs is a matter-
bound value system, as Teufelsdröckh argues, and they would mockingly label as ‘a 
delirious Mystic’ anyone whose vocabulary does not conform to the well-defined 
structures of this system. To Carlyle’s German professor, however, such mockery 
sounds like a ‘foolish cackle’, because it betrays how ‘sand-blind’ these Logicians are 
to the profound mysteries of an ‘all-pervading’ spiritual world, one that cannot be 
perceived through the limited physical and mental apparatus of the modern scientist: 
Thou wilt have no Mystery and Mysticism; wilt walk through thy 
world by the sunshine of what thou callest Truth, or even by the 
hand-lamp of what I call Attorney-Logic; and ‘explain’ all, 
‘account’ for all, or believe nothing of it? Nay, thou wilt attempt 
laughter; whoso recognizes the unfathomable, all-pervading domain 
of Mystery, which is everywhere under our feet and among our 
hands; to whom the Universe is an Oracle and Temple, as well as a 
Kitchen and Cattle-stall, – he shall be a delirious Mystic; to him 
thou, with sniffing charity, wilt protrusively proffer thy hand-lamp, 
and shriek, as one injured, when he kicks his foot through it? – 
Armer Teufel! Doth not thy cow calve, doth not thy bull gender? 
Thou thyself, wert thou not born, wilt thou not die? ‘Explain’ me all 
this, or do one of two things: Retire into private places with thy 
foolish cackle; or, what were better, give it up, and weep, not that 
the reign of wonder is done, and God's world all disembellished and 
prosaic, but that thou hitherto art a Dilettante and sand-blind 
Pedant.96 
One way in which this diatribe can be interpreted is in terms of an attempt to redefine 
and rehabilitate ‘Mysticism’ from a word that negatively signifies ‘the unintelligible’ 
to one that stands for ‘the unfathomable’. The image of the mystic kicking through the 
Logician’s ‘hand-lamp’ serves this purpose, in the sense that it symbolizes how the 
mystic’s all-inclusive and unified spiritual perception leads to the deconstruction of 
the dualistic patterns of thought on which human language is based, and in which the 
logical mind-set is entrapped. In other words, the epistemological bonds of the 
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Logician’s materialist philosophy remain transparent to the mystic, whose experience 
of transcendence lies outside the conceptual entrapments of language, in the realm of 
the ineffable. ‘Mysticism’, in this sense, becomes indicative of ‘the trans-conceptual’ 
and ‘the trans-linguistic’, rather than ‘the ambiguous’ and ‘the unintelligible’. And to 
return to my previous point about the power agenda implicit in such a redefinition, 
Carlyle’s struggle for authority – ideological in this case – is evident here in the fact 
that his defence of mysticism is inseparable from the attack he levels at the 
epistemological sufficiency of autonomous reason. This is why the symbolic light of 
rational ‘Truth’ is drastically re-evaluated by Teufelsdröckh to suggest that, far from 
resembling the sweeping brilliance of the ‘sun’, it is equal to that of a mere ‘hand-
lamp’, a re-evaluation that Carlyle must have deemed necessary for any attempt to 
cast the mystical in a sympathetic and laudatory light; it is based on the belief that 
only by questioning the dominant realism of the time will it be possible to make room 
for the alternative idealist ideology that Carlyle is seeking to promote. In short, the 
excerpt above provides a representative example of how mysticism, as an ineffable 
category, developed out of the tug and pull of nineteenth-century ideas that were 
competing for dominance, particularly those that were preoccupied with questions 
about the nature of reality. 
 Of course, all of this should not indicate that the competition for authority 
inherent in Victorian (idealist) claims of mystical ineffability were only fought for the 
sake of ideology, as it must be borne in mind that, more often than not, the defenders 
of the mystical were also motivated by a personal agenda of power: that is, to promote 
themselves as modern prophets with a moral and cultural significance. While the 
scope of this chapter does not permit a full exploration of this point, it would be 
worthwhile to consider how it applies to the case of Carlyle, at least, as a way of 
offering a suggestive example. I would only add that the same argument presented 
here can be made, with varying degrees of relevance, in relation to other Victorian 
writers who have contributed to the modern making of an ineffable mysticism, several 
of whom I shall be shortly discussing. That said, I believe that Carlyle’s defence of the 
mystical style of German writers, and of their transcendental philosophy, cannot but 
be read also as a defence of his own writing, given that his articles were widely 
perceived by contemporaries to be ‘couched in a style of the most blazing 
Germanism’, as one critic wrote, or to have introduced ‘a new Anglo-German style’, 
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as another critic put it.97 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Carlyle himself was, in 
fact, not averse to being regarded as a ‘Mystic’, nor to admit that he wrote in the 
mystics’ ‘lingo’,98 a telling example of which is what he wrote to Johann Peter 
Eckermann on December 9, 1828: 
I mean to write on Novalis, and not in the style of mockery, but in 
the true ‘mystic’ vein, which is thought to be peculiar to me. For 
you must know that I pass here generally enough for a ‘Mystic,’ or 
man half-drowned in the abysses of German speculation; which, 
considering everything, is all, in my opinion, exactly as it should 
be.99 
It is not unreasonable to assume, therefore, that any transcendent authority Carlyle 
sought to confer upon his German poets was also an assertion of his own authoritative 
position as a cultural man of letters, and a visionary prophet. Among present-day 
critics who have highlighted the ‘self-interested motive’ behind Carlyle’s espousal of 
German mysticism, and his adoption of a ‘romantic rhetoric of mystification’ is David 
Riede. Riede cites Kenneth Burke’s biting commentary on how the nineteenth-
century’s literary appropriation of mysticism was partly driven by the need of poets 
and critics alike to establish the superiority of their intellectual and moral status as 
writers: ‘Perhaps reality would not look mysterious at all to our literary mystics if it 
did not also include the reverence due their professional careerism’. In a section 
entitled ‘Limited Ideologies and the Authority of Transgression’, Riede also invokes 
‘Foucault’s analysis of transgressive language’ to argue that Carlyle’s endorsement of 
the ‘idiosyncratic’ style of German mystics was not only geared toward the 
endorsement of an ideology; it went beyond that to a personal investment in it as part 
of a strategy of self-fashioning (through language), to contrive an image of himself as 
an oracular prophet:  
In order to be heard at all, he must gain the ear, and the respect, of 
an audience that will believe him to have a genuine wisdom from 
“beyond the veil.” And to do this, of course, the prophet must not 
write like other men — he must develop a style to express 
																																																								
97 Catherine Heyrendt, ‘“My Books Were Not, nor Ever Will Be Popular”: Reappraising Carlyle in and 
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99 See CL, IV, pp. 425-29. Also see p. 79 (n. 89) above. 
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experience directly, and the style must be idiosyncratic in order to 
express the novelty of his point of view.100 
 Having touched upon the personal interest that many times underlay Victorian 
proclamations of the ineffability of mysticism, it would now be useful to turn to 
nineteenth-century responses to these proclamations, namely, to how contemporary 
intellectuals who were inimical to the mystical sought to make sense of the notion of 
ineffability. In fact, my present argument that the Victorian construction of an 
ineffable mysticism was part of a quest for authority – whether at the individual, or 
the ideological level – or both – is perhaps best substantiated by the period’s anti-
mystical critics who voiced their suspicions to this effect; that is to say, their defence 
against the notion of ineffability was to brand it as being nothing more than a ploy for 
authority. In ‘Coleridge’ (1840), John Stuart Mill perfectly summarizes these critics’ 
argument when the authority in question is on the ideological level. But first his 
description of the ideological warfare between the positivist and transcendentalist 
philosophical camps, in which mysticism was a key participant:  
Between the partisans of these two opposite doctrines there reigns a 
bellum internecinum. Neither side is sparing in the imputation of 
intellectual and moral obliquity to the perceptions, and of pernicious 
consequences to the creed, of its antagonists. Sensualism is the 
common term of abuse for the one philosophy, mysticism for the 
other. The one doctrine is accused of making men beasts, the other 
lunatics. It is the unaffected belief of numbers on one side of the 
controversy, that their adversaries are actuated by a desire to break 
loose from moral and religious obligation; and of numbers on the 
other that their opponents are either men fit for Bedlam, or who 
cunningly pander to the interests of hierarchies and aristocracies, by 
manufacturing superfine new arguments in favour of old prejudices. 
Keeping in mind that Mill associated the two philosophical traditions with Bentham 
and Coleridge, respectively, he then argues that a major Benthamite objection to the 
transcendentalists is how the authority of ‘their à priori truths’ solely depends on the 
ineffability thesis, irrespective of the lack of verifiable evidence: 
 [The followers of Bentham] allege that the transcendentalists make 
imagination, and not observation, the criterion of truth; that they lay 
down principles under which a man may enthrone his wildest 
dreams in the chair of philosophy, and impose them on mankind as 
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intuitions of the pure reason: which has, in fact, been done in all 
ages, by all manner of mystical enthusiasts. And even if, with gross 
inconsistency, the private revelations of any individual Böhme or 
Swedenborg be disowned, […] whoever form a strong enough party, 
may at any time set up the immediate perceptions of their reason, 
that is to say, any reigning prejudice, as a truth independent of 
experience; a truth not only requiring no proof, but to be believed in 
opposition to all that appears proof to the mere understanding; nay, 
the more to be believed, because it cannot be put into words and into 
the logical form of a proposition without a contradiction in terms: 
for no less authority than this is claimed by some transcendentalists 
for their à priori truths. And thus a ready mode is provided, by 
which whoever is on the strongest side may dogmatize at his ease, 
and instead of proving his propositions, may rail at all who deny 
them, as bereft of “the vision and the faculty divine,” or blinded to 
its plainest revelations by a corrupt heart.101 
Mill’s sketch of the typical Benthamite reaction to claims about the unspeakable 
nature of mystical ‘revelations’ highlights how the intellectual community of the 
nineteenth century was not oblivious to the authority issues that are likely to inform a 
certain characterization of mysticism. More specifically, it indicates how anti-mystical 
critics were conscious of the fact that defining ‘mysticism’ as ineffable conveniently 
supports the ideological legitimacy of the idealist project, in the sense that such a 
definition can easily function as a defensive strategy to keep at bay any rationalist 
critiques of the idealist’s intuitive experience: at the heart of it is the premise that, if 
mysticism is above the conceptual and logical constraints of language, then it exists in 
a sphere of its own, untouchable by rationalist criteria of judgement.  
4. Beyond Carlyle: Other Victorian Voices in Defence of an Ineffable ‘Mysticism’ 
Turning from Carlyle to other Victorian writers who have contributed to 
characterizing the mystical as ineffable, let me underline that my earlier contention 
regarding Carlyle’s influence on William James was merely to draw attention to the 
literary points of contact between two (if not the two) leading figures in the modern 
construction of mysticism in the Victorian and Modernist eras – each in his respective 
era, of course.102 The intention behind this was not to suggest that mysticism, as a 
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modern construct, came to acquire its defining characteristic of ineffability simply 
through a particular case of influence of one author on another. Within his 
contemporary intellectual and literary culture, Carlyle may have been the writer most 
explicit – and even most resolute – in confronting what was negatively perceived to be 
the vagueness and obscurity of ‘mysticism’, but this should not detract from the 
significance of many other Victorian writers who have also voiced their objections to 
this pejorative conception of the term. Indeed, a consideration of examples from a 
number of poets and critics of the period would reveal that Carlyle’s literary 
engagement with this category, pioneering and crucial as it was, was part of a larger 
process of redefinition, one that would require several decades and the weight of 
many concurring voices before it would effect a significant alteration in conceptions 
of mysticism.  
If one is to accept Leigh Schmidt’s suggestion that the on-going editions of the 
Encyclopædia Britannica offer ‘a good and relevant [measure] when it comes to 
category formation’,103 then it is safe to assume that the new definition of ‘mysticism’ 
as an ineffable phenomena had notably taken hold in mainstream intellectual thought 
sometime between the mid-1870s and early 1880s. It should be noted that, in its 
eighth edition (which appeared from 1852 to 1860), the encyclopaedia’s entry on 
mysticism took up a distinctly ambivalent tone, oscillating between idealization and 
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disapproval.104 And what is worth mentioning here is that, within its disapproving 
sections, the mystical featured as a term of reproach to denote ‘murkiness’ and 
‘unintelligibility’. Characterizing it as a ‘wild extravagance’, for example, the entry 
sets up ‘mysticism’ in clear opposition to ‘common-sense’, and the only sympathetic 
account it offers on the subject is in its discussion of the ‘mysticism of Emanuel 
Swedenborg’, and this because it holds that Swedenborg’s scientific learning made his 
a most unmystical mysticism; according to the entry, ‘it differs from that of all other 
mystics’ in its hostility to the vague and obscure, obviously suggesting that these are 
among the defining features of ‘all the mystical systems’, and that Swedenborg is the 
exception to the rule: 
The theosophic mysticism of Emanuel Swedenborg stands alone 
among all the mystical systems which have yet been noticed. [… He 
does not] display any of the rambling theorizing and turbid 
vehemence peculiar to [them]. With the Swedish seer all is scientific 
precision and calm serenity; he utters himself always with clear 
collectedness, and […] is peculiarly temperate and by no means 
mystical.105  
This entry would remain unchanged in subsequent publications of the encyclopaedia 
until 1884, when volume seventeen of the ninth edition came out, containing the 
updated entry.106 In the new edition, one notices not only that the condemnatory tone 
of the previous editions is all but gone, but also that the unfavourable association 
between ‘mysticism’ and ‘unintelligibility’ is completely absent, whereas an idealist 
understanding of it as something defying linguistic articulation takes an 
unprecedented precedence; it is what the entry immediately opens with:  
MYSTICISM is a phase of thought, or rather perhaps of feeling, 
which from its very nature is hardly susceptible of exact definition. 
It appears in connection with the endeavour of the human mind to 
grasp the divine essence or the ultimate reality of things, and to 
enjoy the blessedness of actual communion with the Highest. The 
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first is the philosophic side of mysticism; the second its religious 
side107 
Commenting on the opening sentence, John Quincy Adams states: ‘This comes very 
near to what James calls its ineffability’.108 
That Carlyle was central in bringing about this conceptual shift from the 1858 
definition of the mystical109 is unquestionable; but it is doubtful that this process of 
redefinition could have gained momentum had there not existed an idealist trend of 
literary thought in the nineteenth-century that was already predisposed to Carlyle’s 
notions, one that was increasingly keen to speak of spiritual verities that are 
impervious to scientific reasoning. Indeed, as mentioned in the previous chapter, even 
as early as 1852, Frederick Robertson could explain that it was the development of an 
idealist literary sensibility as a ‘reaction from the age of Science’ that had brought 
about the wave of literary mysticism then sweeping over England. More important 
and more to the point is what I have delayed pointing out when first referring to 
Robertson’s argument, and that is his belief that the development of this idealist strain 
of thought was tied in with an understanding of mysticism that is predicated on its 
ineffability. What Robertson particularly suggests is that the growing appeal of 
mysticism in the mid-century was partly due to the rising recognition that the realities 
of the eternal realm resist articulation through the finite limitations of human 
language, and that ‘the clear formulas and accurate technicalities of science have not 
expressed, nor ever can, the truths of the Soul’. According to Robertson, the poets and 
critics of the century came more and more to appreciate mystical language for how it 
represents both ‘the infinite in the soul of man’ and the ‘undefined sense of mystery 
which broods over the shapeless borders of the illimitable’, leading to the ascendancy 
of what he calls the ‘Poetry of Mysticism’. Mysticism, in other words, was being 
associated with spiritual and religious realms of experience that were believed to 
evade exact definition, and this was embraced as a virtue in a world that gave 
credence to experience only in so far as it was consistent with the scientific culture, 
and its emphasis on precise and definite criteria of judgment. 
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In my discussion in Chapter II of the Victorian identification of ‘mysticism’ as 
part of the poetic enterprise (or vice versa), I have argued that the Victorian writers’ 
poetic and critical defence of the category of mysticism was, in effect, a defence of the 
cultural authority of poetry, and the divine inspiration of the poet: this is obviously 
because asserting an essential affinity between mysticism and poetry served to extend 
any claims that were being made for mysticism to the sphere of poetry. I have 
explained that at the forefront of these claims was what constitutes the Romantic 
(idealist) definition of ‘the mystical’, and that is the belief that it is an intense, 
religious experience of an intuitive form of reality that has epistemological value. It 
was my contention that such a definition was underpinned by the desire to postulate 
the existence of an independent category of experience, entirely different and separate 
from the material/physical levels of experience that are subjectable to scientific 
scrutiny. A corollary of this belief, moreover, is the idea that the knowledge procured 
from this type of experience is equally reliable, if not more so, than that obtained 
through the sensory realm, and some writers even argued that the difference between 
the two is a difference between knowledge of Absolute and relative truth. In short, the 
chapter argued that implicit in Victorian attempts to aestheticize and poeticize 
‘mysticism’ is the claim that knowledge of ultimate reality is obtained, not through the 
much venerated logic of material science, but by an intuitive faculty in man that is 
believed to be, among other things, the seat of the poetic imagination. 
The intent of my discussion was, above all, to underscore how the Victorian 
discourse on poetry was rife with issues of authority, and how its engagement with 
defining ‘the mystical’ reflected the spiritual concerns of a post-Christian perspective: 
it was a way of asserting the poet’s cultural relevance as a divinely-inspired prophet in 
a world where it was felt that the threat of secular positivism to religious and moral 
feeling was constantly on the rise. I believe that it was a similar preoccupation with 
these anxieties about the possible future irreligiosity of Britain – and the poet’s place 
in it – that motivated Victorian poets and critics to defend the ineffability of 
mysticism. After all, it was really the experience of poetic inspiration that was being 
defended, given that it was considered one of the manifestations of the mystical 
temperament. To claim its ineffability, then, was to contend that poets had access to a 
higher state of being that is pre-linguistic, and beyond the reach of ordinary 
perceptions, which only served to validate their religious authority as possessors of a 
unique visionary power. It was also a convenient way to shield the integrity of the 
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poet’s intuitions against the de-spiritualizing effects of scientific reductionism: if an 
experience is incommunicable through physical and conceptual modes of description, 
then it cannot be evaluated according to empirical epistemic principles, and this 
ensures that the poet’s insights can stand unchallenged by the scientific community. In 
‘Mysticism and Philosophy’, Richard Gale has suggested that the concept of 
ineffability, when used as a descriptor of experience, is ‘an honorific title’,110 which 
corresponds well enough with the case of its use in the Victorian discourse on poetry, 
as it is chiefly meant to raise the poet to an exalted moral and spiritual pedestal that 
befits a religious prophet. 
Perhaps Walter Bagehot’s 1855 critique of ‘The First Edinburgh Reviewers’ – 
appearing in the second number of his then newly founded National Review – is a 
good place to start with as an example of this kind of Victorian (Romantic) figuration 
of the poet in the mid-nineteenth century. The article addresses Francis Jeffrey’s 1814 
review of Wordsworth’s The Excursion (1814), which accused the poem of ‘dull 
mysticism’, famously opening with the brutal verdict that ‘This will never do!’. 
Bagehot argues that it was principally for its mysticism that Jeffery castigated 
Wordsworth’s work, and that mysticism was anathema to Jeffrey because he ‘had the 
natural infirmities of a Whig critic’ with which Bagehot believed the entire first 
generation of Edinburgh reviewers were afflicted. As for his definition of what 
constitutes a ‘Whig critic’, he explains that, while a great deal had been written to 
theoretically express the Whigs’ creed, for him, ‘Whiggism is not a creed, it is a 
character’; and, interestingly enough, his description of this character incidentally 
resembles the definitions offered by Matthew Arnold and James Thomson of what 
they respectively termed ‘the Philistines’ and ‘the Bumbles’:111  
[Whig critics are] men of a cool, moderate, resolute firmness, not 
gifted with high imagination, little prone to enthusiastic sentiment, 
heedless of large theories and speculations, careless of dreamy 
scepticism; with a clear view of the next step, and a wise intention 
to take it; a strong conviction that the elements of knowledge are 
true, and a steady belief that the present world can, and should be, 
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quietly improved. […] Nor are the intellectual powers of the 
characteristic element in this party exactly of the loftiest order; they 
have no call to make great discoveries, or pursue unbounded designs 
[…]. In taste, they are correct, that is, better appreciating the 
complete compliance with explicit and ascertained rules, than the 
unconscious exuberance of inexplicable and unforeseen beauties.  
It is with this in mind that Bagehot states that ‘the deep sea of mysticism lies opposed 
to some natures; in some moods it is a sublime wonder; in others an “impious ocean,” 
– they will never put forth on it at any time’. According to him, the Whigs’ aversion to 
mysticism stems from ‘the limitation of their imagination’, which ‘restricts them to 
what is clear and intelligible, and at hand’. He also believes that theirs is a purely 
rationalist temperament, in the sense that they could never ‘be convinced without 
arguments’, refusing to entertain the notion that ‘the most convincing arguments […] 
may be expressed imaginatively, and may work a far firmer persuasion than any neat 
and abstract statement’. This is where Bagehot’s defence of the ineffability of 
mysticism comes into focus, as he states that those arguments which are most 
persuasive to the imagination are characteristically of an intuitive and infinite nature, 
too lofty to be expressed within the rational confines of language:  
They [the Whigs] are most averse to mysticism. A clear, precise, 
discriminating intellect shrinks at once from the symbolic, the 
unbounded, the indefinite. The misfortune is that mysticism is true. 
There certainly are kinds of truth, borne in as it were instinctively on 
the human intellect, most influential on the character and the heart, 
yet hardly capable of stringent statement, difficult to limit by an 
elaborate definition. Their course is shadowy; the mind seems rather 
to have seen than to see them, more to feel after than definitely 
apprehend them. They commonly involve an infinite element, which 
of course cannot be stated precisely, or else a first principle an 
original tendency of our intellectual constitution, which it is 
impossible not to feel, and yet which it is hard to extricate in terms 
and words.112 
 The fact that Bagehot’s conception of an ineffable mysticism occurs in the 
context of discussing the religious and prophetic authority of poetry is evidenced in 
the lines immediately following the excerpt just quoted, where he argues that the 
‘kinds of truth’ mentioned in the lines above constitute ‘what has been called the 
religion of nature, or more exactly, perhaps, the religion of the imagination’. He 
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explains that ‘this is an interpretation of the world’ that is achieved, not through the 
physical senses, but by a ‘mystical sense’ that perceives every aspect of material 
existence as infused with moral and religious significance: 
In nature the mystical sense finds a motion in the mountain, and a 
power in the waves, and a meaning in the long white line of the 
shore, and a thought in the blue of heaven, and a gushing soul in the 
buoyant light, an unbounded being in the vast void air, and 
“Wakeful watchings in the pointed stars.” 
Based on this, Bagehot argues that the work of a true poet or artist must be a 
supremely religious one, because he believes that it is the love of ‘beauty’ that best 
facilitates the discernment of the mystical and religious meanings of the universe. This 
is why he refers to Wordsworth and Coleridge as ‘sacred poets’, arguing that their 
aesthetic sensibilities prove that they ‘possessed the inner nature –  “an intense and 
glowing mind,” “the vision and the faculty divine”’. The latter expressions are of 
course borrowed from Wordsworth’s Excursion (II:274, I:79),113 which reveals that 
Bagehot came from a background that was already absorbed in the early Romantics’ 
cultural narrative of the poet as a visionary prophet, and a figure of moral authority.  
 And it is with recourse to this narrative that he defends Wordsworth’s 
mysticism against charges of unintelligibility, whereby he maintains that ‘the 
sublimities of the preacher’ are not in themselves difficult to understand, but that their 
profundity renders them unfathomable to the mere formalist and rationalist mind-set 
of a Francis Jeffrey, or a Sydney Smith.114 Bagehot adds that, as ‘a scoffer at 
metaphysics’, Jeffrey’s contemporary popularity may linger for a while, but that ‘the 
religion of the imagination’ will surely have the last word, because the prophetic value 
of Wordsworth’s mystical poems will withstand the test of time: 
It is certain that Mr. Wordsworth preached this kind of religion, and 
that Lord Jeffrey did not believe a word of it. His cool, sharp, 
collected mind revolted from its mysticism; his detective 
intelligence was absorbed in its apparent fallaciousness; his light 
humour made sport with the sublimities of the preacher. His love of 
perspicuity was vexed by its indefiniteness; the precise philosopher 
was amazed at its mystic unintelligibility. […] The world has given 
judgment. Both Mr. Wordsworth and Lord Jeffrey have received 
																																																								
113 William Wordsworth, The Excursion: A Poem, a new edn (London: Edward Moxon, 1853), pp. 51, 
6. 
114 Bagehot names them as the most ‘pre-eminent’ among the Whig founders of the Edinburgh Review: 
See ‘First Edinburgh Reviewers’, p. 19.  
	 149	
their reward. The one had his own generation; the laughter of men, 
the applause of drawing-rooms, the concurrence of the crowd: the 
other a succeeding age, the fond enthusiasm of secret students, the 
lonely rapture of lonely minds. And each has received according to 
his kind. 
In reversing the conception of ‘mysticism’ from that which is perplexing and 
incomprehensible to that which is ineffably ‘sublime’, Bagehot was also reversing the 
cultural status of the mystic in relation to the critic: the mystic-poet is no longer a 
proper object of ridicule, but one who is worthy of the divine reverence that is due a 
prophet, whereas the critic becomes nothing more than a contemptible ‘shrill artificial 
voice’: 
Nature ingeniously prepared a shrill artificial voice, which spoke in 
season and out of season, enough and more than enough, what will 
ever be the idea of the cities of the plain concerning those who live 
alone among the mountains; of the frivolous concerning the grave; 
of the gregarious concerning the recluse; of those who laugh 
concerning those who laugh not; of the common concerning the 
uncommon; […] the notion of the world of those whom it will not 
reckon among the righteous – it said, “This won’t do!” And so in all 
time will the lovers of polished Liberalism speak, concerning the 
intense and lonely prophet.115   
 In addition to Bagehot’s article, Swinburne’s previously discussed essay of 
1868 on William Blake is another important critical piece that stakes a position in the 
‘vagueness versus ineffability’ debate in nineteenth-century negotiations of 
mysticism. The essay particularly speaks in defence of Blake’s prophetic books, 
stating that however contradictory and anomalous its mystical language may 
outwardly seem, it is by no means nonsensical: 
Here, as in all swift “inspired” writing, there are on the outside 
infinite and indefinable anomalies, contradictions, incompatibilities 
enough of all sorts; open for any Paine or Paley to impugn or to 
defend. But let no one dream that there is here either madness or 
mendacity:  the heart or sense thus hidden away is sound enough for 
a mystic.116  
Swinburne is convinced that these seeming ‘incompatibilities’ are not to be treated as 
a stylistic weakness, but rather as a distinctive feature of a dignified form of writing 
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that places the poet in the league of ‘inspired’ writers, a belief that obviously accords 
religious or quasi-religious117 value to the mystical. This is confirmed elsewhere in the 
essay, where Swinburne maintains that the ‘sound’ sense hidden behind the mystic’s 
words belongs to the intuitive and spiritual class, and that any linguistic representation 
of it is only a fractional portrayal of what is essentially unsayable and ineffable. ‘The 
meaning of a mystic’, he writes, ‘is but partially expressible by words, as (to borrow 
Blake’s own symbol) the inseparable soul is yet but incompletely expressible through 
the body’.118 For this reason, Swinburne insists that to be able to grasp Blake’s 
meaning, one must follow the poet in his imaginative flight toward that rarefied realm 
of understanding in which the mystic’s consciousness is said to dwell, and where 
discursive reasoning can gain no footing. Such is his advice in the following lines that 
employ a ground/cloud dichotomy to symbolize two opposing epistemological 
standpoints: the rational versus the intuitive, the empirical versus the imaginative, or 
the realist versus the idealist: 
To pluck out the heart of Blake’s mystery is a task which every man 
must be left to attempt for himself: for this prophet is certainly not  
“easier to be played on than a pipe.” Keeping fast in hand what clue 
we have, we may nevertheless succeed in making some further way 
among the clouds. One thing is too certain; if we insist on having 
hard ground under foot all the way we shall not get far. The land 
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lying before us, bright with fiery blossom and fruit, musical with 
blowing branches and falling waters, is not to be seen or travelled in 
save by help of such light as lies upon dissolving dreams and 
dividing clouds. By moonrise, to the sound of wind at sunset, one 
may tread upon the limit of this land and gather as with muffled 
apprehension some soft remote sense of the singing of its birds and 
flowering of its fields.119 
 In summing up the merits of The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, moreover, 
Swinburne suggests that Blake’s readers are of two kinds: those who possess the 
visionary capacity – or a semblance of it – and are thus able to appreciate the poem’s 
intellectual and spiritual depths; and those who do not. The second type, according to 
him, are the ones most impatient with the poet’s mystical language, simply because 
they are powerless to comprehend it. The first, on the other hand, are those readers to 
whom Blake’s mysticism requires no critic’s interpretation/explanation, and to whom 
a critic can be instructive only insofar as to point out the aesthetic, and religious 
qualities of the poem, as Swinburne does in the following lines: 
Remark what eloquence, what subtlety, what ardour of wisdom, 
what splendour of thought, is here; how far it outruns, not in daring 
alone but in sufficiency, all sayings of minor mystics who were not 
also poets; how much of lofty love and of noble faith underlies and 
animates these rapid and fervent words; what greatness of spirit and 
of speech there was in the man who, living as Blake lived, could 
write as Blake has written. Those who cannot see what is implied 
may remain unable to tolerate what is expressed; and those who can 
read aright need no index of ours.120  
As the lines here indicate, Swinburne obviously believed that being a poet makes for a 
superior mystic, but the important point being made is in the last two lines, and that is 
that the mystic’s meaning is untranslatable, so any understanding of it on the part of 
readers really comes down to whether or not they ‘can read aright’ – and not on the 
critic’s efforts to make it more readable. We are made to understand, moreover, that 
‘reading aright’ is possible only when the individual possesses a visionary or 
prophetic temperament akin to that of the mystic-poet’s – not necessarily in degree, 
but in kind. Notice, for example, how those who cannot read aright are described as 
being unable to ‘see’ the mystic’s meaning, associating their lack of understanding 
with a deficiency of vision/visionary power.  
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 This point becomes all the more clear when considered in light of Swinburne’s 
discussion of Blake as a visionary, where the subject of vision is explicitly addressed. 
In terms of Swinburne’s understanding of ‘vision’, Thomas E. Connolly explains in 
Swinburne’s Theory of Poetry that the poet’s essay on Blake employs the term in an 
idealist Blakean sense to mean ‘the transcendence of human reason by imagination or 
intuition’. 121  Connolly sees this best exemplified in the passage below, where 
Swinburne attributes to Blake higher levels of vision than the mere corporeal one, the 
latter of which he refers to as ‘singleness of vision’, associating it to the ‘mechanical 
intellect’ or the closed-eyed state of a sleepwalker: 
Upon earth his [Blake’s] vision was “twofold always”; singleness of 
vision he scorned and feared as the sign of mechanical intellect, of 
talent that walks while the soul sleeps, with the mere activity of 
blind somnambulism. It was fourfold in the intervals of keenest 
inspiration and subtlest rapture; threefold in the paradise of dreams 
lying between earth and heaven, lulled by lighter airs and lit by 
fainter stars; a land of night and moonlight, spectral and serene.122  
When it comes to an individual’s perception of the world, then, Swinburne considered 
it a form of blindness to completely rely on the material and conceptual fields of one’s 
sensory-experience, which he identified with the lowest form of human vision. 
Opposed to this are the various levels of imaginative or intuitive vision that, according 
to him, involve seeing through ‘the soul’, what he elsewhere refers to as the ‘spirit 
within the sense of ear and eye’.123 The fact that Swinburne believed that a reader’s 
comprehension of a mystic’s language requires using this intuitive or spiritual sense is 
perhaps nowhere more evident than in his ‘Notes on the Text of Shelley’ (1869), 
written the year following his publication of William Blake. There he comments thus 
on the mystical sections of Shelley’s Epipsychidion (1821):  
In all poetry as in all religions, mysteries must have place, but 
riddles should find none. The high, sweet, mystic doctrine of this 
poem is apprehensible enough to all who look into it with purged 
eyes and listen with purged ears.124  
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Borrowed from the traditional language of spiritual purification, the word ‘purged’ 
connotes letting go of all the rational categories attached to one’s physical perceptions 
of reality, implying that these are an impediment to understanding the writings of 
mystics whose meanings rise above the normative linguistic forms of a materialist 
worldview.  
 Of course, arguing that mystical poetry requires a specific set of eyes and ears 
for its comprehension is another way of saying that its language is neither obscure nor 
vague, but that it surpasses the capacity of the ordinary or common understanding. In 
Swinburne’s essay on Blake, therefore, the notion of the ineffability of mysticism is 
meant to indicate that the mystic’s intended readers are, as Margot Louis puts it, ‘part 
of a peculiarly gifted élite’. 125 This is certainly one of the reasons Swinburne 
compares the experience of aesthetic appreciation – in the case of reading Blake – to 
the sacrament of the Eucharist, indicating that a reader’s ability to grasp the poet’s 
intuitive (and unutterable) meanings serves as a marker of distinction. To use Margot 
Louis’s argument, ‘Swinburne defends Blake’s apparent obscurity on the ground that 
great art can be appreciated, not by “the corporeal understanding,” but only by a rarer 
“innate and irrational perception”’. Referring to the following excerpt from his essay, 
Louis adds that ‘Swinburne’s main point is that Blake administers his eucharist to the 
small community of “exceptional temperaments” which share with him a kind of 
visionary power’:126 
It is in fact only by innate and irrational perception that we can 
apprehend and enjoy the supreme works of verse and colour; these, 
as Blake indicates with a noble accuracy, are not things of the 
understanding; otherwise, we may add, the whole human world 
would appreciate them alike or nearly alike, and the high and subtle 
luxuries of exceptional temperaments would be made the daily 
bread of the poor and hungry; the vinum dæmonum which now the 
few only can digest safely and relish ardently would be found 
medicinal instead of poisonous, palatable instead of loathsome, by 
the run of eaters and drinkers; all specialties of spiritual office 
would be abolished, and the whole congregation would 
communicate in both kinds. […] The sacramental elements of art 
and poetry are in no wise given for the sustenance or the salvation of 
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men in general, but reserved mainly for the sublime profit and 
intense pleasure of an elect body of church.127 
It should not escape notice that Swinburne’s overall defence of Blake’s language 
against charges of obscurity is one that clearly conflates the spheres of ‘mysticism’ 
and ‘poetry’: I had mentioned earlier how he suggests that, rather than leading us to 
question the poet’s sanity, the ‘anomalies’ and ‘incompatibilities’ of Blake’s mystical 
speech should be taken as one of the signature features of ‘inspired writing’; and 
Swinburne takes this a step further in the quote above, arguing that the fact that 
Blake’s mystical writing cannot be fully understood by the majority of readers does 
not detract from the value of his work, but serves, instead, as a testament to its place 
among ‘the supreme works of verse’. It appears from this that, for him, ‘mysticism’ 
served as a defining characteristic of ‘the most sublime poetry’, which signifies a clear 
overlap in his conceptions of the two categories. Indeed, this is why he describes other 
readers who cannot aesthetically appreciate Blake’s poetry in the same terms used to 
describe those unable to understand his mysticism, namely, as suffering from 
defective senses. To ‘the heavy ear’ and ‘the torpid palate’, he writes, the poetry 
would seem an ‘impediment of speech, very perplexing to the mundane ear; a habit of 
huge breathless stuttering, as it were a Titanic stammer, intolerable to organs of flesh’. 
In both cases, however, Swinburne ultimately seeks to establish that the usual charges 
of ‘vagueness’ and ‘obscurity’ against mystical poetry very often reveal that the 
weakness lies, not in the poet, but in the mainstream contemporary culture that is too 
reliant on the ‘organs of flesh’ to the detriment of the ‘spirit of sense’.128 And, as in 
Bagehot’s review, by asserting the supra-rational and supra-linguistic nature of the 
mystical, Swinburne’s essay transforms ‘mysticism’ from a label of abuse to a term of 
privilege, one that culturally authorizes mystics and their intended readers over the 
abusive critics. 
  Much like Swinburne, and more than twenty years before him, Richard H. 
Horne was also critical of the English intolerance to mystical poetry, similarly 
attributing it in A New Spirit of the Age (1844) to a contemporarily perceived 
materialist preoccupation with the world of the ‘flesh’, what he refers to as the belief 
in ‘the beef’:  
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We are such a people for “beef.” We cry aloud for soul – we want 
more soul – we want to be inspired and the instant anything is 
floated before our ken which might serve as an aerial guide to the 
Elysian Valley, or the Temple of the Spirit, then we instantly begin 
to utter the war-cry of “dreamy folly!” “mystical mystery!” and 
urged by the faith (the beef) that is in us, continue our lowing for the 
calf, that surely cometh, but cannot satisfy our better cravings.129  
This is from Horne’s chapter on Tennyson, in which he speaks in defence of 
Tennyson’s mysticism with recourse to the ineffability thesis, as was the case in 
Bagehot’s vindication of Wordsworth’s mysticism, or Swinburne’s of a mystical 
Blake, or Carlyle’s of his German poets. It should be apparent by now that the 
ineffable mysticism of the nineteenth century was largely a defensive construct, 
something that was invoked by critics in defence of poets whose works were believed 
to supply the much-needed spiritual nourishment for withstanding the increasingly 
pervasive secularism of the time. As such, it was also an aesthetic (or poetic) 
construct, corroborating many a critic’s theoretical account about the true nature of 
poetry, and what it ought to do.  
 With regard to Horne, and as has been previously mentioned, he held the view 
that ‘the poetic fire […] has its source in the divine mysteries of our existence’, and 
that there are three levels to the full appreciation of it: the sensual, the imaginative, 
and the mystical. ‘The first and second of these’, he writes, ‘must be clear to all; the 
last will not receive so general an admission, and, perhaps, may not be so intelligible 
to everybody as could be wished’. To explain these, he argues that, the ‘objects’ of 
poetry are ‘palpable to the external senses’ in so far as the reader has conditioned 
his/her perceptions ‘to contemplate them with interest and delight’; and they are 
‘palpable to the imagination’ in so far as the reader ‘possesses this faculty’ and has 
conditioned it ‘to ideal subjects and profoundly sympathetic reflections’. As for the 
mystical element of poetry, Horne explains that it is the most supreme and subtlest of 
the three, and that any perception of it occurs on the spiritual level, and only by 
readers who have become attuned to their souls’ ‘prophetic sensations’, ‘vague 
emotions’ and ‘aimless impulses’:  
We thus arrive at the conclusion that the poetic element, though 
simple and entire, has yet various forms and modifications of 
development according to individual nature and circumstance, and, 
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therefore, that its loftiest or subtlest manifestations are not equally 
apparent to the average mass of human intelligence.130  
Again, the conclusion that we are meant to draw here is that, if a poem’s language 
appears to be puzzling or obscure, the error may not be in the poet’s style, but in the 
ability of readers to hone their spiritual perceptions, so as to comprehend that which 
resides beyond the natural strictures of linguistic expressibility. This is why Horne 
believes that many English critics of Tennyson are baffled by what he refers to as his 
‘transcendentalisms of the senses’, which ‘do not belong to the flesh-and-blood class’ 
and ‘which no German critic would for a moment hesitate to take to his visionary 
arms’.131 He, therefore, takes complaints about Tennyson’s mystical language as a 
sign of the critic’s spiritual bankruptcy rather than a stylistic weakness in the poet.  
 Tennyson himself also made similar claims about the ineffability of mysticism 
when describing his own trance experiences, which indicates that mysticism, as an 
ineffable category in nineteenth-century literary writing, was not entirely restricted to 
the critical literature, nor was it always used in a defensive context. Aside from it 
generally being a critical construct (employed by critics in defence of poets), many 
Victorian poets were also involved in the construction of this category, and this often 
occurred in the assertive context of claiming transcendence for their own experiences 
as inspired poets. In Tennyson’s case, this is best exemplified in the ‘The Ancient 
Sage’ (1885), especially when compared to the poet’s descriptions of his trance 
experiences in his epistolary or conversational intercourse with intimate friends, part 
of which I have done in the previous chapter.132 ‘The Ancient Sage’, first published as 
‘The Ancient Mystic’, contains perhaps Tennyson’s clearest autobiographical avowal 
to his readers about these trances, in the sense that it is stated outside the literary 
world of the poem; as previously mentioned, footnoted to the section about the ancient 
mystic’s visionary experiences is Tennyson’s ascription of the same kind of 
experience to himself: ‘This is also a personal experience which I have had more than 
once’. In terms of his belief in the ineffability of such an experience, John Tyndall 
reports that, when Tennyson described it to him, he insisted that ‘it was impossible to 
give anything that could be called a description of the state, for language seemed 
incompetent to touch it’. The poet’s letter to Benjamin Blood describing the same 
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experience similarly attests to this: ‘This [is] not a confused state, but the clearest of 
the clearest, the surest of the surest, the weirdest of the weirdest, utterly beyond words 
[…]. I am ashamed of my feeble description. Have I not said the state is utterly 
beyond words?’. 133  A similar account is reported by William Allingham, who 
mentions a conversation he had with the poet on the evening of 22 July 1866 that 
further reveals Tennyson’s belief in the ineffability of mysticism. The conversation is 
quite interesting in that it conveys ‘how necessary’ the poet’s ‘role as Seer’ was for 
him,134 and the kind of authority it granted him:  
T.[ennyson] said, ‘In my boyhood I had intuitions of Immortality – 
inexpressible! I have never been able to express them. I shall try 
some day.’  I say that I too have felt something of that kind; whereat 
T.[ennyson] (being in one of his less amiable moods) growls, ‘I 
don't believe you have. You say it out of rivalry.’135 
As Robert Preyer observes, ‘in this little exchange Tennyson is insisting that he has 
the sort of insights which make a poet and that the poetaster Allingham does not’. On 
the dynamics of authority that govern this distinction, Anne-Marie Millim comments 
that the poet’s trances sometimes occasioned a sense of ‘superiority’: ‘Questioning 
Allingham’s intellect, talent and truthfulness and insisting on his higher status, 
Tennyson re-establishes inequality between them, which the former’s bold claim had 
sought to eliminate’.136  
 As for how Tennyson’s notion of ineffability is reflected in ‘The Ancient 
Sage’, it is partly evident in the fact that the word ‘Nameless’ is employed at least ten 
times in his reference to the ‘Power’ that ‘is more than man’ (or ‘more than mortal 
things’), and, by extension, to his boyhood experience of being spiritually united to it 
(256, 215):137   
  More than once when I 
Sat all alone, revolving in myself 
The word that is the symbol of myself, 
The mortal limit of the Self was loosed, 
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And past into the Nameless, as a cloud 
Melts into Heaven.  
[…] 
  And thro’ loss of Self 
The gain of such large life as match’d with ours 
Were Sun to spark.138   (229-38) 
We are made to understand that, by merging into ‘the Nameless’, Tennyson himself 
also became a nameless power or entity, which lends the quality of unutterbility to the 
whole experience. This is not to mention that the poet immediately describes the 
experience as being ‘unshadowable in words’, recalling the following lines from In 
Memoriam (1850), lyric XCV, in which he expresses his frustration at how painfully 
impotent ‘words’ are to describe the similar experience he had upon reading Hallam’s 
letters: 
Vague words! but ah, how hard to frame 
      In matter-moulded forms of speech, 
      Or ev’n for intellect to reach  
Thro’ memory that which I became.139  (45-8) 
The sage’s words also recall an earlier example in ‘The Two Voices’ (1833-42), 
where the poet speaks of experiencing some ‘mystic gleams’ such ‘as no language 
may declare’ (380-84).140 And to further drive home the notion that these experiences 
are ‘unshadowable in words’, Tennyson’s aged sage adds that ‘words’ are ‘themselves 
shadows of a shadow-world’ (239), an allusion to Plato’s cave allegory, one of whose 
purposes is to highlight how names, and linguistic symbols are twice removed from 
spiritual reality, making them an inadequate representation of truth. As Alan Sinfield 
argues in his commentary on these lines, ‘ultimate reality is defined in terms of its 
inaccessibility to language, and by the end of the passage the adequacy of language 
even to the human world is in question’.141 
 Another Victorian poet who also intimately identified herself with mysticism 
is Elizabeth Barrett Browning, and she is a good example of a nineteenth-century 
writer who positively defined the mystical as ineffable in the context of discussing 
poetry. Barrett Browning’s letters to friends and acquaintances provide numerous 
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instances where she either speaks of a personal inclination to ‘mysticism’, or describes 
herself as ‘a mystic’. ‘I will not deny my mysticism’, she once wrote to Mary Russell 
Mitford, for example, to whom she often spoke (and even joked) about her ‘own 
natural leaning towards mysticism’, suggesting on one occasion that she could 
imagine herself going ‘to Germany to smoke & take a master’s degree in 
mysticism’.142  To Anna Jameson, in 1853, she wrote that she and ‘Robert’ had ‘been 
meditating socialism and mysticism of very various kinds’, and in 1859, just two years 
before her death, her new year’s letter to Ruskin indicates that she had not undergone 
a change of heart on the matter, declaring that ‘I am what many people call a 
“mystic”’.143 That Barrett Browning closely associated the mystical with the poetic, 
and thought of these in relation to ineffability, is evidenced in her letter to Mitford of 
April 1st, 1842, where shares her oft-expressed opinion that Carlyle was 
fundamentally ‘a poet’.144 In the letter, she discusses Carlyle’s mystical language, and 
how it is often deemed idiosyncratic, favourably justifying it as the inevitable 
consequence of a poet’s desire to verbally translate into ‘sound’ and ‘music’ certain 
contemplations of a purely spiritual nature. Such contemplations, she explains, are 
essentially inaudible, cultivated in the ‘silent’ sphere of ‘the mystic & true’, and rising 
above the reach of any human lexicon: 
He does not write pure English .. no, nor quite pure German – nor 
pure Greek, by any means. But he writes thoughts. […] There is 
something wonderful in this struggling forth into sound of a 
contemplation bred high above dictionaries & talkers – in some 
silent Heavenly place for the mystic & true. The sounds do come – 
strangely indeed & in unwrought masses, but still with a certain 
																																																								
142 Wellesley College, Margaret Clapp Library, Special Collections, Browning Collection, Checklist 
Number 41030-00, EBB to Mitford, 14 June 1841, p. 16; Checklist Number 43348-00, EBB to Mitford, 
24 November 1843, p. 11; and Checklist Number 43366-00, EBB to Mitford, 16 December 1843, p. 3, 
in Baylor University Libraries Digital Collections (hencefore abbreviated as BULDC, and all references 
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143 WC, MC Library, Browning Collection, CN 53022-00, EBB to Jameson, 17 March 1853, p. 3, in 
BULDC; and The Letters of Elizabeth Barrett Browning: Edited with Biographical Additions, ed. by 
Frederic G. Kenyon, 2 vols (London: Macmillan, 1898), II, p. 299.    
144 See, for example, ibid., CN 45044-00, EBB to Robert Browning, 17 February 1845, p. 13, where she 
writes that Carlyle ‘is a poet unaware of himself’, or her suggestion that ‘he is a poet […] by his insight 
into the activity of moral causes working through the intellectual agencies of the mind’, a statement 
made in one of the sections she contributed to Horne’s 1844 essay on Carlyle, as presented in ‘Carlyle: 
A Disentangled Essay by Elizabeth Barrett Browning’, in Literary Anecdotes of the Nineteenth 
Century: Contributions Towards a Literary History of the Period, ed. by W. Nicoll and Thomas Wise, 
2 vols (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1896), II, pp. 105-119 (pp. 117).   
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confused music & violent eloquence, which prove the power of 
thought over sound. Carlyle seems to me a great prose poet.145 
 In her 1844 contribution to the essay on Carlyle in Horne’s A New Spirit of the 
Age, Barrett Browning also calls Carlyle a ‘prose poet’, explaining that he had ‘the 
language of a gifted poet, the colour of whose soul eats itself into the words’. This is 
what she meant by her declaration that ‘he is […] a poet in the mode’, but she equally 
argues in the essay that Carlyle qualifies as ‘a poet’ not only by virtue of his style, but 
also in the ‘moral’ sense of what he ‘would do for Society collectively’.146 ‘He fills 
the office of a poet, does he not?’ is a statement she would make the following year in 
a letter to Browning,147 and, according to Joseph Bristow, Barrett Browning believed 
that ‘the office of a poet’ is that of ‘a Vates’, as indicated in her ‘zealous passage’ on 
the poets in Aurora Leigh (1856).148 This is where she asserts that, ‘invested with 
divine knowledge’, the poets are ‘teachers’ of the ‘sublime’, and ‘the only truth-tellers 
now left to God’, their voice often revealing that ‘This soul, / This life, this work is 
being said in heaven’. In other words, Barrett Browning believed that the true function 
of a poet is a highly spiritual one, but, more importantly for the present discussion, 
that the ‘essential truth’ of poetry is the stuff of ‘heaven’, and has its source in the 
human ‘soul’ (Book I. 387. 854-80).149 An obvious consequence of this is her belief in 
the essential ineffability of a poet’s meaning, namely, the idea that poetic truths can 
never be fully represented in the temporal medium of language, because they originate 
in the eternal realm. This is a recurrent theme in her poems, particularly those that 
depict the creative process from the poet’s perspective, such as ‘The House of Clouds’ 
(1841), or ‘Insufficiency’ (1844), the latter of which is one where Barrett Browning 
herself assumes the role of the spiritually inspired poet-prophet. The poem portrays 
her ‘soul’ as being enchained within the body, seeking to ‘utter forth in verse / […] 
something farther, fuller, higher’ than anything that can be found in the ‘false’ and 
‘weak’ world of the flesh (336. 1-2, 4, 9-10). ‘What we best conceive we fail to 
speak’, the poet states, reassuring her soul that it shall attain its full singing 
capabilities, but only after death:    
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146 ‘Carlyle: A Disentangled Essay’ (pp. 115-18).  
147 WC, MC Library, BC, CN 45053-00, EBB to RB, 27 February 1845, p. 2, in BULDC 
148 Bristow, ed., ‘Introduction’, in Victorian Poet: Poetics and Persona, (pp. 12-14).   
149 Ibid. (p. 13); and The Poetical Works of Elizabeth Barrett (Browning): With Two Prose Essays, ed. 
by Humphrey Milford (London: Oxford University Press, 1920). All references to EBB’s poems are to 
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Wait, soul, until thine ashen garments fall, 
And then resume thy broken strains, and seek 
Fit peroration without let or thrall.  (12-4) 
 Returning to Barrett Browning’s understanding of mysticism, ‘The Soul’s 
Expression’ (1844) is another poem that revolves around the inexpressibility of a 
poet’s ‘thought and feeling’ (328. 4), and her description here of her own struggles 
with language is strikingly similar to her commentary on Carlyle’s idiosyncratic style 
quoted above. On the one hand, she suggests that her poetical contemplations are of a 
‘grand’ and ‘infinite’ nature that, whenever translated into ‘sound’ through ‘portals of 
the sense’, the end result is a ‘stammering’ and ‘insufficient’ speech (7, 1, 10). On the 
other, her ‘octaves’ are said to possess ‘a mystic depth and height’ (6), indicating that 
her notions about the ineffability of poetic experiences are closely linked with the 
belief that they are characteristically mystical in nature, perhaps even that she deemed 
mysticism a necessary condition for the unutterability of poetic truths. She even takes 
this a step further than any poet so far discussed, arguing that any attempt to fully 
articulate this mystic ‘song of soul’ would be to the detriment of her physicality: ‘my 
flesh would perish there’ (9, 13).  
 Aside from this, it is worth calling attention to the fact that the terms ‘mystic’, 
‘mystical’, and ‘mystery’ are recurrent ones in the vocabulary of Barrett Browning’s 
poetry, and are many times employed in association with meanings of ineffability. ‘A 
Rhapsody of Life’s Progress’ (1844) is a case in point, to look at but one example.150 
In it, the poet contends that only before birth and after death do ‘we lie still on the 
knee of a mild Mystery’ (I. 272. 2), but that this intimate proximity becomes disrupted 
by the ‘sensual relations and social conventions’ of our mortal state (VI. 274. 4). At 
best, as she explains, we ‘are ‘ware of a sight’ and ‘a sound / Beyond Hearing and 
Seeing’, but ‘we ask not their name’, because we know they are too ‘wonder[ous]’ for 
words (VI. 274. 5-6, 19-20). According to her, even poets who are accorded a special 
place ‘‘twixt the Heavens and earth’ may never adequately speak of ‘the sense of the 
mystical march’: it is true that, through them, ‘we send up the lark of our music that 
cuts / Untired through the cloud, / To beat with its wings at the lattice [of] Heaven’, 
but these only prove to be ‘little wings’ that provoke the ‘pity’ of the angels, and to 
which Heaven’s gate remains ‘shut’ (VI. 274. 30, 13, 24-6, 28-9).  
																																																								
150 For another example, see ‘Human Life’s Mystery’ (1850), in which Barrett Browning speaks of 
‘mystic Things’, describing them as ‘Things nameless’, whose purpose is to ‘draw above our common 
thoughts to Heaven’s unknown’ (37, 43-44, 50).    
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 Besides Tennyson and Barrett Browning, Arthur Symons is yet another 
Victorian poet who was a champion of the concept of an ineffable mysticism, and who 
also personally identified with mystics and their experiences. The latter is something 
he admits to at the very beginning of his influential work The Symbolist Movement in 
Literature (1898), as part of his dedicatory note ‘To W. B. Yeats’: 
I speak often in this book of Mysticism, and that I, of all people, 
should venture to speak, not quite as an outsider, of such things, will 
probably be a surprise to many. It will be no surprise to you, for you 
have seen me gradually finding my way, uncertainly but inevitably, 
in that direction which has always been to you your natural 
direction.151 
It should be pointed out that, in this work, Symons employs the terms ‘mystic’ and 
‘mysticism’ interchangeably with ‘symbolist’ and ‘symbolism’, even arguing at one 
point in his discussion that the ‘Symbolist’, ‘Decadent’, and ‘Mystic’ schools are 
different labels for one and the same principle. He refers to this principle as ‘the 
doctrine of Symbolism’, on one occasion, and ‘the doctrine of Mysticism’, on another, 
and would define it as a philosophy of art that seeks to underscore the centrality of 
‘mystery’ in human experience:  
The doctrine of Mysticism, with which all […] symbolical literature 
has so much to do, of which it is all so much the expression, 
presents us, not with a guide for conduct, not with a plan for our 
happiness, not with an explanation of any mystery, but with a theory 
of life which makes us familiar with mystery, and which seems to 
harmonise those instincts which make for religion, passion, and 
art.152 	
For him, therefore, a mystic-poet is one who ‘has realised, better than any one else, 
the significance, in life and art, of mystery’, whose work is ‘founded’ on ‘the sense of 
the mystery of the universe’. But ‘the mysterious’, Symons contends, is neither 
‘vague’ nor ‘obscure’, pointing out that the difference between the one and the other is 
akin to that between what is transcendentally ‘infinite’ and what is mundanely 
‘indefinite’: 
All art hates the vague; not the mysterious, but the vague; two 
opposites very commonly confused, as the secret with the obscure, 
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152 pp. v, 134, 174. 
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the infinite with the indefinite. And the artist who is also a mystic 
hates the vague with a more profound hatred than any other artist.153 
Symons is obviously speaking here in defence of mystics against critics who are quick 
to label anything mystical as ‘obscure’, elsewhere indicating that their error stems 
from a superficial preoccupation with the mystic’s unusual style that fails to 
appreciate the visionary profundity lying at the heart of it; he believes that, otherwise, 
such critics would be able to recognize that the stylistic irregularities of a Gérard de 
Nerval, for example, represent the breakdown in the capacity for language by one who 
has been overcome with transcendent vision, comparing the condition of ineffability 
to a state of blindness: 
Truth, and especially that soul of truth which is poetry, may be 
reached by many roads; and a road is not necessarily misleading 
because it is dangerous or forbidden. Here is one who has gazed at 
light till it has blinded him; and for us all that is important is that he 
has seen something, not that his eyesight has been too weak to 
endure the pressure of light overflowing the world from beyond the 
world.154  
Conclusion 
 Identifying ‘ineffability’ as a core feature of ‘mysticism’ in the modernist, 
essentialist discourse of William James, Evelyn Underhill, and other twentieth-century 
philosophers and psychologists of religion, this chapter has sought to establish the 
contribution of Victorian writers to the development of this aspect of the term’s 
meaning. At the beginning of the chapter, I have highlighted how, in the period 
between 1830-1870, ‘mysticism’ became a prevalent term in the critical vocabulary of 
Victorian reviews of poetry, most often employed in the condemnatory sense of  
‘vagueness’, and ‘unintelligibility’, a usage that reflects the primarily pragmatic 
nature of the criticism of the period. In particular, and as has been noted, such a usage 
reflects the moral preoccupation of periodical critics and reviewers with the 
human/social reference of the work of art, as it is related to their belief that a simple 
and plain language that dealt with the common and familiar aspects of everyday 
experience is readily capable of engaging the readers’ sympathies; this, they believed, 
would make readers more impressionable to the poet’s moral purpose than if the 
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language had been a strange vernacular, dealing with foreign and unusual realms of 
experience, as in the case of the mystical literature imported from Germany. It has 
been my contention throughout the chapter that it was from this context that an 
ineffable ‘mysticism’ emerged as an important critical term in nineteenth-century 
debates about the transcendental conditions of poetic creativity. I have argued that 
many Victorian poets and critics who were interested in and sympathetic to mysticism 
sought to challenge the charge of ‘unintelligibility’ by conceding that mystics are 
indeed ‘vague’ and ‘obscure’, but only to those whose intuitive faculties have been 
blunted by a purely materialist and logical worldview. In this case, any problems of 
incomprehensibility were blamed on the reader, whereas the mystic-poet was claimed 
to be the minister of a divine revelation, whose complexity of style could be explained 
in terms of the religious profundity of his/her visionary meanings, meanings that were 
said to surpass the rational limits of linguistic expression.  
 Thus, one of the aims of this chapter has been to demonstrate how ‘mystic 
ineffability’ was a by-product of the nineteenth-century idealist trend of literary 
thought, which endeavoured to defend the stylistic irregularities of mysticism by 
positively attributing them, not to a want of eloquence on the mystics’ part, but rather 
to the inherent incapacity of language itself to accommodate their intuitions of an 
infinite and supernatural reality. ‘Mysticism’, in this sense, was transformed from an 
accusatory term into an honorific title, one that was meant to connote the 
transcendental legitimacy of a given poet. Another significant aim of the chapter has 
been to underscore how these attempts at positively redefining ‘mysticism’ were 
implicated in issues of cultural and ideological power: namely, in the need to 
delegitimize the period’s dominant belief in the supreme authority of autonomous 
reason, while advocating the sacrosanctity of private intuitive experience in the face of 
positivist reductions of it by mainstream secular writers. I have attempted to achieve 
this by exploring various examples from Carlyle’s early writings, as well as from 
those of other significant poets and critics of the period, including Tennyson, 
Elizabeth Barrett Browning, Swinburne, and Arthur Symons. Carlyle’s place as a 
chief ‘apologist’ for German literature and thought in nineteenth-century England has 
long been recognized, perhaps as early as 1828, when he received six medals from 
Goethe, who commissioned him with ‘the enviable duty’ of awarding it to ‘people 
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who had served German literature in Britain’.155 My analysis of Carlyle in this chapter 
was intended to show that this legacy extends not only to the leading role he played in 
popularizing mysticism among the British public, but also to his substantial 
contribution in the formation of modern ‘mysticism’ as an ‘ineffable’ category. As for 
my discussion of the other Victorian writers in this chapter, this was for the purpose of 
revealing that Carlyle’s pioneering engagement with this category was only part of a 
larger process of redefinition, one that can be traced in the writings of a considerable 
number of other prominent literary figures in the period. Such writings, I believe, 
stand as a testimony to the indebtedness of twentieth-century philosophy and 
psychology to Victorian poetic theory for their arguments about the unspeakable 
nature of mystical experiences. 
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‘Poetic Inspiration’ in James Thomson’s Two Phases of ‘Mysticism’ 
In James Thomson (B. V.): Beyond “The City” (1965), William D. Schaefer traces the 
moral and intellectual development of James Thomson as a parallel movement, 
occurring on three levels that are closely intertwined and ‘inseparable’ from each 
other. He discusses this over the course of three chapters, which are entitled ‘Theist to 
Atheist’, ‘Optimist to Pessimist’, and ‘Romantic to Realist’. As far as Thomson’s 
poetic theory is concerned, the final chapter argues that Thomson started his literary 
career with Romantic and Shelleyan notions about the divine mission of ‘the poet’ as 
a ‘hierophant’ of an ‘unapprehended inspiration’, along with the conviction that true 
poetry must not be merely ‘Self-possessed’, but ‘God-possessed’. ‘This’, Schaefer 
claims, ‘was the vital point in the entire philosophy’, and it was ‘the Achilles’ heel 
that […] caused its downfall’; ‘when finally convinced that God did not exist’, so the 
argument goes, Thomson’s ‘entire philosophy of poetry had been shattered’, and from 
thence commenced his ‘journey’ from Romanticism to realism. In short, as Schaefer 
would have it, Thomson ‘had disowned Romantic inspiration’ as a necessary part of 
his development toward his final position as an atheist in the late 1860s.1 
 This last conclusion is obviously based on the assumption that a Romantic 
theory of inspiration would not remain intact, without positing a divine source of 
inspiration – whether the divinity is conceived in a Christian, Neo-platonic, or in a 
pantheistic sense. But as a number of recent, and in-depth investigations of the 
category of ‘inspiration’ have shown, there had in fact emerged, from the late 
nineteenth century onwards, alternative theories of creativity that had sought to 
disengage from notions of the sacred while continuing to idealize ‘inspiration’ in 
Romantic terms, a development that was especially helped by the rise of the 
psychological turn in philosophy. Timothy Clark’s The Theory of Inspiration (1997) is 
exemplary in this regard, arguing that the naturalistic strain of humanism in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries assumed ‘inspiration’ ‘to be a “natural” category, 
referable entirely to the individual mind’. This, Clark believes, was an attempt to 
‘locate some privileged inner source of authority’ in place of an external supernatural 
one: ‘The archaic notion of inspiration as dictation from another was reconfigured in a 
																																																								
1 Schaefer, pp. 142, 118-24, 129, 135.  
	 167	
humanist cult of an otherness supposedly within us, a source of hidden powers and 
transformations’. He explains, moreover, that such a theory is too often accompanied 
by the same old Romantic valorization of the process of composition, so that episodes 
of inspiration attain that ‘seductive status as modern versions of miracle’, offering a 
secular ‘sacralization of the writer as unique individual’. ‘Glimpses of the creative 
process’, he writes, ‘remain like brief visions of a promised land. They are, in effect, 
secularized versions of religious conversion narratives such as those of St Paul and St 
Augustine’. One way to look at this, according to Clark, is to consider the ‘Romantic-
idealist conception of inspiration’ as having persisted ‘not as a metaphysical but as a 
psychological ideal’.2 
This view is supported by Todd M. Thrash and Andrew J. Elliot in ‘Inspiration 
as a Psychological Construct’ (2003), which discusses the continuity of traditional 
notions of inspiration up to recent times. Their section on ‘Inspiration from Within: 
Intrapsychic Sources’ points out that, ‘with the emergence of the field of psychology 
toward the end of the 19th century, theorists sought a scientific account of inspiration 
in terms of intrapsychic processes’, with the purpose of ‘replacing supernatural with 
deterministic explanation’. Thrash and Elliot more importantly argue that, despite the 
anti-spiritual framework of these theorists, they did indulge in a Romantic discourse 
of ‘transcendence’. In this case, as they explain, ‘transcendence is illustrated by the 
fact that the individual gains access to and uses ideas that are felt to be more elegant 
or novel than those generated willfully’ – given that inspired ideas are believed here to 
‘impinge on consciousness from the unconscious, the preconscious, or the perceptual 
field’. 3  This is perhaps what Maria Walsh intended by asserting, in Art and 
Psychoanalysis (2013), that ‘the Romantic view still exists that art stems from the 
eruptions of a magical, inspirational unconscious’.4 It is also not far from Rob Pope’s 
argument, in 2005, that modern conceptions of the ‘unconscious’ reveal how 
‘psychology has taken over the roles previously assumed by religion and myth in 
providing the dominant discourse for the more mysterious aspects of the creative 
process’, ‘especially so where creativity is associated with stereotypically Romantic 
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notions of “inspiration” or “genius”’. 5  Perhaps Art Berman best describes this 
movement from ‘idealism’ to ‘psychologism’ in the Romantic conception of art, 
which he identifies as a defining feature of the Modernist aesthetic: 
The modernists’ resolution is to import the romantic theory of 
creativity as a power and place it inside mentality at a special place, 
where mechanistic psychology cannot get at it. Romanticism is 
detached from nature (the earth) and relocated in the mind. The 
romantic philosophy becomes a modernist psychology, yet it is kept 
outside the range of empiricist psychology by retaining the romantic 
transcendence of art. The artwork continues to inspire romantic awe; 
each artist personally arrogates the mystery.6 
 Although it is not my intention in this chapter to suggest that James 
Thomson’s later views on poetry show a special preoccupation with nineteenth-
century psychological theory,7 I do believe that they reflect the residual Romanticism 
toward which the nontheistic humanist currents of contemporary thought were 
gravitating, particularly in Thomson’s treatment of ‘inspiration’ as a completely 
internalized phenomenon. His ‘A Strange Book’ of 1879, written three years before 
his death, is significant in this regard, in that it attempts to accommodate Romanticism 
within a naturalistic interpretation of the classical furor poeticus, the ‘divine madness’ 
of poetic composition. I argue that his interpretation, while not yet informed by the 
Romantic permutations of psychoanalysis, belongs to the pre-Freudian intellectual 
culture of the late nineteenth century that was witnessing attempts to ‘neutralize’ 
Romanticism’s ‘revelatory moments’,8 by displacing its concept of the ‘creative 
																																																								
5 Rob Pope, Creativity: Theory, History, Practice (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 70, 91-96.  
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poetic mind’ was inescapable. In The Poet's Mind: The Psychology of Victorian Poetry 1830-1870 
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imagination’ within a more empirical model of human subjectivity.9 This is what Art 
Berman describes as the period’s quest for ‘a mediating theory’, between the 
aesthetics of idealism and science,10 something that scholars have rightly associated 
with the early modernist project, but which obviously had its beginnings in late-
Victorian poetics.  
Berman explains that such a reconciliation ‘detaches or uncouples romanticism 
from its source in idealism and attaches it to a realism that is at least not incompatible 
with the empiricist environment’ in which it must operate. The reconciliation, in this 
sense, is ‘not simply romanticism extended’, in the way of the mid-nineteenth century, 
with its insistence on a transcendental imagination, lying above the reach of 
Enlightenment rationality.11 Its goal, instead, is to de-spiritualize and transform the 
Romantic aesthetic, by ‘bringing the creative imagination down from its long-standing 
place in the heavens’ to what is believed to be ‘its proper place on earth’;12 and this 
namely by moving from a metaphysical conception of selfhood to one that is 
predominantly psychological. This kind of compromised Romanticism retains the 
sense of mystery and awe that surrounds the ‘unseen’ and ‘invisible’ world beyond 
matter, still crediting poets with a perceptive intuition that could penetrate to the heart 
of the mystery. The difference here is that the ‘unseen’ and the ‘invisible’, while 
belonging to an ‘immaterial’ realm, is still within the bounds of the ‘physical’; 
moreover, whereas the intuitions of the older Romanticism yield ‘access to a higher 
truth that has a Platonic form’, the new aesthetic can ‘sustain no intuited truth higher 
than psychological truth’: that is, the truth of ‘humanity’s knowledge of its own 
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capabilities’.13 With this in mind, I believe that an analysis of Thomson’s later critical 
position will reveal that the poet never abandoned the theory of poetic inspiration, 
only the belief in its divine origin, and that his reconfiguration of it was in such a way 
that allowed him to maintain his early Romantic notions about the prophetic role of 
the poet as the possessor of a unique and privileged insight.  
But this chapter is not a study of Thomson’s Romantic poetics per se, as I am 
only concerned with these insofar as they exemplify what has been elaborated in the 
previous two chapters, regarding the Victorians’ conception of the relationship 
between poetry and mysticism. Building on Grace Jantzen’s and Richard King’s 
premise that definitions of mysticism represent the conceptual site of a historical 
struggle over meaning and authority, I have argued there that Victorian poets and 
critics have attempted to construct an aesthetic (or poetic) mysticism as a way of 
asserting the cultural authority of poetry in the increasingly secularized milieu of 
nineteenth-century culture. My discussion, in this chapter, of Thomson’s developing 
theory of poetic inspiration is in view of this. After all, Timothy Clark has explained 
that ‘inspiration is not, despite appearances, an issue primarily of the genesis of 
poetry, rather of the power, knowledge, and authority at work in the poetic 
performance’.14 I particularly intend to highlight how Thomson’s characterization of 
poetic inspiration, throughout his career, is typically in reference to a certain 
understanding of mysticism, and how both are couched in notions of authority.  
This will involve an analysis not only of the poet’s later thoughts in relation to 
the key concepts at hand, but of his early views as well, because, as noted in the 
introduction of this thesis, tracing the modifications of Thomson’s aesthetic theory 
along his religious and intellectual development will help underscore two central 
points of the study: the first is the conceptual elasticity and openness of ‘mysticism’, 
how it may encompass a wide range of meanings according to the spiritual or cultural 
needs of the individual/group by which it is employed; secondly, that the one common 
element that lies behind all definitions of the term is the drive for authority. In this 
sense, Thomson’s significance for a study of the cultural construction of mysticism as 
a modern category in Victorian poetry and poetics lies in this fact: that his career-long 
engagement with this concept, including his later adaptations to its definition, reflects 
on a larger scale the history of its development in the second half of the Victorian age: 
																																																								
13 Art Berman, Preface to Modernism, pp. 104-5, 22, 45.  
14 The Theory of Inspiration, p. 53. 
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how the Romantic appropriation of the term in the mid-nineteenth century was 
especially freighted with religious meanings, and how this would gradually change at 
the turn of the century, where it would become more open to secular and naturalistic 
interpretations.  
After offering a literature review of previous scholarly investigations of the 
question of mysticism in Thomson’s writings, the analysis in this chapter will be 
divided into two sections, of which the guiding argument will be that mysticism 
functions in Thomson’s texts as a category of resistance to cultural marginalization. 
This could be understood as a response either to the general marginalization of poetry 
as a cultural power, or to the intellectual relegation that Thomson himself had suffered 
in consequence of his association with the militant atheism and radicalism of Charles 
Bradlaugh’s National Reformer. More specifically, the first section will deal with 
early Thomson, and is essentially an extension of the analysis of Chapter II: it aims to 
call attention to the religious claims that Thomson was making for poetry in his search 
for a spiritual and moral substitute for traditional Christianity, and how this involved 
his definition of mysticism as being the highest form of poetry. In doing so, I will, at 
the outset, dedicate a good part of the discussion to Thomson’s early proto-Victorian 
concerns about how Christianity was gradually being rendered obsolete by the era’s 
radical changes in science and industry. The purpose is to demonstrate that the poetry 
and essays of this early period offer a cultural criticism of the moral dissolution of 
society, whose redemption is possible only in the hands of a Carlylean type of hero, 
most likely of the class of ‘Poets’. Referring to a number of his essays of the 1860s, 
such as ‘Shelley’ (1860), ‘The Poems of William Blake’ (1864), ‘Open Secret 
Societies’ (1865), and ‘Sympathy’ (1865), I will then endeavour to show Thomson’s 
conception of ‘poetic inspiration’ as a form of mystical experience, falling back on the 
complex web of relations he weaves between ‘Poets’ and ‘Mystics’. I draw attention 
here to Thomson’s deployment of ‘mysticism’ in his attempt to differentiate between 
two types of poetry, the inspired and the uninspired, with the former being construed 
as representative of ‘quintessential poetry’. The section will finally turn to a 
discussion of how Thomson’s aesthetic recourse to mysticism is, in effect, a 
‘protective strategy’ to secure art and poetry in an autonomous sphere, away from the 
pressures of scientific inquiry, thereby safeguarding their religious authority. As for 
the second section, this will focus on the points of continuity between Thomson’s 
early and later poetic theory, particularly in relation to the quasi-naturalistic 
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understanding of the principle of ‘poetic inspiration’ that he adopts in ‘A Strange 
Book’, and how this connects with his later redefinition of ‘mysticism’. But a central 
concern of this final section is also to highlight how Thomson’s construction of an 
ineffable mysticism was a way of challenging his intellectual relegation to the fringes 
of Victorian cultural life. I argue that  ‘mystical obscurity’, or the quality of ‘not being 
understood’, served for Thomson as an apologetic for a poet’s obscurity of reputation, 
something that could help justify his own unfavourable reception by reviewers. 
1. Thomson and ‘The Mystical’: A Literature Review 
In discussing James Thomson’s unpopularity in public opinion, Henry Stephen Salt, 
the poet’s first biographer,15 recounts the reaction of Thomson’s former landlady upon 
requesting her contribution to his biography. She ‘sourly regarded’ him, he recalls, ‘as 
if she resented any mention of her impecunious lodger’, only willing to say that he 
had ‘passed away’, but that if the inquisitor wished ‘to write the life of a truly good 
man, a cheerful Christian, and an earnest teetotaller, […] there was—her dear 
departed husband’. This not too implicit suggestion by the landlady of Thomson’s 
irreligiousness exemplifies, as Salt explains, how the poet’s reputation was ‘heavily 
weighted’ by his association with the secularism, atheism and republicanism of the 
Freethought party. It is, Salt moreover believes, what eventually ‘jeopardized’ 
Thomson’s ‘chance of literary fame’, as reviewers ‘seem to have been disqualified for 
forming a just estimate of him by the dislike or timidity with which they regarded 
what was heretical and unpopular in his career’.16 Harold Hoffman is of the same 
view, particularly with regard to what is considered Thomson’s greatest literary 
achievement, The City of Dreadful Night, with its clear atheistical sentiments: ‘It is a 
poem which places its author among the immortals, but its fame has been 
circumscribed by reason of the prudery of the British public and by virtue of the fact 
																																																								
15 Salt’s interest in Thomson is unsurprising, as both were ‘Shelleyans’, and disbelievers in ‘established 
religion’, entertaining, instead, some form of belief in universal brotherhood. More importantly, Salt 
was, as he would describe himself, ‘an ist with a foot in every ism’, a vegetarian, humanitarian, and 
socialist freethinker, who held many rebellious views that served to estrange him from respectable 
circles, giving him a ‘sympathetic understanding of outcasts and unrespectables’ such as Thomson. See 
George Hendrick, Henry Salt, Humanitarian Reformer and Man of Letters (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1977), pp. 1, 88, 97-9; and David Allen, The Naturalist in Britain: A Social History, 2nd 
edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 181. 
16 Henry Salt, The Life of James Thomson (“B.V.”), rev. edn (London: Watts, 1914), pp. vii-viii, 39. 
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that its theme forbids popularity’.17 Indeed, one might say that Thomson’s heretical 
writings and secularist connections are so integral a part of his literary career that, 
even if it could no longer deny him critical approbation, or – eventually – a place in 
the English poetic canon, it does tend to hinder our appreciation of other noteworthy 
aspects of his thought and character. This certainly appears to have been the case at 
least with the critical evaluations that have attempted to make sense of the place of 
mysticism in Thomson’s work. 
 It cannot be denied, of course, that the writings of James Thomson present a 
curious case for anyone investigating the question of if, and how, they are related to 
the literature of mysticism, especially for such a study as the present one, which 
adopts a constructivist-oriented approach. For here is a poet who, for nearly the last 
two decades of his life, continually published anti-Christian and blasphemous18 satires 
in the secularist journals of the nineteenth century, addressed ‘to the most irreligious 
audience London could then provide’, 19  but whose major work is surprisingly 
reminiscent of the mystical writings of saints. Could such a poet possibly have 
contributed to the modern construction of an idealized and essential mysticism, one 
that is now being characterized by religious and cultural historians as an ‘ahistorical’ 
and ‘universal’ construct? This seems doubtful if we are to accede to the previous 
critical literature engaging with the question of mysticism in Thomson’s texts, the 
greatest part of which rests on the assumption that, being at the forefront of Victorian 
intellectuals who attacked religion, Thomson naturally held antagonistic views 
towards mystics and the mystical. 
The most notable critique from the literature espousing Thomson’s anti-
mysticism is the chapter dedicated to the subject in Isobel Armstrong’s Victorian 
Poetry: Poetry, Poetics, Politics, entitled ‘James Thomson: Atheist, Blasphemer, and 
																																																								
17 Harold Hoffman, ‘An Angel in the City of Dreadful Night’, The Sewanee Review (1924), 317-335 (p. 
320). 
18 Although Thomson was never legally prosecuted for blasphemy, his writings very often provoked 
angry responses from readers and critics, protesting against what the ‘Christian World’ described as his 
‘blasphemous irreverence’ or ‘horrible and blasphemous invocation’, a fact that led him to the writing 
of ‘A Word on Blasphemy’ (1867). He argues there that an atheist cannot be guilty of blaspheming 
God, because a man can only blaspheme that which he holds holy. William Schaefer explains that it 
was ‘only through good fortune’ and the ‘limited circulation’ of the National Reformer that Thomson 
escaped the similar fate of his friend G. W. Foote, who spent a year in prison in 1883 for publishing 
something far less blasphemous than Thomson’s satires. See James Thomson, Satires and Profanities 
(London: Progressive Publishing Company, 1884), pp. 132, 65-9; and Schaefer, James Thomson (B.V.): 
Beyond “the City”, p. 66. 
19 Henry Paolucci, James Thomson’s the City of Dreadful Night: A Study of the Cultural Resources of 
the Author and a Reappraisal of the Poem, 2nd edn (Dover, DE: Griffon House, 2005), pp. 147-8. 
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Anarchist: The Grotesque Sublime’. Although Armstrong acknowledges that The City 
of Dreadful Night is steeped in mystical language, her main contention is that 
Thomson’s ‘project is to construct single-handed a new symbolic language and a 
wholly new mythological system’, ‘the mythos of atheism’, and that this 
‘reconstructed modern myth had to be made out of existing forms of thought, images 
and language’. She suggests that the poem, not only aims at ‘stealing the language of 
spiritual rhapsody to portray a materialist universe’; but, more elaborately, that it uses 
the different ‘categories of spiritual discourse’, including the ‘traditional symbolism of 
the dark night of the soul’, to enter fully into its conditions, ‘and at the same time 
withdraws from it to expose it as a mystified mythology which collapses under an 
antagonistic alternative materialist mythology’. In other words, and according to 
Armstrong, what is striking about Thomson’s poem is its ‘use of the traditional 
language of spiritual experience to overturn it, a language overturned by its own 
oppressive weight’.20  
 On another occasion, Armstrong similarly rejects The City’s affinity with 
mysticism, on the same grounds, particularly in comparison to T. S. Eliot’s The Waste 
Land: 
Nothing could be further from Eliot’s poem, with its humanized 
quasi-mystical symbolism taken eclectically from different spiritual 
traditions […] than Thomson’s poem. The estrangement of The City 
of Dreadful Night is not caused by spiritual breakdown but precisely 
by the oppression of theist and Christian ideology itself. Thomson, 
almost always described as a ‘pessimist’ and not the anarchist and 
atheist he was, is easy to misread because his project was to rewrite 
Christian language, using its symbols against itself.21 
This reading of The City as being essentially a ‘parody’22 of the Christian spiritual 
tradition is, in fact, a recurrent one in Thomson criticism. It is suggested, for example, 
in the analysis offered by David Seed, who, at first, discusses the poem’s Dantesque 
elements, not failing to mention ‘the paradox of how a poet who has lost his faith, 
indeed developed an outright scepticism towards the symbolic system of Christianity, 
could even contemplate imitating an allegory based on medieval Catholicism’. Seed, 
then, follows Armstrong’s cue, arguing that Thomson employs ‘the most traditional 
																																																								
20 Armstrong, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 461-4.  
21 ‘Victorian Poetry’, in Encyclopaedia of Literature and Criticism, ed. by Martin Coyle and others 
(London: Routledge, 1990), pp. 278-94 (p. 290). 
22 Armstrong, Victorian Poetry: Poetry, Poetics, Politics, p. 475.  
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tropes in spiritual symbolism’ only in a ‘parodic spirit’, because ‘the stylistic 
manifestation of his atheism is a series of attacks or inversions of such conventional 
symbolism’.23  
 Again, the key factors here are the poet’s anti-Christian and radical politics. 
And it is because of these that we find Lothar Hönnighausen, in his commentary on 
Thomson’s ‘Hymns to the Night’, hastily dismissing the possibility that Thomson 
could entertain an interest in anything mystical. This is when he comments on the 
poet’s ‘preoccupation’ or ‘obsession’ with the ‘mystical German’ Novalis,24 which, he 
believes, ‘seems rather puzzling’. Hönnighausen suggests that this preoccupation must 
have developed through Thomson’s reading of the laudatory 1829 ‘Novalis’ essay by 
Carlyle, who diligently sought there to redeem the obscurity of German mysticism 
from public contempt. He insists that the poet’s enthusiasm for the German writer 
could not have been for any other reason than the ‘biographical parallel’ between the 
two (that is, of having both mourned the death of a ‘child bride’),25 ‘since Carlyle’s 
essay on the mystic German romantic’, he unhesitatingly adds, ‘could scarcely have 
made him attractive to a Victorian follower of the radical reformer Bradlaugh’.26 
But, that being said, what is evidently problematic with these and similar 
studies is that, in order to make their case, they must ignore a great deal of the poet’s 
writings, together with other facts demonstrating how Thomson, in fact, had a deep 
interest in mystics and mysticism. An indispensible context for understanding The 
City, for instance, is the poet’s 1865 essay ‘Open Secret Societies’, which these critics 
fail to consider. The essay, along with Thomson’s closely dated critical pieces on 
Blake (1864), Shelley (1860) Emerson (1858), and, not to mention, the one on Garth 
Wilkinson, written as late as 1879, all offer a powerfully sentimental and idealizing 
portrait of mysticism. As Gurdit Singh suggests in reference to his prose criticisms, it 
is with nothing short of a ‘whole-hearted reverence’ expressed in ‘a tone of exquisite 
																																																								
23 David Seed, ‘Hell Is a City: Symbolic Systems and Epistemological Scepticism in the City of 
Dreadful Night’, in Spectral Readings: Towards a Gothic Geography, ed. by Glennis Byron and David 
Punter (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 88-107 (pp. 97, 101-2). 
24 Novalis was the penname of the eighteenth-century German poet and writer Georg Friedrich von 
Hardenberg.  
25 Although Novalis was indeed betrothed to the young Sophie von Kühn, who was barely fifteen when 
she died, there is no biographical evidence indicating that there was so much as a romantic attachment 
between Thomson and Matilda Weller, the thirteen year old daughter of an armour-sergeant that 
Thomson befriended during his army service in Ireland. For a discussion of the highly conjectural 
nature of the ‘supposed romance’, see William Schaefer, Beyond “The City”, pp. 8-20.     
26 Lothar Hönnighausen, The Symbolist Tradition in English Literature: A Study of Pre-Raphaelitism 
and Fin De Siécle. trans. by Gisela Hönnighausen, 2nd edn (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2010), p. 178.  
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tenderness’ that Thomson regards the mystical, whether it manifests itself in the works 
of saints, poets, the Persian orient, or Buddhism.27 Lothar Hönnighausen’s assumption 
that Thomson would not have been inclined to read Novalis for his mysticism clearly 
proves unfounded, when one considers his readings not only of other mystical 
literature, but also of the critical studies on the subject, all of which indicate that his 
preoccupation with mysticism was more serious than has often been supposed.  
We know, for example, that Thomson was an admirer of Emerson, whose 
‘verse’, Thomson states, ‘as well as his essays and lectures [are] little else than the 
expression of [the] mystical’.28 He moreover wrote that ‘the purest fountain and the 
most copious river’ of mysticism is to be found in the literature of the East,29 which he 
read in translation ‘with the ardour of a great lover’, as suggested by Singh. According 
to Henry Paolucci, Thomson was not only acquainted with Hafiz and Saadi,30 but also 
with the Divan of Goethe,31 particularly through his reading of Heinrich Heine, who 
was himself not without his personal engagement with mysticism.32 Singh has even 
contended that the depth of Thomson’s reading in oriental poetry has left its clear 
mark on his writings, offering several examples from the poet’s work ‘to show how 
deeply saturated his mind was with the Persian imagery and symbolism’.33 This is to 
say nothing of the fact that Thomson had read the scholarly considerations of 
mysticism in William Jones’s Dissertation on the Mystical Poetry of the Persians and 
Hindus (1792), as well as Emerson’s ‘Swedenborg; Or, The Mystic’ (1850), both of 
which he cited in his own discussions of the mystical.34 As for his familiarity with 
Buddhism, suffice it to say that Thomson knew enough to able to critique 
Schopenhauer’s philosophical system inspired by the religion; to be sure, in the short 
																																																								
27 Gurdit Singh, The Vision of James Thomson (“B.V.”): An Exploration (New Delhi: Bahri, 1980), pp. 
109, 154-6. 
28 James Thomson, ‘The Poems of William Blake’, in Biographical and Critical Studies, ed. by 
Bertram Dobell (London: Reeves & Turner and B. Dobell, 1896), pp. 240-69 (p. 267). The essay, 
henceforth referred to as ‘Poems of Blake’, was written in 1864, and published in 1866 in the National 
Reformer’s instalments of Jan. 14, 21, 28, and Feb. 4.  
29 James Thomson, ‘Open Secret Societies’, in Essays and Phantasies (London: Reeves & Turner, 
1881), (p. 208). Written in 1865, the essay was published in the National Reformer’s instalments of 
Feb. 18, 25, and March 4, 1866. 
30 The pennames of Abu Muhammad bin Abdullah Shirazi, and Khawaja Shamsu-Din Shirazi, two of 
the most celebrated Persian poets of the medieval period. 
31 Paolucci, p. 94. 
32 See, for example, Poetry and Prose: Heinrich Heine (New York: Continuum Publishing Company, 
1982), p. 137. 
33 Singh, p. 152-4. 
34 James Thomson, Essays and Phantasies, p. 208; and Biographical and Critical Studies (London: 
Reeves and Turner, and Bertram Dobell, 1896), p. 319. 
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memoir on Thomson that appeared in the Freethinker, in Feb. 10, 1889, J. M. Wheeler 
‘recalls how he was amazed at Thomson’s knowledge of Buddhism, a subject on 
which Wheeler had been doing research in Thomson’s last years’. 35 
Aside from this, one must also not entirely dismiss the impact of Thomson’s 
early religious training, by a mother who was ‘mystically inclined with Edward 
Irving’, and a father who would regularly take him to ‘small meetings in a private 
room where the members detailed their spiritual experiences of the week’.36 Indeed, 
Schaefer argues that the importance of this is hard to deny, but given that it occurred 
in Thomson’s early childhood, it ‘was probably more on emotional, and to use the 
word loosely, psychological levels than on a purely intellectual one’.37 It is the same 
view expressed by Imogene B. Walker in her critical study on Thomson: 
The significant point is that during his first six years Thomson lived 
in a home wherein religious emotionalism was high and that this 
emotionalism was intensified during the two following years. 
Certainly such an atmosphere left its mark.38 
This is a more cautious view than Hugh Walker’s, who considers Thomson’s religious 
influence by his parents a purely ‘hereditary’ matter; he declares that the poet 
‘strikingly illustrated the law of inheritance from both the paternal and maternal 
strain’, the latter of which he deems to be responsible for the ‘melancholy and 
mystical religion’ that is found in Thomson.39 But regardless of whichever view one is 
inclined to accept, both seem to suggest that Thomson was not at all hostile to mystics 
and mysticism. It is telling, after all, that Thomson had chosen ‘B. V.’ as his 
pseudonym, standing for ‘Bysshe Vanolis’, the latter of which is an anagram of none 
other than Novalis, and Bysshe being the middle name of Shelley, whom, as we shall 
see, Thomson idolized throughout his career as the quintessential mystic-poet in the 
English language.40   
Indeed, the significance of the factors just mentioned have not altogether 
escaped the notice of Thomson critics, and – although quite rare – have led some to 
even argue that a number of his works rightfully belong to the literature of mysticism; 
in other words, that instead of merely revealing an admiration or ‘reverence’ for the 
																																																								
35 William Schaefer, Beyond “The City”, p. 157. 
36 This is from a private letter by Thomson to his sister-in-law, later published in Salt, p. 4. 
37 Schaefer, Beyond “The City”, p. 38. 
38 James Thomson (B.V.): A Critical Study (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970), p. 6. 
39 The Literature of the Victorian Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1910), pp. 586-7. 
40 See, for example, Biographical and Critical Studies, pp. 261-4, 278-81, 326.  
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mystics, such works offer an honest account of an experience that can essentially be 
called ‘mystical’. Of the earliest critics to adopt this position is Henry Salt, who called 
Thomson a ‘mystic visionary’, as early as 1889, arguing that while Thomson was ‘one 
of the shrewdest logicians’ of the age, he possessed a duality of mind that would 
explain why his poetry also displayed moments ‘of rapturous joy and spiritual 
exaltation’: ‘in the highest heaven of his most spiritual flights he is still the keen, calm 
reasoner, while in his coldest speculations he retains something of the impassioned 
poet’.41 But perhaps the most extensive commentary on this is found in the 2005 
comprehensive study of ‘The City’, by Henry Paolucci, who states that the poem’s 
concluding canto symbolizes ‘the mystical reality’ of Thomson’s ‘phantasmagoric 
vision’, an ‘ecstatic experience of spiritual darkness’ that is akin to what Dante has 
undergone while briefly wandering in the ‘selva oscura’, but told ‘from a superior 
vantage point’. Paolucci points out the importance of ‘Open Secret Societies’ to this 
analysis, explaining that it should be interpreted as the poet’s claim to having 
‘experienced the ecstasis of Platonic, or, to use Plato’s term, erotic love’ that is 
particularly exclusive to the mystics, who are the most exalted and encompassing 
class of Thomson’s secret societies. This ecstasis, he adds is ‘the point of unity where 
the mysteries of bravery, purity, wisdom, and beauty are dissolved momentarily in an 
ineffable experience of infinite love’. It is also a ‘sublime paradox’, coupling ‘the 
profoundest spiritual anguish’ with ‘the supremest joy’ and ‘loftiest hope’. After 
noting how mystical writings, throughout history, have dwelt either on the dazzlingly 
brilliant raptures of such a unity, or the darkest miseries of its subsequent disunity, 
Paolucci finally concludes that ‘in the City [Thomson] has attempted to picture, in 
Dantesque language, this world […] as it appears to one who has just sunk back into it 
from the highest experience of erotic ecstasy’.42  
In addition to Salt and Paolucci, we also find two other critics who make 
similar assertions of the poet’s mysticism, Lyman A. Cotten, as well as Thomson’s 
contemporary fellow-Scotsman and correspondent, William Maccall. Cotten calls 
attention to this, in 1945, in his investigation of the relationship between Giacomo 
Leopardi 43  and Thomson: ‘Both men were melancholiacs by reason of certain 
experiences which can best be termed mystical’. He namely argues that, in ‘A Lady of 
																																																								
41 The Life of James Thomson ("B. V.") (London: Reeves and Turner, and Bertram Dobell, 1889), pp. 
315, 57. 
42 Paolucci, pp. 183-4, 106-8. 
43 An Italian poet, essayist, and philosopher of early nineteenth-century Romanticism.  
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Sorrow’ (1862-67), Thomson charts the stages of his spiritual ‘enlightenment’, 
beginning with his ability to see the world ‘with catholic vision’, and culminating in 
that ‘mystical insight’ found in Leopardi’s Zibaldone that ‘tuttoè è nulla’: ‘all is 
nothing’. This conviction, Cotten observes, generates ‘a mystical love of death’ that 
teaches ‘the justice of annihilation and the blessedness of Nirvana’. 44  Maccall 
interestingly also finds in the Nirvana of Buddhism a central concept for an 
understanding of the poet’s ethical and literary life, as indicated in the title of his book 
A Nirvana Trilogy: Three Essays on the Career and the Literary Labours of James 
Thomson (1886). Maccall proclaims here, more seriously than ‘in jest’, that he 
himself, as ‘a Mystical Panontist’, ‘an Oriental born in the North’, is probably ‘the 
only religious man ever born in Scotland’, with the exception of Thomson, whom he 
believes was very ‘religious with a religion that Pharisees can never know or feel’. 
This comes in the context of criticising the Christianity of his countrymen, who ‘have 
taken as religion the arid and sterile faith which the Hebrews offered them’, and 
‘never rose higher than, a naked Monotheism’. In his definition of mysticism, he 
identifies the mystic as one who ‘rejoices in the mysterious, adores it for its own sake: 
where the veil is dark and deep he would make it still darker and deeper’, and this 
precisely, he believes, was the overriding principle in the drama of James Thomson’s 
life: ‘Beyond and above the drama […] was the vision, was the void of something 
neither life nor death – something far more deep and awful than that which men 
vaguely and helplessly call mystery’. The ultimate objective of Maccall’s book – 
which, in effect, is an unabashedly idealising ‘funeral oration’ – is to offer the poet’s 
legacy as ‘the prophecy of Nirvanaism as a new religion’, for far from being a mere 
‘scoffer’ and ‘blasphemer’, Maccall declares that Thomson should be remembered as 
one of ‘Nirvana’s grandest apostles’, ‘a godlike man’ and ‘a priest of the Infinite’.45 
Aside from how sneeringly embarrassed Thomson would have been had he 
lived to read such epithets, the difficulty with Maccall’s evaluation, as well as those of 
Cotten and Paolucci, is that they commit the same ‘essentialist fallacy’46 that I have 
observed in the case of Tennyson and Hopkins critics in Chapter I. That is, the fallacy 
of evaluating a text against a proposed definition of the ‘essence’ of mysticism, one 
that necessarily complies with the critic’s personal ideology, while disregarding the 
																																																								
44 Lyman Cotten, ‘Leopardi and "the City of Dreadful Night"’, Studies in Philology (1945), 675-689 
(pp. 679-80). 
45 Maccall, (London: Watts & Co., 1886), pp. 19-20, 27, iii-v, 31.  
46 King, Orientalism and Religion: Postcolonial Theory, India and "the Mystic East", p. 10. 
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fact that all textual representations of ‘the mystical’ – including those from which the 
proposed definition was derived – cannot escape the influence of their broader 
historical, cultural and political contexts. As pointed out in the first chapter, the 
methodological deficiencies of the essentialist paradigm have led to an increased 
demand to subject such texts to a cultural analysis that gives no privileged authority to 
one or a group of texts over others, but rather sees mysticism as a shifting social and 
cultural construct in the history of ideas.47 This would eventually help neutralize the 
view that mysticism is nothing but an intense private subjective experience that 
provides genuine insights into the nature of reality, the view implicit in the 
evaluations of Maccall, Cotton and Paolucci, itself a product of the modern 
construction of mysticism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In this sense, such 
evaluations, to borrow Richard King’s phrasing, continue to ‘construct’ the ‘object 
that they purport to explain’.48 Therefore, while supporting the latter critics’ view that 
Thomson’s writings show a positive preoccupation with mysticism, I depart from 
them in that my analysis is only concerned with the cultural dimensions of Thomson’s 
involvement with this category.   
2. Thomson’s Career from 1855-1866  
2.1. Early Aesthetic Theory: The Poet as a Surrogate Guide 
In England and the English (1833), Edward Bulwer Lytton captures the sense, felt by 
many intellectuals writing in the early and mid-nineteenth century, that theirs was a 
period of moral and social transformation, characterized by the erosion of old 
religious beliefs and the absence of a new alternative: 
We live in an age of visible transition – an age of disquietude and 
doubt – of the removal of time-worn landmarks, and the breaking up 
of the hereditary elements of society – old opinions, feelings, – 
ancestral customs and institutions are crumbling away, and both the 
spiritual and temporal worlds are darkened by the shadow of 
change.  
Lytton declares that while this change is being optimistically ‘hailed’ by ‘the 
sanguine’ as an indicator of ‘the coming of a new Millennium’, to him, ‘such epochs 
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appear but […] the times of greatest unhappiness to our species’, ‘uncertainty’ being 
‘the greatest of all our evils’.49 As Carlyle had put it in 1831, ‘the Old has passed 
away, but, alas the New appears not in its stead; the Time is still in pangs of travail 
with the New’.50 Probably the period’s most eloquently concise expression of this 
motif of being caught up in a moral or spiritual limbo comes in Matthew Arnold’s 
famous lines from ‘Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse’ (1855), a poem which seems 
to have strongly resonated with readers and poets of the time, one of whom was the 
twenty-one year old James Thomson.51 ‘Wandering between two worlds, one dead / 
The other powerless to be born’, was Arnold’s estimation of nineteenth-century 
religious anxieties, and within three months of the publication of this poem, Thomson 
responded with one of his earliest poems, “Suggested by Matthew Arnold’s ‘Stanzas 
from the Grande Chartreuse”’. 
Published in 1855, the poem reflects Thomson’s religious views during his 
early years as an army schoolmaster, how he was troubled by the same doubts and 
apprehensions that plagued nineteenth-century thinking, but how he remained loyal – 
at least emotionally – to the Evangelical inheritance of the early religious training he 
received, both at home, and in his eight years as a student at the Royal Caledonian 
Asylum. 52  In ‘Suggested by Matthew Arnold’, 53  Thomson opens by describing 
Arnold’s poem as a ‘Dirge for a mighty Creed outworn’, recognizing that 
Christianity’s spirit is ‘fading from the earth’, ‘almost quenched in death’, and how it 
																																																								
49 England and the English, 2 vols (London: Richard Bentley, 1833), II, pp. 166-7. Walter Houghton, in 
Victorian Frame of Mind, p. 10, called my attention to Lytton’s discussion. 
50 Houghton, Victorian Frame of Mind, pp. 8-10. For another good example, see John Stuart Mill’s 
1831 ‘The Spirit of the Age’, in The Spirit of the Age: Victorian Essays, ed. by Gertrude Himmelfarb 
(Yale: Yale University Press, 2007), pp. 50-79 (pp. 63-4). 
51 A contemporary poet and commentator argued that the ‘genesis and importance’ of Arnold’s 
‘Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse’ (1855) parallels that of Tennyson’s In Memoriam, particularly in 
its expression of this motif. See Carl Dawson, ed., Matthew Arnold: The Critical Heritage, 2 vols 
(London: Routledge, 1973), II, pp. 218-20.    
52 Several scholarly studies have attempted to offer a history of Thomson’s religious development, 
starting from the Calvinism of his earliest childhood to the religious doubts of his youth, and then to his 
subsequent rejection of Christianity, which, in turn, led to his formation of an alternative pantheistic 
faith that was finally abandoned for a more pessimistic and godless worldview. The most valuable of 
these are the chapter entitled ‘“Doubt and Fear,” 1834-1862’ in Imogene Walker’s James Thomson 
(B.V.): A Critical Study (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1970), pp. 1-38; William Schaefer’s chapter 
‘From Theist to Atheist’ in Beyond “The City”, pp. 37-81; and Henry Paolucci’s discussion of 
Thomson’s ‘Religious and Moral Preparation’ in James Thomson's the City of Dreadful Night: A Study 
of the Cultural Resources of the Author and a Reappraisal of the Poem, 2nd edn (Dover, DE: Griffon 
House, 2005), pp. 32-63. 
53 James Thomson, The Poetical Works of James Thomson, ed. by Bertram Dobell, 2 vols (London: 
Reeves & Turner, and Bertram Dobell, 1895), II, pp. 368-80. All references to Thomson’s poems are to 
page numbers, and (unless specified otherwise) are from this edition – hereafter abbreviated as Poetical 
Works. 
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is no longer deemed fit ‘to lead the modern march of thought’. Arnold’s ‘sad and 
deep’ ‘dirge-moan’, according to Thomson, ‘befits our anguished time too well’, a 
time that is ‘blinded’ by its political strength, ‘material might’, and the ‘wealth’ that is 
‘gorging’ its ‘imperial marts’; it has become ‘absorbed in frantic worldly strife’ that it 
is ‘fast losing all / Earth has of heaven; bereft of faith; / And living in Eternal Death’. 
The poet explains that, in such a ‘matter-lusting’ world, driven by its ‘greed for gold’, 
the few rich ‘yet wealthier rise’ while the ‘great mass’ of the starving population sink 
deeper in ‘want and woe’, and ‘in both the spirit dies.’ On the intellectual front, 
moreover, the situation is equally grim: this ‘proud strong Age’, he says, is beset by 
‘black disbelief, substantial doubt’ and ‘gloom-involved unmoving lies’, and so, ‘in 
despair’s stark sinfulness’, it rejects and ‘reviles the promised Paradise’ (368-72).  
But Thomson urges his fellowmen not to ‘turn hastily away’ from the dead, 
sprawled figure of the ‘Son of God’, which represents here the formal doctrines of 
Christianity. For, although ‘the great Form lies there nerveless still’, it might not be a 
genuine death, only a ‘slumber’, from which it will ‘awake’, ‘refreshed and strong, 
full-powered to sweep / The darkness’ of disbelief. Yet, if ‘it be death’ indeed, 
Thomson believes that it is ‘the Form alone – its earthly shrine’ that ‘is subject to 
earth’s mortal sway’, because he is convinced that ‘there is no death for the Divine / 
Which lives in ever-perfect youth’. In other words, if the forms and doctrines of one 
religion ‘expire’, God would always substitute them with ‘new and nobler’ ones, 
while its spiritual essence remains the same: ‘In the Old’s death the New has birth’. 
Thomson, thus, insists that their duty is to remain by the side of their ‘death-bound 
Monarch’, and ‘gaze in deep reverence on’ His holy ‘features’, in the hope that they 
would ‘recognise / That Greater One who shall succeed’ (373-4):     
Yes, let us stay in loving grief, 
Which patient hope and trust yet cheer, 
Silent beside our silent Chief, 
Till His Successor shall appear; 
Till death's veil fall from off His face, 
Or One anointed take His place.  (379) 
What is particularly significant about this poem, for the purposes of my 
analysis, is that Thomson is also contending that ‘God never can / So utterly depart 
from man’, that even in the interval of this transition from one great religion to 
another, mankind would never be left without human guides: 
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Nay, – our adoring love should have 
More faith than to believe that He, 
Before Another comes to save, 
Can leave us in blind misery 
Without a Guide.    (379) 
The guides, we are made to understand, are those who are exalted above others by 
reason of their ability to discern the presence and movements of the Divine spirit in 
the world, when the rest of humanity, ‘with blinded sight’, ‘dare to cry, There is no 
light!’. Thomson argues that whoever proclaims that ‘the Divine is dead’, or ‘dumb’, 
should recognize that God reveals Himself only according to one’s ability to perceive 
Him: ‘He gives us all we can receive; / He teaches all we can believe’. As such, ‘He is 
obscure’ only to those who have become spiritually ‘blind’ and ‘deaf’, through their 
reliance on their physical faculties of perception, and not to those who have cultivated 
their spiritual senses: 
For measured to each eye and ear 
His glory shines, His voice outspeaks; 
To each He gives the most it seeks. 
[…] 
The pure can see Him perfect – pure; 
The strong feel Him, Omnipotence; 
The wise, All-wise. He is obscure 
But to the gross and earth-bound sense. (379) 
This elite group of ‘the pure’, ‘the strong’ and ‘the wise’ are identified 
elsewhere in the poem as ‘our noblest captains, priests and seers’, and, in more 
specific terms, as the ‘grand crowd of sages, bards, saints, [and] heroes’ (377, 369). 
Interestingly, the latter classification is not only identical to the one Thomson employs 
in his poem ‘Shelley’ (1861),54 but reappears, almost verbatim, in his ‘Open Secret 
Societies’ (1865), an essay in the fashion of Carlyle’s On Heroes,55 where the ‘need 
																																																								
54 ‘God sends thee age by age, / In pity of thy wild perpetual moan, / The saint, the bard, the hero, and 
the sage’ (257). 
55 Thomson’s critical writings show great familiarity with Carlyle’s work, including his notion of the 
hero. See, for example, Essays and Phantasies (London: Reeves and Turner, 1881), pp. 52, 101, 118, 
126, 143-144, 285, 299; and Biographical and Critical Studies, pp. 205, 271, 280, 394-5, 417, 450, 
469. For Thomson, Carlyle was one of the few intellectuals in whom ‘the thought of the age in our 
country is embodied’, believing that he was endowed with a ‘creative genius’ in history and philosophy 
that commands ‘homage of which a lofty-minded and strong-minded man could justly be proud’: 
Essays and Phantasies, p. 126; and  Carlyle was also one of the writers to whom Thomson sent a copy 
of The City, when he was seeking recognition in 1874, and William Schaefer suggests that the fact that 
Carlyle – unlike George Eliot – never replied partly accounts for why he was considered with ‘less 
enthusiasm’ by Thomson in the seventies: Beyond “The City”, p. 174.   
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for a Messiah is the central motivation’.56 In this essay, Thomson observes that the 
world’s ‘loftiest’ brotherhoods may be distinguished into five classes, those of ‘the 
Heroes’, ‘the Saints’, ‘the Philosophers’, ‘the Poets’, and finally ‘the Mystics’, whom 
he considers the most exalted of all, being the culmination of all the other four 
fraternities, ‘Saints of Saints, Heroes of Heroes, Philosophers of Philosophers, and 
Poets of Poets’. Although written a decade after his poetic response to Matthew 
Arnold, when Thomson was already contributing religious satires to the National 
Reformer, much remained the same in terms of his emotional attachment to the figure 
of Christ; no longer able to believe in the divinity of Jesus, the ‘Son of God’ now 
becomes ‘a poor carpenter’s son’, but one who is elevated to the greatest rank in 
Thomson’s hierarchical classification of the world’s noblest brotherhoods. That is to 
say, he is deemed a mystic, and, at that, is given the status of the ultimate mystic of 
Western tradition.57 I shall of course go into more detail about ‘Open Secret Societies’ 
in the course of my analysis, but for now, the important point to highlight is this: that 
the essay’s treatment of the class of ‘Poets’ further illustrates the widely-accepted 
critical argument that Victorian aesthetic theory called upon poetry ‘to defend the 
religious spirit’, as Lawrence J. Starzyk puts it, ‘seeking an alternative in literature for 
an effete religion’. To further use Starzyk’s words, this involved viewing the poet as 
‘the high-priest who intimates to man the movement ordered existence is pursuing. 
Where the many see multitudinousness and purposelessness, he sees order and 
meaningful progress’,58 an observation that accurately applies to Thomson’s Poets. 
 Obviously influenced by Carlyle’s ‘The Hero as Poet’, Thomson asserts that 
Poets ‘are they who feel that the universe is one mighty harmony of beauty and joy’, 
an ‘eternal music whose orchestra comprises all things’ from ‘the worm to man’.59 In 
feeling this, moreover, they are able to reproduce it ‘in the language of men’, the 
impact of which is spiritually ameliorating: 
																																																								
56 Houghton, Victorian Frame of Mind, p. 311. Also, see generally pp. 310-16 for the nineteenth-
century vogue of hero-worship, and veneration for great men, and how it is connected with the 
Victorian’s search for a ‘Messiah’ or a ‘savior’ in ‘a period of radical transition’ where ‘the problems to 
be solved are so vast’ and ‘the need for guidance is so imperative’.  
57 See p. 211 of Essays and Phantasies, hereafter abbreviated as EP. 
58 ‘“That Promised Land”: Poetry and Religion in the Early Victorian Period’,   (pp. 270, 280, 283). 
59 Compare to Carlyle’s On Heroes, p. 78: ‘It is man’s sincerity and depth of vision that makes him a 
poet. See deep enough, and you see musically; the heart of Nature being everywhere music’. See also 
William Schaefer’s Beyond “The City”, pp. 94,165 (n15), on Thomson’s conception of the poet along 
Carlylean lines.   
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In all these imitative songs of theirs is a latent undertone, in which 
the whole infinite harmony of the whole lies furled; and the fine ears 
catch this undertone, and convey it to the soul, wherein the furled 
music unfurls to its primordial infinity, expanding with rapturous 
pulses and agitating with awful thunders this soul which has been 
skull-bound, so that it is dissolved and borne away beyond 
consciousness, and becomes as a living wave in a shoreless ocean.  
That poetry has this power to effect a religious experience is also true, Thomson adds, 
when it is visually consumed by readers in its printed form: 
If, however these their poems be read silently in books, instead of 
being heard chanted by the human voice, then for the eye which has 
vision an underlight stirs, and quickens among the letters which 
grow translucent and throb with light; and this mysterious splendour 
entering by the eyes into the soul fills it with spheric illumination, 
and like the mysterious music swells to infinity, consuming with 
quick fire all the bonds and dungeon-walls of the soul, dazing it out 
of consciousness and dissolving it in a shoreless ocean of light. 
It should be noted that, having abandoned the belief in the divinity of Jesus in this 
essay, Thomson also seems to have abandoned hope in the future regeneration of 
Christianity through another ‘anointed’ savior. He now preferred to believe that ‘while 
creeds and systems […] languish and die away’, what endures ‘throughout the 
centuries and millenniums’ is the spiritual force of poets, saints and other great men, 
who are ‘ever ready in battle array to repel or to assault’ the evils of a disenchanted 
age.60 
In fact, as far as Thomson’s contemporary scene is concerned, his writings 
suggest that it is the ‘Poets’, more than any other force, who are capable of offering a 
moral and spiritual alternative to the faltering Christianity of his day, which is evident 
in how often he turns to poetry for a possible solution to nineteenth-century problems. 
Prime examples of this are his 1861 poem ‘Shelley’, and the earlier poem ‘The Doom 
of a City’ (1857), as well as the essay ‘Per Contra: The Poet, High Art, Genius’ 
(1865). In ‘Shelley’,61 as in ‘Open Secret Societies’, there is no mention of the 
possibility of a Christian revival, but Thomson’s imagination is evidently still 
dependent on a Christian worldview. The poem begins with a vision of Raphael, 
surrounded by a host of angels, mourning the deteriorating state of Christendom. 
																																																								
60 EP, pp. 197, 205. 
61 Poetical Works, II, pp. 244-258. 
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According to the archangel, ‘the Churches are polluted’ with ‘old errors’ that are 
being exploited by those in power ‘to stifle Freedom’. An obvious symptom of this, he 
declares, is how religion’s original ‘laws […] of justice’ are being violated, serving as 
‘silken meshes for the great / But iron nets to hold the poor and mean’. But what is 
most detrimental about the ‘false[ness]’ of ‘the priests’, and the ‘impur[ity]’ of ‘the 
shrines’ is that ‘mankind in God Himself all faith have lost’, and ‘would live 
henceforth without any law’ (246-7). Raphael finally poses a question that 
demonstrates the Victorian mind in search of a religious saviour:  
Who will go down amidst these desolations  
Of fire and blood and lunacies and woe,  
To chant aloud to all the wildered nations  
Those heavenly truths no earth can overthrow,  
The changeless truths Eternal? Who will go  
To preach the Gospel of our Lord above,  
Chanting perpetually the law of Love? (247) 
The answer to this comes from a poet, and this poet is Shelley, who is 
portrayed as a ‘fervent Seraph’ whose breath is of ‘the heavenly air / Of perfect 
holiness and love and truth’. He volunteers to be God’s messenger, and is sent down 
to earth disguised in ‘mortal flesh’. The poem then dramatizes the achievements of 
Shelley, which, in effect, turns into a poetic treatise on the divine potential of poetry 
to assume religion’s role in addressing the spiritual and social ills of the time. True 
poets, we learn, are ‘a witness of the one true Lord of all / Amidst a world gone mad 
with sin and crime’. They are ‘a voice of right amdist a world’s foul wrong / A voice 
of hope amidst a world’s despair’, giving assurances of a triumphant future, and a 
blessed afterlife (248-50). Their ‘Song’ is driven by one aim: ‘to teach’ men, not the 
God of established religion, but ‘the true God, Whose reign / Is infinite love for all 
things that exist’ (255), making ‘the World a Poem, and Earth a Paradise’ (251). Such 
spiritual guidance naturally translates into social and political reform, as this kind of 
poetry strives not only to cure men of ‘their greed for dross’, ‘their pride and fawning 
in the palaces’, and ‘their solemn church-attending worldliness’, but also to bring 
together ‘the tyrant and the slave’, charging them to recognize ‘their common 
brotherhood’ (254-5). In this sense, Thomson was obviously seeking to reaffirm the 
religious, social and political role that Shelley had set out for the artist in ‘A Defence 
of Poetry’ (1821), an essay that was never far from Thomson’s mind when 
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formulating his poetic theory, and from which he actually quotes a line in a footnote 
to the poem.62 Shelley had stated thus: 
Poets […] are not only the authors of language and of music, of the 
dance, and architecture, and statuary, and painting: they are the 
institutors of laws, and the founders of civil society, and the 
inventors of the arts of life, and the teachers, who draw into a certain 
propinquity with the beautiful and the true that partial apprehension 
of the agencies of the invisible world which is called religion.63 
 Indeed, such a view of the cultural centrality of the poetic vocation also finds 
expression in Thomson’s earlier poem ‘The Doom of a City’ (1857).64 In this poem, 
and similar to the one on Shelley, the central figure is also a poet who is singled out to 
be God’s messenger to an England in moral and spiritual decline, delivering a 
message that encompasses all aspects of life, the social, the civil, the economic, the 
political, and, not the least, the religious. Addressing England as the ‘Queen of the 
Sea’, Thomson bemoans the decaying state of Christianity, which seems a body 
without spirit: ‘Thy Church has long been becoming the Fossil of a Faith; / The Form 
of dry bones thou hast, but where are the blood and breath?’. Although the Church 
‘swearest’ that ‘The King is but sick, not dead’, referring of course to a metaphorical 
Jesus, Thomson declares that he cannot detect ‘the signs of His life’ anywhere around 
him: this is especially true in relation to the country’s ‘Priesthood’, who ‘vouchsafe in 
His name to write, pretend by His will to act’, but are, in fact, nothing more than 
‘scribes’ and ‘placemen’ for the Monarchy (184-6). As in ‘Suggested by Matthew 
Arnold’, however, ‘The Doom’ shows that, in 1857, Thomson was still not immune to 
the belief that Christianity ‘lives and shall for ever reign’, through a future 
regeneration of its essential teachings. His scepticism here is merely toward a nation 
that, according to him, hypocritically makes such a proclamation while, in practice, it 
‘spurnest the laws most sacred of all’ that have been ordained by this religion (187).  
Thomson namely argues that ‘should Christ come now from Heaven to reap 
the harvest sown’ by His sacrifice, He would find that, among the ‘myriads who claim 
in Him a share’, there are ‘scarcely enough’ true Christians to save their world from 
																																																								
62 See p. 257 in Poetical Works, II, and also see pp. 207, 228 in EP, and pp. 279, 330-32 in 
Biographical and Critical Studies (hereafter abbreviated as BCS), for examples of how Thomson draws 
on Shelley’s essay when formulating his own poetic theory. 
63 ‘A Defence of Poetry’, in Essay, Letters from Abroad, Translations and Fragments, ed. by Mary 
Shelley, 2 vols (London: Edward Moxon, 1840), I, pp. 1-57 (pp. 6-7). 
64 Poetical Works, II, pp. 109-190. 
	 188	
an impending doom (188). It is a world, he explains, whose ‘chief social laws seem 
strictly framed to secure / That one be corrupting rich, another bitterly poor, / And 
another just starving to death’ (184). Their streets are consequently afflicted ‘with an 
holocaust of woes, sins, lusts and blasphemies’, among which are the ‘thousands of 
harlots’ who are not more accountable than ‘those who made them first and who keep 
them harlots yet’ (185-6). In terms of the country’s trade, it is ‘fretted by gambling 
greed’, ‘slimed by creeping fraud’, ‘trading in lies and in human bodies and souls’ 
(184-6, 189). On a similar note, the country’s political status depends on justifying the 
rightfulness of its imperialism, by priding itself for its inherent strength, wisdom, 
goodness and freedom, while depreciating all other nations: ‘This one is blind, this 
deaf, and the other is but a mute; / This one is fair indeed, but drunken and dissolute; / 
[…] This one is proud and great, but a heathen in her soul […, etc.]’ (183). A self-
centred philosophy also dominates the empire’s national politics, as ‘rulers’ and 
politicians ‘rule for the good of themselves alone’, ‘with scarcely one noble aim’, 
rendering themselves ‘infidels to pure Right, / Deaf to the holy voice of the 
Conscience of the World’ (189, 185). 
But not all are deaf to the World’s transcendent voice, and this is where the 
role of the poet in ‘The Doom’ gains legitimacy. That the poem’s narrator is indeed 
depicted as ‘a Carlylean poet-prophet’, as William Schaefer has suggested,65 is 
evident from the fact that he qualifies for both Carlyle’s and Thomson’s definition of 
a poet: he is endowed with heightened spiritual perceptions that enable him to discern 
the divine musicality underlying the phenomenal world. Take the following lines, for 
instance, in which the speaker, through his ‘pure celestial ears’, is able to perceive the 
heavenly ‘Chorus’ forever reverberating within the movements of the planets:  
The stars for ever sweep through space, surrounding  
Their sun-kings and God's central hidden Throne  
With splendour and deep music far-resounding, 
Though heard by pure celestial ears alone: 
Their music chants His lofty praise for ever, 
Their splendours burn to Him the Light Divine;  
In their grand uneager motions pausing never,  
They live and sing and shine. (176) 
It is one of the thematic concerns of ‘The Doom’ to suggest that this privileged 
insight into the metaphysical harmonics of the universe sets poets apart from society, 
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and invests them with the religious and cultural authority to redeem men from 
corruption and moral degradation. This is conveyed by means of Romantic allegory, 
where the poem’s main persona (Thomson’s alter ego) is portrayed as a solitary 
figure, who, driven by such transcendent intuitions, flees his native urban setting, a 
city very much reminiscent of Victorian London.66 He embarks on a long boat 
journey, surviving a violent storm, and a horrific encounter with a sea-monster, after 
which he is finally granted the proverbial Romantic revelation that leaves him with the 
obligation to deliver a message to his fellow city-dwellers. It is telling that the poem’s 
narrator depicts the moment of revelation as being converted into musical instrument, 
a symbol of his poetic initiation:  
That Spirit which will never be withstood 
Came down and shook and seized and lifted me, — 
As men uplift a passive instrument 
Through which to breathe whatever fits their mood, 
Stately triumphal march or war-note dread, 
Anthem, gay dance, or requiem for the dead; 
And through my lips with irrepressible might 
Poured forth its own stern language on the night. (182) 
The revelation involves an apocalyptic vision of the destruction of a city similar to the 
one he had left behind, and the message is a simple warning: ‘Repent, reform or 
perish’ (184). As Schaefer notes, the warning ‘to repent’ is Thomson’s own message 
to his present-day England, and is significant in how it reveals Thomson’s recourse to 
Christian notions in his early social criticism.67 But more than that, given the poem’s 
allegorical representation of the quest for poetic identity, the message has a clear 
implication about Thomson’s poetic theory. It symbolizes poetry’s claim to a didactic 
and moral authority that is predicated on its divine origin. After all, the city-dwellers 
in the poem are expected to heed the poet-persona only because the message he had 
‘poured forth’ came from an overwhelming divine ‘Spirit’ that had transformed him 
into a mere ‘instrument’ of song, an event made possible by his own intuitive 
																																																								
66 For commentaries on how ‘The Doom of a City’ is a precursor of Thomson’s representation of 
London in The City of Dreadful Night, see Philip Tew, ‘James Thomson's London: Beyond the 
Apocalyptic Vision of the City’, in A Mighty Mass of Brick and Smoke: Victorian and Edwardian 
Representations of London, ed. by Lawrence Phillips (New York: Rodopi, 2007), pp. 107-30 (pp. 114-
5); Valeria Tinkler-Villani, ‘‘Ruins of an Unremembered Past’: Poetic Strategies in James Thomson’s 
the City of Dreadful Night’, in Babylon Or New Jerusalem?: Perceptions of the City in Literature, ed. 
by Valeria Tinkler-Villani (New York: Rodopi, 2005), pp. 125-34 (pp. 125, 131-2); and William B. 
Thesing, The London Muse: Poetic Responses to the City (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1982), 
pp. 136-41. 
67 Beyond “The City”, p. 45. 
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attunement to the spiritual rhythms of the universe. Thomson seems to be arguing that, 
in a time when Christianity was losing its hold on English cultural and religious life, it 
is the responsibility and rightful place of poetry to act as a spiritual mediator between 
God and the rest of mankind. 
With regard to Thomson’s essay ‘Per Contra’, it similarly assigns an exalted 
religious role for the poet, but his language here appears less Christian and more 
pantheistic. It is, in fact, a companion piece to his satirical essay ‘Bumble, 
Bumbledom, Bumbleism’ (1865), 68  where he draws upon Matthew Arnold’s 
conception of the middle class as ‘Philistine’ to offer his own critique of British public 
life. His critique here differs from those found in the previous two poems in that it 
refrains from cataloguing the various symptoms of the country’s social, economic, and 
political problems, focusing instead on what he believes to be the temperamental 
defects of English mainstream culture, particularly in relation to the powerful middle 
class. Although he agrees with Arnold’s characterisation of its members as ‘humdrum 
people, slaves to routine, enemies to light, stupid and oppressive, but at the same time 
very strong’, Thomson believes that, in England, they are not so dignified as to 
procure the German term ‘Philistine’. He particularly argues that, unlike its 
continental counterpart who commit ‘atrocities’ of oppression against the ‘children of 
light’, the English middle class ‘is not terrible, nor malignant, nor sanguinary; it is 
simply a very great bother and bore’, hence his labelling of it with the awkward term 
‘Bumble’, which equally stands for the head of a typical Victorian family of that 
class.69 The greatest vice of Bumble, we are told, is his prude conventionalism, his 
																																																								
68 On the possible connection between Thomson’s Bumble and the beadle in Dickens’s Oliver Twist, 
William Schaeffer writes: 
The O.E.D reveals that Dickens’ Mr. Bumble had already been adopted into common 
usage by the time Thomson wrote this essay. As early as 1856 in the Saturday Review 
there are references to “collective Bumbledom of the West-minster” and to the “great 
Bumble mind.” Similarly, the Spectator (April 22, 1865) had used the phrase, “the true 
spirit of parish Bumbledom.” 
Citing the following section from Thomson’s essay, moreover, Richard Pawley argues that ‘unlike 
Dickens’ Bumble of a decade before, Thomson’s is not hypocritical’: 
Let no one accuse Bumble of conscious insincerity; dissimulation he detests […] When he 
seems to the irreverent observer to be playing the hypocrite in concert with his brother 
Bumbles, be assured that he is doing what he is doing with the very best intentions, and 
the saintliest anxiety for the continuation of the stability and prosperity of that 
Bumbledom which he honestly loves and venerates. 
See Schaeffer (ed.), The Speedy Extinction of Evil and Misery, p. 114; and Richard Pawley, 
Secret City: The Emotional Life of Victorian Poet James Thomson (B. V.) (Oxford: University 
Press of America, 2001), p. 170. 
69 Richard Pawley, Secret City, p. 170. 
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intolerance and aversion to new ideas, which become culturally crippling because he 
has the power to control ‘public opinion’: 
Bumble is not malignant […] but one thing he does hate […]: this 
thing is a new idea, or even the semblance of a new idea such as a 
novel opinion […] Every new idea is a reproach and insult cast upon 
our old doctrines and institutions.   
Thomson’s main contention is that Bumble is able to exert an oppressive hold over 
popular opinion because he financially controls the public-intellectual market: he ‘can 
afford to buy the journals in thousands and tens of thousands’, and journalists (who 
are mostly ‘born Bumbles’) know that they ‘depend for their livelihood upon the 
favour of their stronger brother Bumbles’. This means that ‘woe be to any one who 
shall have the audacity to shock his cherished, his sacred convictions, on any social or 
moral or religious matter’: 
If the English paper or book ventures beyond the bounds of 
Bumbledom’s restrictions in religion or morals, it is effectually 
suppressed by Bumble, – he won’t buy it, however brilliant and 
thoughtful and honest it may be. 70 
For Bumble, as Thomson asserts in another essay, ‘the naked beauty is obscene and 
the naked truth is blasphemous’.71 
This brings me to Thomson’s recommendation of the best way to cure 
Bumble, which, as William Schaefer notes, depends on ‘shock treatment, waking him 
from his lethargy by bluntly revealing truth and beauty as objects of veneration’, a 
role that ‘not surprisingly, fell to the poet’.72 In his ‘Per Contra: The Poet, High Art, 
Genius’, Thomson identifies ‘Poets’ as ‘the antithesis to Bumble’, ‘the men of new 
ideas, the men always in advance of their age’, and, in the same manner of ‘The 
Doom’ and ‘Shelley’, he ascribes religious and spiritual significance to the 
progressive role given them in this essay. This is evident in how he defines the key 
terms of the essay’s title, at first describing ‘the Poet’ as ‘the Priest of Beauty in 
general, whatever material he consecrates to its service’. ‘High Art’ is, then, said to be 
‘the loftiest Expression of the Beautiful, in which more or less latent are involved the 
Good and the True’. But what infuses these with spiritual meanings is his definition of 
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‘Genius’ as ‘the divine (never forget the divine) Inspiration of the Poet and Spirit of 
High Art’, which, again, gives the poet access to transcendental knowledge that is 
kept hidden from others. This is not to mention the highly spiritualised language 
Thomson employs when elaborating on his argument that the ultimate function of 
poetry is to offer its student ‘some breath of a really divine afflatus’. Explaining what 
he means by ‘divine afflatus’, he writes: 
Something that will rock the walls and rend the foundations of his 
old prison-house of habit as with an earthquake, something that will 
daze and blind his earthly vision as with a great light from Heaven, 
something that will melt and consume away his old commonplace 
existence with the fervent heat of enthusiasm! 73 
One of the subtexts of ‘Per Contra’, however, is that such spiritual ecstasy has become 
much less feasible as a result of the spiritual malaise of modern age, whose distinctive 
feature is its ‘abjectness under the yoke’ of the ‘inert commonplace and monotonous 
routine’. Thomson believes that this monotony and disenchantment has especially 
affected the ‘intellectual and moral life’ of the nation, 74  including its literary 
production, as indicated in a later essay: ‘The condition of our literature in these days 
is disgraceful to a nation of men: Bumble has drugged all its higher powers, and only 
the rudest shocks can arouse them from their torpor’. 75  ‘Per Contra’ suggests, 
therefore, that, before poetry and art can be rehabilitated to their natural functions of 
spiritually inspiring their ‘hearers or spectators to ecstasy’,76 it is the responsibility of 
poets to revive nineteenth-century society from its moral inertia, by rudely shocking 
its sensibilities with the boldest expression of ‘the Good and the True’.  
2.2. ‘Mysticism’ in Thomson’s Early Poetic Theory 
Having touched upon some principal aspects of Thomson’s poetic theory, and how it 
involved a belief in the religious responsibilities of the poet amidst the ideological 
crisis created by Christianity’s decline, it is now time to consider how his writings 
stand as a representative example of the Victorians’ aesthetic preoccupation with 
mysticism. Indeed, in a way that is probably comparable only to Carlyle’s writings, 
Thomson’s work displays a consistent interest in mysticism that virtually spans his 
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entire career. In the earlier part of his career, by which I mean the period up to the 
mid-1860s, his conception of the term, as it will be shown, was clearly in the 
Romantic sense of a divine state of consciousness that is deeply rooted in aesthetic 
and poetic experience, the same conception that is found in the various examples cited 
in the previous chapter from Carlyle, Mill, Swinburne, Elizabeth Barrett Browning, 
and others. As I have discussed there, and as Grace Jantzen would have it, such a 
definition was not without a power agenda: I have worked to establish that this was 
ideologically oriented toward the general cause of advancing religious belief, and its 
cultural sphere of influence, as well as the more immediate objective of asserting the 
spiritual function of poetry in a modern secular setting. Both objectives are, of course, 
better understood in relation to the recurrent nineteenth-century objection that 
scientific rationalism – while rightly undermining traditional religion – offers an 
incomplete approach to reality, because its modes of discovering truth fail to appeal to 
the whole of man’s faculties, the imaginative (or emotional), in addition to the 
rational. The following discussion on Thomson will, therefore, serve to further 
illustrate my previous argument, that mysticism, as a modernist (Romantic) category, 
is inherited to a large degree from the Victorian discourse on poetry, particularly that 
which reflected the spiritual concerns of a post-Christian perspective. The hope, 
however, is that by exploring this element in the work of a poet-critic significant in his 
own right, the discussion will also offer a useful addition to Thomson scholarship, 
helping to challenge some longstanding misconceptions about him while casting more 
light on the less acknowledged aspects of his thought and character.  
That being said, it may be well to point out at the outset that Thomson’s 
conceptualisations of mysticism frequently occur in tandem with his attempt to 
negotiate a view of Shelley as a ‘quintessential poet’.77 One of his earliest critical 
works that conflates the mystical with the poetic, for instance, is his essay ‘Shelley’ 
(1860), written primarily in defence of Shelley’s poetry, but also offering an 
instructive articulation of Thomson’s poetic credo. For the most part, the essay is a 
medley of Romantic notions drawn from Wordsworth, Coleridge, Carlyle, Emerson 
and Shelley, where poetry is celebrated throughout as an instrument of direct contact 
with an ultimate divine principle. ‘The essence of poetry’, Thomson states, ‘is 
communication with the Infinite and the Eternal’, so that ‘to be strongly inclined to 
																																																								
77 BCS, ‘Shelley’, p. 281. 
	 194	
such communication is to be gifted with the first requisite for a poet’. In a deferential 
nod to Plato, moreover, he identifies ‘inspiration’ as the ‘essential law of poetic 
creation’, citing relevant lines from Shelley’s translation of the Ion, to highlight the 
spiritual nature of aesthetic creativity: ‘a poet’, the translation reads, ‘is, indeed, a 
thing ethereally light, winged, and sacred; nor can he compose anything worth calling 
poetry until he becomes inspired’. And again: ‘[poets] do not attain to excellence 
through the rules of any art; but they utter their beautiful melodies of verse in a state 
of inspiration, and, as it were, possessed by a spirit not their own’. Indeed, placing this 
Platonic concept of poetic inspiration at the ‘climax’ or ‘threshold’ of critical 
inquiry,78 Thomson invokes it here as the highest standard by which to judge any 
given poet – in this case, Shelley. 
But by what practical means, one would ask, could a critic judge whether or 
not a poem was ‘poetically inspired’? Thomson argues that it is through what had 
become known in literary-critical jargon as ‘mysticism’, as it is indicated in the 
following excerpt, where he raises the question of whether or not Shelley is entitled 
‘to the epithet inspired’, the answer to which involves his assertion of the definitive 
place of mysticism in poetic inspiration: 
Is he entitled, in a high sense, to be called inspired? That he was a 
singer who sang songs beautiful, wise, and pure may be affirmed of 
many a poet, though of no two with the same emphasis. What is it, 
then, which differentiates him from the second-class poets, and 
exalts him to sit with Isaiah and Dante, as one of the small choir of 
chief signers who are called transcendent? It is that of which I but 
now spoke; it is that of which he is so often accused under the name 
of mysticism.  
The lines here suggest that there are two types of poetry, the inspired and the 
uninspired, and while the latter has much merit, it is considered ‘second-class’ to the 
former. For Thomson, moreover, there is no greater measure of a poet’s superiority 
than his/her mysticism, because mysticism is an indicator of poetic inspiration. Of 
course what Shelley was being consistently accused of ‘under the name of mysticism’ 
is the intentional use of unintelligible and obscure language. But Thomson argues in 
this essay (and elsewhere) that, in this case, any perceived vagueness or 
unintelligibility indicates a failing on the part of the critics, not the poet: that is, that 
they lack the transcendental intuitions necessary to comprehend a poet of the first 
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order, one whose spiritual insights lie in the realm of the mysterious, beyond the 
rational boundaries of language. For that reason, Thomson contends that ‘the 
accusations of mysticism but ignorantly affirm that [Shelley] was most intensely and 
purely a poet’.79   
 This last point is an important one that I shall return to in more detail later in 
this chapter, when I come to discuss Thomson’s part in the Victorian effort to 
reconstruct mysticism from a term indicating a negative obscurity into a positive 
marker of ineffability, and how such a redefinition attempts to overthrow the 
epistemological sufficiency of autonomous rationalism. As far as Thomson’s early 
poetic theory is concerned, however, the key points to be emphasized here are two. 
The first is his insistence on the conceptual link between mysticism and poetic 
inspiration, and therefrom arises the essay’s principal claim to theoretical significance, 
being otherwise largely eclectic. That is, it may be fairly said that the essay’s main 
contribution to Victorian formulations of poetic theory is how it frames its definition 
and defence of mysticism – an undertaking for which Thomson was clearly indebted 
to Carlyle – in an argument for a Shelleyan brand of Platonic inspiration. This, as we 
shall see, would remain the one unwavering feature of Thomson’s poetic theory, even 
through his final years. Secondly, unlike his later materialist, anti-spiritual 
interpretation of the term, a belief in spiritual transcendence through a divine source 
stands at the centre of Thomson’s understanding of mysticism at this stage of his 
career, which is exemplified in the embedded supernaturalism of the essay’s following 
description of mystical poetry:  
The experience contained in it has been spiritually transmuted from 
lead into gold. […] It perceives always the profound identity 
underlying all surface differences. […] It is unadulterated with 
worldly wisdom, deference to prevailing opinions, mere talent or 
cleverness. […] It is most philosophic when most enthusiastic, the 
clearest light of its wisdom being shed from the keenest fire of its 
love. […] It is ever-fresh wonder at the infinite mystery, ever-young 
faith in the eternal soul. Whatever be its mood, we feel that it is not 
self-possessed but God-possessed; whether the God came down 
serene and stately as Jove, when, a swan, he wooed Leda; or with 
overwhelming might insupportably burning, as when he consumed 
Semele.80 
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 In addition to ‘Shelley’, two other essays in which Thomson recognizes 
Shelley as a mystic poet are ‘Open Secret Societies’ and ‘Sympathy’, both written in 
1865, and both similarly presenting a valuable contribution to the Victorian dialogue 
on the relationship between poetry and mysticism. In ‘Open Secret Societies’, 
Thomson charts this relationship in terms that give supremacy to mysticism, but in 
which mysticism and poetry depend on each other for their definitions. As mentioned 
earlier, the Open Secret Society of the Mystics comprises those who have become 
initiated, to the highest degree, into all the other four societies discussed in the essay, 
those of the Heroes, the Saints, the Philosophers, and the Poets. What this means in 
the context of the present discussion is that Thomson believed that while not every 
Poet is a Mystic, every Mystic must be a Poet: put otherwise, to be a fully-initiated 
Mystic, one must be a fully-initiated Poet, though the reverse is not true. However – 
and this is an important point – Thomson also acknowledges that the ‘divisions and 
subdivisions’ of these societies are, in fact, more complicated and not as neat as one 
might assume, so that a member of a given society ‘while belonging supremely to one, 
belongs in lower degrees to many of them, for every point in the circle of his nature 
touches a point in the circle of some other nature’. That being the case, the essay 
suggests that the point of contact between Poets and Mystics is the phenomena of 
poetic inspiration, which is essentially a mystical experience, as Thomson’s essay on 
Shelley had previously indicated; this means that mysticism, as an experience, is 
something that the Poet may have temporary access to, without necessarily becoming 
a thorough Mystic. Although the essay uses the term ‘interior illumination’, or 
‘mysterious trance’,81 instead of ‘inspiration’, Thomson’s description of the Society of 
the Poets here – cited at length earlier in this chapter82 – certainly reiterates the same 
views that had been expressed in relation to the ‘inspired’ poets of his Shelley essay, 
likewise differentiating them from what he had called the ‘uninspired poetasters’.83 
Unlike the poetasters, referred to here as the ‘uninitiate’, who, at best, produce 
beautiful and wise utterances in skilful rhyme and meter, the ‘genuine bards’ of this 
Society possess a transcendent sense of sight and hearing that enables them to 
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perceive the spiritual homogeneity underlying all things and beings, great or small, 
that make up ‘the music and splendour of infinity’.84  
 Another principal point to recognize with regard to the relationship drawn in 
this essay between poetry and mysticism is the idea that fully-initiated Mystics are 
considered the most exalted Poets, seeing how Thomson classifies them as ‘Poets of 
Poets’. This further reveals the commanding place he assigns to mysticism in the 
definition of  poetry: not only is it crucial for Poets to temporarily experience the 
supernatural ‘entrancements’ of Mystics in order to produce genuine poetry, but those 
of them who have become complete Mystics are the ones who have attained to the 
highest ideals and standards of poetry.85 The same notion is also found in Thomson’s 
Shelley essay, where after having declared that the mystical element is ‘displayed in 
the works of Shelley more gloriously than those of any other poet in our language’, he 
had named Shelley ‘the poet of poets’, and insisted that he must be studied ‘for 
quintessential poetry’.86 All of this indicates how Thomson seems to have held 
Mysticism and Mystics to be the archetypes of Poetry and the Poet. As for Thomson’s 
wish to construct an image of Shelley as a mystic poet in ‘Open Secret Societies’, it is 
evident in the fact that Shelley features as a prime example in his discussion of the 
secret ‘fraternities’ of both the Poets and the Mystics: in the former, for his ‘Defence 
of Poetry’; and, in the latter, for his Epipsychidion.87 
 It should be noted that, in asserting the comprehensive virtues of the Open 
Secret Society of the Mystics, Thomson refers to its members as ‘the very flower and 
crown’ of the best and noblest in mankind, an expression that reappears verbatim in 
his essay ‘Sympathy’, also in the context of discussing poets and mystics. In the case 
of this essay, Thomson’s veneration for these figures rests upon Shelley’s concept of 
‘sympathy’, which features as an aesthetic, moral, and spiritual principal in his 
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‘Defence of Poetry’. Shelley had stated there that the imaginative faculty is ‘the organ 
of the moral nature of man’, because it is the seat of one’s capacity for ‘sympathy’, 
what he defined as ‘a going out of our own nature and an identification of ourselves 
with the beautiful which exists in thought, action or person, not our own’. Poetry, 
Shelley had consequently argued, is one of the vital avenues for the moral elevation of 
society, not due to any notion of its value for didactic moralism, but on the grounds of 
his belief that aesthetic experience – both poetic creation and appreciation – is a 
supreme exercise in sympathy; in this sense, poetry is effective in how it constantly 
‘awakens’ and ‘enlarges the circumference of the imagination’, itself ‘the great 
instrument of moral good’. To Shelley, this was possible through the spiritually 
transformative effects of sympathy: ‘Poetry […] transmutes all that it touches, and 
every form moving within the radiance of its presence is changed by wondrous 
sympathy to an incarnation of the spirit which it breathes’. 88   
In the hands of Thomson, these notions become informed by the Carlylean 
heroicizing impulse, as the capacity for imaginative sympathy comes to be identified 
as a true mark of greatness. Thomson argues that ‘so rare and priceless is genuine 
sympathy’ that we should deem those who possess it ‘so much purer and higher’ than 
the rest of mankind. Unsurprisingly, poets and mystics are among those celebrated by 
Thomson in the catalogue of heroic-types that he presents in the essay: 
The uncommon sentimentalists, the men and women supremely 
sympathetic, are the very flower and crown of our race; they are the 
poets who are more than great wits, the heroes who are greater than 
conquerors, the mystics who are wiser than sages, the saints who are 
purer than theologians, the martyrs more sublime than any church or 
creed; they are Pascal and Leighton, Joan of Arc and Charlotte 
Corday, Shelley and Jesus.89 
It is unclear why the mystics are placed here at the same rank as the other great 
figures, but it is likely that ‘Sympathy’ was written prior to ‘Open Secret Societies’, 
before Thomson had decided to set them apart, above the rest. The unquestionable fact 
remains, however, that Thomson believed that the poetic and mystical faculties shared 
the same locus, and were cultivated by the same creative principle, and that these were 
profoundly spiritual in nature.  
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Yet another essay of Thomson’s that takes note of Shelley’s mysticism is ‘The 
Poems of William Blake’ (1864), which actually devotes the most substantial part of 
its discussion to surveying nineteenth-century poets according to their manifestation 
of ‘this spirit of mysticism’, indicating how mysticism constituted a valid criterion of 
judgment in Thomson’s art criticism. His conclusion is that ‘consummate singer as he 
was’, ‘Shelley possessed, or rather was possessed by, this [spirit] to the uttermost’, 
ranking him above Wordsworth, Coleridge, Tennyson and the Brownings, in terms of 
the genuineness and degree of their mysticism.90 As the title of the essay suggests, 
however, this work is chiefly an investigation of Blake’s poetry, of which a full 
appreciation is not possible, so Thomson argues, without taking account of its 
mystical subject matter. As a side note, it should be pointed out that part of the essay’s 
achievement, as a nineteenth-century piece of literary criticism, lies in the fact that it 
was published in 1864, ‘anticipating even Swinburne’s famous early study’ of 
Blake,91 something that has been duly acknowledged by Blake critics.92 I argue here 
that another part of its historical significance is related to how well the essay 
demonstrates the place of mysticism, as a construct, in Victorian conceptualizations of 
‘poetry’, including how mysticism bolstered the kind of apologetics needed to 
safeguard poetry from the encroaching effects of positivist materialism.  
 Much like Thomson’s essay ‘Shelley’, the concepts of mysticism and poetic 
inspiration are inexorably linked in ‘The Poems of Blake’, and both are similarly 
understood to involve a direct experiential awareness of an ultimate divine reality. The 
only difference in this essay is that Thomson conceives such an experience in terms of 
a religious conversion in which the old self leaves behind a so-called ‘adult’ religious 
consciousness and returns to a primal or ‘childlike’ state of spiritual purity. Bearing in 
mind that the adult-child distinction employed in the essay is better understood as a 
continuum rather than a clear dichotomy,93 the traits that Thomson associates with 
‘adult’ religion are those of virtue, intellectualism, ritualism and melancholy, whereas 
																																																								
90 BCS, p. 261, 264. 
91 William Schaefer, ed., ‘Introduction and Notes’, in The Speedy Extinction of Evil and Misery 
(Cambridge University Press: London, 1967), (p. 10). Gurdit Singh, The Vision of James Thomson, p. 
126. 
92 For William B. Yeats, and Edwin J. Ellis, for instance, the essay made Thomson ‘one of the century’s 
most important Blake commentators’; Harold Bloom, ed., William Blake: Bloom's Classic Critical 
Views, ed. by Alexis Harley (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2008), p. 104. 
93 Thomson believed, for example, that Emanuel Swedenborg’s ‘adult-like’ engagement with the 
dialectics of scholastic theology detracted from the authenticity of his mysticism, hampering its childish 
simplicity and spontaneity; but he considered him a mystic nonetheless. See pp. 252-3 in BCS. 
	 200	
a ‘childlike’ religiosity is taken to have a strong connection with innocence, 
intuitiveness, joyfulness and purity; and it is the youthful traits that Thomson deems to 
be closest to the spirit of mysticism. ‘Blake was supremely a mystic’, he declares, 
designating Blake’s mature years, ‘when he was withdrawn from common life into 
mysticism’, as ‘his second childhood and boyhood and youth’, a description that 
conveys Thomson’s belief that an ‘infantine’ innocence and simplicity are 
characteristic features of mysticism. This is confirmed in the final part of his lengthy 
definition of the term in the essay: 
Its supreme tendency is to remain or to become again childlike, its 
supreme aspiration is not virtue, but innocence or guilelessness: so 
that we may say with truth of those whom it possesses, that the 
longer they live the younger they grow, as if  “passing out to God by 
the gate of birth, not death”. 94 
This is why, throughout the essay, the term ‘mysticism’ is either coupled or 
interchanged with the word ‘simplicity’: the ‘spirit of mysticism’ that is the subject of 
the lines above, for example, is later described twice as ‘this mystical simplicity’, and 
six times merely as ‘this simplicity’.95 
As far as the principle of poetic inspiration is concerned, Thomson refers to it 
in the essay as ‘the breathing of song’, by which he makes the familiar allusion to the 
Latin root of inspiration – inspiratio (noun) from inspirare (verb) – which literally 
means ‘breathing in’, or ‘the breath of God’.96 In fact, Thomson develops this allusion 
into an elaborate metaphor of ‘breathing’ in a discussion that is couched in the same 
terminology of religious conversion that governs the essay’s treatment of mysticism – 
with the same child-adult opposition for its guiding trope. He particularly draws on 
James Garth Wilkinson’s distinction between a child’s and an adult’s physiological 
act of breathing in an attempt to analogically differentiate between inspired and 
uninspired poetry. In The Human Body and Its Connection with Man (1851), 
Wilkinson had maintained that an adult can never ‘breathe like a child’ because ‘adult 
breath’ is burdened by ‘a peopling of multitudinous thoughts, […] hardness and 
troubles, as does not cede to the attempt to act the infantine even for a moment’. 
Framing his analogy along these lines, Thomson suggests that true poetic inspiration 
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and creation – or ‘the breathing of song’  – can only occur when the poetic-self has 
spiritually metamorphosed back into its infantine state of religious purity, whose 
musical ‘lisp’ can not be imitated by any adult consciousness that has not undergone 
such a transformation: 
What is true of common breathing, is true more conspicuously of 
breathing idealised and harmonised, of the breathing of song in 
which psychical have superseded the physical rhythms. The adult 
cannot sing like a child; but Blake in these Songs [Songs of 
Innocence and Experience] does so: he did not act the infantine, for 
he was infantine, by a regeneration as real while as mysterious as 
ever purest saint experienced in the religious life.97 
In other words, Thomson is arguing that a ‘mysterious’ regeneration makes up a 
necessary part of the poetic creative process, placing poetic inspiration on a par with 
the spiritual experiences of saints.  
It hardly bears noting that Thomson’s use of the word ‘mysterious’ in the lines 
just quoted is intended to signal a connection with mystical phenomena, which is 
confirmed in how he immediately goes to compare the mysticism of Blake with that 
of the eighteenth-century Swedish scientist, philosopher and theologian, Emanuel 
Swedenborg, the latter of whose reputation was widely being established as a mystic-
saint.98 According to Thomson, the evidence for Blake’s and Swedenborg’s mysticism 
is found in the autobiographical reports of their experiences of the various sights and 
sounds of the spiritual world, which reinforces his definition of mysticism as a 
phenomenon related to the possession of visionary powers. For Thomson, then, the 
poet’s ‘inspiration’ and the saint’s ‘mysticism’ are virtually one and the same, both 
involving an intense regenerative experience that leads to the awakening of the 
spiritual senses. But the interesting thing about the comparison offered here is the 
suggestion that the poet’s mysticism can sometimes surpass that of the religious saint, 
with Blake being considered more authentically mystical than Swedenborg; Thomson 
suggests that Blake is more in touch with the mystic’s childlike dependence on 
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intuitions, as opposed to Swedenborg’s serious commitment to intellectual and 
rational argument: 
[Blake] was emphatically a seer, and had the disdain of all seers for 
the pretensions of gropers and guessers who are blind. Like 
Swedenborg, he always relates things heard and seen; more purely a 
mystic than Swedenborg, he does not condescend to dialectics and 
scholastic divinity.99 
 I cite below Thomson’s summation of the mystical quality of Blake’s poetry as 
well as that of the leading poets of the nineteenth-century whom he believed were 
influenced by Blake.100 Although the excerpt is long, it is worth its space given that 
few examples in Thomson’s early criticism so effectively capture how his 
preoccupation with mysticism was essentially an aesthetic preoccupation, one that was 
motivated toward the Romantic conception of the poet as a mediator of visionary and 
transcendental knowledge. In this sense, the excerpt also serves as a representative 
example supporting my general thesis that Victorian poetic theory, especially from the 
mid-century onwards, displayed an increasing interest in employing or defining such 
terms as ‘mysticism’, ‘mystics’ and ‘mystery’ as a way of asserting the religious 
authority of poetry in what was perceived to be a post-Christian world: 
The essence of this poetry is mysticism, and the essence of this 
mysticism is simplicity. […] It [this mysticism] sees, and is 
continually rapturous with seeing, everywhere correspondence, 
kindred, identity, not only in the things and creatures of earth, but in 
all things and creatures and beings of hell and earth and heaven, up 
to the one father (or interiorly to the one soul) of all. […] For it 
“there is no great and no small;” in the large type of planets and 
nations, in the minute letters of dewdrops and worms, the same 
eternal laws are written; and merely as a matter of convenience to 
the reader is this or that print preferable to the other. And the whole 
universe being the volume of the Scriptures of the living word of 
God, this above all is to be heeded, that man should not dwell 
contented on the lovely language and illustrations, but should live 
beyond these in the sphere of the realities which they signify. It is 
passionately and profoundly religious, contemplating and treating 
every subject religiously, in all its excursions and discursions 
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issuing from the soul to return to the soul, alone, from the alone, to 
the alone.101  
As it may be obvious, the basis of this Romantic appropriation of mysticism as a 
visionary state of consciousness that is deeply rooted in aesthetic and poetic 
experience is the much-discussed Victorian desire to ‘set[…] up a relationship of 
essential relatedness between poetry and religion’. The relationship, in this instance, is 
not the kind that is grounded on that traditionalist ‘servant/master’ paradigm of John 
Keble’s Praelectiones (1832-41), where the religious value of poetry is considered 
only in terms of its perceived subservience to ‘the Christian cause’: namely, how it 
should merely aim ‘to make emotionally appealing the intellectually profound 
doctrines of faith’. Instead, the kind of relationship Thomson is promoting belongs to 
the same hero-worshipping intellectual culture of Carlyle and company that went 
beyond viewing poetry as a mere emotional auxiliary for orthodox religion to the 
notion of the ‘divine agency’ of poets who become themselves the source of a unique 
divine revelation, capable of imparting new religious truths.102  
What makes ‘The Poems of Blake’ post-Christian in its adoption of this 
conception of poetry is Thomson’s apparent agnosticism about the nature of the 
divine: on the one hand, he contemplates a cosmological structure that is in continuity 
with the Christian tradition, with its understanding of God as a transcendent being; on 
the other, he suggests that this could be equally replaced by a pantheistic worldview, 
where the divine is conceived as the ‘interior’ soul of all. Either way, one thing is for 
certain, and that is that his belief here in the visionary capacities of poets, and their 
direct access to divine reality, lends to poetry a religious authority that is valuable in 
itself, independent of orthodox religion, whose role it could in fact assume, if the latter 
proved unable to withstand the scientific and intellectual challenges of the time. 
Although Thomson indicates in the opening of the lines above that his remarks are 
true of a certain class of poetry (not of poetry per se), one must not forget that his 
‘Shelley’ essay had judged this type of poetry to be of ‘the highest’ kind, labelling 
poets who write in the mystical mode as ‘transcendent’, and those who do not as 
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‘second-class poets’. This is not to mention what has been pointed out earlier in my 
discussion of both ‘Shelley’ and ‘Open Secret Societies’: that Thomson assigns 
archetypal status to mystic-poets (poets who are also full-fledged mystics), naming 
them ‘Poets of Poets’, hence implying that the more a poet’s work displays elements 
of mysticism, the closer it is to the quintessential ideals of poetry. The above-quoted 
passage from ‘The Poems of Blake’ should be read, therefore, not only as Thomson’s 
characterization of the mystical strand in nineteenth-century poetry, but also as a 
description of the core properties of genuine poetry. After all, ‘The Poems of Blake’ 
was written in 1864, after his essay on ‘Shelley’ (1860), and before ‘Open Secret 
Societies’ (1865), which suggests that it must have contributed to the theoretical 
continuity between them.  
 Aside from that, ‘The Poems of Blake’ also demonstrates an important point 
that has been discussed in the previous chapter: how nineteenth-century arguments for 
the religious authority of poetry through the Romantic aestheticization of mysticism 
depended in no small degree on securing mysticism against the onslaught of scientific 
and materialistic analysis. This involved defining mysticism in a way that excluded all 
rational modes of perception from its domain, ensuring that it stood separately and 
independently from the realm of logic, either on an equal or superior footing. By 
extension, it also meant that the validity of poetic truths could not be tested or 
measured by any logical means. In ‘The Making of Modern “Mysticism”’, Leigh 
Schmidt highlights the importance of Wayne Proudfoot’s Religious Experience 
(1985), particularly his chapter on ‘Mysticism’, for an understanding of the origins of 
this category’s development as an anti-positivist and anti-materialist construct.103 
Proudfoot traces the roots of modern attempts to ground religion on intuitive 
experience to the first major work of the German theologian Friedrich 
Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers (1799), which he 
argues arose as a Romantic reaction to eighteenth-cenutry criticisms of traditional 
religious doctrines, and to the Kantian critique of speculative metaphysics. In 
Proudfoot’s view, Schleiermacher’s ‘program’ rested on an understanding of religion, 
not as a prescribed set of dogmas, but as an ‘independent’ and ‘autonomous moment 
in human experience’ taking place only on the affective level of consciousness, an 
understanding that would develop, by the mid-nineteenth-century, into a powerful 
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‘protective strategy that serves apologetic purposes’: it ‘sought to free religious belief 
and practice from the requirement that they be justified by reference to nonreligious 
thought or action and to preclude the possibility’ of any ‘conflict with the results of 
science or any other kind of secular inquiry’.104  
 In the case of ‘The Poems of Blake’, this can be observed in Thomson’s 
differentiation between the visionary senses of mystics and the natural (or normative) 
senses of the rest of mankind, as well as his recognition of the distinctive integrity of 
the mystical consciousness, how it is insusceptible to the evaluative judgments of 
secular arguments: 
Blake and Swedenborg and other true mystics (Jesus among them) 
undoubtedly had senses other than ours; it is as futile for us to argue 
against the reality of their perceptions as it would be false in us to 
pretend that our perceptions are the same.105   
Not only is this an attempt to separate the religious from other realms of experience, 
but it is also a rejection of the epistemic sovereignty of the analytic and rationalist 
perspective. Such a perspective, Thomson says, would prove ‘futile’ if it were tasked 
to refute the phenomenological reality of mystical perceptions, as these take place 
only subjectively in the inner life of experience, and are therefore resistant to external 
standards of authority. Proudfoot offers a befitting commentary on the kind of 
discourse to which Thomson’s argument belongs: 
It suggests that the religious consciousness can be portrayed as an 
autonomous way of perceiving the world. As an attitude that is 
complete in itself, it is independent of and cannot conflict with 
common sense or the results of scientific inquiry. Some people see 
the world in religious terms; others regard it in naturalistic terms. 
These are mutually exclusive perspectives, but they can never come 
into direct conflict.106 
Indeed, this is why Thomson argues that, unlike the tendency of the natural, 
material consciousness toward analytic differentiation and categorization, the mystical 
mode of perception is chiefly characterized by its inclination to see unity and 
correspondence in the world that it thus stands indifferent to the concepts and 
principles of the scientific literature: ‘it thus ignores or pays little heed to the countless 
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complexities and distinctions of our modern civilisation and science, a knowledge of 
which is generally esteemed the most useful information and most valuable learning’. 
This belief that the mystical consciousness exists independently of material and 
rational categories is also why Thomson maintains that Blake’s mystical faith had no 
place for the rational arguments of the natural theology of William Paley or Richard 
Whitely, commonly known as the ‘Christian evidences’:   
As to the “Christian Evidences,” as they are termed, of which the 
mass of good people are so enamoured, in trying to argue 
themselves and others into a sort of belief in a sort (and such a sort!) 
of deity, he would have no more dreamed of appealing to them than 
he would have tried elaborately to argue himself into belief in the 
existence of the sun. “I feel the warmth, I see the light and see by 
the light: what do you want to argue about? You may call it sun, 
moon, comet, star, or Will-o’-the-Wisp, if so it pleases you; all I 
know and care for is this, that day by day it warms and lights me.107  
For Thomson, Blake’s was an experientially-based belief system: just as his belief in 
the existence of the sun was derived from his sensory experience of its ‘warmth’ and 
‘light’, so were his religious beliefs derived from his immediate spiritual experience of 
the divine through his intuitive senses.  
 An obvious corollary of this separation between the mystical consciousness 
and the rational one is that each would have its own sphere of influence and utility, 
something that Thomson apparently had in mind. One might certainly argue that ‘The 
Poems of Blake’ aims to make a legitimate case for the value and significance of 
mysticism as an independent cultural force capable of addressing society’s moral and 
spiritual needs in a way that could not be met by modern science. As evidence of the 
rising significance and contemporary relevance of the ‘spirit of mysticism’, Thomson 
observes how ‘in eighty years the influence of this spirit has swelled from the “Songs 
of Innocence” to the poems of Emerson – a rapid increase of the tide in literature’. 
Beyond Emerson and the major English poets of the century, moreover, he adds that 
‘other signs of its [mysticism’s] increase meet us everywhere in the best books of 
verse published during the last few years’, one of which indicates that ‘perchance the 
increase has been even more rapid than the most of us have opportunity to learn’. By 
this, Thomson is referring to John Garth Wilkinson’s Improvisations from the Spirit 
(1857), which he had not yet read at the time, but would review fifteen years later in 
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‘A Strange Book’ (1879), primarily for its mystical interest. His suggestion that ‘it 
would be a boon to the public’ to make this ‘volume easily accessible’, coupled with 
his following prediction about Emerson’s mystical poetry, reflects the high hopes that 
Thomson held for the future of mysticism: 
Anyone with ears to hear may catch pregnant hints of what poetry 
possessed by this spirit can accomplish, and therefore will 
accomplish; for no pure inspiration having once come down among 
men ever withdraws its influence until it has attained (humanly) 
perfect embodiment.108 
While it is true that mysticism’s attainment of ‘organic perfection’ in poetry must 
have been part of Thomson’s intended meaning by its ‘(humanly) perfect 
embodiment’,109 both his earlier review of Emerson and later review of Wilkinson 
suggest that another part of his meaning relates to the social functionality of mystical 
poetry. In ‘Notes on Emerson’ (1858), for example, he argues that the real worth of 
reading Emerson – whom he also labels as a ‘Mystic’ there110 – is how his mystical 
writing has a moral and spiritual effect on his readers: ‘it raise you to a grand sphere 
of thought, inspire you to a lofty mood’.111 After recognizing Wilkinson’s mysticism 
in ‘A Strange Book’, moreover, Thomson similarly argues that, when writers are 
endowed with such ‘splendid powers’ as Wilkinson’s, they can only attain ‘their full 
development and happiness in usefulness’, and this is by answering to society’s 
profound need for ‘much that is pure and wise and beautiful’. ‘Our poor race [is] 
pining for illumination’, he declares, and ‘the supreme warmth and light of genius and 
intellect are so rare, so sorely needed’, that it is the obligation of all ‘fulgent spirits 
[…] to be effulgent’: to ‘let their light shine forth before men’.112 
3. Points of Continuity Between Thomson’s Early and Later Aesthetic Theory 
In the opening of this chapter, I have called attention to the view put forth by William 
Schaefer, in James Thomson (B. V.): Beyond “The City”, that Thomson ‘had 
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disowned Romantic inspiration’ as a necessary part of his development toward his 
final position as a self-proclaimed atheist in the late 1860s, a view that finds similar 
expressions elsewhere in Thomson scholarship.113 This section will be dedicated to 
problematizing this view, which I intend to do by casting some light on a few points 
of continuity between Thomson’s early and later poetic theory with the overall 
purpose of highlighting his late Romanticism. In this sense, the analysis herein seeks 
to elaborate on previous critical commentaries that have noted the indebtedness of 
Thomson’s later poetics to his early idealist conceptions of inspiration, such as the one 
found in Valeria Tinkler-Villani’s (2003) historical and literary-critical account of 
Shelley’s reception in the nineteenth century. In the course of her discussion, Tinkler-
Villani responds to the view proposed by R. A. Foakes that The City of Dreadful Night 
marks the culmination of the Victorian’s negation of Romantic visionary poetry. She 
argues that Thomson’s five studies on the structure of Prometheus Unbound, 
published in 1881 (a year before his death) were, in fact, based on his 1860 essay on 
Shelley, an essay she primarily describes as a ‘romantic reading of the Romantic poet, 
in which greatness is defined by inspiration’. Foakes, it should be noted, had observed 
that Thomson’s poem ‘inverts the rhetoric and the images of the Romantic vision, and 
applies them to an assertion of despair, the negation of that vision’.114 But Tinkler-
Villani’s defence is that the poet’s debt to Shelleyan Romanticism ‘goes beyond 
images, assertions of certainties or the adoption of a rhetoric of vision’: it is dedicated, 
she states, ‘to the essence of poetic skill’, which Thomson believed would entitle a 
poet ‘the epithet inspired’, something that he attempted to reproduce ‘in his own 
verbal and metrical virtuosity in the complex forms and verse of The City of Dreadful 
Night’.115 Another significant commentary of Thomson’s late Romantic poetics is 
Jerome J. McGann’s 1963 analysis of the same poem, which builds on Harold 
Bloom’s Shelley’s Mythmaking and The Visionary Company. Contrary to Foakes, he 
regards Thomson as ‘a direct descendent of the Visionary Romantic type’, arguing 
that any inversion in The City of Shelley’s Prometheus Unbound is an inversion of its 
mythic structure, rather than of its visionary inheritance. Dubbing Thomson ‘the 
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Victorian disciple of the great Romantic’, McGann writes that ‘he too sees visions, 
dreams dreams, makes myths’, but in his case ‘the myth as a vehicle for unifying all 
experience is destroyed and in its place is established an anti-myth, a vehicle for 
promoting and unifying none- or negative experience’.116   
 My analysis here differs from that of Tinkler-Villani and McGann in that I 
intend to explore Thomson’s late Romanticism in the context of his contribution to the 
modern construction of mysticism, and with particular attention to his 1879 essay ‘A 
Strange Book’. Where Thomson’s notions of the mystical are concerned, I have so far 
focused on how his early poetry and criticism attempted to attribute religious authority 
to poetry through a conception of it as a source of divine revelation, and how this was 
significantly grounded in his definitions of mysticism. The rest of this chapter will 
further explore Grace Jantzen’s premise that ‘defining mysticism is a way of defining 
power’, but in the more particular light of Thomson’s self-fashioning as a poet and 
critic. In other words, I have previously argued that Thomson’s Romantic 
appropriation of mysticism was a means of asserting the general authority of poetry as 
a cultural force, but now I will endeavour to look more closely into how it was also an 
important means of conferring authority upon himself within his literary and critical 
scene. This necessitates a discussion of the intellectual relegation that Thomson had 
suffered in consequence of his association with the militant atheism and radicalism of 
Charles Bradlaugh’s National Reformer. 
When Henry Paolucci and J. Edward Meeker respectively referred to Thomson 
as a ‘disreputable rebel’ and a ‘Bohemian in the very respectable Mid-Victorian 
period’,117 they both meant something along the lines of Isobel Armstrong’s remark 
that ‘Thomson belonged to a group politically and ideologically out of the mainstream 
of cultural life’, one that may be qualified to constitute ‘Another Culture’.118 Space 
does not allow me to deliberate here on this group’s political and ideological 
orientations, and the extent of the poet’s involvement with it,119 but it is pertinent to 
merely note that Thomson’s lengthy literary career with the National Reformer 
aligned him with that radical secular community surrounding Charles Bradlaugh, 
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which practiced a ‘militant’ or ‘negative’ form of secularism, as opposed to the 
‘positive’ one espoused by George Holyoake. In discussing how these two differ, 
Susan Budd explains that Bradlaugh believed that the only effective means of 
extending secular principles was to prepare a ‘bold front’ against Christianity, 
regardless of how much atheism was feared or despised by polite society: ‘You must 
go boldly to them in your Freethought propaganda and break their teeth, or else they 
bite those members of your party who are the weakest’. Holyoake, on the other hand, 
believed that Bradlaugh’s approach only served to repel the much more needed 
support of the middle class, so he sought to make the movement ‘more respectable’ by 
moderating its anti-religious nature, and focusing instead on the positive establishment 
of a ‘scientific morality’ and the promotion of liberty. The result was that, whereas 
Holyoake was able to attain certain – albeit limited – social and political privileges 
among the respectable circles, Bradlaugh’s group remained ‘perpetual outsiders’ to all 
but the working-class radical culture.120 
That Thomson would have personally felt the effects of this kind of cultural 
exclusion is understandable, given the low status and readership achieved by the 
National Reformer throughout his association with it. As pointed out by Meeker and 
Bertram Dobell, ‘Bradlaugh’s paper seemed far from respectable to the upper classes 
of Mid-Victorian society’, its readers being ‘chiefly the more intelligent members of 
the working classes’.121 Indeed, those of his reviewers who wished to devalue his 
work rarely failed to point out the paper’s marginal position among mainline 
periodicals, deprecatingly referring to it, for instance, as a ‘foolish working men’s 
paper’,122 or a ‘little-read periodical’.123 One paper even compares its combative 
outspokenness to its small following, describing it as ‘an outsider’ who – recognizing 
that its own ‘sentiments’ are ‘confined to a very few’ – seeks to attract attention by 
‘amateur trumpeting’. ‘The National Reformer’, it stated, ‘makes a noise quite 
disproportioned to the number of its adherents’.124  
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This is not to mention that Thomson was guilty of much of this ‘noisy, wordy,’ 
and ‘angry’ proselytizing that went on in Bradlaugh’s paper, a stance that, according 
to Budd, was itself partly a reaction to such marginalization. The secularist, she 
explains, ‘found himself in a position of self-sustaining rebellion, an attitude to 
society which could find no channel except violent hostility to the symbols of the 
respectable mores which excluded him’. 125  As for Thomson’s justification, he 
believed that ‘disrespectable’ militancy should be considered a sign of intellectual 
honesty: ‘Alas for the times when honesty and valour must turn rebels! Not the least 
harm done by shallow and hypocritical respectability is its disgusting sincere men into 
disrespectability’. He further makes this point in his rejection of Thackery’s ‘salon 
morality’ that chooses to criticise the middle class on its own terms, where it should 
have ‘taken up a more honourable and commanding position of attack outside the 
mansion’.126 
Thomson’s choice of this more ‘honourable’ vantage-point from ‘outside the 
mansion’ of course meant that he also found himself subject to constant rejection and 
censure by mainstream publishers, editors and critics, who, in their turn, wished to 
ensure that he remained ‘outside’. As Bertram Dobell has put it: ‘He had dared to 
transgress the most stringent of all commandments of the British Philistine “Thou 
shalt before all else, be respectable,” and he paid the due penalty for his 
contumacy’.127 Indeed, we are told that at the outset of his literary career, from 1862 
to 1869, and before he had given up on the matter, Thomson struggled with ‘almost 
uniform ill-success, to obtain admission’ for his work into the major magazines of the 
time, despite the fact that he was not ‘an especially faulty artist’128 – His poetry, 
indeed, brought him the friendship and ‘admiration of so many good literary judges’, 
such as George Meredith, the Roessettis, Froude, Herman Melville, E. C. Stedman, P. 
B. Martson, George Eliot, Kingsley and Saintsbury.129 Dobell is right in suggesting 
that Thomson was fortunate enough to have in Bradlaugh’s radical paper a sure place 
to publish his heterodox pieces,130 but even his success to publish there exposed him 
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to far more critical and public reproach than admiration. It is safe to say, for example, 
that the hostility of the following 1876 excerpt from the Christian World towards 
certain sections from Thomson’s work is not at all uncommon of the critical attention 
he attracted from reviewers:  
This is but a specimen of the disdainful and derisive tone with 
which this writer, who at length leaves himself stranded in a region 
of the dreariest Atheism, continually speaks of that Book which 
what he terms ‘the illusions of our younger days’ might have taught 
him to respect.131   
In fact, the poet’s work sometimes managed to become too audacious even for 
National Reformer readers, as evidenced in a letter of April 9, 1874, where the poet 
mentions how the first instalments of The City drew from subscribers ‘three or four 
letters energetically protesting against its publication’ next to ‘only one praising it’.132 
Bradlaugh was even compelled, at least once, to discontinue one of Thomson’s 
contributions, when its previous instalments elicited a letter of this kind:    
The very mention of your name is enough to make the hair stand. 
[…] I showed your last number to a neighbour who was so horrified 
that he said your paper, yourself, and all your supporters ought to be 
burned.133  
Neither were Thomson’s opportunities more congenial when it came to 
publishing his work in book form. Unable to raise the costs of a publication from the 
scanty earnings of his writings, he ventured between 1874 and 1880 to find a 
publisher who would ‘risk money’ on his work, but was never successful. ‘Verse by 
an unknown man’, he believed, ‘is always a drug in the market, and when it is 
atheistic it is a virulently poisonous drug, with which respectable publishers would 
rather have nothing to do’.134 It is only by Dobell’s ‘fortunate application’, on behalf 
of his friend, to the more liberal Reeves and Turner – and by the fact that Dobell had 
also covered half of the publication’s expenses – that Thomson lived to witness the 
favourable reception of his first volume of poetry, The City of Dreadful Night and 
Other Poems (1880).135 Still, this achievement was short-lived, as the following year 
came with the unprofitable publication of his second volume of poetry Vane’s Story 
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and Other Poems (1881), and his first prose collection, the latter becoming practically 
paralyzed by public apathy and critical neglect: 
“Essays and Phantasies” […] received scarcely any notice from the 
leading organs of critical opinion, and was almost a failure as a 
publishing venture. Not much more than three hundred copies of the 
book had been disposed of when, in 1890 (nine years after its first 
issue), the remaining copies […] were destroyed by fire.136 
That Thomson realized the full extent of his obscurity is shown in his confession 
to Rossetti:  
No living writer can have much less reputation than myself, who am 
simply known to some readers of the National Reformer as “B. V.,” 
the author of many pieces and scraps in prose and verse. […] The 
only production in reputable society, which I can cite in my favour 
is ‘Sunday Up The River’.137  
Elsewhere he declared: ‘I am an author thoroughly unknown and writing for a 
periodical of the deepest disrepute’. And although the poet attempted to imply his own 
indifference to the obscurity of his reputation, stating in 1874 that he had ‘neither tried 
nor cared to win any popular applause’, Ian Campbell’s observation that there is 
reason to question this is not without support.138  
In addition to Campbell’s keen insights in demonstrating how the poet’s 
‘surviving notebooks and correspondence show an acute sensitivity to what reviews, 
and to what others were saying’ of his work, these private sources also indicate how 
thrilled Thomson was for receiving any favourable acknowledgment of his writing, 
whether they were from George Eliot, the Rossettis, or even an anonymous critic of a 
respectable – or ‘popular’ – periodical. Dobell may have gone too far in suggesting 
that Eliot’s commendation of the poet ‘probably gave him the greatest degree of 
pleasure that he was capable of feeling’, but Thomson’s letters of gratitude to his 
admirers do, if anything, tell of the isolation of an unknown poet, who is hardly 
indifferent to recognition. They show how Thomson was always in ‘haste’ to 
‘heartily’ thank them for the ‘very valuable’ approval with which they have ‘rendered 
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[…] to an obscure stranger’, helping to ‘cheer’ him ‘on a somewhat lonely path’.139 
Aside from that, some of Thomson’s correspondence with Dobell clearly reveals how 
distressed he was for being repeatedly turned down for publication – at times, 
complaining of ‘the damned Dizzy suspense’ of having to wait to get published – and, 
at others, venting his frustration on ‘the infernal impolicy of our Jewish-Jingo 
misgovernment’, which he blamed for the general ‘depression of trade’ that had led 
publication companies into hard times.140 What this all meant, moreover, is that, 
instead of focusing on his poetry, Thomson was very often constrained to write 
articles ‘of the hack order’ to pay for his bare expenses: ‘Pity me for the nonsense I 
have to scribble for the NR in these bad days’.141 In fact, William Schaefer believes 
that one of the contributing factors to Thomson’s pessimism of the seventies is how 
‘he undoubtedly felt’ that, ‘as a crusading essayist’, ‘his work was already doomed to 
obscurity in the back issues of the disreputable’ periodicals of the time. Commenting 
on the subject, Dobell recalls how his friend ‘was, indeed, quite destitute of that 
persistence and “push” which enables some men of quite ordinary talents to achieve a 
success which is often denied to those of far greater powers’.142  
This brings me to the first point of continuity in relation to Thomson’s critical 
views on poetry, namely, his estimation of the work of Shelley, a poet whom 
Thomson felt was ‘starved with scorn’ in his lifetime by an unsympathetic public,143 
something with which Thomson could easily associate.144 A brief look at some 
evidence of Thomson’s enduring admiration for the Romantic poet is instructive in the 
sense that it reveals how ‘poetic inspiration’ was a viable category in Thomson’s later 
critical vocabulary. In a prefatory note to a posthumous collection of Thomson’s 
writings on Shelley, Dobell indicates the depth of his friend’s lasting veneration for 
the earlier poet, which dated back to a time when Shelley was still an obscure figure:   
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Not one of SHELLEY’S admirers, I am convinced, ever surpassed 
JAMES THOMSON in affectionate devotion to his memory, or ever 
studied his writings with more minute and loving care. His poetry 
inspired THOMSON in his youth, at a time when SHELLEY’S 
reputation had not yet risen above the fogs and clouds that so long 
obscured its radiance: it was a resource and a consolation to him 
under the misfortunes of his manhood: and to the last he never 
ceased to regard with gratitude and love “the poet of poets and 
purest of men.”145 
Dobell was evidently taking cues from Thomson’s deleted introduction to ‘Notes on 
the Structure of “Prometheus Unbound”’ (1881), written in 1878, and posthumously 
published under the title ‘A Note on Shelley’ (1884).146 In it, Thomson is keen to 
separate himself from the crowds of Shelley’s superficial admirers, distinguishing 
himself as a long-devoted ‘genuine student’ of the poet, whose early unfavourable 
reputation never deterred this critic from discerning the ‘breath of divine inspiration’ 
that infuses Shelley’s verse: 
It is no longer needful to excuse or vindicate this poet of poets. It is 
now fashionable and facile to laud him, with or without 
understanding. Even church-going belles are now free to admire 
“that poor dear Shelley;” even pious pastors may now sleek him 
with praise soft and pitiful, as an erring lamb which, had it lived to 
mature sheephood, would certainly have found its way back to the 
one secure fold. For genuine students the time to simply praise is 
past, the time to fitly appraise not yet come; […] In the meantime, 
those who from their youth up, when he was despised and rejected 
of men, have loved and revered him with a rapture of enthusiasm 
such as no other singer of these latter days has excited, to whom he, 
far beyond any other, has been a glorious light of truth, a burning 
fire of love, a breath of divine inspiration, can perhaps render him 
no better public service, in addition to that intimate service of  
devout following on his pathway so far as their strength will permit, 
than the very humble one of endeavouring, while it is yet time, to 
make his text as clear, accurate, genuine, and complete as 
possible.147 
In the part that made it in ‘Notes on the Structure of “Prometheus Unbound”’, 
moreover, Thomson had similarly invoked Shelley’s power of ‘inspiration’ in what 
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seems to be another attempt to stake a claim to a pioneering recognition of the 
Romantic poet’s genius:  
Whatever my rashness and errors [in commenting on Shelley], 
certainly I love and have loved much, from the earliest study of my 
youth through thirty long years; I yield to no one living in the 
fulness of my tribute of gratitude and love and reverence, as no one 
in the measure of his or her capacity can be indebted for fuller 
delight and inspiration to this glorious poet of the glorious possible 
future of Humanity, “in one word, and that the only proper word, 
Divine.”148 
Aside from this, Thomson’s letters of correspondence with William Rossetti between 
February 1872 and September 1873 provide further evidence of Thomson’s abiding 
admiration for Shelley, and of how this was predicated on a belief in poetic 
inspiration. I cite here one example from his letter of 18 April 1873, where Thomson 
disagrees with Rossetti’s appraisal of Shelley’s Epipsychidion: 
While agreeing with you in ranking The Witch of Atlas very high, I 
cannot agree with you in preferring it to the Epipsychidion. It has 
always seemed to me that Shelley never soared higher than in this 
poem, which I find full of supreme inspiration.149 
As for how all this relates to Thomson’s later understanding of mysticism, I have 
previously noted that Thomson’s early conceptualisation of mysticism in terms of 
poetic inspiration frequently occurred as part of an attempt to negotiate a view of 
Shelley as a ‘quintessential poet’; and this interestingly holds true with regard to 
Thomson’s later literary thought. This is evidenced in ‘A Strange Book’, to which I 
shall shortly return, but it will suffice for now to point out that Thomson there 
profusely quotes Shelley’s ‘Defence of Poetry’ in his attempt to make a case for the 
fundamental relationship between mysticism and ‘this doctrine of inspiration’. In 
doing so, moreover, he asserts that Shelley is ‘the most spontaneous and inspired of 
modern poets’, which is another way of saying that he is the most mystical.150     
 In addition to this, another way in which Thomson’s continuing appreciation 
of Shelley relates to his later notions of mysticism is the fact that it reflects his belief 
in the ineffable nature of the mystical, which is actually the second point of continuity 
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between his early and later poetic theory. This is also where Thomson’s personal 
search for cultural authority is most clear. Indeed, a comparison between a few 
sections from his early critical pieces and the general argument of ‘A Strange Book’ 
will reveal that Thomson’s appropriation of this category was in such a way that 
reflects his desire to overturn his position of cultural otherness, by allowing him to 
invent or fashion for himself a superior place at the centre of literary culture. This is 
related to his attempt to positively redefine mysticism’s negative signification of 
‘obscurity’ into ineffability, which – I suggest – turns out to be nothing less than an 
exercise in redefining his own status as an obscure or unknown poet. The examples 
referred to in the discussion below will show that, following in the footsteps of 
Carlyle, Thomson contended that critics and literary reviewers who contemptuously 
speak of the ‘vagueness’ or ‘difficulty’ of mystical language are but unwittingly 
betraying their own incapacity as true judges of poetry. For him, as it was for Carlyle, 
verse that is rich in obscure expression signifies the poet’s possession of a higher 
intuitive faculty that allows him/her to discern prophetic truths that are too profound 
for ordinary language; and equally, only readers possessing a similar faculty are able 
to apprehend its insights. Again, as stated in the previous chapter, this was to say that 
it is not the mysticism of the poetry that is at fault, but the critics’ inability to develop 
the necessary intuitions to comprehend it.   
That this is not free from a hidden power agenda becomes apparent when we 
are made to understand that Thomson himself is endowed with that superior intuition, 
a suggestion that is made through his nearly didactic, all-too-authoritative judgments 
of what (or who) may and may not count as mystical. This, I argue, was meant not 
only to convey Thomson’s authority as a critic over the alleged majority of 
incompetent ones, but also to assert his own claims to genuine poetry. It may help us 
understand why his defence of mysticism often comes hand in hand with his defence 
of such poets as Shelley, Blake and Browning whose obscurity of language, according 
to Thomson, attracted enough censure as to hinder their attainment of the recognition 
due their poetic genius.151 One can assert from this that the notion of ‘mystical 
obscurity’, or the quality of ‘not being understood’, served for Thomson as an 
apologetic for a poet’s obscurity of reputation, something that could help justify his 
own unfavourable reception by reviewers. 
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To demonstrate this, the best place to start with is Thomson’s previously 
discussed essay of 1865 ‘Open Secret Societies’, whose title is a clear invocation of 
Goethe’s ‘offenbar geheimniß’, an expression that Carlyle had Englished as ‘the open 
secret’ in ‘The Hero as Poet’ (1840), with which Thomson was familiar. In fact, 
Thomson had earlier translated the first stanza of Goethe’s 1814 poem of the same 
title152 in ‘The Poems of Blake’ (1864), and would later not only translate the full 
poem in his essay ‘The Divan of Goethe’ (1871), but also quote it again in ‘A Strange 
Book’. This suggests the strong hold that Goethe’s conception of the mystic-poet 
exercised on Thomson’s mind throughout his literary career. I cite here the first and 
last stanzas of Thomson’s translation, which reveal Goethe’s desire to subvert the 
negative implications of the term ‘mystic’ in favour of the poem’s subject, the Persian 
poet Hafiz. As in the case of Carlyle, moreover, the stanzas show Goethe 
endeavouring to question the position of authority from which Hafiz’s critics ridicule 
his writings:  
They have called you, O holy Hafiz, 
They have called you the Mystic Tongue: 
Nor knew, the great word-scholars, 
The sense of the words they sung. 
[…] 
But you are mystic only 
As quite transcending their wit; 
That you are not pious and yet are blest 
They cannot at all admit.153 
As it would not have been lost on Thomson, the poem’s ‘open secret’ is related to the 
highly intuitive and ineffable meanings of Hafiz’s poetry, which are beyond the grasp 
of the ‘great word-scholars’ who pay too close an attention to the peculiar 
technicalities of the Persian poet’s language. Indeed, this is the meaning that Thomson 
appropriates in ‘Open Secret Societies’. 
 But what is important to point out is that Thomson further extends Goethe’s 
notion, adopting it as the central principal around which he constructs his five ‘secret 
societies’: these are represented as eternal communities whose members are linked by 
ineffable ties of kinship that transcend the artificial and mechanical means of 
association that govern earthly societies. Unsurprisingly, Thomson’s description of 
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these societies heavily relies on a language of inclusion/exclusion, which is interesting 
to note, considering that it belongs to a poet-critic who was conscious of his own 
marginality in the literary scene of his day. Of the eternal character of these societies, 
Thomson states: 
There always have been and always will be in the world countless 
genuine Secret Societies of the most open, while of the most hidden, 
character. Continuous and unadulterate these have flowed, separate 
streams through the Sea of Time, from an antiquity which makes all 
nobilities and castes unreverend; holding in solution secrets and 
mysteries so august, so ineffable. […] Exactly what they cherish and 
adore as the inmost mystery of their being, their whole being ever 
strives to utter most clearly abroad to the senses and hearts and 
intellects of the whole world; only the initiated ever truly hear and 
read it, to all others it is sound without meaning and letters without 
significance.154 
As for the ‘initiated’ and ‘uninitiated’ members of each society, they are described as 
follows: 
Their members are affiliated for life and death in the instant of being 
born; without ceremonies of initiation, without sponsorial oaths of 
fidelity. Their bond of union is a natural affinity, quite mysterious in 
its principles and elements, precise and assured in its results as the 
combination and proportions of oxygen and hydrogen in water, or 
oxygen and nitrogen in air. No spy or traitor, no unworthy or 
uncongenial brother, can obtain entrance among them, any more 
than a hemlock or a lily can be adopted into the family of the roses, 
any more than an ape or a tiger can pass as one of a herd of 
elephants. […] But it must be admitted that these loftiest of the 
Open Secret Societies, which exist everywhere and endure with the 
aeon of our race, are parodied and counterfeited and traduced by 
ingenious Societies of the artificial kind, and that many simple 
people confuse the parody with the original, the artificial with the 
natural.155  
That Thomson’s assertion of the ineffability of mysticism is accompanied by 
an attempt to assert his own authority as a poet and critic is evident in how he 
implicitly suggests that he is an ‘initiate’ member of the ‘Open Secret Society of the 
Poets’. This he does by differentiating between genuine poetry and its parodies, and 
then placing himself as a judge of what can count as the former and what should pass 
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	 220	
as the latter. This becomes clear when the essay is placed next to Thomson’s criticism 
of the various poets of his day in ‘The Poems of Blake’. Blake, Coleridge, Shelley, 
Keats, The Brownings, and Emerson are deemed to be true members of this fraternity 
while Byron, and Scott are excluded from it. But the clearest example of this is found 
in how Tennyson fairs under Thomson’s critical scrutiny. In ‘Open Secret Societies’, 
Thomson describes the parodies of true poetry as follows: 
Serious parodies of these divine songs abound in every age, and are 
welcomed by the uninitiate (who are usually what we call persons of 
liberal culture […]) as the most beautiful utterance of the inmost 
mysteries of this veritable Secret Society; and the authors thereof 
win during their lifetime wealth and honour and renown. For many 
of them can copy with marvellous adroitness the rhythms and 
rhymes and melodious phrases which are much loved by the true 
brotherhood, so that not only by others but also by themselves they 
are believed to be genuine bards. But when one who is initiate hears 
or reads their productions, he discerns that they are as fair bodies 
without souls; for the music and the splendour of infinity are not 
within them, and they are utterly unrelated to eternity.156 [my italics] 
And this is exactly Thomson’s verdict on the Laureate’s poetry: 
Tennyson has no more of this simplicity than had Byron: his chief 
youthful fault was such a young ladyish affectation as could not 
exist together with it. But he is fully aware of its value, and woos it 
like a lover, in vain. […] Scarcely any other artist in verse of the 
same rank has ever lived on such scanty revenues of thought (both 
pure, and applied or mixed) as Tennyson. While it cannot be 
pretended that he is a great sculptor, he is certainly an exquisite 
carver of luxuries in ivory; but we must be content to admire the 
caskets, for there are no jewels inside. […] He is continually petty 
with that littleness of the second degree which makes a man brag 
aloud in avoiding some well-known littleness of the first degree. 
[…] Nothing gives one a keener insight into the want of robustness 
in the educated English intellect of the age than the fact that nine-
tenths of our best-known literary men look upon him as a profound 
philosopher. When wax-flowers are oracular oaks, Dodona may be 
discovered in the Isle of Wight, but hardly until then. […] A great 
school of the poets is dying out: it will die decently, elegantly, in the 
full odour of respectability, with our Laureate.157	
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis contributes to the recent turn in Victorian and Modernist Studies towards 
eschewing the ‘spectacular privileging of disjuncture’ that has traditionally governed 
how scholars of Modernism characterize the shift from the nineteenth to the twentieth 
century in a way that overlooks the many contributions of the former to Modernist art, 
culture and ideology.1 The main thrust of my argument has been to highlight how the 
nineteenth-century’s post-Romantic definitions of mysticism were a constitutive 
discourse in Victorian poetry and poetics, whilst also attempting to fill a long-standing 
gap in the existing postmodernist scholarship that endeavours to problematize the 
modern category of mysticism. In particular, my work partly serves as a response to 
how previous problematizations of the category promote the view that the Western 
preoccupation with mysticism – a preoccupation that is traceable back to an early 
period of its intellectual history – was temporarily interrupted by the scientific and 
materialist culture of the nineteenth century which had almost sounded its death-knell, 
only to be revived at the turn of the twentieth century by Modernist philosophers, 
religionists and aesthetes. As earlier mentioned, and according to Leigh Schmidt, 
studies contributing to this account of mysticism’s discursive history have duly 
acknowledged the role of both the seventeenth and twentieth centuries in the process 
of the category’s modern formation, but they have kept silent about the nineteenth-
century’s significant legacies in this regard. Building on Schmidt’s work and that of 
other recent scholars, my study sought to offer a modest step toward redressing the 
balance, particularly calling attention to the imperative part played by the Victorians 
in how twentieth-century mysticism came to be primarily defined by its ineffability, as 
well as by its fundamental affinity to poetry and the arts. 
 In doing so, I have employed a cultural constructivist method of analysis 
similar to that adopted by Richard King (1998) and Grace Jantzen (1995), one that 
acknowledges that ‘mysticism’, ‘culture’ and ‘power’ are mutually overlapping 
categories, and that any definition of the mystical constitutes a conceptual site of 
struggle for authority, whether individual or institutional. The theoretical 
underpinnings of this approach were outlined in my first chapter, whose chief purpose 
was to offer a rationale for this methodological choice, as well as a critique of 
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previous literary-critical scholarship that adopts ‘mysticism’ as a primary analytic 
category. After giving an overview of the two theoretical understandings of mysticism 
that have dominated its academic study in the fields of Philosophy and Religion 
(namely, the essentialist and the constructivist), the chapter argued that the majority of 
previous critical investigations of the question of mysticism in Victorian poetry have 
been conducted from a predominantly essentialist perspective, and that this is 
particularly true of the scholarship that was published before the 80s of the past 
century. With the rise of Katzian constructivism in the late 1970s, there has been an 
evident decline in the status of the essentialist approach to the mystical that, as I have 
contended, parallels a similar decline in scholarly interest in the relationship between 
Victorian poetry and mysticism. It was my contention that this lapse in the status of 
the perennial paradigm does not mean that mysticism should become an outmoded 
category in critical discussions of nineteenth-century poets, and that adopting a 
constructivist approach to the subject can, in fact, do much in the way of recuperating 
it as a viable category for the analysis of the period’s poetry and its poetics.    
Referring to the constructivists’ theoretical objections to the essentialist 
school, Chapter I also sought to underline that one of the methodological deficiencies 
of the essentialist phenomenology of mysticism which has precipitated its decline is 
that it is implicitly theological, often generating ideologically exclusionary narratives. 
This point was demonstrated by reviewing the representative opinions of literary 
critics who have interrogated the mysticism of Tennyson and Hopkins, two Victorian 
poets who have especially attracted this kind of critical attention. With a focus on the 
critics’ phenomenological evaluations of the poets’ mystical experiences (that is, their 
investment in the question of whether or not the poet’s experiences are worthy of 
being called ‘mystical’), I have shown that such criticism is too often culpable of 
making onto-theological truth claims that are imposed on the reader, or on the literary 
text itself. The examples referred to in this discussion were specifically for the 
purpose of exposing how this critical approach depends in its analysis on a number of 
ontological and phenomenological categories that it unreflectively takes as self-
evident, universal, and as constituting stable referents from which the meaning of the 
literary text can be derived, and this without addressing the problem that categories of 
this kind are, in fact, highly contentious.  
It is important to note, moreover, that my critique of the essentialist-oriented 
critical literature in this chapter necessitated that I to draw attention to the fact that my 
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rejection of it is not a rejection, per se, of the use of the essentialist approach in 
literary criticism, but rather of how it has almost always been employed without the 
introduction of critical reflexivity, the latter of which is not necessarily incompatible 
with the essentialist model of analysis. While embracing the interpretive strategies of 
the constructivist method, therefore, I noted that my application of it is innocuous of 
any attempt to silence the voices of contemporary literary critics who are interested in 
the phenomenology of mysticism, as I do not wish to further contribute to the 
entrenchment of the essentialist/constructivist divide in scholarly debates on this topic. 
In terms of its location on the essentialist-constructivist spectrum, the approach that 
has been applied here is situated somewhere in a middle position: this is in the sense 
that it de-ontologizies mysticism merely for interpretive purposes, while suspending 
judgment on questions pertaining to the philosophy and phenomenology of religion, 
as opposed to the practice of abolitionist constructivism that completely seeks to 
invalidate the ontological reality of mystical experiences. As I have explained, my 
own preference for employing the constructivist method in this thesis has been 
prompted by my belief that the past dominance of the essentialist method in literary 
critical inquiries of mysticism has led to the treatment of ‘mystical texts’ as being 
nothing but a record of intense private subjective experiences that provide genuine 
insights into the inner world of the writer/poet, a perspective that, I believe, ought to 
be neutralized by turning our attention to the cultural aspects of mysticism.  
Although this study is not alone in examining Victorian literature’s 
engagement with mysticism through an interpretive approach that is mindful of its 
cultural constructedness, one of my contributions to this line of research is my attempt 
to define the conceptual and theoretical parameters of the debate that informs this 
approach in relation to the literary scholarship on Victorian poets. This was done with 
the hope of explicitly clarifying and reinforcing an already emerging literary-critical 
discourse that deals with this category, and is, in my opinion, a necessary step toward 
providing what may be considered an overdue corrective to the essentialist literary 
interpretations of the mystical corpus of Victorian writers. To my knowledge, none of 
the existing constructivist interrogations of the category in the literary context of 
nineteenth-century England have addressed the essentialist scholarship that has been – 
and is still being – conducted on mysticism within the field of literary studies, leaving 
open a lacuna that I hope my introductory chapter has partially filled. I have ventured 
to do this by importing some of the key theoretical questions and concerns that have 
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been raised in the fields of Philosophy, Religion and History regarding mysticism to 
the field of literary studies. As well as helping lay the groundwork for my analysis, 
Chapter I’s review of the essentialist critical scholarship on Tennyson and Hopkins is 
significant in that it invites essentialist-minded literary critics to go beyond debating 
the question of mysticism on solely essentialist terms, and take into account other 
critical perspectives that are not merely in contention with one or another specific 
phenomenological definition of mysticism, but with the whole essentialist paradigm 
on which these definitions are based. Aside from this, I believe that if literary scholars 
from both the essentialist and constructivist camps agree that mysticism – whether it is 
taken as an experiential or a conceptual category – or both – was crucial to the 
Victorian literary and critical imagination, then they at least ought to agree that an 
awareness of the complexities and subtleties that any adequate definition of the 
mystical must admit and reconcile is equally crucial for any interpretation that seeks 
to do justice to the subject under consideration. 
In addition to this, and as noted in Chapter I, a central concern of previous 
literary research on the Victorian construction of mysticism has been its interest in 
tracing the category’s relationship to the developing field of psychology in the second 
half of the nineteenth century, particularly in how mysticism was shaped by the shift 
of emphasis from a philosophical to a physiological perspective in mid-nineteenth-
century scientific studies of mind. The major context in which this has been examined 
is the Victorian realist fiction of the 1860s onward. This thesis extends the application 
of the constructivist method to a new context in which the concerns of Victorian poets 
and their critics are brought to the forefront, going back as early as the mid-1820s that 
saw the coming together of the ‘mystic clique’ within the society of the Cambridge 
Apostles, of which Tennyson and Arthur Hallam were chief members. Changing the 
context of analysis has allowed me to highlight how the century’s earlier attempts to 
rehabilitate mysticism from public censure had firmer ties to German philosophical 
Idealism, and how nineteenth-century poetic theory, and the period’s poetic enterprise 
as a whole, constituted a major arena where this German-inspired development took 
place.  
Previous research that has taken up the important task of documenting the role 
of Germany in the Western construction of the mystical is Grace Jantzen’s work of 
1995, which extends and builds on the findings of Wayne Proudfoot’s Religious 
Experience (1985). I have said in Chapter II that one of the valuable contributions of 
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Jantzen’s work is her analysis of the debt that modern mysticism owes to the post-
Kantian epistemology at the centre of German Romantic Idealism: namely, for 
mysticism’s key characteristic of ineffability, and, not less importantly, for the 
experiential emphasis in its definition as a state of ‘immediate consciousness of the 
Deity’ – immediate because intuitively felt, rather than rationally perceived, in a way 
that overcomes the Kantian subject-object dichotomy. Jantzen’s account, however, 
neglects to acknowledge that much of the influence of post-Kantian Romantic 
Idealism in the formation of an ineffable mysticism was firmly grounded in 
nineteenth-century formulations of poetic theory. Her emphasis is rather on the 
‘theological and philosophical’ aspects of this influence, so that even when citing 
Carlyle’s and Emerson’s foundational role in the development of William James’s 
notions, the aesthetic preoccupations of their Romanticism are hardly mentioned, 
along with how these must have equally shaped their own conceptions of the 
mystical.2 
 In fact, very little has been said in the available cultural studies on this 
category of the fact that modern mysticism figured as a poetic construct in the 
writings of William James and subsequent (Modernist) scholarship, or of the 
nineteenth-century’s part in this. While there is nothing in Jantzen’s work that 
explicitly points to a possible connection between mysticism and poetry, the 
conceptual ‘genealogy’ of the category offered by Richard King briefly notes how 
medieval Christian notions of the mystical (as being related to the sacraments and the 
allegorical hidden meaning of the scripture) gradually became secularized from the 
seventeenth century onwards to be ‘associated with the metaphors and mysteries of 
poetry and “literature”’. King explains that this association was increasingly attached 
to what was conceived as ‘irrational, uncivilized and feminine’, and was part of a 
Western Orientalist project that was concerned with ‘exorcising’ the anti-
Enlightenment aspects of its own culture and projecting it on an Oriental other as a 
way of controlling and manipulating the East. But aside from pointing out this post-
medieval tendency to generally group the mystical with the poetic as part of the 
culture’s ‘Dionysian’ impulses,3 King’s analysis makes no reference to the way in 
which attendant notions of poetry may have contributed to the nineteenth-century 
remaking of mysticism. Such an omission is similarly found in Leigh Schmidt’s work 
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on the subject, which goes little beyond the – albeit significant – assertion that the art 
and poetic literature of the period were not without their role in this process of 
remaking.4 Alex Owen’s The Place of Enchantment comes closest to rectifying this 
omission in her cursory glance at the links between ‘occultism’ – a term that she 
recurrently uses to include the mystical – and ‘French Symbolism, literary 
“decadence,” and the poetics of Yeats and others’, all of which she describes as being 
part ‘of the rich cultural repertoire within which occultism was defining itself at the 
dawn of the new century’. This nonetheless remains merely suggestive in scope, not 
only because ‘occultism’ has a much broader meaning than that of my study’s key 
term; it is also because Owen’s remarks principally aim to demonstrate the fin de 
siècle occult ‘consciousness of self’,5 rather than to particularly highlight the way in 
which modern mysticism had become an aestheticized category by the beginning of 
the twentieth century, a discussion that is significant in its own right.  
The discussion of Chapter II in this thesis is, therefore, my attempt to answer 
to the lack in previous scholarship of any serious recognition and analysis of the fact 
that modern mysticism is fundamentally a poetic and aesthetic construct, one that was 
shaped by the nineteenth-century discourse on poetry and art. By its substantive 
engagement with the conceptual overlap between mysticism and poetry in both 
Modernist and Victorian discourse, the chapter in turn offers an important 
contribution to a post-modernist understanding of mysticism, as well as some new 
insights about a significant aspect of Victorian poetic theory. Referring to such 
various writers and poets as Carlyle, Tennyson, Swinburne, Barrett Browning, or even 
John Stuart Mill, Chapter II worked to demonstrate the growing Victorian tendency 
towards positively defining ‘poetry’ in terms of ‘mysticism’ and vice versa, with a 
sufficient commentary on the cultural and ideological agenda implicit in such 
definitions. Its overall aim was to identify and characterise a particular nineteenth 
century critical mind-set which found in the mystical tendencies of Romantic and 
post-Romantic poetry an authoritative voice that could compete with the cultural 
influence of the pragmatic and materialist ideologies of the day. This is the same 
agenda behind the many religious claims that were being made for poetry during the 
period, occurring at a time when it seemed that the Bible was losing its credibility as a 
cultural force, their chief aim being to transfer what can be salvaged of its spiritual 
																																																								
4 ‘MMM’ (p. 283); and Restless Soules, pp. 201-3. 
5 The Place of Enchantment, pp. 139-40. 
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and moral functions to the realms of poetry and art. In short, Chapter II centred on the 
argument that the Victorian aestheticization of mysticism came as an answer to a 
pervasive contemporary angst over the possible (or even inevitable) prospect of a 
faithless future, and the need to assert and make sense of the place of poetry in it. This 
is suggestively confirmed by the following words of W. S. Lilly’s ‘Modern 
Mysticism’ (1885) on the significance of mysticism for his time, stated immediately 
after declaring the religious authority of mystical art (including mystical poetry): 
So much must suffice to indicate the transcendent importance which 
mysticism seems to me to possess in these days, when so many a 
fair philosophy lies in ruins, and time-honoured theologies are 
threatened with swift extinction, as mere collections of meaningless 
words about unintelligible chimaeras.6  
 This argument was extended in Chapter III, one objective of which was to 
demonstrate that it was a similar preoccupation with these anxieties about the future 
possibility of a godless England – and the poet’s place in it – that motivated Victorian 
poets and critics to defend the ineffability of mysticism. It was my contention that the 
then-emerging discourse on the ineffability of the category developed as a response to 
how ‘mysticism’ featured as a significant term of reproach in early and mid-
nineteenth-century literary-critical reviews, those which had certain notions about 
poetry’s moral responsibilities toward its readers, as well as the conceptual and 
stylistic demands that should be made upon it. As I have shown, ‘mysticism’, as a 
condemnatory term, was often used in the sense of ‘unintelligibility’, ‘mistiness’, 
‘vagueness’ and ‘obscurity’, a usage that reflects the primarily pragmatic nature of the 
criticism of the period, and its preoccupation with the human/social reference of the 
work of art; catering to a prevalent taste for practical and materialist principles (over 
idealist ones), it was employed by critics who held that one of the poet’s moral 
obligations was to write in simple and lucid language about common, everyday 
experiences, so as to readily arouse the readers’ sympathies, the accomplishment of 
which was claimed to be the measure of true poetry. According to such criteria, the 
mystical poets’ use of what was deemed a strange and uncommon vernacular 
indicated that they were morally and emotionally deficient in sympathy. With a focus 
on Carlyle’s writings, I have sought to demonstrate that it is in this nineteenth-century 
context that mysticism’s ineffability arose as a defensive construct, something that 
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was invoked by critics in defence of poets whose works were believed to supply the 
much-needed spiritual nourishment for withstanding the increasingly pervasive 
secularism of the time. 
Building on some key notions discussed in the previous two chapters, Chapter 
IV explored James Thomson’s relationship to mysticism. The chapter began with a 
study of Thomson’s early career, and how his preoccupation with mysticism was 
essentially an aesthetic preoccupation, one that was motivated toward the Romantic 
conception of the poet as a mediator of visionary and transcendental knowledge. It 
focused on a number of excerpts from his early criticism, particularly on Thomson’s 
belief that time in a time when Christianity was losing its hold on English cultural and 
religious life, it is the responsibility and rightful place of poetry to act as a spiritual 
mediator between God and the rest of mankind. The discussion has also endeavored to 
show Thomson’s conception of ‘poetic inspiration’ as a form of mystical experience, 
falling back on the intricate network of relations he develops between ‘Poets’ and 
‘Mystics’. It has also drawn attention to his deployment of ‘mysticism’ to differentiate 
between two types of poetry, the inspired and the uninspired, with the former being 
construed as representative of ‘quintessential poetry’. In this sense, one of the central 
concerns of this chapter was to demonstrate how Thomson’s writings offer a 
representative example of the Victorians’ aesthetic preoccupation with mysticism. As 
for the second part of the chapter, it focused on the points of continuity between 
Thomson’s early and later poetic theory, particularly in relation to the quasi-
naturalistic understanding of the principle of ‘poetic inspiration’ that he adopts in ‘A 
Strange Book’, and how this connects with his later redefinition of ‘mysticism’. It has 
attempted to look more closely into how Thomson’s Romantic appropriation of 
mysticism was an important means of conferring authority upon himself within his 
literary and critical scene. This involved discussing the intellectual relegation that 
Thomson had suffered in consequence of his association with the militant atheism and 
radicalism of Charles Bradlaugh’s National Reformer. The aim of this was to 
emphasize that Thomson’s attempt to positively redefine mysticism’s negative 
signification of ‘obscurity’ into ineffability turns out to be nothing less than an 
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